Preferred Citation: Sheehan, James J., and Morton Sosna, editors The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1991 1991. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft338nb20q/


 
Notes

Notes

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. Robert Louis Stevenson, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 65-67. On the dichotomizing tendency which Victorian culture, see Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1957), 162, and Daniel Joseph Singal, The War Within: From Victorian to Modernist Thought in the South, 1919-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 5, 26-29.

2. Stephen R. Graubard, "Preface to the Issue, 'Artificial Intelligence,'" Daedalus 117 (Winter 1988): v. break

PROLOGUE: MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY

1. See Patrick Bateson, "Biological Approaches to the Study of Behavioural Development," International Journal of Behavioural Development 10 (1987), to which I owe the example of the turtle eggs.

2. See Richard M. Smith, "Transfer Incomes, Risk and Security: The Roles of the Family and the Collectivity and Recent Theories of Fertility Change," in David Coleman and Roger Schofield, eds., The State of Population Theory: Forward from Malthus (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

3. John Searle has suggested this in Minds, Brains and Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). break

4. This argument has been forcefully developed by Charles Taylor in articles collected in his Human Agency and Language (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

5. Advocates of this kind of research often claim that the only alternative to their program lies in superstition and mystification; Marvin Minsky's book The Society of Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) provides some (relatively mild) examples of this rhetoric.

6. The most extreme of these believers are Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, who once said that folk psychology "is a stagnant or degenerating research program, and has been for millennia." An extended statement may be found in Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). A more moderate line is taken by Stephen Stich in his book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambiridge: MIT Press, 1983).

7. A related point is central to Donald Davidson's treatment of causality; see Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

8. A detailed and very effective argument is provided by Jennifer Hornsby's "Physicalist Thinking and Concepts of Behaviour," in Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds., Subject, Thought and Context (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

9. Recent discussion has been shaped by Hilary Putnam's important article, "The Meaning of 'Meaning.'" reprinted in his Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). The issues are set out in the introduction to Pettit and McDowell, Subject, Thought and Context .

10. The doctrine is weaker than several that could be expressed in those words. I have given some account of it in "Formal and Substantial Individualism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85 (1984/85).

11. Arguments on these points are well deployed in David Hillel-Ruben, The Metaphysics of the Social World (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) break

One— Introduction

1. For an analysis of this painting, see Robert Essick, William Blake and the Language of Adam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

2. There issues are treated in John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974).

3. On the role of animals in Greek religion, see Walter Burkert, Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979) and J. P. Vernant, "Between the Beasts and the Gods," in Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (Hassocks, Sussex: 1980). There is a fine analysis of Aristotle in G. E. R. Lloyd, Science, Folklore, and Ideology: Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

4. Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 21; Clarence Glacken, Traces on the rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteen Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 463.

5. Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 9, 140.

6. Ibid., 89. As Harriet Ritvo's contribution to this volume makes clear, in the nineteenth century this tendency to anthropomorphize nature was translated into a more appropriate vocabulary.

5. Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 9, 140.

6. Ibid., 89. As Harriet Ritvo's contribution to this volume makes clear, in the nineteenth century this tendency to anthropomorphize nature was translated into a more appropriate vocabulary.

7. Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 210; J.-J. Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 87.

8. A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 195-196, 199.

9. See Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, Chap. Nine, and D. G. Charlton, New Images of the Natural in France: A Study in European Cultural History, 1750-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), esp. 77 ff.

10. Donald Worster, Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 180; Philip Appeleman, ed., Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton, 1979), 128, 130. break

11. There is a useful collection of Darwin's writing on this subject edited by Alexander Alland, Human Nature: Darwin's View (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). The quottion is from p. 153.

12. Appleman, Darwin, 208.

13. There is a sympathetic discussion of ethology in Melvin Konner, The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraint on the Human Spirit (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982), 143 ff. The Lorenz quotation is from Arthur L. Caplan, ed., The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on Ethical and Scientific Issues (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 72.

14. Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), 230. The Caplan collection just cited provides a good introduction to the discipline and its critics.

15. Konner, Tangled Wing, 16; Appeleman, Darwin, 208. break

* Among the many people who have offered comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter, I am especially grateful to Daniel Brudney, Nancy Cartwright, Justice Cassell, Stanley Cavell, Lorraine Daston, Peter Galison, Jan Goldstein, Joel Snyder, David Wellbery, and the editors of this volume.

Two— The Horror of Monsters*

1. Lucien Febvre, "Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past," in A New Kind of History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 24.

2. This chapter is a fragment of a much longer manuscript entitled "The History of Horror: Abominations, Monsters, and the Unnatural." That manuscript is a comparative historical analysis of the three concepts mentioned in the title, linking each of them to the reaction of horror and thus taking a first step toward writing a history of horror. I then use this comparative history to consider both the phenomenology of horror and its moral analysis, interlacing historical and philosophical concerns throughout.

3. Jean Delumeau, La Peur en Occident: Une citié assiegié (Paris: Fayard, 1978), and Le Péché et la peur: La culpabilisation en Occident (Paris: Fayard, 1983).

4. For useful discussion, see, among many others, Jacques Le Goff, "Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities," in Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, eds., Constructing the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Robert Mandrou, "L'histoire des mentalités," in the article "Histories," Encyclopedia Universalis (Paris: Encyclopedia Universalis France, 1968); Jean Delumeau, "Déchristianization ou nouveau modèle de christianisme," Archives de Science sociales des Religion 40 (Juillet--Décembre 1975); and Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), "Preface to the Italian Edition."

5. This is emphasized by Alphonse Dupront in his seminal essay, "Problémes et méthodes d'une histoire de la psychologie collective," Annales (Janvier--Fevrier 1961).

6. I have tried to do this for the history of sexuality in "How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of continue

Sexuality," Critical Inquiry (Winter 1986); "Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality," Critical Inquiry (Autumn 1987); and "Closing Up the Corpses: Diseases of Sexuality and the Emergence of the Psychiatric Style of Reasoning," forthcoming in George Boolos, ed., Mind, Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

7. See Dupront, "Problémes et méthodes," 9.

8. Martin Luther, Werke (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1930-1985), XI:370-385.

9. In my interpretation of this pamphlet, I follow Jean Céard, La Nature et les prodiges (Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1977), 79-84.

