Chapter 4—
Urban Dwellers and Labor under Economic Reform: The Politics of Acquiescence
One of the most contentious issues in the implementation of economic reform in Africa has been the ability of states to impose programs that noticeably discriminate against urban populations, especially labor. Indeed, the "IMF riots" that occurred in countries such as Sudan and Zambia have led some to conclude that African states are too weak to implement policies biased against urbanized labor that are inevitably part of an economic reform program. This chapter examines why the PNDC has been able to implement a series of policies that appear to be biased against labor and urban-dwellers yet has suffered almost no popular unrest. Ghana is a particularly interesting example in this regard because at least some writers had claimed that trade unions in the country were relatively politicized and that it would therefore be difficult for any government to carry out noticeably antilabor reforms. As chapter 3 did, this section will also examine how the PNDC's initial implementation of reform measures affected its long-term efforts to develop significant political support for itself and its economic policies.
Labor Power in Africa
Observers of African workers and trade unions have long recognized the weaknesses of organized labor in Africa. In their important early article, Elliot Berg and Jeffrey Butler argued that African labor unions were not noticeably political during the terminal colonial period.[1] However,
within the context of African societies, where all groups that seek to organize for political power suffer from grave organizational deficiencies, some have suggested that labor is among the more powerful political organizations. First, simply because it is somewhat concentrated, labor has the advantage over many other groups, notably the peasantry, who are dispersed over the countryside.
Second, irrespective of the amount of organization they have, workers are usually located in the cities in Africa and therefore have at least the potential to threaten the government through organized or spontaneous demonstrations. The potential for urban labor to threaten governments in the cities, especially the capital, is particularly important because in a significant number of African countries the political power of the state rests solely on its ability to control the cities. Thus, Robert Bates notes, "The contemporary histories of many of the independent African nations might credibly be recorded by focusing on major periods of strike action and worker protest."[2] Indeed, Bates argues that it is precisely because workers can exercise power through both organized and unorganized means that African governments find it particularly difficult to suppress them.
Direct attacks on labor movements are open to reprisals; in moments of economic stress, labor movements can join with their urban constituents, paralyze cities, and create the conditions under which ambitious rivals can displace those in power. And attempts at co-optation still leave open the chance for wildcat actions; during moments of economic crisis in the cities, workers can and have acted on their own.[3]
The potential power of workers is actually greater than is suggested by their numbers because workers' actions may quickly combine with the simmering discontent found in all African cities to cause an avalanche of popular protest.[4]
Activism among workers in Ghana has been especially noticeable because, while they share all the weaknesses traditionally attributed to labor in Africa, workers have at certain moments organized to present a real threat to the government in power. St. Clair Drake and Leslie Alexander Lacy were moved, perhaps somewhat overenthusiastically, to
claim in the 1960s that "the main threat to national stability will no longer be tribalism, but the wildcat strike."[5] Similarly, Richard Jeffries, in his thorough study of the railway workers, noted,
The Sekondi-Takoradi railway strikes of 1950, 1961 and 1971 were all highly political in conception. That is to say, they were consciously directed against the government rather than the management, and were expressions of protest at general policies and characteristics of the regimes in question rather than narrowly occupational grievances.[6]
Some of the railwaymen's actions, notably the strike in 1961, resulted in the mobilization of the entire community. The marketwomen and unemployed who joined the protests were motivated not only by their own financial dependence on the railwaymen, but also by the desire to add their grievances against Nkrumah's government to those of the striking workers.[7] There is little evidence that these other groups would have acted had the striking workers not provided the spark. More generally, it is claimed that Ghanaian workers may ignite social unrest because labor's own interests are not fundamentally different from those of the larger society. Thus, Kraus has noted that workers' strikes between 1968 and 1971 tended to "articulate the interests of the broadest stratum of labour, the lower-paid and minimum wage earners."[8]
Thus, many scholars believe that labor unions in Ghana can exercise at least some political power. For instance, Bill Freund observes that "a sensitive analysis of developments in a country such as Ghana also shows that the unions are conduits at times for shocks that can present difficulties for regimes."[9] Similarly, Jeff Crisp notes in his study of mine-workers that "the history of Ghana in colonial and post-colonial periods is a testament to the susceptibility of the Ghanaian state to the threat of popular unrest and protest."[10] Crisp makes clear, however, that because of a number of factors relating to internal organization and ideology, the
