7
Treaties of Alliance
A number of treaties (foedera ) of alliance between Rome and various states of the East are attested through the second and into the first century B.C. It is in the nature of the evidence that very few of the attested compacts can be dated with full confidence to the latter half of the second century or early first. Because of the chronological uncertainty, widely divergent views are currently held about when association based on a formal treaty with Rome became a widespread phenomenon.[1] If it is a feature of the period that concerns us rather than of the earlier stage, during which the Roman imperium was first extended over Greece and the Aegean, then we must ask what the significance of such treaties was at a time when their ostensible purpose—to provide the framework of a military alliance against threats to Roman imperial security—seems largely obsolete. Recent treatments have stressed the symbolic character of the alliances in our period. For Dahlheim, a treaty was "the visible proof of Rome's good will" and satisfaction with a community's behavior, although he would allow it some concrete significance as a guarantee of local sovereignty.[2] Gruen goes farther: the treaties of this period had "a purely honorific character, signaling Roman benevolence, and couched in a formal phraseology whose effect
was symbolic rather than concrete."[3] The emphasis on symbolism is surely correct, but the nature of the message deserves closer scrutiny than it has thus far received.
It is necessary to state at the outset of this discussion that I accept the view that mere reference to "alliance and friendship" (
/societas et amicitia ) or to "allies" (/socii ) is not evidence that a treaty underlay the relationship.[4] Some recent attempts to emphasize the role and extent of treaty relationships between Rome and Hellenistic states have failed to refute this principle.[5] Those cooperating with Rome in war are naturally called "allies" in our sources regardless of treaty relationships, while even the official, diplomatic use of the title of /socius in the second century carries no demonstrable implication of the existence of a treaty. Many embassies from Greek cities "renewed goodwill, friendship, and alliance" before the Roman Senate[6] and heard their homelands honored as "fine and good, our friends and allies"[7] along with an answering "renewal" of goodwill, friendship, and alliance.[8] But these diplomatic courtesies do not refer to treaties, as is evident from the fact that the "renewal" of the alliance (along with goodwill and friendship) is not something that envoys ask for but simply is part of their representations before the Senate. As the juxtaposition of alliance with goodwill and friendship suggests, "renewal" here () implies only a verbal act, a Hellenistic diplomatic courtesy that had no necessary connection with a formal treaty.[9] The existence of a treaty can be presumed only where it is unambiguously indicated in the evidence.
Chronology
The unambiguously attested treaties of alliance with Rome of known date and within our period are those with newly independent Elaea (probably) not long after the conclusion of the war with Aristonicus,[10] with Epidaurus about 112/111,[11] with Astypalaea, an island city in the Dodecanese, in 105,[12] and with Thyrreum in Acarnania in 94.[13] These were all places of minor to minimal significance on the military and diplomatic map of the Hellenistic East.
A number of other treaties of alliance between Rome and Greek states whose precise date is uncertain may well belong to the period covered in this study. A treaty with Cibyra in Phrygia has been dated as early as the period between the Antiochene and Third Macedonian wars (188-167), but a fairly wide interval around the middle of the century now seems to be most favored in the absence of any sure chronological indicators.[14] A treaty (surely of alliance) with Heraclea in Pontus is mentioned by the local historian Memnon in a brief summary of early relations with Rome.[15] While Memnon's placement of the alliance at the conclusion of his narrative of early friendly contacts between Heraclea and Roman generals in
Asia Minor during the Antiochene War has seemed to suggest a date shortly after 189, it is not unlikely that Memnon anticipates a considerably later event, stretching beyond the temporal limit of that book, in order to provide the fitting conclusion for his account of the development of relations with Rome from "friendship" (
) to "alliance" ().[16] An equally wide chronological range must be considered possible for the preserved treaty between Rome and Methymna on Lesbos, often placed either somewhere between 167 and 154 or around 129 and the conclusion of the war with Aristonicus.[17]
Let us now cross the Hellespont to Europe. It is possible that Rome's alliance with Byzantium belongs shortly after the war with Philip Andriscus, presumably in the 140s.[18] A recently published inscription gives the text of a treaty of alliance with Maronea on the Thracian coast, which a growing consensus places shortly after 167.[19] The year 167 is, however, only a terminus post quem, based on the conjectured identification of the "Lucius" of line 8 of the inscription with Aemilius Paulus, conqueror of Macedon in 168.[20] Unfortunately, the arguments for connecting the treaty closely with that date depend on the assumption that Rome used treaties
