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10.6.2—
Ideology and Theory—Bad Precedents

Second, one can hardly be optimistic about the precedents for holding scientific theories to the litmus of a particular metaphysical or methodological ideology. Cartesian mechanism, Humean views on induction and causation, logical positivism, behaviorism—these stand as just a few prominent examples of research programmes that were based on metaphysical or methodological views with heavy theoretical implications. All of them seemed very compelling in their time, as they canonized metaphysical views or forms of explanation that held a firm grip on the imaginations of their day. But each was eventually eroded by successful scientific work that belied their metatheoretic assumptions. It is one thing to study the mutual influence of scientific theory and metaphysics or theories of scientific method. It is quite another to take a view like strong naturalism and use it as a test for scientific legitimacy. This kind of move has a poor track record. Better to look at the kinds of explanations that psychological theory does provide and draw one's conclusions from there.


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Chapter Ten— An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology
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