mineworkers have not been able to go beyond being an episodic political force in the country.[11] Nevertheless, although organized labor may not be able to be a consistent political force in the country, it may be able to mobilize significant portions of the society to protest specific policies and thereby sabotage any effort at economic reform. For instance, Jim Sliver argued that should Ghana agree to IMF suggestions and sign an economic reform program that freezes wages, the mineworkers will inevitably resist. He suggests that they will either strike, depleting the country's foreign exchange reserves, or rebel while staying on the job, severely reducing the country's flow of minerals.[12]
Economic Reform and Labor
Precisely because they are able to exercise at least some political power, workers, especially in the urban areas, have been able to receive a disproportionate share of the political goods distributed by African governments across the continent. A central theme in Bates's book is that fear of unrest on the part of urban workers has been a consistent factor in the drive by African governments to keep food prices as low as possible. Thus, to buy the political acquiescence of workers and city-dwellers, governments have taxed the peasants. In addition, many African governments have found it politically convenient to try to co-opt the urban population by padding state-owned enterprises with as many surplus workers as possible. Also, the urban population has traditionally benefited from subsidies on fuel and government services not usually available to the rural population. Finally, the urban population has often been the beneficiary of artificially cheap imported goods, especially food but also clothes and other consumer goods, brought into the country when the currency has been overvalued.
Not surprisingly, therefore, urban workers are one of the chief targets of economic reform programs that hope to bring about fundamental changes in African economies. As noted in chapter 3, most economic reform programs hope to devalue the local currency and thereby increase the price of many goods consumed primarily by the urban population. These economic reform programs also seek to reduce government spending and subsidies on crucial commodities such as food, fuel, and trans-
port that the urban population benefits from disproportionately.[13] Finally, many reform programs demand sharp reductions in the staffing of public-sector enterprises; such reductions inevitably increase unemployment among the urban working class.
In the short run, the urban population is almost certain to face nothing but relative income losses; thus, labor will be tempted to mobilize to block economic reform programs. The fact that so much of the cost of economic reform will be visible immediately plays to the urban working class's political strength. The potential for strikes and labor unrest igniting more general popular protest will clearly be greatest during a drastic program that suddenly causes a sharp deterioration in the standard of urban living. Thus, especially in the first few years of any economic reform program, one of the central questions for any government is whether it can contain labor protests until the benefits of the reforms become obvious to workers.
In Ghana, much of the reform program was ostensibly directed against the urban population. For instance, the devaluation of the cedi, discussed in chapter 3, had a disproportionate effect on the urban population, which consumed most of the imported goods. Also, beginning in the 1983 budget, the government embarked on a radical reform of prices. Subsidies for many government services were eliminated with the result that the urban population was faced with sudden price increases for basic goods: hospital fees were introduced in 1983 and increased in 1985; water fees rose 150 percent; postal tariffs increased 365 percent; and electricity rates rose 1,000 percent.[14] There was also a dramatic effort to reform price controls. Previous governments had established a byzantine system of regulating close to 6,000 prices on nearly 700 producer groups. The PNDC quickly abolished almost all these controls. By the late 1980s, only a handful of price controls still existed, and these regulations had only a minimal effect on the pricing decisions of companies.[15] Indeed, Rawlings went out of his way to emphasize that the removal of price controls was an antiurban move. For instance, in his first speech after the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was
announced, Rawlings defended the kerosene price increases in part because the majority of the fuel was not marketed in the rural areas.[16]
Since 1983, the government of Ghana has also embarked on a wide-ranging program to reform state-owned enterprises that has as its central mission the reduction of surplus workers. For instance, in the mid-1980s, the government undertook an evaluation and redeployment exercise that reduced the size of the Cocoa Board's payroll from 100,000 employees to 50,000. Other state enterprises are undergoing similar programs, although none can claim quite the extravagance of waste that the Cocoa Board achieved. The government is also hoping to reduce its own work force, and the ERP includes plans to eliminate approximately 36,000 positions from a total civil service of approximately 540,000.
