1. Moynihan 1994, pp. 66, 150. [BACK]

2. The U.S. example, of course, illustrates the issue of self-determination, not nationalism. [BACK]

3. Rong and Naigu 1994, p. 509. [BACK]

4. Richardson 1984, pp. 1-2. [BACK]

5. Victory in the representational war can be important. Despite the historical reality, the Tibetan exile government's representation of the invasion has generally prevailed—the U.S. Congress, for example, consistently refers to the invasion of Tibet as occurring in 1949 rather than 1950. [BACK]

1. Shakabpa 1967, pp. 39-40. [BACK]

2. These events were recorded in inscriptions carved on stone pillars in Lhasa that still exist. See Richardson 1985 for text of the treaty of 821 / 822 A.D. [BACK]

3. Kolmas 1967, pp. 12-15. [BACK]

4. Shakabpa 1967, p. 63.

5. Ibid.; Rossabi 1988, p. 41. [BACK]

4. Shakabpa 1967, p. 63.

5. Ibid.; Rossabi 1988, p. 41. [BACK]

6. Personal communication, E. Sperling, April, 1997. [BACK]

7. Shakabpa 1967, p. 133. [BACK]

8. Ya 1991, pp. 47-48. [BACK]

9. De Filippi 1937, p. 170. [BACK]

10. Ya 1991, p. 52. [BACK]

11. Kolmas 1967, pp. 41-42. Some of these areas such as Litang and Batang were returned to Tibetan jurisdiction in 1735. [BACK]

12. Communication from the Qing emperor Gaozong to the new amban after the death of Pholhanas, cited in Ya 1991, p. 55. [BACK]

13. Dung dkar 1983, pp. 124-125. [BACK]

14. The names and dates of birth of each candidate were to be written in the Manchu, Han, and Tibetan lanuages on metal slips and placed in a golden urn provided by the Manchu emperor. After prayers before the statue of the Buddha in the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, a slip was drawn, the Buddha ensuring that the correct slip was selected. [BACK]

15. This document was jointly drafted by Fu Kang'an, the incarnate lama Kyirong Hutuktu (representing the Dalai Lama), and the head administrator of the Panchen Lama. A translation appears in Ya 1991, pp. 72-83. [BACK]

16. Ya 1991, p. 72.

17. Ibid., pp. 83-84. [BACK]

16. Ya 1991, p. 72.

17. Ibid., pp. 83-84. [BACK]

18. Phuntso Tashi 1995, p. 296. [BACK]

19. Lamb 1960, p. 146. [BACK]

20. Richardson 1984, p. 78.

21. Ibid., p. 91.

22. Ibid., p. 272.

23. Ibid., p. 274. For more details on this period see: Goldstein 1989; Lamb 1966; Richardson 1984; Snellgrove and Richardson 1980; Ya 1991. [BACK]

20. Richardson 1984, p. 78.

21. Ibid., p. 91.

22. Ibid., p. 272.

23. Ibid., p. 274. For more details on this period see: Goldstein 1989; Lamb 1966; Richardson 1984; Snellgrove and Richardson 1980; Ya 1991. [BACK]

20. Richardson 1984, p. 78.

21. Ibid., p. 91.

22. Ibid., p. 272.

23. Ibid., p. 274. For more details on this period see: Goldstein 1989; Lamb 1966; Richardson 1984; Snellgrove and Richardson 1980; Ya 1991. [BACK]

20. Richardson 1984, p. 78.

21. Ibid., p. 91.

22. Ibid., p. 272.

23. Ibid., p. 274. For more details on this period see: Goldstein 1989; Lamb 1966; Richardson 1984; Snellgrove and Richardson 1980; Ya 1991. [BACK]

24. Teichman 1922, p. 14. [BACK]

25. Goldstein 1989, p. 51.

26. Ibid., pp. 51-52. [BACK]

25. Goldstein 1989, p. 51.

26. Ibid., pp. 51-52. [BACK]

1. Teichman 1922, p. 18. [BACK]

2. Goldstein 1989, pp. 59-60. [BACK]

3. Grasso, Corrin, and Kort 1991, p. 72. [BACK]

4. Li 1960, p. 130. [BACK]

5. Goldstein 1989, pp. 68-70.

6. Ibid., pp. 71-73. [BACK]

5. Goldstein 1989, pp. 68-70.

6. Ibid., pp. 71-73. [BACK]

7. See Lamb 1989, pp. 13-14, for a cogent discussion of Simla. [BACK]

8. See Goldstein 1989, pp. 41-212, for a detailed examination of this period. [BACK]

1. Goldstein 1989, p. 392 (cited from U.S. Foreign Relations , 1942, 103.91802 / 687). [BACK]

2. Woodrow Wilson's lofty commitment to freedom and self-determination can be seen from his February 11, 1918, speech to a joint session of Congress when he stated that, ''National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril" (cited in Moynihan 1994, PP. 78-79).

