1. Tibetan Review , June 1978, p. 4.; Feb. 1979, p. 9ff.; Feb 1989, p. 9. Deng Xiaoping had also raised the Tibetan Question on December 28, 1978 when he responded to U.S. journalists that "the Dalai Lama may return, but only as a citizen of China." And, "we have but one demand—patriotism. And we say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late." Deng added that even though the Dalai Lama disliked the government in the past, if he now likes it, the past is irrelevant. ( Ren min Ribau [ People's Daily , Beijing edition], "White Paper," 9 / 24 / 92).

2. Goldstein 1990.

3. From the "Report of the National United Front Work Conference," 23 January 1982, (Minzu zhengce wenxuan, Selected Documents of Nationality Policy . Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chuban she, 1985, p. 10), as cited in Sharlho 1992, p. 38.

4. National here refers to nationality or ethnic.

5. Summary of World Broadcasts . 30 May 1980 (NCNA in Chinese).

6. In China there are no "nationality" Communist parties. Consequently, the Communist party in Tibet is part of the one undivided Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and is subordinate to its policies.

7. It should be noted that the Han cadre withdrawal policy ran into many obstacles in Tibet because disapproving "leftist" cadre dragged their feet in implementation and because many of these Han cadre decided it was in their economic self-interest to remain in Tibet. Generally, the Chinese officials with special skills such as doctors, scientists, and so forth were eager to leave because they had no trouble finding suitable work, but those without such skills quickly found that they were worse off in the other areas of China. The central government had stipulated that their home province had to accept them, but had not stipulated that this acceptance would be at the same

salary and with equivalent perks. These officials also had their families with them in Lhasa, most of whom were earning income. When they came to realize that returning to inland China would mean a drop in their standard of living, a large number protested and insisted that the salary / perks issue be decided in advance, i.e., before they left Tibet. As a result of these issues, the withdrawal policy was never fully implemented. In fact, it probably had the unintended consequence of encouraging the best, most skilled cadre to leave and the least skilled to remain.

8. News Tibet . September-December, 1993, p. 7.; and a ms., Office of Tibet .

9. Beijing Review 49 (5): 10, 1984.

10. Tibetan Review (May 1983): 5.

11. In October 1982, e.g., the Office of Tibet in New York City submitted a fourteen-page document on "Chinese Human Rights Abuses in Tibet: 1959-1982."

12. One scholar (Dawa Norbu 1991) has written that the exiles raised these points at the 1982 meeting, but that appears to be incorrect.

13. The new strategy was finalized, it appears, after a series of high-level meetings between key Tibetan and Western supporters in New York, Washington, and London in 1986 / 87. The history of these developments has not yet been well-documented and details are still sparse.

14. In fact, he first visited the United States only in 1979, having previously been denied a visa for ten years (Grunfeld, unpublished manuscript).

15. News Tibet 22 (3) May / August 1988, p. 8. The exiled Tibetans had received their first explicit support from the U.S. Congress in July, 1985, when ninety-one members of congress signed a letter to Li Xiannian, president of the PRC, expressing support for continued direct talks and urging the Chinese to "grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration." (Point 14 of Section 1243 of Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 cited in U.S. Government Printing Office 1992.

16. The talk used "Greater Tibet" as the referent for "Tibet."

17. U.S. Government Printing Office 1992, p. 96.

18. Ibid.

17. U.S. Government Printing Office 1992, p. 96.

18. Ibid.

19. Much of this and the next section was adapted from Goldstein 1990.

20. This is the collective prayer assembly that was founded by Tsongkapa in 1408. It was banned at the start of the Cultural Revolution and had just been revived in 1986.

21. All but one of these were eventually released before the Prayer Festival started.

22. Other accounts of these events are found in Sharlho 1992 and Schwartz 1994.

23. Tibet Briefing , The Office of Tibet, New York City, 1994, p. 24.

24. It was strongly criticized, for example, by the Tibetan Youth Congress, the European Tibetan Youth Association, and the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Thupten Norbu, who sent a letter to Tibetans throughout the world attacking his brother's decision to relinquish the goal of independence. However, informed sources in Dharamsala say that the head of the Tibetan Youth Congress publically stated at a meeting at which he was being attacked for criticizing the Dalai Lama, that it was the Dalai Lama who asked him to take the hard-line stand, presumably so he could gracefully pull back from the terms he had just announced.

25. "Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation." Beijing Review (September 28-October 4 1992): 22.

26. The Dalai Lama's Department of Information and International Relations states in a background report that the Dalai Lama offered to send a ten-member religious delegation to participate. ( World Tibet News 30 Nov. 1995.)

27. Beijing Review , August 8-14, 1994. International Campaign for Tibet, 2 / 11 / 1994.

28. They are, therefore, coming not on orders from Beijing but because there are lucrative jobs to be had and money to be earned.

29. One is reminded of the difficulties indigenous populations in Malaysia and Indonesia faced trying to compete with resident Chinese.

30. Comment of Deng Xiaoping to Jimmy Carter, Tibet Daily (Ch. edition), 22 November 1993 (the comment was made on 29 June 1987).

31. Since Beijing does not have to worry about votes for its policy in Tibet, this is not a constituency in the normal Western sense. It resembles more the "facts on the ground" type of constituency that Israel uses on the West Bank, although these "facts" do not have citizenship in Tibet.

32. The very fact that Tibetan cadre were doing this illustrates the magnitude of Beijing's problem.

33. Tibet Information Network Update (1355-3313), May 6, 1997.