Finally, the government has made it clear through its intervention in the wage process that it is not going to allow significant wage increases for workers in the near future for fear of reigniting inflation. Rawlings warned the Trades Union Congress when it was reformulated in December 1983 that "many members of the general public see the TUC as an organisation which has attempted in the past to hold the rest of the community to ransom."[17] Also, the government has declared that it is not in the business of promoting the wages of workers. Although Ghana has retained its Prices and Incomes Board (PIB), this body now only regulates wages. In 1988, for instance, when some companies agreed to raise the incomes of their workers by 30 to 50 percent, the PIB decreed that no raises of greater than 25 percent would be allowed.[18] In addition, if employers promise workers a wage increase but have not paid their taxes and social security contributions and put aside money for terminal benefits, the board will make them reduce the size of the wage increase to meet these other commitments.[19] Ghana still sets a minimum wage, but the Employers Association of Ghana reports that the wage is so low that most employers, especially in the major urban areas, are already paying it. In addition, the government does not have the ability to monitor those employers in the rural areas who do not pay the minimum wage.[20]
Thus, workers in Ghana, at least some of whom have been portrayed
as having a history of antistate activity, have been hit by what appears to be a large number of blows over the last few years. As the Trades Union Congress noted,
Although the various statistical indicators are moving in the desired directions under the nation's Economic Recovery Programme, the going is still hard for the working people. . . . The sum effect of the IMF and World Bank sponsored economic policies are the cheapening of the local currency through the foreign exchange auction system, the high rates of unemployment and a rising cost of living brought about by the decontrolling of prices, removal of subsidies on essential goods and services and the partial freeze on wages and salaries of the working people.[21]
Certainly, the ERP has instituted more far-reaching changes in the economy than either the 1961 or 1971 budgets, which sparked much worker unrest. Indeed, the Ghanaian reforms are near the magnitude of the Zambian price increases that caused large-scale rioting and the eventual abandonment of that reform program in 1986.
However, since the massive reform program was first announced in 1983, Ghana has not experienced significant popular unrest ignited by organized or unorganized labor (or anyone else for that matter). As figure 5 shows, while there have been some strikes, labor unrest is not as high as it was in the 1970s; indeed, currently there are fewer strikes in Ghana than there have ever been. Despite the government's economic policies, protests have been few.
Why has labor acquiesced to these economic reforms, especially given Ghana's history? The explanation given by many Ghanaians, within both government and the Trades Union Congress, derives from a belief that Ghanaians desire to avoid conflict and that they will stand for almost any government action. As one Ministry of Finance official noted in an interview, "The Ghanaian has his own personality. If this would have been Nigeria, heads would have rolled."[22] This explanation is particularly unsatisfactory, however, given that Ghana has had, if anything, a more active labor movement than most other African countries over the last twenty-five years. Certainly, very few, if any, of the authors who studied Ghanaian labor movements in the 1960s and 1970s pictured Ghanaian workers as particularly acquiescent, and the mobilization of workers during 1982 makes this argument particularly unpersuasive.
Fig. 5.
Work Days Lost to Strikes
Source: International Labour Organization, Yearbook of Labour Statistics
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, various years).
Explaining Political Acquiescence
Despite the PNDC's previous efforts at mobilizing the workers, the devaluation and increases in prices that the government announced in April 1983, as well as the firm indication that more costly reforms were on the way, led to immediate union protests. As noted in chapter 3, the unions were exceptionally vocal in their protests. Many workers went beyond these statements and publicly protested the budget. For instance, worker protests prevented a speech by Finance Secretary Kwesi Botchwey in Kumasi in May 1983.[23]
In the crucial period immediately after the budget announcement, however, the government was able to survive with little difficulty. Workers blustered, but did not take to the streets. Similarly, as figure 5 indicates, although there was an upsurge in strikes in 1983, it was not a significant increase compared to previous labor activism in Ghana. Indeed, there are some indications that in the period immediately after the budget announcement, the PNDC retained the support of at least some of the workers. For instance, Hansen notes that when the regime faced its most severe coup threat on June 19, 1983, the WDCs mounted road blocks and rallied to support the regime.[24]
There are probably several reasons why workers did not organize in the days immediately after the coup and present a significant challenge to the government. The first factor, usually ignored in political studies, is simply chance. Large mob actions of the type that African governments fear most usually form spontaneously, and it may just have been that the mob did not come together in the right manner. Once a few days had elapsed, the moment for mass popular protest had passed.