10. Martin Luther and Phillip Melancthon, Of Two Wonderful Popish Monsters , trans. John Brooke. (Imprinted at London: Colophon, 1579.) I have modernized spelling and punctuation. The quotation comes from the first page of Brooke's preface, which is unpaginated in the 1579 edition of the pamphlet.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. The quotation comes from the second page of Brooke's preface.

10. Martin Luther and Phillip Melancthon, Of Two Wonderful Popish Monsters , trans. John Brooke. (Imprinted at London: Colophon, 1579.) I have modernized spelling and punctuation. The quotation comes from the first page of Brooke's preface, which is unpaginated in the 1579 edition of the pamphlet.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. The quotation comes from the second page of Brooke's preface.

10. Martin Luther and Phillip Melancthon, Of Two Wonderful Popish Monsters , trans. John Brooke. (Imprinted at London: Colophon, 1579.) I have modernized spelling and punctuation. The quotation comes from the first page of Brooke's preface, which is unpaginated in the 1579 edition of the pamphlet.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. The quotation comes from the second page of Brooke's preface.

13. Jean Delumeau, Le Péché et la peur , 153.

14. I am following Delumeau's account here. Ibid., 152-158. But chap. 4 as a whole should be read in this context.

15. Quoted in Delumeau, La Péché et la peur , 155.

16. Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges (Edition Critique et commentée par Jean Céard) (Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1971). There is an English translation under the title On Monsters and Marvels (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). I have tried to follow the English translation in my quotations, but I have altered in whenver I felt it was necessary to preserve Paré's meaning. For some inexplicable reason, the English renders prodiges as "marvels" rather than "prodigies," a translation that cannot help but result in obfuscation.

17. Jean Céard, La Nature et les prodiges .

18. Katharine Park and Lorraine J. Daston, "Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England," Past and Present 92 (August 1981). For some premedieval treatments of monsters, see Bruce MacBain, Prodigy and Expiation: A Study in Religion and Politics in Republican Rome (Collection Latomus: Brussels, 1982); Raymond Bloch, Les prodiges dans l'antiquité classique (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1963); and E. Leichty, "Teratological Omens," in La Divination en Mésopotamine ancienne et dans les régions voisines (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1966).

19. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (New York: Benziger Brothers), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 53 Second Article. I have generally followed this translation, although in paraphrasing Aquinas, I have also consulted the Latin and facing-page English translation of the Summa by the Blackfrairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1980). I have appropriated terminology from each of the translations when I thought it appropriate.

20. Ibid., 157-158.

21. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Reply.

22. Ibid., 161.

23. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Rep. Obj. 4 break

24. Ibid., 160. A useful discussion of this part of Aquinas can be found in John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See esp. chap. 11.

19. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (New York: Benziger Brothers), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 53 Second Article. I have generally followed this translation, although in paraphrasing Aquinas, I have also consulted the Latin and facing-page English translation of the Summa by the Blackfrairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1980). I have appropriated terminology from each of the translations when I thought it appropriate.

20. Ibid., 157-158.

21. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Reply.

22. Ibid., 161.

23. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Rep. Obj. 4 break

24. Ibid., 160. A useful discussion of this part of Aquinas can be found in John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See esp. chap. 11.

19. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (New York: Benziger Brothers), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 53 Second Article. I have generally followed this translation, although in paraphrasing Aquinas, I have also consulted the Latin and facing-page English translation of the Summa by the Blackfrairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1980). I have appropriated terminology from each of the translations when I thought it appropriate.

20. Ibid., 157-158.

21. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Reply.

22. Ibid., 161.

23. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Rep. Obj. 4 break

24. Ibid., 160. A useful discussion of this part of Aquinas can be found in John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See esp. chap. 11.

19. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (New York: Benziger Brothers), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 53 Second Article. I have generally followed this translation, although in paraphrasing Aquinas, I have also consulted the Latin and facing-page English translation of the Summa by the Blackfrairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1980). I have appropriated terminology from each of the translations when I thought it appropriate.

20. Ibid., 157-158.

21. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Reply.

22. Ibid., 161.

23. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Rep. Obj. 4 break

24. Ibid., 160. A useful discussion of this part of Aquinas can be found in John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See esp. chap. 11.

19. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (New York: Benziger Brothers), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 53 Second Article. I have generally followed this translation, although in paraphrasing Aquinas, I have also consulted the Latin and facing-page English translation of the Summa by the Blackfrairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1980). I have appropriated terminology from each of the translations when I thought it appropriate.

20. Ibid., 157-158.

21. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Reply.

22. Ibid., 161.

23. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Rep. Obj. 4 break

24. Ibid., 160. A useful discussion of this part of Aquinas can be found in John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See esp. chap. 11.

19. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica (literally translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (New York: Benziger Brothers), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 53 Second Article. I have generally followed this translation, although in paraphrasing Aquinas, I have also consulted the Latin and facing-page English translation of the Summa by the Blackfrairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1980). I have appropriated terminology from each of the translations when I thought it appropriate.

20. Ibid., 157-158.

21. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Reply.

22. Ibid., 161.

23. Ibid., II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12, Rep. Obj. 4 break

24. Ibid., 160. A useful discussion of this part of Aquinas can be found in John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See esp. chap. 11.

25. Ambroise Paré, On Monsters and Marvels , 3. IN 1579, Paré added a third category to that of monsters and marvels, namely, the maimed ( les multilez ). I shall not discuss this category, since, as Céard notes, after the preface, Paré no longer uses the concept of the maimed. See Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges , 151.