with minor states in this period as diplomatic and strategic weapons, a view that at the very least must be considered much too doubtful to be made a chronological criterion.[21] The letter-forms of the Maronea treaty suit the later second century as well as its middle.[22] At some point under the Republic, Callatis on the west coast of the Black Sea also obtained a treaty of alliance with Rome, part of which survives. Again, the evidence for a date is scant and highly problematic.[23] The conclusion of such a treaty is difficult to credit during Mithridates' domination of the west shore of the Black Sea from around the turn of the second century until M. Varro Lucullus's campaign of 72,[24] nor does that general's conquest of Callatis (Eutr. 6.10) seem an appropriate context for Rome's granting formally equal terms of alliance.[25] G. de Sanctis acutely noted that the treaty with Callatis was to be published in Rome in the Temple of Concordia rather than, as in other known cases, in the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol; but these are insufficient grounds for the conjecture that the treaty must have been concluded between the burning of the Temple of Jupiter in 83 and its restoration in 69.[26] Orthography seems to point to the second century,
though the first is not excluded.[27] Recent conjectures have focused on the earlier period of Thrace-ward expansion by Rome, between 114 and 107.[28]
Arguments about the dates of these treaties often employ the unstated assumption that they should be related to the broad outline of Roman expansion. It is sobering to review with this notion in mind the dates of those treaties that are well fixed chronologically. Without the explicit evidence of date in the texts themselves, no one would have divined that Epidaurus and Astypalaea received treaties as late as the last two decades of the second century, or Thyrreum even after the turn of the century. The attempt to connect the known treaties to landmark dates in Roman intervention in the East is clearly misguided in the case of such insignificant powers, whose diplomatic aspirations are normally beneath the purview of ancient authors. The case of Elaea (probably 120s), as well as the much earlier precedent of Rhodes (ca. 164) and, likely rather later, Byzantium (140s?), does show that a not uncommon impetus for seeking alliance with Rome was the need to confirm good relations after a Roman war in the region. But to judge from the date of the treaties with Epidaurus, Astypalaea, and Thyrreum, this was dearly not the only likely occasion for a Hellenistic city to seek a treaty with the imperial center.
The treaties we have surveyed are with minor Hellenistic states, and are, with the exception of the case of Byzantium, known to us largely by chance—through the fortuitious survival of epigraphic documents, or (for Heraclea) due to the patriotic interest of a local historian. There is no strong evidence that Rome bound itself by means of a foedus to any minor Greek state before 148: the Achaean League (whose treaty with Rome was concluded in the late 190s or early 180s), the Aetolian League (bound in alliance to Rome by the peace treaty of 189), and Rhodes (granted a treaty ca. 164) were all noteworthy Hellenistic powers.[29] Moreover, the earliest
of the four foedera with minor Greek states whose dates are certain belongs no earlier than the 120s. It seems therefore most likely that most if not all of the alliances surveyed above belong after the middle of the second century. A pattern is then discernible: Rome's policy evolved from the formation of a minimum of formal alliances in the early second century, and those with major powers, to indiscriminate indulgence of the applications of the most insignificant states at century's end.[30]
The Nature of the Alliances
What is immediately striking about the treaties of which texts are extant is that they are virtually identical.[31] The treaty proper typically begins with a declaration of permanent "friendship and alliance" (
) between Rome and the other party on land and sea, and the seemingly superfluous addition that there is to be no war between them.[32] Following this comes a provision that neither party is to allow passage, with hostile intent, to enemies of the other, either through its own land or that which it controls; neither may it assist this third party with weapons, money, ships, or (sometimes) grain.[33] Each side is to come to the assistance of the other "as appropriate" () if a third party initiates war against it or its subjects.[34] A further clause allows amendment
of the treaty with the agreement of both parties.[35] Finally, arrangement is made for the publication of the alliance: one copy is to be set up in Rome on the Capitol, usually in the Temple of Jupiter; others in local places.[36]
The standardization of the form of these treaties suggests that the terms themselves were not a matter for discussion or negotiation. But it is equally clear that the initiative for the conclusion of the treaties came from the Greek side. Embassies from the Greek cities went to Rome to request a treaty;[37] Rome simply "accepts" them into its friendship and alliance as a reward for loyalty and faithful service. This is well illustrated by a passage in a decree of Elaea.