Second, the PNDC had destroyed much of the unions' traditional leadership and replaced it with people who owed their political survival to Rawlings. The new regime viewed the existing trade union leadership as part of the problem to be overcome rather than part of the solution. As Rawlings noted in a speech in 1987, "The traditional union movement, like other institutions . . . has had its own history of power being exercised by a few who do not always express the real interests of that constituency."[25] Beginning shortly after the December 31 coup, the previously elected TUC officials were subject to continual harassment. For instance, in January 1982, sixteen general secretaries of various unions were "reported to have gone into hiding for fear of molestation by the workers, some of whom cursed and cried for their blood."[26] In April 1982, the existing union leadership was deposed, and the TUC was placed under the control of an appointed Interim Management Committee made up of radical supporters of the new regime.[27]
The Workers' Defence Committees, especially as they operated during 1982, can also be seen as a profound challenge to the organized union structures that were supposed to represent workers' interests on the shop floor. Certainly, other Ghanaian governments had attempted to co-opt the labor movement. However, this was the first time in the nation's history that a regime had gone so far as to try to supplant actual union organization on the shop floor. As Emmanuel Hansen noted, "The WDC's became the main centres for the expression of shop-floor militancy and struggle within the labour process, first for the control of the labour movement and secondly for the control of the labour process itself."[28]
The PNDC was therefore able to mobilize a significant number of
workers, although outside normal union channels. For instance, when the Ghana Textile Products Company in February 1982 threatened to lay off half its workers because of the country's grave economic condition, the workers took over the factory. The government did nothing until March 1983, when the police attacked a WDC march in Tema. It then intervened and supported the workers, condemned the police action, and deported the expatriate manager.[29] More generally, workers turned out in large numbers at the continual rallies the PNDC had during 1982.
The new labor leaders, who had been appointed outside the traditional labor union structure, were then fatally compromised when the PNDC announced its economic reform package in 1983. There was no denying that the PNDC had made a fundamental reversal in its economic policies and that labor was no longer seen as particularly important to the regime. But no core of leaders existed around whom workers could coalesce in a concentrated wave of antiregime protests. In fact, the only leaders the workers had "appealed to workers to exercise utmost restraint whilst the leaders engage in consultation with the government in order not to jeopardize the long-term goals of the workers' struggles."[30]
Third, as with the devaluation, much of the urban population was already paying higher prices through the black market. Indeed, as early as 1970, Tony Killick had found that only 17 percent of items in stores were priced according to government controls; 11 percent were below the control price, but 72 percent of the goods actually cost more than they should have. In the urban areas, where most of the workers were concentrated, there was only a 30 percent observance rate.[31] Given the decay that Ghanaian administrative structures underwent after 1970, it is likely that even fewer of the controlled prices were being observed by the early 1980s. As one Ministry of Finance official noted,
It was not too difficult to reduce price controls. Price controls were for civil servants and others whose salaries were high . . . the only merchandise that was available was from the black market. You were lucky to get one bar of soap at the controlled price.[32]
In fact, the black market prices that most urban dwellers paid were, as explained in chapter 3, probably at least as high as shadow prices for most basic commodities.