26. Jean Céard, La Nature et les prodiges , 304-305.

27. On this topic, see Stuart Clark, "The Scientific Status of Demonology," in Brian Vickers, ed., Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

28. Paré, On Monsters , 152.

29. Céard, La Nature et les prodiges , 293-295.

30. Paré, On Monsters , 5. In this chapter, Paré also considers the monsters that are produced when a man copulates with a woman during her period; he analogizes such activitiy to bestiality, since "it is a filthy and brutish thing to have dealings with a woman while she is puring herself." Without discussing this important topic here, I simply note that the same chapte of Leviticus which prohibits bestiality also prohibits intercourse with a woman during her period (the relevant chapter is Leviticus 18, not 16 as Paré states).

31. Paré, Des monstres , chap. IX. This chapter appears as chap. XX in the English translation.

32. Paré, On Monsters , 67.

33. Ibid., 73.

32. Paré, On Monsters , 67.

33. Ibid., 73.

34. See Delumeau, La Péché et la peur , 156.

35. Quoted in John Block Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 182. Friedman's book is a useful introduction to the topic of monstrous races, a topic I shall not discuss here.

36. Paré, On Monsters , 8.

37. For an English example, see John Sadler's The Sicke Woman's Private Looking-Glasse , relevant portions of which are excerpted in Paré, On Monsters , 174-176.

38. Lorraine Daston, "The Decline of Miracles." Unpub. ms., 12.

39. Paré, On Monsters , 69. The practice of killing both the human being and the beast involved in bestial copulation has a long history that goes back to the law of Leviticus 20: 15-16. I have been able to find a few exceptions where the beast was spared. The most interesting of these exceptions is reported as follows:

E. P. Evans states that at Vanvres in 1570 one Jacques Verrons was hung for copulating with a she-ass. The animal was acquitted on the grounds that she was in a victim of violence and had not participated of her own free will. The prior of the local convent and several citizens of the town signed a certificate saying that they had known said she-ass for four years, and that she had always shown herself to be virtuous both at home and abroad and had never given occasion of scandal to anyone. This document was produced at the trial and is said to have exerted a decisive influence upon the judgment of the court.

Quoted in Harry Hoffner, "Incest, Sodomy and Bestiality in the Ancient Near East," Harry Hoffner, ed., Orient and Occident , Band 22 of Alter Orient und Altes continue

Testament (Germany: Verlag Butzon & Bercker Kevelaer, 1973), 83, fn. 13. This exceptional case should not misdirect one to think that trials for bestiality required the ascription of normal responsibility to animals. For discussion, see J. J. Finkelstein, The Ox that Gored , esp. 69-72.

40. Edward Tyson, "A Relation of two Monstrous Pigs, with the Resemblance of Human Faces, and two young Turkeys joined by the Breast," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society XXI (1669): 431. I have modernized spelling and punctuation.

41. Ibid., 434.

40. Edward Tyson, "A Relation of two Monstrous Pigs, with the Resemblance of Human Faces, and two young Turkeys joined by the Breast," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society XXI (1669): 431. I have modernized spelling and punctuation.

41. Ibid., 434.

42. Both Treves's memoir and the relevant medical reports are reprinted in Ashley Montagu, The Elephant Man (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979).

43. See Aquinas's discussion in Summa Theologica , I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2, and Q. 94.

44. I have taken my list from Art. I, Sect. 4, of S. Tissot, L'Onanisme, Dissertation sur les maladies produites par la masturbation , 5th ed. (Lausanne: Marc Chapuis, 1780). Tissot's list is entirely representative of other eighteenth-century discussions. An English translation of Tissot's book appeared in 1832: Treatise on the Diseases Produced by Onanism (New York: Collins and Hennay, 1832). I have often found it necessary to modify the English translation. For discussions of the masturbation literature, see T. Tarczylo, "L' Onanisme de Tissot," Dix-huitième Siècle 12 (1980), and Sexe et liberté au siècle des Lumières (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1983); J. Stengers and A. Van Neck, Histoire d'une grande peur: La masturbation (Brussels: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1984).

45. A representative example is Alfred Hitchcock, "Insanity and Death from Masturbation," Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 26 (1842).

46. Tissot, L'Onanisme , 33.

47. See, e.g., the last paragraph of the introduction to L'Onanisme .

48. Ibid., 3.

49. Ibid., 121.

47. See, e.g., the last paragraph of the introduction to L'Onanisme .

48. Ibid., 3.

49. Ibid., 121.

47. See, e.g., the last paragraph of the introduction to L'Onanisme .

48. Ibid., 3.

49. Ibid., 121.

50. Pierre Guiraud, Dictionnaire historique, stylistique, rhétorique, étymologique, de la littérature érotique (Paris: Payot, 1978), 76.

51. Ibid., 215.

50. Pierre Guiraud, Dictionnaire historique, stylistique, rhétorique, étymologique, de la littérature érotique (Paris: Payot, 1978), 76.

51. Ibid., 215.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

52. Ambroise Tardieu, Étude médico-légale sur les attentats aux moeurs , Septième éd. (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878), 198. The category of sodomy has proven notoriously flexible and has been used to encompass a variety of activities. However, despite the flexibility, I believe that this category has more conceptual unity than has sometimes been attributed to it. I discuss this issue in the manuscript of which this chapter is an excerpt.

53. Ibid., 255.

54. Ibid., 195.

55. Ibid., 237.

56. Ibid., 236.

57. Ibid., 258.

58. Ibid., 260.

59. Michael Mitchell, Monsters of the Guilded Age: The Photographs of Charles Eisenmann (Toronto: Gauge Publishing Limited, 1979), 28, 30. I am indebted to Ian Hacking for providing me with this book. break

* I would like to thank Rosemarie Bodenheimer, Jonathan Dewald, Rita Goldberg, Ilona Karmel, Kathleen Kete, Jessica Marcus, and John Maynard for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

Three— The Animal Connection*

1. Genesis 2:20-22. break

2. For an overview of attitudes toward animals in Western philosophy and theology, see John Passmore, "The Treatment of Animals," Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (1975): 195-218. Marc Shell offers an idiosyncratic and benign interpretation of those attitudes in "The Family Pet," Representations 15 (1986): 121-153. For another interpreation of the significance of pets, see Harriet Ritvo, "The Emergence of Modern Pet-keeping," in Andrew Rowan, ed., Animals and People Sharing the World (Hanover, N.H.: New England University Press, 1988), 13-32.

