1. The word "strategy" entered the English language through military science. The Oxford English Dictionary still gives its primary definition as the "art of the commander in chief." It is reasonable to extend the use of the term to cover other competitive occasions (such as games), in which, through the use of clever tactics, one party may win and thus cause the other to lose. But to consider all decisions made in the course of procuring a livelihood "strategic," as does Jochim (1981), is to demean life into a narrow struggle for survival. In the more circumscribed world of Benguet vegetable culture, however, the strategy metaphor is apposite. [BACK]

2. The postwar retrenchment of the Suyoc mines was caused both by the poor performance of gold on the world market and by changes in the

relative value of the Philippine currency. The prewar depression years had been a boomtime for gold producers the world over (Kemmerer 1975:115); in the 1930s the value of the precious metal rose, on average "70 per cent in terms of depreciated currencies" (Palyi 1972:332). But wartime brought a near universal inflation, while the price of gold remained fixed in dollar terms. From 1940 to 1951 "the purchasing power of gold suffered continuous erosion" (Jastram 1977:167); in the postwar period, the United States held it at the increasingly artificial price of 35.0875 dollars per ounce. In the early 1960s, gold began to creep upward on the London Free Market, but a group of central banks intervened to bring it back to the desired price level (see Jastram 1977:52).

In the Philippines this situation was exacerbated by an over-valued currency. Inflation had been fierce during the mid-1940s; at the end of the war prices were approximately eight times higher than they had been five years earlier (Golay 1961:60). Furthermore, inflation persisted for some time as the U.S. government shipped in more currency than goods (see D. Bernstein 1947:218). Although the late 1940s witnessed a slight deflation (Golay 1961:74), the peso was never readjusted to the dollar, which had retained much more of its prewar value. The U.S. government actually insisted, in the notorious "Bell Trade Act," that the peso remain valued at fifty American cents. This enforced currency overvaluation made it difficult for the Philippines to export anything at all, including mineral resources (Valdepenas and Bautista 1977:161; Baldwin 1975:19).

The combination of underpricing gold while overpricing the peso made gold mining, whether by modern or traditional methods, a marginal endeavor. The Philippines' yearly production had been as high as 1,012,000 fine ounces in the late 1930s; in 1947 it totaled 65,000 fine ounces (Golay 1961:43). Although the industry began a slow recovery in the late 1940s, it lagged for many years. The Suyoc people continued to dig, but no longer could they afford to celebrate large feasts.

3. Officially, cabbage plantings increased from 1,137 hectares to 7,650 hectares (Republic of the Philippines 1954, v. 3, pt. ii:2944, and ibid. 1960 b :76, 77). For figures on potato production, see Republic of the Philippines 1954, v. 3, pt. ii:2955, and ibid. 1972:110. [BACK]

2. The postwar retrenchment of the Suyoc mines was caused both by the poor performance of gold on the world market and by changes in the

relative value of the Philippine currency. The prewar depression years had been a boomtime for gold producers the world over (Kemmerer 1975:115); in the 1930s the value of the precious metal rose, on average "70 per cent in terms of depreciated currencies" (Palyi 1972:332). But wartime brought a near universal inflation, while the price of gold remained fixed in dollar terms. From 1940 to 1951 "the purchasing power of gold suffered continuous erosion" (Jastram 1977:167); in the postwar period, the United States held it at the increasingly artificial price of 35.0875 dollars per ounce. In the early 1960s, gold began to creep upward on the London Free Market, but a group of central banks intervened to bring it back to the desired price level (see Jastram 1977:52).

In the Philippines this situation was exacerbated by an over-valued currency. Inflation had been fierce during the mid-1940s; at the end of the war prices were approximately eight times higher than they had been five years earlier (Golay 1961:60). Furthermore, inflation persisted for some time as the U.S. government shipped in more currency than goods (see D. Bernstein 1947:218). Although the late 1940s witnessed a slight deflation (Golay 1961:74), the peso was never readjusted to the dollar, which had retained much more of its prewar value. The U.S. government actually insisted, in the notorious "Bell Trade Act," that the peso remain valued at fifty American cents. This enforced currency overvaluation made it difficult for the Philippines to export anything at all, including mineral resources (Valdepenas and Bautista 1977:161; Baldwin 1975:19).

The combination of underpricing gold while overpricing the peso made gold mining, whether by modern or traditional methods, a marginal endeavor. The Philippines' yearly production had been as high as 1,012,000 fine ounces in the late 1930s; in 1947 it totaled 65,000 fine ounces (Golay 1961:43). Although the industry began a slow recovery in the late 1940s, it lagged for many years. The Suyoc people continued to dig, but no longer could they afford to celebrate large feasts.

3. Officially, cabbage plantings increased from 1,137 hectares to 7,650 hectares (Republic of the Philippines 1954, v. 3, pt. ii:2944, and ibid. 1960 b :76, 77). For figures on potato production, see Republic of the Philippines 1954, v. 3, pt. ii:2955, and ibid. 1972:110. [BACK]

4. Many such famines have been reported in the Baguio Midland Courier. See, for example, Oct. 10, 1949; May 30, 1965; June 27, 1965; December 4, 1966; and April 22, 1967. [BACK]