| Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality |
| PREFACE |
 | INTRODUCTION |
 | PART I— COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS |
| Chapter One— The Computational Theory of Mind |
| Chapter Two— Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology |
| Chapter Three— "Derived Intentionality" |
| • | 3.1— Searle's and Sayre's Criticisms |
| • | 3.2— Three Implicit Criticisms |
| • | 3.3— The Formal Symbols Objection |
| • | 3.4— Derived Intentionality |
| • | 3.5— The Ambiguity of "Derived Intentionality" |
| • | 3.6— Causally Derived Intentionality |
| 3.7— Assessing the Causal Derivation Objection |
| 3.8— The Conceptual Dependence Objection |
| • | 3.9— The Need for Semiotics |
| PART II— SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS |
| Chapter Four— Symbols—An Analysis |
| Chapter Five— The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers |
| Chapter Six— Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols |
| PART III— THE CRITIQUE OF CTM |
| Chapter Seven— Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication |
| Chapter Eight— Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms |
| Chapter Nine— Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content |
| PART IV— AN ALTERNATIVE VISION |
| Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology |
| Chapter Eleven— Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization |
| APPENDIX |
| Notes |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY |
| INDEX |