3. William Swainson, On the Hobits and Instincts of Animals (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1840), 74.

4. Charles Hamilton Smith, Introduction to the Mammalia (Edinburgh: W.H. Lizars, 1842), 74.

5. George John Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals (LondoN: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1883), inset.

6. Donald R. Griffin, Animal Thinking (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), vii-viii.

7. Robert Nozick, "About Mammals and People," New York Times Book Review , Nov. 27, 1983; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983).

8. Stephen Kellert has has worked out a typology of ten basic attitudes toward animals--naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic, moralistic, scientistic, aesthetic, utilitarian, dominionistic, negativistic, and neutralistic. Only the first four admit the possibility of a categorization not based on the axiomatic division between humans and animals, and they by no means require such a reversal. For an overview of his analysis and the reserach that support it, see Stephen R. Kellert, "Human-Animal Interactions: A Review of American Attitudes to Wild and Domestic Animals in the Twentieth Century," in Rowan, Animals and People Sharing the World , 137-176.

9. Donna Haraway, "Animal Sociology and Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part II: The Past Is the Contested Zone: Human Nture and Theories of Production and Reproduction in Primate Behavior Studies," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 4 (1978): 55-56; Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, "Empathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female," in Ruth Bleier, ed., Feminist Approaches to Science (New York: Pergamon, 1986), 119-146.

10. For an exploration of the relationship of twentieth-century paleoanthropology to twentieth-century cultural history, see Roger Lewin, Bones of Contention: Controversies in the Search for Human Origins (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

11. M. Godine, "Comparative Influence of the Male and Female in Breeding," Farrier and Naturalist 1 (1828): 468.

12. William Youatt, Cattle: Their Breeds, Management, and Diseases (London: Bladwin and Craddock, 1834), 523. It should be remembered that oxen are castrated animals.

13. Judith Neville Lytton, Toy Dogs and Their Ancestors, Including the History and Management of Toy Spaniels, Pekingese, Japanese and Pomeranians (New York: D. Appleton, 1911), 194-195. break

14. The struggles of breeders to determine the ideal form of the pig is elaborately chronicled in Julian Wiseman, The History of the British Pig (London: Duckworth, 1986).

15. For a thorough review of the breeding practices of eighteenth-century improvers in comparison with those of their predecessors, see Nicholas Russell, Like Engend'ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Less revisionist overviews include R. Trow-Smith. A History of British Livestock Husbandry, 1700-1900 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), and Stephen J. G. Hall and Juliet Clutton-Brock, Two Hundred Years of British Farm Livestock (London: British Museum [Natural History], 1989).

16. Ambrose Blacklock, A Treatise on Sheep (Glasgow: W.R. McPhun, 1838), 67; John Lawrence, A General Treatise on Cattle, the Ox, the Sheep, and the Swine (London: H.D. Symonds, 1805), 30-31.

17. Harrison Weir, Our Cats and All About Them (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1889), 96.

18. Ibid., 96.

17. Harrison Weir, Our Cats and All About Them (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1889), 96.

18. Ibid., 96.

19. John Farley, Gametes and Spores: Ideas About Sexual Reproduction 1750-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), chaps. 1 and 2. See also Frederick B. Churchill, "Sex and the Single Organism: Biological Theories of Sexuality in Mid-Nineteenth Century," Studies in the History of Biology 3 (1979): 139-177.

20. James A. Secord has discussed the contribution of pigeon fancying to Darwin's theory of evolution in "'Nature's Fancy': Chrles Darwin and the Breeding of Pigeons," Isis 72 (1981): 163-186. Darwin continued to make use of information supplied by animal breeders after he wrote On the Origin of Species , most notably, in The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868).

21. Exposure to scientific data and theory would not necessarily have made any difference. At least some Victorian scientists shared breeders' inclination to identify women with other mammalian females, eagerly but without much evidence conflating the human menstrual cycle with the oestrus cycle of dogs and cattle. Thomas Laqueur, "Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology," in Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Laquer, eds., The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1987), 24-35.

22. "The Physiology of Breeding," The Agricultural Magazine, Plough, and Farmer's Journal (June 1855): 17.

23. William M'Combie, Cattle and Cattle-Breeders (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1867), 153.

24. Youatt, Cattle , 524.

25. John Boswell, "Essay upon the Breeding of Live Stock, and on the Comparative Influence of the Male and Female Parents in Impressing the Offspring," Farmer's Magazine I, NS (1838): 248.

26. William M'Combie, Cattle and Cattle-Breeders , 118-119, Robert Oliphant Pringle, The Livestock of the Farm , ed. and rev. James MacDonald (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1886), 101-102. break

27. John Jennings, Domestic and Fancy Cats: A Practical Treatise on Their Varieties, Breeding, Management, and Diseases (London: L. Upcott Gill, n.d.), 45.

28. Everett Millais, "Influence; with special reference to that of the sire," in The Dog Owners' Annual for 1894 (London: Dean), 153.

29. Vero Shaw, The Illustrated Book of the Dog (London: Cassell, 1881), 525.

30. Hugh Dalziel, The Collie: As a Show Dog, Companion, and Worker , rev. J. Maxtee (London: L. Upcott Gill, 1904), 48.

31. Dalziel, British Dogs: Their Varieties, History, Characteristics, Breeding, Management, and Exhibition (London: "Bazaar," 1879-1880), 462-463.

32. Gordon Stables, The Practical Kennel Guide; with Plain Instructions How to Rear and Breed Dogs for Pleasure, Show, and Profit (London: Cassell Petter and Galpin, 1877), 121.

33. Millais, "Influence," 153. At an earlier period, this theory was occasionally applied to human matings as well. Thus, according to John Aubrey, the distinguished seventeenth-century doctor, William Harvey claimed that "he that marries a widow makes himself Cuckold." Quoted in Alan MacFarlane, Marriage and Love in England, 1300-1840 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 232.