Finally, the role of government repression must be made clear. Rawlings earned a universal reputation for being tough after he ordered the execution of three former heads of state. This reputation was bolstered by severe human rights violations during the first year of the PNDC. It must have been easy for the workers to imagine that the regime was more than willing to turn its violence on them should they publicly oppose the new reforms. Indeed, Finance Secretary Botchwey immediately made clear that criticism of the budget would be seen as a disloyal act:
The sudden alliance between certain negative elements in society and workers following the release of the 1983 budget is an attempt by such elements to hide behind legitimate workers' grievances and subvert an economic programme meant to put the economy right.[33]
Similarly, in 1988, shortly before the TUC was to elect a new leadership, Kojo Tsikata, the PNDC member in charge of security, warned,
The trade union movement is like a ship. . . . If we permit these infantile leftists, these super revolutionaries, these people who want to be more Catholic than the Pope to seize control of this ship . . . well for those of you who can swim "good luck," but for those of you who cannot swim, you better say your last prayers.[34]
Bates and others have noted that repression against trade unions often does not work because, especially in Africa, threats to the government usually come in the form of wildcat strikes rather than organized actions, which can be prevented by locking up leaders. However, the particular type of repression so evident in 1982, when violence was directed in a highly decentralized manner against many members of society, may have inadvertently deterred workers from engaging in any kind of antiregime activity because it was clear that even the ordinary person was susceptible to repression. Of course, the central role that repression played suggests that arguments about the political nature of Ghanaians have relatively little relevance in understanding the unfolding of post-1983 developments.
In fact, government repression did have a significant effect on labor's calculations concerning the amount of political space it had to operate
in. In December 1983, the interim committee of the TUC was voted out, and many pretakeover leaders of the congress were returned to power. The new leadership continued to attack the evolving economic reform program of the government. A. K. Yankey, the new head of the TUC, said, "The plain truth is that the ordinary Ghanaian, the poor worker, is suffering. And the government must know that there is a limit to human endurance."[35] Similarly, a resolution adopted by the TUC executive board in 1984 noted that
as a result of these IMF and World Bank conditions, the working people of Ghana now face unbearable conditions of life expressed in poor nutrition, high prices of goods and services, inadequate housing, continuing deterioration of social services and growing unemployment above all. . . . We caution government that the above conditions pose serious implications for the sharpening of class conflict in the society.[36]
In addition, sporadic worker protests embarrassed the regime. For instance, in January 1986, after a minimum wage announcement, workers in Tema marched through the streets while the local labor coordinator said that the increase in the minimum wage represented nothing more than "a slave-wage which is not our choice."[37]
However, while they continued to agitate about the reforms, union leaders clearly recognized that, given the nature and history of the PNDC, there were real limits to the government's patience in confronting actual protests. For instance, when the TUC sought to protest the Cocoa Board's retrenchments and the matter of paying out terminal benefits, the PNDC surrounded the TUC headquarters with armored cars.[38] Accordingly, trade union officials have adjusted their tactics. As one senior TUC official told me,
The TUC knows that if it had a militant policy with strikes it might end with the dissolution of the TUC. Then we would have the double task of trying to get reinstated and to help protect the workers' movement. We are working toward the survival of the workers' movement. Therefore, we use these methods [talks with government] rather than violence.[39]
In addition, the TUC was also handicapped by not having the analytic and organizational ability to develop an alternative to the government's
programs. The labor movement's organizational ability had been greatly weakened by the long economic decline and the various changes in leadership that the PNDC had engineered. Thus, protests against the government could only be viewed as a negative action, one that did not lead the country anywhere.
Despite the workers' timidity, however, by 1986 the regime was becoming increasingly insecure about popular reaction to its policies because of sporadic worker actions and increasing resistance to its economic policies among its cadres. As noted in chapter 3, the regime resorted to a foreign exchange auction in 1986 in part to deflect increasing pressure from the urban areas. The PNDC government has also occasionally capitulated to labor demands to avoid conflict. For instance, in 1987, the government announced that it was eliminating leave allowances for employees. There was a huge uproar throughout the country; and the TUC, under severe pressure from workers, asked government to review the announcement, which it eventually did.[40] Rawlings stated that it was strategically important to concede to the workers, but he warned that "members of the military and some trained militia [are] on standby and ready to take over essential services."[41] Thus, labor acquiescence in Ghana is not based only on repression but also on the government's at least occasional ability to adopt strategies that avoid outright political conflict.
As the ERP progressed, some workers probably began to do better economically. Unfortunately, the data that the Ghana Statistical Services provide on wages are so erratic that the figures cannot be used for any type of serious analysis. Therefore, it is unclear how workers' salaries have evolved over the last few years. However, it is evident to everyone in Ghana that the overall economic situation is improving and that the regime's policies are bringing benefits—even if these benefits are not immediately concentrated among the working class. As figure 6 shows, starting in 1983, Ghana has experienced a real increase in per capita income of approximately 2 to 3 percent each year. This is a spectacular performance given that the rest of the continent, on average, has experienced an annual decline of 1 percent in per capita income.[42] Of course, Ghana is still well below where it was even in the late 1970s, but there
Fig. 6.