Since our People, from the beginning preserving their goodwill and friendship with the Romans, have given many other exhibitions of their friendly policy in the most pressing crises, and likewise in the war against Aristonikos have applied themselves with all enthusiasm and have undergone great dangers both on land and on sea, in consequence of which the People of the Romans came to know the friendly policy of our People, accepted our goodwill and have received our People into friendship and alliance.[38]
The individual Greek states set great store by these treaties. Embassies undertaken by citizens in order to request alliance with Rome are mentioned in honorific inscriptions as major benefactions to the city.[39] Archelochus of Epidaurus was honored by his city with a bronze statue in the most conspicuous part of the Asclepieum, tax exemption, and front-row seating in all civic contests for the success of his embassy to Rome to request an alliance.[40] The Elaean decree expresses this aspect so well that it is once again worth quoting in extenso:
The stephanophoros and the priests and priestesses and the magistrates on behalf of the citizens are to open the temples of the gods, offer frankincense, and pray: "For the good luck and safety of our People and of the Romans and of the Association of the Artists of Dionysos Our Leader (we pray that) for all time there will remain with us the friendship and alliance with the Romans." And there is to be presented a sacrifice, as fine as possible, to Demeter and Kore, the presiding goddesses of our city, and likewise to Roma and to all the other gods and goddesses. And the day is to be holy, and there is to be an exemption for the children from their studies, and for the household slaves from their work. And there is to be celebrated, after the sacrifice, a parade for the boys and young men, under the direction of the supervisor of the boys' education and the gymnasiarch.[41]
Why were these treaties of such great import for the cities that requested them? It is difficult to say whether the political leaders of the Greek cities in the later second or early first century expected that a treaty with Rome would assure greater security against external enemies than merely informal recognition as amici et socii . It is not impossible. There is no sign as yet of consciousness of a pax Romana ; piracy was growing, sporadic outbreaks of violence between neighbors still occurred, Thracians and other Danube tribes were still making devastating incursions into Macedonia and even Greece, and perhaps some Asian cities sensed that relations with the dynasts might not always be benign. The destruction or collapse of the great powers of the old Greek heartland along the Aegean shore left Rome as the obvious choice of protector. Under such circumstances it was only natural for the minor Greek states to attempt to provide for their future security by linking their fortunes to Rome. The oaths sworn for mutual defense may well have imparted a sense of security to the minor
states of Hellas.[42] Whether in fact these treaties availed them at all, or provided greater protection than mere recognition without a treaty as an amicus et socius , is however open to question. If they did not, this would explain the diminished frequency of treaties after the convulsion of the Mithridatic wars.
But defense can be only part of the story. The dearest example of the nonmilitary context of an alliance between Rome and an Eastern community is that of Rhodes ca. 164. For the Rhodians, a treaty of alliance is regarded as significant, not as an assurance of security against the military designs of a third party but above all as a mark of favor and an official and public recognition of friendship.[43] This "honorific" quality of the old form of the mutual defense treaty emerges from the special stress often laid in our texts on the publication of the treaties in Rome and in the home city. In the honorary inscription for Archelochus of Epidaurus to which we have already several times referred it was not enough to say that the embassy succeeded in its object of concluding friendship and alliance with Rome; details of publication must be added:
Friendship and alliance with the Romans were concluded for the city of Epidaurus, and (since) of the decree passed and handed over to the (Roman) treasury and of the alliance put up on a bronze plaque in the Capitolium—of (both) these (documents) copies have been delivered by him to our public archives—it has been decreed by the synedroi and the People to praise Archelochos (son) of Aristophantes.[44]
And we may note, in Memnon's mention of the alliance with Heraclea, his striking emphasis not only on publication but on the alliance's suggestion of equality in the relationship between the two cities:
And at last there came a treaty for the Romans and Heracleotes, stipulating that they be not only friends of each other but allies, against and in defence of whomever either party requested. And two bronze tablets carrying the pact, which was equal and identical, were nailed up, one in Rome in the Temple of Zeus [Jupiter] on the Capitol, the other in Heraclea, likewise in the Temple of Zeus.[45]
It emerges clearly that treaties of alliance forged a special link between minor states and the center of power, Rome—a link more tangible and more visible than mere enrollment on a formula amicorum .[46] A formal treaty of alliance was something one could point to "in the most conspicuous place" (
) in the city, and defined one's relationship with Rome in familiar Hellenic terms. This bond boosted civic pride and perhaps gave a welcome sense of security in a world in which the old centers of power were collapsing. And, no doubt, it could come in handy when a city wanted a favor from Rome. A special bond such as a treaty of alliance will have given point to the old courtesy of "renewing goodwill, friendship, and alliance" that we find so often in the speeches of envoys before the Senate.[47] Under the Principate, Greek cities typically reminded the Senate of such alliances if they existed,[48] and this will hardly have been different in our period.