34. G. H. Andrews, Modern Husbandry: A Practical and Scientific Treatise on Agriculture (London: 1853), 163.

35. Millais, "Influence," 153.

36. Frances Simpson, Cats and All About Them (London: Isbister, 1902). 64.

37. Lytton, Toy Dogs , 195. Scientists took the notion of telegony more seriously than the scantly evidence would seem to justify, perhaps for the same reasons that made it appealing to animal breeders. Richard Burkhardt, Jr., "Closing the Door on Lord Morton's Mare: The Rise and Fall of Telegony," Studies in the History of Biology 3 (1979): 16-17.

38. Dalziel, Collie , 41.

39. William Taplin, The Sportsman's Cabinet, or, A correct delineation of the various dogs used in the sports of the field (London, 1803), I: 27-28.

40. Shaw, Illustrated Book of the DogK , 524.

41. Dalziel, Collie , 48.

42. John Mills, A Treatise on Cattle (London: J. Johnson, 1776), 271, 310, 401.

43. Ibid., 387.

42. John Mills, A Treatise on Cattle (London: J. Johnson, 1776), 271, 310, 401.

43. Ibid., 387.

44. George Hanger, Cononel George Hanger, to All Sportsmen, and Particularly to Farmers, and Game Keepers (LondoN: George Hanger, 1814), 47.

45. Stables, Practical Kennel Guide , 125.

46. Ibid., 123-124.

45. Stables, Practical Kennel Guide , 125.

46. Ibid., 123-124.

47. Shaw, Illustrated Book of the Dog , 523.

48. C. J. Davies, The Kennel Handbook (London: John Lane, 1905), 66. break

Four— Language and Ideology in Evolutionary Theory: Reading Cultural Norms into Natural Law

1. The basic claim of atomic individualism can be schematically expressed as follows:

figure

(successive orders of interaction are represented by the terms xij, xijk, xijkl , etc.

The actual implementation of this methodology depends, however, on three implicit assumptions:

1. The first term in the series is primary;

2. All relevant interactions are included in the subsequent summations; and finally, that

3. The series converges (i.e., there are no uexpected effects from neglected higher order terms).

Ultimately, it seems to me that the application of all three of these assumptions to evolutionary theory is subject to serious question. My particular focus here, however, is one the adequacy of the first two assumptions.

2. Although the actual words here are neutral enough, Monod's giveaway is in his use of the "gypsy" simile, for the world on the margins of which the gypsy lives is first and foremost a human world, a society, whose indifference is, in fact, rejection.

3. Midgley's manifestly psychological explanation is at least congruent with my own more explicitly psychological account of another, perhaps related, rhetorical and conceptural conflation--namely, that between objectivity and domination seen in a number of traditional attempts to describe (and prescribe) relations of mind to nature (see Keller 1985, chap. 6).

4. See Keller (1988) for a discussion of Hardin's use of the same slippage in arguing for the universality of the "competitive exclusion principle" (1960).

5. Douglas Boucher (1985) has even suggested a new metaphor: in place of "nature red in tooth and claw." he offers "nature green in root and bloom."

6. That is, it raises a question about the adequacy of the third assumption of my schematic account of the methodology of individualism--that in which the essential (or existential) autonomy of the individual organism is assumed.

7. Which is, in fact, the situation of population genetics.

8. Including both population genetics and mathematical ecology.

9. For example, in the absence of other organisms, the fitness of a sexually reproducing organism is, strictly speaking, zero. break

10. Darwin originally introduced the idea of sexual selection--always in clear contradistinction to natural selection--in an effort to take account of at least certain aspects of reproductive selection. For many years thereafter, the idea was neglected. Its recent revival in the theoretical literature is of interest, but it ought not be taken to indicate an integration of reproductive dynamics into the central project of evolutionary theory. Rather, it indicates a shift in that project. In my view, the recent interest in sexual selection among sociobiologists is a direct consequence of the final, and complete, abandonment of the individual organism as a theoretical entity. Genic selection theories, it could be said, complete the shift of attention away from organisms begun by the Hardy-Weinberg calculus. Sexual reproduction is a problem in this discourse only to the extent that individual organisms remain, somewhere, an important (even if shifting) focus of conceptual interest.

11. See Keller (1987) for details.

Six— Reflections on Biology and Culture

1. Reductionism, in the relevant sense, is described and defended at length by R. L. Causey in The Unity of Science (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977). For further discussion and criticism, see my paper, "The Disunity of Science," Mind 92 (1983):321-346.

2. The currently definitive and most detailed demolition of human sociobiology is Philip Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature (Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1985). A good sense of the current state of scientific debate on the subject can be gleaned from the various comments on this work and Kitcher's replies in Brain and Behavioral Sciences 10 (March 1987). This also includes a précis of Kitcher's book.

3. The locus classicus for the defense of taking this slogan seriously is Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

4. For the complexity of genetic interactions and the significance of this complexity, see Richard Lewontin, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

5. For a critique of "genetic selectionism," the idea that evolution should be conceived of as fundamentally concerned only with differential selection of genes, see E. Sober and R. C. Lewontin, "Artifact, Cause, and Genic Selection," Philosophy of Science 47(1982):157-180. break

6. As his more extended presentation in The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1982) makes clear, Konner is perfectly well aware of the facts of cultural variation. Our disagreement, I suppose, has to do entirely with how such facts are to be interpreted.

7. See, especially, David Barash, The Whisperings Within (London: Penguin, 1979). For a devastating critique of these arguments, see Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological theories about Men and Women (New York: Basic Books, 1985), esp. chap. 6.

8. Again, Konner's book The Tangled Wing confirms that his views on this topic are quite complex and sophisticated. But both here and there, he seems inclined to draw general conclusions that, to my mind, are entirely unwarranted by the kinds of facts the adduces.

9. See, e.g., David L. Hull, "The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy: 2000 Years of Stasis," British Journal for Philosophy of Sciences 15 (1965):314-326, 16 (1965):1-18; for a more general critique of essentialism, see my "Sex, Gender, and Essence," Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 11 (1986):441-457.

