1. Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland , in Sämtliche Schriften (München: Piper, 1971), 3:594-596. [BACK]

2. Karl Marx, "Das philosophische Manifest der historischen Rechtsschule," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke (Berlin: Dietz-Verlag, 1958), 1: 80. [BACK]

3. The best philological treatment of Kant's influence in France so far can be found in Maximilien Vallois, La formation de l'influence Kantienne en France (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1932). More can be found on this issue (but without a systematic historical analysis of Kant's impact on "the French ideology") in the following works: La philosophie politique de Kant (Paris: PUF, 1962); A. Philonenko, Théorie et praxis dans la pensée morale de Kant et de Fichte (Paris: Vrin, 1968); G. Vlachos, La philosophie politique de Kant (Paris: PUF, 1962). [BACK]

4. Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy , ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). The analysis of Kant as a "spectator" can be found on pp. 44-45. I am in perfect agreement with Arendt's dictum: "[T]he French Revolution had awakened him . . . from his political slumber (as Hume had awakened him in his youth from dogmatic slumber, and Rousseau had roused him in his manhood from moral slumber)" (p. 17). However, as will become clear from what follows,

I decidedly disagree with Arendt's opinion that "there is" a political philosophy in Kant, yet one which "does not exist" (i.e., has remained unwritten) (p. 31). [BACK]

5. The reference to Grégoire's correspondence with Philippe-Jacob Müller, a professor at the University of Strassburg, is found in Vallois, Formation , p. 34. Kant's position on the crucial and hotly debated issue of the revolutionary reform of the church can be summed up in the following terms. The church has no right to complain about the confiscation of its wealth. This wealth had been based on "popular opinion" ( Volksmeinung ) which has now evidently changed. Corporations anyhow have no raison d'être in a republic (this argument was identical with the position of Sieyès): Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Immanuel Kant, Werke in Zwölf Bänden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1956), 8: 444-445. Kant even went further. In the spirit of his own distinction between church ( Kirchenwesen ) and religion, the latter being a purely internal issue of the citizen, he recognized the state's legitimacy in reforming the organization of the church. However, he declared every intervention into religious beliefs by the state as negative acts "beneath the dignity of the state" (Kant, in Werke , 8: 447-448). So far, Grégoire would have enthusiastically subscribed to Kant's philosophy of religion. What he, a partisan of Catholic democracy, would not have been able to accept in Kant's position was the philosopher's very active hostility to the minimum institutionalization of religion and the "invisible church," the ethical community of believers. In Die Religion innerhalb der blossen Vernunft , in Werke , 8: 852-853, Kant declared, certainly not without a certain degree of Protestant bias, that every form of the organization of the church (papal absolutism and Catholic democracy alike ) are forms of the same fetishistic religion, and, despite the name, forms of the same despotic rule. This was, by the way, in perfect harmony with Kant's general conception of democracy as an imperfect realization of res publica noumenon , about which I will say more later. [BACK]

6. For the reference to the enthusiastic review of Moniteur as well as to Sieyès's interest in Kant's philosophy, see Arsenij Gulyga, Immanuel Kant (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 280. [BACK]

7. For Kant's rejoinder to Constant's critique of his position in Constant's Des réactions politiques (Paris, 1797), see Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen , in Werke , vol. 8. [BACK]

8. On Napoleon's "encounter" with Kant and the unsuccessful attempt of the first French Kant expert, Charles Villers, to convert the first consul to Kant's philosophy, see Gulyga, Immanuel Kant , pp. 280-281. Vallois, Formation . pp. 51-124, gives a detailed characterization of Villers's interpretation of Kant. He briefly mentions Villers's "report" for Bonaparte titled "Philosophie de Kant, aperçu rapide des bases et de la direction de cette philosophie" (Paris, Fructidor An IX, 1801), in Formation , p. 57. [BACK]

9. In Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis , in Werke , 11: 159. Presumably, Kant polemicizes here against Danton in his capacity as minister of justice in the fall of 1792, and Danton's much too summary declaration of civil rights and properties as null and void in an emergency situation and in the absence of a factual contract. [BACK]

10. More recently, André Tosel made efforts in his Kant révolutionnaire (Droit et politique) (Paris: PUF, 1988), to characterize Kant's political philosophy as a reaction to

the Revolution. Although I appreciate this methodological approach to the problem, I cannot accept Tosel's consistent attempts to "homogenize" Kant's political philosophy in the sign of Jacobinism. [BACK]

11. "Dass Könige philosophieren, oder Philosophen Könige würden, ist nicht zu erwarten, aber auch nicht zu wünschen" ( Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang , in Werke , 11: 228). [BACK]

12. See the characterization of Robespierre's unique position in Ferenc Fehér, The Frozen Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 107. [BACK]

13. The state of rebellion is characterized by Kant as "Zustand einer völligen Gesetzlosigkeit (status naturalis), wo alles Recht aufhört, wenigstens Effekt zu haben," Über den Gemeinspruch , in Werke , 11: 158. [BACK]

14. Der Streit der Fakultäten , in Werke , 11: 356-358. [BACK]

15. Kant makes an explicit reference to the existence of "the drive of freedom" in his Anthropologie , in Werke , 12: 604. [BACK]

16. Here are a few typical examples of Kant's categorical rejection of a "right to revolution" or rebellion: Über den Gemeinspruch , in Werke , 11: 154, 156, 158-159 (here Kant characterizes the leaders of the revolutions of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and England as Staatsverbrecher , "criminals against the state"); Zum ewigen Frieden , in Werke , 11: 245, 246; Der Streit der Fakultäten , in Werke , 11: 360 (fn.); Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre, in Werke , 8: 437, 438, 439. [BACK]

