Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality
  PREFACE

 expand sectionINTRODUCTION

 collapse sectionPART I—  COMPUTATIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS
 expand sectionChapter One—  The Computational Theory of Mind
 expand sectionChapter Two—  Computation, Intentionality, and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Three—  "Derived Intentionality"

 collapse sectionPART II—  SYMBOLS, COMPUTERS, AND THOUGHTS
 expand sectionChapter Four—  Symbols—An Analysis
 expand sectionChapter Five—  The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers
 expand sectionChapter Six—  Rejecting Nonconventional Syntax and Semantics for Symbols

 collapse sectionPART III—  THE CRITIQUE OF CTM
 expand sectionChapter Seven—  Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication
 expand sectionChapter Eight—  Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms
 collapse sectionChapter Nine—  Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content
 •9.1—  Strong and Weak Naturalization
 expand section9.2—  What Is "The Mental"?
 expand section9.3—  Phenomenology and the Mental
 •9.4—  Phenomenology and Scientific Psychology
 expand section9.5—  Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized
 expand section9.6—  Naturalizing Broad Content
 •9.7—  Naturalizing Narrow Content
 •9.8—  Conclusion

 collapse sectionPART IV—  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
 expand sectionChapter Ten—  An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
 expand sectionChapter Eleven—  Intentionality Without Vindication, Psychology Without Naturalization

 expand sectionAPPENDIX
 expand sectionNotes
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
 expand sectionINDEX
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