10. This suggestion is developed in more detail in my paper, "Human Kinds," in J. Dupré, ed., The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality (Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1987). break

Seven— Introduction

1. J. David Bolter, Turing's Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 11, 22.

2. Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy (New York: Garland, 1968), 200-201.

3. Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie's 'L'homme machine': A Study in the Origins of an Idea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 14, 16, 22, 25. break

4. Cynthia Russett, Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 106-107.

5. Bolter, Turing's Man , 33.

6. Vartanian, La Mettrie's 'L'hoome machine ,' 132-134.

7. Howard Gardner, The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 20.

8. Bolter, Turing's Man , 13.

9. Gardner, Mind's New Science , 6; Miller quoted by Sherry Turkle, "Artificial Intelligence and Psychoanalysis: A New Alliance," in Stephen Graubard, ed., The Artificial Intelligence Debate: False Starts, Real Foundations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 242.

10. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint," in Graubard, ed., Artificial Intelligence Debate , 19.

11. Gardner, Mind's New Science , 141. On shifting trends within AI, see the essays in Graubard.

12. Anya Hurlbert and Tomaso Poggio, "Making Machines (and Artificial Intelligence) See," in Graubard, ed., Artificial Intelligence Debate , 238.

13. Konner, "On Human Nature: Love Among the Robots," The Sciences 27 (1987): 14. break

Eight— The Meaning of the Mechanistic Age

1. See Pierre Maxime Schuhl, Machinisme et Philosophie (3d ed.; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969). Jean Pierre Vernant, "Remarques sur les formes et les limits de la pensée technique chez les Grecs," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences et de leurs Applications 12 (1957): 205-225 (translated in his Myth and Thought Among the Greeks [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983]); and Bertrand Gille, Les Mécaniciens Grecs: La Naissance de la Technologie (Paris: Seuil, 1980).

2. Alex Keller, "Mathematical Technologies and the Growth of the Idea of Technical Progress in the Sixteenth Century," Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance: Essays to Honor Walter Pagel (New York: Neal Watson, 1972), 11-27.

3. William Eamon, "Technology as Magic in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance," Janus 70 (1983): 171-212.

4. William Giblert, De Magnete [On the Magnet], trans. Silvanus P. Thompson (London: Chistwick Press, 1900), ii, verso.

5. John L. Heibron, Elements of Early Modern Physics (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1982), 17 et seq .

6. Gérard Simon, "Les machines au XVIIe siècle: Usage, typologie, résonances symboliques," Revue des Sciences Humaines 58 (1982): 9-31.

7. Lén Brunschvicg, L'Expérience Humaine et la Causalité Physique (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922); and Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).

8. Lavoisier and Laplace, Memoir on Heat , trans. Henry Guerlac (New York: Neal Watson, 1982).

9. Frederic Lawrence Holmes, Lavoisier and the Chemistry of Life: An Exploration of the Scientific Creativity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

10. Roger Hahn, "Laplace and the Mechanistic Universe," in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), 256-276.

11. See Laplace's unpublished correspondence with Le Sage and Prévost listed in Roger Hahn, Calendar of the Correspondence of Pierre Simon Laplace (Berkeley: Office for History of Science and Technology, 1982).

12. quoted in Hahan, "Laplace and the Mechanistic Universe," 268-269.

13. G. June Goodfield, The Growth of Scientific Physiology (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

14. Roger Hahn, "Science in the Early 19th Century: Another Views," Acta Historiae Rerum Naturalium Necnon Technicarum , special issue 13 (1981): 59-74; Frederick Gregory, Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977); Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Machanics in Nineteenth-Century German Biology (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982); and John E. Lesch, Science and Medicine in France: The Emergence of Experimental Physiology, 1790-1855 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) break

15. Nikhil Bhattacharya, "Knowledge 'per caussas': Vico's Theory of Natural Science," in Giorgio Tagliacozzo, ed., Vico: Past and Present (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), I: 182-197; and the articles by Badaloni, Belaval, and Berlin in Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden v. White, eds., Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

16. Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens: Die sieben Welträthesel (2d ed.; Leipzig: Von Veit, 1884); aslo in his Vorträage über Philosophie und Gesellschaft , ed. Siegfried Wollgast (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1974). break

Nine— Metaphors for Mind, Theories of Mind: Should the Humanities Mind?

1. Actually, of course, Soar is realized as a set of programs in various programming languages (Lisp and C) that run on a wide range of standard computers.

2. This and other times are asserted of human congition; they are not the time for running Soar on a computer work station.

3. There is good reason that it should not: the upper reaches of capability are not het well charted empirically.

4. Actually, the current Soar has a more general attribute-value representation (Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom 1987), but we posit that humans represent external situations by forming models in this more basic representation.

5. Production systems are often referred to as rule-based systems . In many systems, they function as rules with a rule interpreter. In Soar, productions function as an associative recognition memory and not as rules, as that term is used in philosophical discussions of rule following.

6. There need not be a unique battleground; consider socibiology.

7. This graph is a variant of the store-versus-compute trade-off familiar in computer science. This particular version is adapted from Berliner and Ebeling 1988.

8. The analogous inquiry for Hitech-like systems is not useful yet, because few exist and because they arise from a research community that values exploration for its own sake.

9. The slow neural technology (which runs at ms speeds) might be conjectured to be relevant. However, animals (including man) mostly must respond to other organisms, as predator, prey, and rival. Since all are constructed in the same technology, its absolute speed is probably not strongly relevant. break

10. It does not, by the way, claim completeness of current cognitive theory, only that what is missing is as relevant to mundane as to creative cognition.

Ten— Thinging Machines: Can There Be? Are We?

1. Hobbes, Leviathan , quoted in Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea , 24.

2. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy , 592.

3. See chap. 2, Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition .

4. One large-scale and quite controversial example was the MIT/Club of Rome simulations of the world social and economic future ( The Limits of Growth ). Rome simulation of the world social and economic future ( The Limits of Growth ).

5. See, e.g., the discusions in Davis and Hersh, Descartes' Dream .

6. See Gardner, The Mind's New Science , for an overview of the historical context.

7. These are among the section headings in Minsky, The Society of Mind . break

8. See, e.g., Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving , and Laird et al., Universal Subgoaling and Chunking .