3. Ibid., p. 93. [BACK]

2. Woodrow Wilson's lofty commitment to freedom and self-determination can be seen from his February 11, 1918, speech to a joint session of Congress when he stated that, ''National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril" (cited in Moynihan 1994, PP. 78-79).

3. Ibid., p. 93. [BACK]

4. Goldstein 1989, pp. 391-392. [BACK]

5. Rupen 1979, p. 46. [BACK]

6. Ya 1994, pp. 417-418. [BACK]

7. Goldstein 1989, p. 625.

8. Ibid., p. 626. [BACK]

7. Goldstein 1989, p. 625.

8. Ibid., p. 626. [BACK]

9. Shikang (Xigang) province was created in 1927 out of ethnographic Tibetan areas that now comprise western Sichuan province. It was incorporated into Sichuan province in 1955.

10. Ibid., pp. 628-629.

11. Ibid., p. 630. By contrast, President Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet to begin patrolling the Taiwan Straits in June 1950 to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of Taiwan (Harding 1992). [BACK]

9. Shikang (Xigang) province was created in 1927 out of ethnographic Tibetan areas that now comprise western Sichuan province. It was incorporated into Sichuan province in 1955.

10. Ibid., pp. 628-629.

11. Ibid., p. 630. By contrast, President Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet to begin patrolling the Taiwan Straits in June 1950 to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of Taiwan (Harding 1992). [BACK]

9. Shikang (Xigang) province was created in 1927 out of ethnographic Tibetan areas that now comprise western Sichuan province. It was incorporated into Sichuan province in 1955.

10. Ibid., pp. 628-629.

11. Ibid., p. 630. By contrast, President Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet to begin patrolling the Taiwan Straits in June 1950 to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of Taiwan (Harding 1992). [BACK]

12. Mao 1977. [BACK]

13. In 1949-50, China was divided (by the Chinese Communists) into four large military-civil bureaus. These were charged with operating newly liberated areas until a time when "people's governments" could be established. The S.W. Bureau was in charge of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Tibet. [BACK]

14. Goldstein 1989, p. 715. [BACK]

15. So did the United States. [BACK]

16. India also argued that bringing up the Tibet issue at that time would hurt its efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Korea. [BACK]

17. Claims that this agreement is invalid since it was signed under duress are misleading. Certainly the Tibetans did not want to sign a treaty acknowledging Chinese sovereignty, but like many defeated countries had little choice. The Chinese negotiators on several occasions made threats to continue the invasion into Central Tibet if certain points were not accepted, but the Tibetan negotiators were never

themselves physically threatened and were free to refuse to sign an agreement right up to the end. Similarly, the common charge that the seal of the Tibetan government was forged by the Chinese is incorrect. The Chinese made only personal seals for each of the Tibetan delegates and these are what they used to sign the agreement. See Goldstein 1989, chap. 20, for a detailed discussion of this agreement. [BACK]

18. Goldstein 1989, p. 765.

19. Ibid., pp. 763-769. The Common Programme was the 1949 precursor to China's constitution.

20. Ibid., pp. 759-760. [BACK]

18. Goldstein 1989, p. 765.

19. Ibid., pp. 763-769. The Common Programme was the 1949 precursor to China's constitution.

20. Ibid., pp. 759-760. [BACK]

18. Goldstein 1989, p. 765.

19. Ibid., pp. 763-769. The Common Programme was the 1949 precursor to China's constitution.

20. Ibid., pp. 759-760. [BACK]

21. The development of U.S. involvement is discussed in detail in Goldstein 1989, p. 763 ff. [BACK]

22. Goldstein 1989, p. 794. [BACK]

23. Cited in Goldstein 1989, p. 798. [BACK]

24. Dalai Lama, interview with Goldstein, April, 1995. [BACK]

25. The author is currently completing a book-length monograph on Sino-Tibetan relations during the 1950s. [BACK]

26. Dalai Lama, interview with Goldstein, April, 1995. [BACK]

27. It is interesting to note that this was taking place while Mao was turning more leftist in China proper, launching the antirightist campaign in 1957 and the Great Leap Forward in 1958. [BACK]

