1. Reductionism, in the relevant sense, is described and defended at length by R. L. Causey in The Unity of Science (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977). For further discussion and criticism, see my paper, "The Disunity of Science," Mind 92 (1983):321-346. [BACK]

2. The currently definitive and most detailed demolition of human sociobiology is Philip Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature (Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1985). A good sense of the current state of scientific debate on the subject can be gleaned from the various comments on this work and Kitcher's replies in Brain and Behavioral Sciences 10 (March 1987). This also includes a précis of Kitcher's book. [BACK]

3. The locus classicus for the defense of taking this slogan seriously is Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). [BACK]

4. For the complexity of genetic interactions and the significance of this complexity, see Richard Lewontin, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). [BACK]

5. For a critique of "genetic selectionism," the idea that evolution should be conceived of as fundamentally concerned only with differential selection of genes, see E. Sober and R. C. Lewontin, "Artifact, Cause, and Genic Selection," Philosophy of Science 47(1982):157-180. break [BACK]

6. As his more extended presentation in The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1982) makes clear, Konner is perfectly well aware of the facts of cultural variation. Our disagreement, I suppose, has to do entirely with how such facts are to be interpreted. [BACK]

7. See, especially, David Barash, The Whisperings Within (London: Penguin, 1979). For a devastating critique of these arguments, see Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological theories about Men and Women (New York: Basic Books, 1985), esp. chap. 6. [BACK]

8. Again, Konner's book The Tangled Wing confirms that his views on this topic are quite complex and sophisticated. But both here and there, he seems inclined to draw general conclusions that, to my mind, are entirely unwarranted by the kinds of facts the adduces. [BACK]

9. See, e.g., David L. Hull, "The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy: 2000 Years of Stasis," British Journal for Philosophy of Sciences 15 (1965):314-326, 16 (1965):1-18; for a more general critique of essentialism, see my "Sex, Gender, and Essence," Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 11 (1986):441-457. [BACK]

10. This suggestion is developed in more detail in my paper, "Human Kinds," in J. Dupré, ed., The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality (Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1987). break [BACK]