9. Feigenbaum and McCorduck, The Fifth Generation , 86, 95, 152.

10. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 187. Although Minsky's view is prevalent among AI researchers, not all of his colleagues agree that thought is so openendedly nonlogical. McCarthy (cofounder with Minsky of the MIT AI lab), for example, is exploring new forms of logic that attempt to preserve the rigor of ordinary deduction, while dealing with some of the properties of commonsense reasoning, as described in the parpers in Bobrow, ed., Special Issue on Nonmonotonic Logic.

11. Newell and Simon, "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry" (their speech accepting the ACM Turing Award, the computer science equivalent of the Nobel Prize).

12. Newell, "The Knowledge Level," 88.

13. Newell and Simon, "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry," 121.

14. Michie and Johnston, The Creative Computer , 35.

15. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 17.

16. Ibid., 67.

17. Ibid., 33.

15. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 17.

16. Ibid., 67.

17. Ibid., 33.

15. Minsky, The Society of Mind , 17.

16. Ibid., 67.

17. Ibid., 33.

18. Waterman, A Guide to Expert Systems , 4.

19. Michie and Johnston, The Creative Computer , 129.

20. Feigenbaum and McCorduck, The Fifth Generation , 12, 40.

21. Ibid., 229.

20. Feigenbaum and McCorduck, The Fifth Generation , 12, 40.

21. Ibid., 229.

22. Lenat, "CYC," 75.

23. Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition , xv.

24. Newquist, "The Machinery of Medical Diagnosis," 70.

25. See the discussion in H. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine .

26. See, e.g., H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do , and Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition .

27. Holt, "Remarks Made at ARPA Principal Investigators' Conference," 1.

28. See the discussion of the BORIS program in Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition , 121 ff.

29. See Athanasiou, "High-tech Politics: The Case of Artificial Intelligence," 24.

30. Lee, "Bureaucracy as Artificial Intellignece," 127.

31. Weber, Economy and Society , 1002.

32. Ibid., 975.

33. Ibid., 973.

31. Weber, Economy and Society , 1002.

32. Ibid., 975.

33. Ibid., 973.

31. Weber, Economy and Society , 1002.

32. Ibid., 975.

33. Ibid., 973.

34. March and Simon, Organizations , 38.

35. For a historical account and analysis of the current debates, see H. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain." For a technical view, see Rumelhart and McLelland, Parallel Distributed Processing . Maturana and Varela, in The Tree of Knowledge , offer a broad philosophy of cognition on this basis.

36. Turkle, "Romantic Reactions."

37. H. Dryefus, "Alchemy and ARtificial Intelligence."

38. See chap. 5of Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition , for an overview. break

39. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society , 61.

40. Roszak, The Cult of Information .

41. Newquiest, "The Machinery of Medical Diagnosis," 70.

42. See Flores, "Management and Communication in the Office of the Future"; Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition; and Winograd, "A Language/Action Perspective on the Design of Cooperative Work."

43. Howard, "Systems Design and Social responsibility."

Eleven— Romantic Reactions: Paradoxical Responses to the Computer Presence

1. This article grew out of many long hours of conversation with Seymour Papert. I am indebted to him as a dialogue partner and critical reader.

2. My work on romantic reactions in the computer culture among children and adults is ethnographic and clinical. See Sherry Turkle, The Secound Self: Computers and The Human Spirit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), esp. chap. 1, "Child Philosophers: Are Smart Machines Alive," 29-63; chap. 8, "Thinking of Yourself as a Machine," 271-305; and "On Method: A Sociology of Sciences of Mind," 315-323.

3. Turkle, The Second Self , 239-240.

4. See John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 417-424, for an emphasis on biology; Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence , 2d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), for an emphasis on "embodiment" and situated knowledge ("Knowing how vs. knowing that"); and Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, continue

1976), for an emphasis on the ineffable, on knowledge that cannot be formally expressed.

5. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason , 201.

6. Turkle, The Second Self , chap. 8.

7. See David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition , vol. 1 (Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1986).

8. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), and Seymour Papert, Mindstorms: Children, Computers, and Powerful Ideas (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 167-170.

9. For a more etailed discussion of the dichotomy between emergent and information-processing AI, see Seymour Papert, "One AI or Many?" and Sherry Turkle, "Artificial Intelligence and Psychoanalysis: A New Alliance," in Daedalus 117, 1 (Winter 1988): 1-14, 241-268.

10. Cited in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus Modeling the Brain: Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint," Daedalus 117, 1 (Winter 1988): 35.

11. My discussion of the evocative properties of "betwixt and between" objects owes much to the work of Victor Turner on liminal objects and Mary Douglas on category maintenance. See, for example, Victor Turner, The Ritual Process (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), and Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

12. W. H. Auden and Louis Kronenberger, eds., The Viking Book of Aphorisms (New York: Penguin, 1981), 24.

13. Turkle, The Second Self , 24.

14. My use of the idea of "objects to think with" owes much to Claude Levi-Strauss's notion of "bricolage," the use of concrete materials to think through scientific problems. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

15. In the field studies for The Second Self , I worked with over 200 children and adolescents, ages 4 to 16. My first formulation of how children use "objects to think with" came out of that research experience. Since 1984, my research with children has turned more directly to differences of personal style in relationships with objects, both computational and traditional; my new studies include clinical, projective, and observational materials on a closely studied group of 20 fifth-graders.

16. Jean Piaget, The Child's Construction of the World (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1960).

17. For example, in a sample of 88 children, ages 4 through 14, 68% used physical criteria and 11% psychological criteria to discuss the "aliveness" of noncomputational or "traditional" objects, but when they turned to computational objects, the proportions were reversed. Then, 17% used physical criteria, and 67% used psychological criteria. See Turkle, The Second Self , "Children's Psychological Discourse: Methods and Data Summary," 324-332.

