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Chapter 6 The Gaullist Exorcism Anti-Americanism Encore

1. Philippe de St-Robert, Le Jeu de la France (1967), 157. [BACK]

2. My interpretation of Gaullist foreign policy relies mainly on the following works: Stanley Hoffmann's two essays in his collection Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (1974), 283-331, 332-62; Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, 1981); Alfred Grosser, Affaires extérieures. La politique de la France 1944-1984 (1984); Edward Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca, 1974); and the articles, especially Anton De Porte's "De Gaulle's Europe: Playing the Russian Card," in the issue of French Politics and Society 8 (Fall 1990) devoted to de Gaulle. I also used the papers prepared for conferences on de Gaulle held during 1989 and 1990, especially those of Frank Costigliola (on John Kennedy), Richard Challener (on John Foster Dulles), and Lloyd Gardner (on Lyndon Johnson) that will appear in De Gaulle and the United States, 1930-1970: A Centennial Reappraisal, ed. Nicholas Wahl and Robert Paxton (1993). Another important source is Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, vol. 3, Le Souverain (1986). The abridged translation of the three-volume Lacouture biography is Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, vol. 1, The Rebel, 1890-1944, trans. Patrick O'Brian (1990); and vol. 2, The Ruler, 1945-1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (1992). My citations will be from the English translation. [BACK]

3. Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages: Avec le renouveau, mai 1958-juillet 1962 (1970), 3:198. [BACK]

4. NARA, 611.51/8-1659, 16 August 1959, Ambassador Houghton to Sec. of State. [BACK]

5. The American embassy reported that de Gaulle "knows that if we wanted to, we could give him far greater satisfaction than we have to date in meeting his requests. If we were willing to give France a status of real partnership in formulating world policies and military strategy, the other problems might be more readily solved. He undoubtedly realizes we are

unwilling to do this and has therefore embarked in rough poker playing tactics with us" (NARA, 611.51/5-559, 5 May 1959, Livingston Merchant to Sec. of State). [BACK]

6. Evidence is not conclusive on this issue, but de Gaulle did speak privately about replacing the Atlantic alliance with bilateral pacts (Lacouture, De Gaulle 2:382). It is difficult to see how a complete separation from NATO would have benefited France. [BACK]

7. Karl W. Deutsch et al., France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (1967), 20-22, 60-69. Nearly 150 politicians, military officers, civil servants, businessmen, and intellectuals were interviewed by American social scientists in the summer of 1964. [BACK]

8. This group included Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, Pierre Emmanuel, David Rousset, and Jean-Marie Domenach (Sirinelli, Intellectuels et passions françaises, 241). [BACK]

9. Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et l'Alliance," Esprit, June 1963, 1058-83. [BACK]

10. Jean-Marie Domenach, "Les Contradictions de l'anti-l'anti-américanisme de gauche," Esprit, July-August 1963, 100. Michel Winock ( Chronique des années soixante, 1987, 155-56) recalls this "Gaullism" at Esprit . [BACK]

11. Domenach, "Encore sur l'anti-l'anti-américanisme," Esprit, October 1963, 458. [BACK]

12. Serge Mallet, "Un certain antagonisme," in Les Américains et nous (1966), 139-49. This title was published separately but appeared originally as an issue (no. 26, 1966) of the journal La Nef (hereafter cited as Les Américains et nous ). In Esprit also see Mallet's articles: "Le deuxième âge du gaullisme" (June 1963, 1041-57) and ''L'L'Après-gaullisme et l'unité socialiste,'' (July-August 1963, 30-42). [BACK]

13. Gaston Defferre, "L'Indispensable Europe," Les Américains et nous, 151-59. [BACK]

14. Editorials by Beuve-Beuve-Méry in Le Monde, 16 January and 31 July 1963, 25 July 1964, and 6 February 1965. Also see Jeanneney and Julliard, "Le Monde" de Beuve-Beuve-Méry, 237-40. [BACK]

15. Le Monde, 19 April 1966. [BACK]

16. An Institut français d'opinion publique (IFOP) poll of late 1957 showed that 38 percent wanted American troops to leave "immediately" and only 26 percent wanted them to remain. By early 1960 58 percent were very hostile to the GIs while only 20 percent were favorable (IFOP, Les Français et de Gaulle, ed. Jean Chariot [1970], 77). A Gallup poll of 1966 showed that 41 percent believed U.S. military bases in France were a "bad thing" and that only 29 percent termed them a "good thing" for French security, with 30 percent saying they didn't know ( The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France, 1939, 1944-75 [1976], 1:530-31). [BACK]

17. Under the Fourth Republic the proportion of those polled who rejected the integration of France into the Western bloc oscillated between 39 and 51 percent but reached a peak of 57 percent following the end of the war in Indochina. After 1958 an absolute majority chose nonalignment (IFOP, Les Français, 78). [BACK]