28. Immediately after the 1959 uprising, monasteries were classified according to degree of involvement in the uprising. In those designated as "involved," most monks were either sent home or sent to work units (as laymen). A few monasteries not involved in the uprising such as Tashilhunpo, the seat of the Panchen Lama, continued to function as monasteries until the Cultural Revolution. In other important monasteries, a small number of monks were permitted to remain to look after their possessions, etc. The well-known destruction of monastic buildings, books, statues, and so forth mainly occurred a few years later during the Cultural Revolution in 1966-67. [BACK]

29. It should be noted that Deng Xiaoping was intimately involved in the Tibet Question. From 1949 to 1955 he was political commissar of the S.W. Bureau in Chongqing (which was in charge of the 1950 invasion and administration of Tibet). He moved to Beijing in 1955 where he served as general secretary of the party. [BACK]

30. UN Resolution 1723 (XVI) of December 20, 1961, cited in Van Pragg 1987. [BACK]

31. International Commission of Jurists 1959, p. iv. [BACK]

32. Public Records Office (FO371 150710), Feb. 20, 1960, letter from Christian A. Herter to the Dalai Lama. [BACK]

33. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter, October 14, 1959 (cited in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60, vol. 19, China . [BACK]

34. And presumably an indeterminate number of Tibetans in Tibet. [BACK]

35. Goldstein, Siebenschuh, and Tsering 1997, p. 108.

36. Ibid. pp. 109-110. [BACK]

35. Goldstein, Siebenschuh, and Tsering 1997, p. 108.

36. Ibid. pp. 109-110. [BACK]

37. Goldstein and Beall 1990, pp. 40-46. [BACK]

1. Tibetan Review , June 1978, p. 4.; Feb. 1979, p. 9ff.; Feb 1989, p. 9. Deng Xiaoping had also raised the Tibetan Question on December 28, 1978 when he responded to U.S. journalists that "the Dalai Lama may return, but only as a citizen of China." And, "we have but one demand—patriotism. And we say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late." Deng added that even though the Dalai Lama disliked the government in the past, if he now likes it, the past is irrelevant. ( Ren min Ribau [ People's Daily , Beijing edition], "White Paper," 9 / 24 / 92). [BACK]

2. Goldstein 1990. [BACK]

3. From the "Report of the National United Front Work Conference," 23 January 1982, (Minzu zhengce wenxuan, Selected Documents of Nationality Policy . Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chuban she, 1985, p. 10), as cited in Sharlho 1992, p. 38. [BACK]

4. National here refers to nationality or ethnic. [BACK]

5. Summary of World Broadcasts . 30 May 1980 (NCNA in Chinese). [BACK]

6. In China there are no "nationality" Communist parties. Consequently, the Communist party in Tibet is part of the one undivided Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and is subordinate to its policies. [BACK]

7. It should be noted that the Han cadre withdrawal policy ran into many obstacles in Tibet because disapproving "leftist" cadre dragged their feet in implementation and because many of these Han cadre decided it was in their economic self-interest to remain in Tibet. Generally, the Chinese officials with special skills such as doctors, scientists, and so forth were eager to leave because they had no trouble finding suitable work, but those without such skills quickly found that they were worse off in the other areas of China. The central government had stipulated that their home province had to accept them, but had not stipulated that this acceptance would be at the same

salary and with equivalent perks. These officials also had their families with them in Lhasa, most of whom were earning income. When they came to realize that returning to inland China would mean a drop in their standard of living, a large number protested and insisted that the salary / perks issue be decided in advance, i.e., before they left Tibet. As a result of these issues, the withdrawal policy was never fully implemented. In fact, it probably had the unintended consequence of encouraging the best, most skilled cadre to leave and the least skilled to remain. [BACK]

8. News Tibet . September-December, 1993, p. 7.; and a ms., Office of Tibet . [BACK]

9. Beijing Review 49 (5): 10, 1984. [BACK]

10. Tibetan Review (May 1983): 5. [BACK]

11. In October 1982, e.g., the Office of Tibet in New York City submitted a fourteen-page document on "Chinese Human Rights Abuses in Tibet: 1959-1982." [BACK]

12. One scholar (Dawa Norbu 1991) has written that the exiles raised these points at the 1982 meeting, but that appears to be incorrect. [BACK]

13. The new strategy was finalized, it appears, after a series of high-level meetings between key Tibetan and Western supporters in New York, Washington, and London in 1986 / 87. The history of these developments has not yet been well-documented and details are still sparse. [BACK]