18. Susan Carey, Conceptual Change in Childhood (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). break

19. Rochel Gelamn and Elizabeth Spelke, "The Development of Thoughts About Animate and Inanimate Ojbects: Implications for Research on Social Cognition," in John H. Flavell and Lee Ross, eds., Social Cognitve Development: Frontiers and Possible Choices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

20. See Turkle, The Second Self, chap. 1, for detailed descriptions of children in "psychological" discussions about computational objects.

21. George Boole, The Laws of Thought, vol. 2 of Collected Works (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1952).

22. William F. Allman, Apprentices of Wonder: Inside the Neural Network Revolution (New York:Bantam, 1989), 1.

23. Ibid., 2.

22. William F. Allman, Apprentices of Wonder: Inside the Neural Network Revolution (New York:Bantam, 1989), 1.

23. Ibid., 2.

24. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making Mind vs. Modeling the Brain," 16.

25. Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search," reprinted in John Haugeland, ed., Mind Design (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 41.

26. Douglas r. Hofstadter, Metamagical Themes: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Patter (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

27. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman, "A Comparison of Models," in Geoffrey Hinton and James Anderson, eds., Parallel Models of Associative Memory (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981), 3. In Rumelhart, McClelland, and the PDP Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing, the PDP model of learning is contrasted with that of traditional AI:

In most models, knowledge is stored as a static copy of a pattern. . . . In PDP models, through, this is not the case. In these models the patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what is stored is the connection strengths between units that allow these patterns to be recreated. . . . Learning must be a matter of finding the right connection strengths so that the right patterns of activation will be produced under the right circumstances. This is an extremely important property of this class of models, for it opens up the possibility that an information processing mechanism could learn, as a result of tuning its connections, to capture the interdependencies between activations that it is exposed to in the course of processing. (31-32)

28. John Searle, "The Myth of the Computer," The New York Review of Books, April 29, 1982, 5.

29. Ibid.

28. John Searle, "The Myth of the Computer," The New York Review of Books, April 29, 1982, 5.

29. Ibid.

30. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain," 25.

31. Cited in Ibid., 25.

30. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain," 25.

31. Cited in Ibid., 25.

32. Science 86 (May 1986): 27.

33. Terry Winograd, "Thinking Machines: Can There Be? Are We?" See chap. 10, this vol.

34. See Turkle, "Artificial Intelligence and Psychoanalysis."

35. For a presentation of psychoanalytic theory in terms of the dichotomy between a drive and an object model, see Jay R. Greenberg and Stephen A. Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

36. Minsky, The Society of Mind .

37. Winograd, "Thinking Machines," chap. 10, this vol. break

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

37. Winograd, "Thinking Machines," chap. 10, this vol. break

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

37. Winograd, "Thinking Machines," chap. 10, this vol. break

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. W. Daniel Hillis, "Intelligence as an Emergent Behavior," Daedalus 117, 1 (Winter 1988): 175-176. Italics mine.

41. Psychoanalytic writers have taken object-relations theorists to task on this point. See, e.g., Roy Schafer, A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), and Thomas H. Ogden, "The Concept of Internal Object Relations," The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 64 (1983).

42. Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

43. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain," 26.

44. Ibid., 35.

43. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain," 26.

44. Ibid., 35.

45. Leo Marx, "Is Liberal Knowledge Worth Having?" Address to the Conference of the Association of Graduate Liberal Studies Programs, DePaul University, Chicago, October 7, 1988, unpub. ms., 10-11.

46. Lovelace put it like this: "The analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform."

47. Although this statement is true in spirit, large and complex programs are not peedictable in any simple sense.

48. Hillis, "Intelligence as an Emergent Behavior," 176.

49. Papert, "One AI or Many?" 14.

50. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: Norton, 1979).

51. For a discussion of the turn to the concrete and away from algorithm, see Sherry Turkle and Seymour Papert, "Epistemological Pluralism: Styles and Voices Within the Computer Culture," in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16, 1 (Sept. 1990).

52. Cited in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind vs. Modeling the Brain," 24-25.

53. T. S. Eliot, "The Metaphysical Poets," in Selected Essays 1917-1932 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1932), 241-250.

54. Minsky, The Society of Mind, 182.

55. Ibid.

54. Minsky, The Society of Mind, 182.

55. Ibid.

56. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs."

57. John Searle, "Minds and Brains Without Programs," in Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield, eds., Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 219. break

Twelve— Biology, Machines, and Humanity

1. Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1960). break

Coda

1. Anthony Flew, A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Essays on the Nature of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 23; Walter Burkert, Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), xiii; Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 80.

2. J. David Bolter, Turing's Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), explores these various metaphors.

3. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Mentor ed., New York, 1958); Melvin Konner, "On Human Nature: Love Among the Robots," The Sciences 27, 2 (1987): 13.

4. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), 24, 48.

5. Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979), 351.

6. For an introduction to the disciplinary histories of sociobiology and artificial intelligence, see Arthur Caplan, ed., The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on Ethical and Scientific Issues (New York: Harper and Ro, 1978), and Howard Gardner, The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

7. Wilson, in his introduction to Caplan, The Sociology Debate , xiii; Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 169.

8. This point is developed in Howard Kaye, The Social Meaning of Modern Biology: From Social Darwinism to Sociobiology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). See also Toulmin's The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the continue

Theology of Nature (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1982).

9. The New York Review of Books , Sept. 25, 1986.

10. Seymour Papert, "One AI or Many?" in Stephen Graubard, ed., The Artificial Intelligence Debate: False Starts, Real Foundations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 2. Peirce, quoted in Michael Crowe, The Extraterrestrical Life Debate, 1750-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 552.

11. Bolter, Turing's Man , 207.

12. R. C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon Kamin, Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 249; Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 160; Gould, in The New York Review of Books , June 25, 1987. For more on these issues, see Evelyn Fox Keller's essay in Part I.

13. W. V. Quine, "A Postscript on Metaphor," in Sheldon Sacks, ed., On Metaphor (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 159; Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942). break


Notes
 

Preferred Citation: Sheehan, James J., and Morton Sosna, editors The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1991 1991. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft338nb20q/