6.9.4—
Blackburn's Argument

Simon Blackburn (1984) argues that Tarski in fact gives no definition of any semantic notions, but merely describes a "neutral core" that "connects together truth, reference, and satisfaction" but "gives us no theory of how to break into this circle; that is, of how to describe what it is about a population which makes it true that any of their words or sentences deserve such semantic descriptions" (Blackburn 1984: 270). Blackburn's chapter on Tarski and truth presents a number of insights that are not easily separated. But one important observation he makes is that the specific character of Tarski's characterizations of the semantic notions renders them ill suited to serve as definitions. In particular, there are two problematic features of these characterizations: their extensional character and their relativization to a language. First, in giving a list-description of, say, names in language L and their denotations, one does nothing to explain what the property is that is being characterized. A list-description tells you what objects are named by what terms, given that you know that the property characterized by the mapping is supposed to be naming in a particular language, but it tells you nothing about naming per se. One can make use of these lists only if one also knows that they are descriptions of how L -speakers use this set of expressions as names, and hence we have no real definition here (see ibid., 268-269). Second, the definition of, say, 'satisfies' for L1 is completely different from the definition of that same word (or a corresponding word) relative to L2 . The satisfaction relation is provided merely in terms of extensional characterization for particular languages . It is defined differently for each language individually, because there is a different mapping of expressions onto objects in each language, and there is no overarching notion of satisfaction apart from those relativized to particular languages. If satisfaction were really defined extensionally (indeed, even if it were fully accounted for in extensional terms), it would seem to be the case that there is no property or function called "satisfaction" common to L1 and L2 , but rather it would be more accurate to speak of separate notions of satisfaction-for-L1 and satisfaction-for-L2 . This, Blackburn observes, is a problem for Tarski's account. For although Tarski is surely right in relativizing truth to a language,

it does not follow that there is nothing in common to . . . truth as expressed in English sentences, and as expressed in those of any other language whatsoever. Reflection upon the application of an abstract semantic system to any actual population shows that there must be. (ibid., 270)

In other words, there is clearly something in common to notions such as truth or satisfaction across languages. But list-accounts for individual languages do not provide any indication of this common feature. Hence Tarski's analysis does not do an adequate job of "defining" the semantic properties.

I believe that this part of Blackburn's analysis is quite right. For our purposes, however, there is a certain aspect of Blackburn's approach that cannot be simply accepted without some justification. For when Blackburn says that Tarski does not tell us how to "break into the circle" of truth, reference, and satisfaction, he glosses this by saying that it gives us no theory "of how to describe what it is about a population which makes it true that any of their words or sentences deserve such semantic descriptions" (ibid., 270). Blackburn explicitly rejects the idea that one can separate a purely semantic account from a pragmatic account that ties a purely abstract language to the actual practices of a community (ibid., 269). This is, of course, very much in accord with what I wish to argue in this chapter. But by the same token, it is the very point which the fictional critic of this chapter wishes to contest. So the most we are really permitted to take from Blackburn here is the conclusion that Tarski's analysis does not provide a definition of the semantic terminology in nonsemantic terms (except perhaps in the model-theoretic sense of "definition"). What we are not licensed to conclude from Blackburn's arguments is the more robust thesis that the notions of satisfaction and primitive denotation presented by Tarski do not constitute notions that are legitimately semantical, yet do not have conventional elements.

At best, we might be able to make the following argument towards that conclusion on the basis of Blackburn's considerations. We might regard Tarski's "definitions" in one of the following two ways: (1) as attempts to give accounts of familiar semantical notions in nonsemantic terms, or (2) as stipulative definitions of how he is going to use those terms. If we interpret the definitions as stipulative in character, Blackburn's observations are enough to show that "denotation" and "satisfaction" thus defined are not really semantical notions at all, but merely model-theoretic counterparts of semantical notions. If we interpret Tarski in the first way, Blackburn's arguments show that Tarski has not successfully reduced the familiar semantical notions, but Blackburn has not shown that these notions are not "pure" in the sense of containing no conventional (or "pragmatic") element. This will require a further original consideration of the import of Tarski's work.