Per Capita Income during the Recovery (1985 U.S. $)
Sources: R. Summers and A. Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5)," computer
disk provided by authors; and Enhancing the Human Impact of the Adjustment Program
(Accra: Government of Ghana, 1991), Annex Table 2.
has been enough progress to dissuade some from opposing the government. Some workers, notably those in gold mines, also are probably beginning to benefit from the upturn in their export-oriented industries that the devaluation caused. As the incomes of some workers increase, the potential popular coalition against the government weakens, making any kind of action against the government more unlikely.
Thus, through a combination of luck, repression, and political skill, the government was able to survive worker anger and implement a far-reaching economic reform program. This analysis accords with the developing conventional wisdom on economic reform, which finds that the coalition that develops to oppose cuts in subsidies and price increases during economic reform is often far less threatening than is usually imagined. For instance, Henry Bienen and Mark Gersovitz have noted that "urban food prices in African countries have in fact risen in recent years without endemic instabilities."[43]
The primary lesson of Ghana for the rest of Africa is that urban unrest cannot be predicted primarily on the basis of the severity of the economic reform program. For instance, because so few were benefiting from price controls and the overvalued exchange rate, the actual effect of the ERP on workers has probably been far less than the announcements would
indicate. Because the program hurt less than it appeared to and because opposing the regime publicly could entail large costs, popular unrest was not an attractive option.
Building a Coalition for Economic Reform
A much more interesting question than why urban labor has not been able to protest against the PNDC is whether the ERP would ever have allowed the Rawlings regime to develop a political constituency among the workers. It can be argued that rural dwellers are the obvious constituency for the PNDC regime because so much of the ERP is devoted to promoting agriculture. However, previous Ghanaian governments sought to marginalize the rural areas, and, as chapter 5 argues, it will be very difficult in the short term to effect any kind of political mobilization among this atomized population.
In addition, the urban population continues to have the potential to riot, at least in the minds of the leaders. While I have argued that this possibility is unlikely, fear of the urban population may still weigh heavily on the minds of Ghana's rulers. Indeed, Bienen and Gersovitz argue that African leaders have consistently overestimated the likelihood of urban riots.[44] Therefore, constructing an urban constituency may have been especially important to the PNDC, which, as a regime that came to power through a coup, knows that it too can be replaced.
However, it is one of the great ironies of present-day Ghana that precisely those factors that allowed the PNDC to implement such a drastic program of economic reform in the short run created substantial obstacles to creating any constituency, much less one based on the support of workers. The PNDC during the early days of the economic reform program, when it was unclear whether it could survive the popular uproar caused by the reforms, was small, not dependent on the support of any particular group, and willing and able to use force against opponents. To create constituencies, however, the PNDC must be able to consult and build support among other groups and appear to have put aside any recourse to violence. This may have been too great a transition for the regime to make.
For instance, one way that the PNDC could have at least begun efforts at establishing a constituency among workers would have been to develop closer ties with the unions. However, in direct contrast to previous
governments, which sought to co-opt the trade unions, the PNDC did not make any effort to associate the TUC more closely with economic programs. As one senior TUC official noted in an interview, "The impression given is that the TUC is part of the planning process but it is not. Since 1983 the TUC has not been consulted. We are not in a position to participate."[45] The government was clearly wary of the TUC after its muted protests against the ERP: tolerance of criticism is not one of the personality traits of senior government officials. Given the amount of mistrust that has developed between the PNDC and official trade union structures, it would have been difficult for the government to develop a constituency among workers through the TUC.