17. Über den Gemeinspruch , in Werke, 11: 160. [BACK]

18. Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Werke , 8: 442. [BACK]

19. A whole book has been dedicated to this not particularly convincing explanatory principle by D. Losurdo, Autocensura e compromesso nel pensiero politico di Kant (Naples, 1985). [BACK]

20. Anthropologie , in Werke , 12: 686. [BACK]

21. A detailed analysis of Kant's position concerning happiness is given in Agnes Heller's "Freedom and Happiness in Kant's Political Philosophy," manuscript. [BACK]

22. The celebrated statement in Der Streit der Fakultäten , to which I have already referred ( Werke , 11: 358), explicitly predicts the possibility of the collapse of the Revolution under the burden of its own crimes . At the same time, it considers the serious possibility of its resuming its work in a better "second edition." [BACK]

23. Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man , trans. Reginald Snell (New York: F. Ungar, 1965), pp. 34-35, 40-41. [BACK]

24. Fehér, Frozen Revolution , pp. 97-112, "Revolutionary Justice." For Michael Walzer's rejoinder to my criticism, see his "The King's Trial and the Political Culture of the Revolution," in The Political Culture of the French Revolution , ed. Colin Lucas, vol. 2 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988). [BACK]

25. Kant's vacillation can be seen in the contradiction between his two major statements on the issue. In Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang, in Werke, 11: 246, his position is the following: After the victory and the consolidation of a revolution, which had been by definition the violation of the (former) law but which in turn became legal authority, the monarch is bereft of the right (together with all other citizens) to rebel against the new authority because it has now become law . But it goes without saying that he cannot be punished now for his past reign because he then had been law . In Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Werke , 8: 442-443, Kant's argument is more complex. The

logical and moral impossibility of punishing the former monarch for the past reign is of course further maintained. But at this point, Kant has doubts whether the exmonarch has the right to rebel against those who had unlawfully overthrown his rule. Naturally, this is the ideal quotation for those who subscribe to the thesis of Kant's self-censorship. I am, however, convinced that the structure of the argument suggests even here that Kant was exclusively preoccupied with justice. [BACK]

26. In Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Werke , 8: 465, Kant for once spoke directly (and not only indirectly and hypothetically) about the French Revolution and (without mentioning his name) Louis XVI. He regarded Louis's concessions, which finally led to the fusion of the "sovereign" (the supreme executive) with the legislative power, as the king's tragic mistake. The (historically correct) description leaves no doubt as to Kant's understanding: the sub rosa unification of executive and legislative power in the hands of the Constituent Assembly was usurpation and despotic rule. [BACK]

27. Kant's most comprehensive statement is the long footnote in Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Werke , 8: 440-441, on the trials of Charles I and Louis XVI. It is worth mentioning that here Kant almost anticipated an argument more recently represented by Walzer, one of "political justice" in defense of the trials. In this regard, Walzer's new argument, as it appears in his paper published in The Political Culture of the Revolution , can be rendered, with a certain simplification, in the following way: They would have killed him anyway; therefore , it is better that they gave to the act the `'form of law," which made it "political justice." Kant's sharp answer to this anticipated train of thought was that the legal form had made the sham trial worse. Notrecht (emergency law or political justice) is a presumed, not a real principle of justice. Necessitas non habet legem ( Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Werke , 8: 343). Kant's major concern here and elsewhere was the protection of the purity of the maxim of action , which he regarded as the sole guarantee of a future return to republican legality. [BACK]

28. For the principle of the obligatory public character of the maxim of politics, see Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang , in Werke , 11: 244, 245. The principle which cannot be made public is described in Der Streit der Fakultäten , in Werke , 11: 359 (fn.). [BACK]

30. His aversion to the (potentially or actually) despotic character of the ancient city republics was expressed in the most explicit fashion in Zum ewigen Frieden , in Werke , 11: 206-208.

31. Ibid. [BACK]

30. His aversion to the (potentially or actually) despotic character of the ancient city republics was expressed in the most explicit fashion in Zum ewigen Frieden , in Werke , 11: 206-208.

31. Ibid. [BACK]

32. The terms are either Form der Beherrschung versus Form der Regierung or Staatsform versus Regierungsart ( Zum ewigen Frieden , in Werke , 11: 206, 208). In both cases, the first term refers to the technical appellation of the state, the "form of government." The second term refers to the distribution of powers , the crucial ways in which power is exercised either despotically or in a republican manner. [BACK]

33. Über den Gemeinspruch , in Werke , 11: 149 (fn.). Here Kant termed the head of the state ( Oberhaupt der Staatsverwaltung ) "the personified law." He emphasizes that the "sovereign" (the head of the state) is not an agent of the state. But in Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre , in Werke , 8: 435, Kant described the "regent" or the "prince," that is, the supreme executive power, as an agent of the state . [BACK]

34. The three evil maxims are (1) fac et excusa (act and find excuses); (2) si fecisti

nega (if you did it, deny it); (3) divide et impera: Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang , in Werke , 11: 236.

35. Ibid., p. 240.

36. Ibid., p. 234. [BACK]

34. The three evil maxims are (1) fac et excusa (act and find excuses); (2) si fecisti

nega (if you did it, deny it); (3) divide et impera: Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang , in Werke , 11: 236.

35. Ibid., p. 240.

36. Ibid., p. 234. [BACK]

34. The three evil maxims are (1) fac et excusa (act and find excuses); (2) si fecisti

nega (if you did it, deny it); (3) divide et impera: Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang , in Werke , 11: 236.

35. Ibid., p. 240.

36. Ibid., p. 234. [BACK]

37. Anthropologie , in Werke , 12: 485. [BACK]

38. Metaphysik der Sitten. Tugendlehre , in Werke , 8: 591. [BACK]