1.1—
Intentional States

CTM is a theory about the nature of intentional states and cognitive processes. To understand what this means, however, we must first become clear about the meanings of the expressions 'intentional state' and 'cognitive process'. The expression 'intentional state' is used as a generic term for mental states of a number of kinds recognized in ordinary language and commonsense psychology. Some paradigm examples of intentional states would be

—believing (judging, doubting) that such-and-such is the case,

—desiring that such-and-such should take place,

—hoping that such-and-such will take place,

—fearing that such-and-such will take place.

The characteristic feature of intentional states is that they are about something or directed towards something . This feature of directedness or intentionality distinguishes intentional states both from brute objects and from other mental phenomena such as qualia and feelings, none of which is about anything. The expressions 'intentional states' and 'cognitive states' denote the same class of mental states, but the two terms reflect different interests. The term 'intentionality' is employed primarily in philosophy, where it is used to denote specifically this directedness of certain mental states, a feature which is of importance in understanding several important philosophical problems, including opacity and transparency of reference and knowledge of extramental objects. The term 'cognition' is most commonly employed in psychology, where it is used to denote a domain for scientific investigation. As such, its scope and meaning are open to some degree of adjustment and change as the science of psychology progresses. A third term used to indicate this same domain is 'propositional attitude states'. This expression shows the influence of the widely accepted analysis of cognitive states as involving an attitude (such as believing or doubting) and a content that indicates the object or state of affairs to which the attitude is directed. Since the contents of mental states are often closely related to propositions, such attitudes are sometimes called propositional attitudes. These three ex-

pressions will be used interchangeably in the remainder of this book. In places where there is little danger of misunderstanding, the more general expression 'mental states' will also be used to refer specifically to intentional states.