In addition, economic reform programs create problems for regimes trying to build constituencies, as opposed to simply trying to repress groups, because there are so few popular symbols around which to rally the population. In 1982, the PNDC had some success in mobilizing workers around pledges to bring about a "revolution." However, the visible symbols of the revolution are not at all obvious now that the government is collaborating so closely with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As PNDC member Mr. Justice D. F. Annan freely admitted, the "blood and thunder politics" of the early years of the PNDC are gone.[46] The obvious income disparities that have appeared, as at least some have become rich under the ERP, make it clear to all Ghanaians that, whatever else, the euphoric populist policies of 1982 have now been abandoned. Indeed, Rawlings in his 1990 New Year's speech was put in what, for him, must have been the highly difficult position of defending the well-to-do:
We need not condemn or resent all people merely for their affluence. We must acknowledge the fact that a great many people have taken full advantage of the economic conditions which the government has deliberately created to encourage individual initiative.[47]
Clearly, there was not much for the workers to rally around.
During the late 1980s, the PNDC made a concentrated effort to resurrect Nkrumah as a nationalist symbol, and there was at least some energy devoted to portraying Rawlings as Nkrumah's natural successor.
However, this effort was extremely difficult because, just as the regime was promoting Nkrumah's legacy, it was systematically dismantling the economic measures so closely associated with Ghana's first ruler. Thus, the state enterprises that Nkrumah established to control the commanding heights of the economy were being reformed or privatized; and price controls, which were previously portrayed as helping the poor, were eliminated. When taking these actions, the regime implicitly (and correctly) tied Ghana's economic decline directly to its first leader. Therefore, Nkrumah probably cannot serve as an important symbol for workers and others to rally around.
Another avenue open to the PNDC to build a constituency among workers was through the newly created local political structures. In early 1989, voters throughout Ghana went to the polls to elect citizens to 110 newly created district assemblies. These elections were done on an individual basis, without political parties. The PNDC hoped that the district assemblies would be the beginning of a decentralized political power structure that would not revert to the political abuses of the past.
However, it was unlikely that the district assembly system, as constituted, could have been used to develop constituencies in the urban areas. The urban population in Ghana has long benefited from a political system where numbers have not counted and where geographical proximity to the leadership guaranteed that politicians would seek to purchase the urban population's quiescence. In fact, the TUC rejected the idea of district-level elections.[48] Therefore, as discussed at length in chapter 5, it is not at all surprising that the Greater Accra area had by far the lowest turnout in the election.
A reflection of the fact that any electoral system that decentralized political power would inevitably diminish the urban population's political strength was the occupational composition of the members of the assembly. Throughout the country, approximately one-third of them were peasants; another third were teachers.[49] Ghanaians were electing those who had the most in common with themselves or those who had traditionally commanded respect in the local communities. In contrast, only 40 percent of the assembly members in Greater Accra were peasants or teachers while 24 percent (twice the national average) were in the civil and public service.[50] Thus, the urban population, even in an election
dedicated to decentralizing political power, chose those closely associated with the state to represent them. They thereby demonstrated just how difficult it is for a population group long used to automatically possessing political power to begin to develop indigenous leaders apart from the state.
The implications of the PNDC's being unable to develop an approach whereby it gains a constituency among workers are potentially significant. Clearly, the political logic of economic reform programs is that if a government is able to get through the immediate crisis posed by devaluation and the elimination of subsidies and price controls, it will be able to garner increased political support in the long term as the economy improves. However, given how reluctant the PNDC was to consult with the TUC or to develop viable symbols around which workers could rally, even if workers' incomes had begun to improve, it is hard to see how those gains would have translated into political support for the Rawlings regime. Thus, even as the economy improved, the regime remained isolated from the urban population, with the unnerving habit of occasionally lashing out and trying to impose labor discipline—which might have been volunteered by the unions had they been properly consulted.
Conclusion
The Ghanaian experience suggests that earlier examinations of the political implications of economic reform programs have fundamentally misunderstood the dynamics of economic reform. It has not been the case in Ghana, or many other countries, that the short-term sparks imposed by stabilization programs have ignited wide-scale popular protests threatening to the regime. In Ghana and elsewhere in Africa, the chances of wildcat strikes igniting urban popular protest are low and can be further decreased by skillful government policies. However, the Rawlings regime has not been able to develop noticeable support for its policies despite exceptional economic performance over the last few years. Thus, as with devaluation, even a government that successfully raises prices may not be able to develop long-term support for fundamental changes in institutional structures. Indeed, the very success in raising prices may have seriously compromised the structural adjustment effort.