18. "Pacte Atlantique: les Français désavouent de Gaulle," Le Nouvel Observateur, 18-24 October 1967, 26-29. Even 44 percent of those who voted Communist wanted to retain NATO. In 1966 to the question: "At the present time do you think NATO is essential to the security of France?", 46 percent said yes; 22 percent said no; and 32 percent said they didn't know ( Gallup Polls, 1:519). To the query posed in March-April 1966 "Do you think it desirable that France withdraw from NATO?,'' 38 percent said no; 22 percent said yes; 40 percent abstained (IFOP, Les Français, 269). Interviews with members of the elite revealed a preference for reform, but not for withdrawal from NATO (Deutsch, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, 78). [BACK]

19. Polls from 1956 to 1968 in IFOP, Les Français, 264.

20. Ibid., 265-67.

21. Polls taken in 1964 and 1965 (ibid., 268). [BACK]

19. Polls from 1956 to 1968 in IFOP, Les Français, 264.

20. Ibid., 265-67.

21. Polls taken in 1964 and 1965 (ibid., 268). [BACK]

19. Polls from 1956 to 1968 in IFOP, Les Français, 264.

20. Ibid., 265-67.

21. Polls taken in 1964 and 1965 (ibid., 268). [BACK]

22. Serge Berstein, La France de l'expansion: La République gaullienne, 1958-1969 (1989), 1:271. Since the left opposed de Gaulle's regime and his policies, 29 percent disapproval does not seem like a high figure. [BACK]

23. Those who estimated that independence was possible at the political level fell from 46 to 34 percent; at the economic level, from 41 to 26 percent; and on the military level, from 31 to 28 percent (IFOP, Les Français, 88). [BACK]

24. Jean Charlot, "Les Elites et les masses devant l'indépendance nationale d'après les enquêtes d'opinion" in Les Conditions de l'indépendance nationale dans le monde moderne, Institut Charles de Gaulle (1977), 39-49. [BACK]

25. De Gaulle, Discours et messages: Pour l'efffort, août 1962-1962-décembre 1965 (1970), 4:341.

26. Ibid., 4:429. [BACK]

25. De Gaulle, Discours et messages: Pour l'efffort, août 1962-1962-décembre 1965 (1970), 4:341.

26. Ibid., 4:429. [BACK]

27. Lacouture, De Gaulle 2:363-64. [BACK]

28. From an article entitled "Mobilisation économique à l'étranger" that first appeared in 1934 and has been reprinted in Charles de Gaulle, Trois Etudes précédées du mémorandum du 26 janvier 1940 (1971), 185. [BACK]

29. Cited in Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance (1982), 211. [BACK]

30. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, trans. Terence Kilmartin (1971), 35. [BACK]

31. Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d'espoir: L'Effort (1970-71), 119. My translation differs slightly for this quotation, as it does for the subsequent one, from that of the English translation ( Memoirs of Hope, 342). [BACK]

32. De Gaulle, Mémoires d'espoir: Le Renouveau 1958-62 (1970-71), 115-17 (English version in Memoirs of Hope, 341). Although de Gaulle wrote these lines in 1970, he makes them appear in his memoirs as if they preceded 1968. [BACK]

33. John Bovey, "Charles XI," French Politics and Society 9 (Spring 1991):35. [BACK]

34. Quoted in André Passeron, De Gaulle parle: 1962-1966 (1966), 2:306. [BACK]

35. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (1973), 511. [BACK]

36. Quoted in Lacouture ( De Gaulle 1:334-35) from an interview the journalist had with Pleven. [BACK]

37. Ambassade de France, French Foreign Policy, 1968, 103-4. [BACK]

38. Le Monde, 29 November 1967. [BACK]

39. Data on the growth of consumerism are found in Jean-Pierre Rioux, "Vive la consommation," L'Histoire no. 102 (1987): 90-100, and Jean Baudrillard, La Société de consommation (1970), 41-59. [BACK]

40. Marc Cantrel, "Les Américains explorent un marché: France," Direction no. 97 (1963): 710. [BACK]

41. Rioux, "Vive la consommation," 95-96. [BACK]

42. Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, eds., Histoire économique et sociale de la France, vol. 4, pt. 3 (1982), 1289. [BACK]

43. Edgar Morin, The Red and the White: Report from a French Village (1970), 58. Similar changes are reported by Wylie in Village in the Vaucluse . [BACK]

44. Claude Krief, "La France dans dix ans," L'Express, 27 June 1963, 34. [BACK]

45. Areas that were seemingly resistant to the New World included literature and theater; in some fields such as comics and popular music, American dominance actually retreated. For the later years see Pascal Ory, L'Entre-deux mai: histoire culturelle de la France, mai 1968-mai 1981 (1983), 200-4. [BACK]

46. Georges Perec, Les Choses: A Story of the Sixties, trans. Helen Lane (1967), 58. [BACK]

47. John Ardagh, The New French Revolution (London, 1968), 264, 228-29, 458. [BACK]

48. Polls taken in 1962 and 1967 (IFOP, Les Français, 299, 90-91). [BACK]

49. Rioux, "Vive la consommation," 100. [BACK]

50. IFOP, Les Français, 299. [BACK]


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