The Manilian Law

At the beginning of 66, there were no less than four commanders of consular rank (not counting Lucullus) heading armies in the East that now totaled some seventeen legions; now for the fifth successive year since 70 more than half of the mobilized legionary strength of Rome was operating in the East.^[121] But this massive military effort on a variety of fronts was not yet over. The pirates had been tamed, the war in Crete was at last reaching its end, but in Pontus the Roman defense was paralyzed by Lucullus's lack of authority and the inertia or lack of resources of the new commander, Glabrio.^[122] Pompey's stunning success against the pirates pre-

sented an irrefutable argument for turning command of the Mithridatic War over to him in the current crisis. Although it was by a law of the tribune C. Manilius that the change of command was effected, this time strong support was forthcoming from within the senatorial leadership: no lesser men than the consulars P. Servilius Isauricus (cos. 79), C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76), Cn. Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 73), and C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73) openly supported the proposal, which made it safe for the new man Cicero, praetor in this year, to come forth in its favor and win credit with the urban populace thereby.^[123] Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) and Q. Hortensius (cos. 69), who led the opposition as they had against the Gabinian law on piracy the previous year, did not press the point unduly,^[124] and the law was passed without difficulty. The lex Manilia was not, in fact, overly controversial, for Pompey had convincingly justified the trust put in him the previous year.

Cicero's speech to the people in support of the Manilian law is a valuable document for investigation of Roman attitudes toward eastern empire as expressed in political rhetoric around the middle of the decade. We must not lose sight of the fact, of course, that the arguments employed in it must have been chosen for their appeal to its primary audience: the urban plebs , meeting in an informal assembly (contio ). Among Cicero's arguments for regarding events in Asia Minor with great seriousness, gloria imperil and the defense of allies naturally take their due place (Leg. Man . 4, 6, 11-14)—an important sign that these things did matter even to Roman city dwellers—but Cicero stresses above all the necessity to protect "your revenues" (vestra vectigalia ).^[125] The theme is struck immediately, when the Mithridatic War is first mentioned (bellum grave et periculosum vestris vectigalibus ac sociis , 4), and the phrase vestra vectigalia is repeatedly stressed (4 bis, 5, 6). "Your revenues" are after all "the sinews of the state" (17), and those in the province of Asia were the richest (maxima , 6, 14) and most reliable (certissima , 6) that Rome possessed.^[126] Asia, alone among the provinces, Cicero points out, was wealthy enough to pay

substantially more than was needed for its defense alone (14); while, according to the interpretation in chapter 10, revenues from it had increased vastly after the first dash with Mithridates, it had never required a sizable legionary garrison before then, nor indeed after Lucullus's victories over the Pontic king. The loss of Asia's revenues would entail the loss of "the adornments of peace" (pacis ornamenta )—a veiled reference to games, public buildings, and perhaps hoped-for grain subsidies and land distributions—and "the resources for war" (subsidia belli , 6).^[127] Of course, the war was not being waged in Asia provincia , nor had it been, save for the siege of Cyzicus, which was over as early as 72.^[128] Cicero needs therefore to stress at some length that in order to assure the flow of crucial revenues, Asia must be defended not merely from armed invasion, but even from any anticipation of one (14-15). A further argument aims more directly at individual interest. Many Romans, Cicero points out—not only equestrian publicani but others of all orders—have invested their fortunes in Asia (16-18; cf. 4). The beginning of the first war with Mithridates, when thousands of Romans were slaughtered and so many fortunes lost in Asia, "taught us" (nos docuit ) that private credit in the city of Rome itself depended on the survival of private investment in Asia (19). The degree to which this point must be elaborated, and the telling words "believe me," dearly imply that this argument is not so familiar to his audience, who are not themselves, for the most part, financiers, and about whose general indifference to the fate of his beloved publicani Cicero has shown himself to be more than a little worried (17-18). But many members of his audience may well have been borrowers, and so Cicero seeks to persuade them that they have a personal stake in the protection of Roman financial interests in Asia by reminding them of the collapse of credit twenty-two years before.

Cicero's arguments for the Manilian law clearly enunciate a new conception toward eastern empire, one that goes well beyond the maintenance of a hegemonial position and emphasizes above all the exploitation of the fruits of conquest not merely to maintain Roman strength in war but for the enjoyment of the Roman people in peace. Its origins can of course be

traced back to the Gracchi, who had first urged the use of Asian revenues to finance "your privileges" (vestra commoda ), as Gaius had put it.^[129] Yet before 69 the practical impact of such rhetoric was quite restricted. It was the confrontation with Mithridates and the pirates, and the threat that these hostile forces came to pose not merely to the finances of the state but to the direct, material interests of Roman negotiatores, publicani , and the entire urban plebs , that made the argument for exploitation virtually unanswerable. With the recovery of the fun powers of the tribunate the Roman people would permit no scruple of international diplomacy or constitutional tradition to weaken the effort to protect and augment its commoda . The result was a sequence of tribunician interventions into the affairs of the Eastern imperium , from Spinther's veto of peace with the Cretans in 69 through the Manilian law of 66, that at last sprang the latches of the old hegemonic attitude.