14. In fact, he first visited the United States only in 1979, having previously been denied a visa for ten years (Grunfeld, unpublished manuscript). [BACK]

15. News Tibet 22 (3) May / August 1988, p. 8. The exiled Tibetans had received their first explicit support from the U.S. Congress in July, 1985, when ninety-one members of congress signed a letter to Li Xiannian, president of the PRC, expressing support for continued direct talks and urging the Chinese to "grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration." (Point 14 of Section 1243 of Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 cited in U.S. Government Printing Office 1992. [BACK]

16. The talk used "Greater Tibet" as the referent for "Tibet." [BACK]

17. U.S. Government Printing Office 1992, p. 96.

18. Ibid. [BACK]

17. U.S. Government Printing Office 1992, p. 96.

18. Ibid. [BACK]

19. Much of this and the next section was adapted from Goldstein 1990. [BACK]

20. This is the collective prayer assembly that was founded by Tsongkapa in 1408. It was banned at the start of the Cultural Revolution and had just been revived in 1986. [BACK]

21. All but one of these were eventually released before the Prayer Festival started. [BACK]

22. Other accounts of these events are found in Sharlho 1992 and Schwartz 1994. [BACK]

23. Tibet Briefing , The Office of Tibet, New York City, 1994, p. 24. [BACK]

24. It was strongly criticized, for example, by the Tibetan Youth Congress, the European Tibetan Youth Association, and the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Thupten Norbu, who sent a letter to Tibetans throughout the world attacking his brother's decision to relinquish the goal of independence. However, informed sources in Dharamsala say that the head of the Tibetan Youth Congress publically stated at a meeting at which he was being attacked for criticizing the Dalai Lama, that it was the Dalai Lama who asked him to take the hard-line stand, presumably so he could gracefully pull back from the terms he had just announced. [BACK]

25. "Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation." Beijing Review (September 28-October 4 1992): 22. [BACK]

26. The Dalai Lama's Department of Information and International Relations states in a background report that the Dalai Lama offered to send a ten-member religious delegation to participate. ( World Tibet News 30 Nov. 1995.) [BACK]

27. Beijing Review , August 8-14, 1994. International Campaign for Tibet, 2 / 11 / 1994. [BACK]

28. They are, therefore, coming not on orders from Beijing but because there are lucrative jobs to be had and money to be earned. [BACK]

29. One is reminded of the difficulties indigenous populations in Malaysia and Indonesia faced trying to compete with resident Chinese. [BACK]

30. Comment of Deng Xiaoping to Jimmy Carter, Tibet Daily (Ch. edition), 22 November 1993 (the comment was made on 29 June 1987). [BACK]

31. Since Beijing does not have to worry about votes for its policy in Tibet, this is not a constituency in the normal Western sense. It resembles more the "facts on the ground" type of constituency that Israel uses on the West Bank, although these "facts" do not have citizenship in Tibet. [BACK]

32. The very fact that Tibetan cadre were doing this illustrates the magnitude of Beijing's problem. [BACK]

33. Tibet Information Network Update (1355-3313), May 6, 1997. [BACK]

1. Although the golden urn lottery had been used on a number of occasions after 1792, it was not used for the last two Dalai Lamas or the last Panchen Lama. [BACK]

2. The late Panchen Lama in 1988 wrote why he couldn't return to Tibet in 1949, "The Kashag (the Tibetan local government in Lhasa) had not recognized me as Panchen, so I couldn't go to Tibet. (According to Tibetan tradition, the confirmation of either the Dalai or the Panchen must be mutually recognized.)" (Panchen Lama 1988, p. 11.) [BACK]

3. Tibet Press Watch , May 1995, p. 13, and Gyalo Thondup, comments made to delegation of National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1995, Hong Kong. [BACK]

4. Gyalo Thondup was in Beijing as part of a secret delegation sent by the Dalai Lama. They carried letters to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (see Dalai Lama 1993). [BACK]

5. Gyalo Thondup, comments made to delegation of National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1995, Hong Kong.

6. Ibid. [BACK]

5. Gyalo Thondup, comments made to delegation of National Committee on U.S. China Relations, November 1995, Hong Kong.

6. Ibid. [BACK]

7. FBIS—CHI-95-229, 29 November 1995, from Xinhua. [BACK]

8. Apropos of this, R. Barnett (personal communication, April 1997) indicated that the Dalai Lama had already worked with a BBC film crew doing a piece on the selection of the Panchen Lama, creating incontrovertible film evidence that he had done the confirming divination before the Chinese announcement so there would be evidence that he had actually confirmed the boy before the Chinese. This could have been used as a face-saving device among his followers in exile. [BACK]

9. These taxes were primarily to pay for the expansion of the army. [BACK]

10. The Regulations of 1792 began the custom of the Chinese-run golden urn lottery. [BACK]

11. The decree stated there was no need for "confirmation formalities" (i.e., the golden urn lottery). [BACK]

12. Ya 1994, pp. 309-312. [BACK]

13. Ya 1994, pp. 337-338. [BACK]

14. However, as mentioned earlier, Mao did not want to elevate the Panchen Lama to political equality with the Dalai Lama, so he rejected the proposal to treat the Panchen Lama as head of a "Back Tibet" centered on Tashilhunpo that was equal to the Dalai Lama's "Front Tibet" centered on Lhasa. [BACK]

15. FBIS—CHI-95-229, 29 November 1995, from Xinhua; FBIS—CHI-95-223, 4 November 1995, from Lhasa Radio. [BACK]

16. FBIS—CHI-95-223, Lhasa Radio Broadcast, 3 November 1995. [BACK]

17. Tibet Press Watch , May 1995, p. 13. [BACK]

18. Xinhua News Agency, May 7, 1997, cited in World Tibet News . [BACK]

19. The source for this is a senior Tibetan exile official. [BACK]

20. Copy of letter dated February 21, 1997, provided by the International Campaign for Tibet. [BACK]

21. Reuters, 20 January 1997. [BACK]

22. Reuters, Taipei, 27 March 1997. [BACK]

23. Internal unity among the exiles has been shaken over the past few years as a result of the Dalai Lama's willingness to forsake complete independence, and as a result of his prohibition of the worship of a Yellow Hat sect protector deity called Shungden. Threats have been made against the Dalai Lama's life, and in February 1997, a key monastic official working for the Dalai Lama was assassinated in Dharamsala by Tibetan dissidents. [BACK]

24. Actually, in a recent TV interview, the Dalai Lama responded to a question about Buddhism and violence with the intriguing response that "intentions" are more important than actions, and that if acts, even violent ones, are carried out with pure intentions, they would not be evil. [BACK]

25. Tibet Information Network News Update, 28 December 1996, SSN 1355-3313. [BACK]

26. The first "official" U.S.-Tibet contact appears to have taken place in 1908 when W. W. Rockhill, President T. Roosevelt's envoy to China, met the thirteenth Dalai Lama. (See Rowland 1967, pp. 36-37.) [BACK]

27. The U.S. CIA had informed the Tibetan guerrillas by the late 1960s that they were terminating U.S. financial support. [BACK]

28. Most of the support groups appear to have developed as an outgrowth of the first riots in Lhasa in 1987 / 88 (see McLaren, forthcoming). An interesting account of the place of Tibet in the Western imagination is found in Bishop 1989. [BACK]

29. Tibet Press Watch . May 1994, p. 5. [BACK]

30. Tibet Press Watch . October 1996, p. 5. [BACK]

31. President Bush, however, is said to have frankly told the Dalai Lama that he was limited in what the U.S. could do to help Tibet. [BACK]

32. Tibet Press Watch . 1991, vol. 3 (1): 17. The president has the option of commenting on these provisions to clarify the official U.S. position but chose not to, apparently to avoid irritating the pro-Tibet lobby in Congress. [BACK]

33. Herald Tribune , 22 November, 1993, p. 1. [BACK]

34. An article by Shimuzu (1996) cogently examines the Clinton Administration's China policy. [BACK]

35. State Department 1995, p. 4.

36. Ibid., p. 1. [BACK]

35. State Department 1995, p. 4.

36. Ibid., p. 1. [BACK]

37. World Tibet News , 11 April 1997 (press release from the Danish Tibet Support Group). [BACK]

38. The New York Times , 16 April 1997, p. 6. [BACK]

39. One is reminded of the fates of three other "Tibetan areas"—Sikkim, Ladakh, and Bhutan—all of whom, with different degrees of success, had to accommodate the interests of their powerful neighbor, India. [BACK]

40. He would also have to agree to the legitimacy of the Panchen Lama chosen in China. However, since a lama like the late Panchen Lama can decide to incarnate into several new bodies simultaneously, it is possible to have two incarnations of one lama and this should pose no insurmountable problem. [BACK]