What of Rome? Did the treaties have any particular significance for the hegemon? Given that the initiative came from Greeks, and that the treaties were sufficiently motivated by purely Greek concerns, we need not accept the often unexpressed assumption that they were in any sense instruments of Roman policy, a means of control, or of extending influence. Roman commanders made extensive use of local auxiliaries in military campaigns
in Macedonia and Asia Minor during our period,[49] and these requests seem to have been understood within a framework of
. The most explicit example is from a recently published document of Aphrodisias, dating to the 80s. The proconsul Q. Oppius commends the people of Aphrodisias for having sent troops promptly when he had requested them: "This you did just as it was incumbent on good allies and friends of the Roman people to do."[50] But mere recognition as amicus et socius sufficed; there was no need for a focal treaty of alliance to justify Roman requests for assistance. Roman documents imply that all amici or amici et socii are entitled to protection and care, without distinction between those with and those without a treaty.[51]
The large number of treaties with insignificant states that have been preserved for us by mere chance certainly suggests that a very large number eventually possessed treaties. But even by the Ciceronian age this class can hardly have been coextensive with that of "friends and allies," since the civitates foederatae were evidently a considerably smaller class than
even that of liberae .[52] Rome did not found its empire in the East upon the treaty relationship.
A final point needs to be made. Even those bound by a treaty seem to have been remarkably free to refuse assistance to Rome, as is shown by a noteworthy incident involving Heraclea Pontica. According to Memnon, Mithridates and L. Murena, preparing to dash in the so-called Second Mithridatic War, each sent embassies to Heraclea requesting military assistance against the other. Heraclea considered Rome's power terrible, Memnon writes, but feared Mithridates' proximity; so the city responded to both embassies that with the outbreak of a war of such magnitude they would hardly be able to protect their own territory, much less assist one or the other.[53] Heraclea was able officially to refuse compliance with a Roman request for aid—and apparently did not suffer for it, for when Bithynia was taken over by Rome, Heraclea was apparently at first left free. The city was made to pay tribute eventually only because it had rendered active aid to Mithridates' navy when it sailed the Bithynian coast early in 73.[54]
Rome concluded treaties of alliance with a host of minor states in the Greek East during the period 148-81, if we may judge from the number of known examples attested only by the chance survival of inscriptions. Around the turn of the century towns as insignificant as Thyrreum and Astypalaea had mutual defense pacts with Rome on formally equal terms. Gruen has rightly stressed Hellenic initiative in this process; Rome's role was more or less to hand out bronze tablets. The alliances were hardly instruments of Roman control, as were those that bound the states of Italy to Rome before the Social War. There is indeed evidence of some sense of mutual obligations between Rome and its amici et socii , but it does not appear that these obligations were based on formal treaties rather than on the loose, unregulated relationship of "friendship and alliance."
Greeks may well have expected some concrete benefits from their treaties with Rome: greater security, perhaps, and more influence at the center of power. But an equally important function of treaties was surely to ex-
press a dose connection to Rome in familiar and flattering terms. Mere enrollment in a formula amicorum was little distinction; a treaty of alliance on equal terms, posted in the Capitolium at Rome and in the most conspicuous place or places at home, was a dramatic expression of a special relationship to the caput imperii .
Rome's apparent lack of interest in use of the treaty of alliance as an instrument of control on the one hand, and at the same time its disinclination to discourage Greek efforts to employ the treaty of alliance to define their relationship with Rome, present a further illustration of Rome's unwillingness to revolutionize the institutions of the Hellenic world. Ostensibly equal alliances of Greek character were by no means incompatible with Rome's imperium , in view of the real disparity of power; indeed, as symbols of loyalty to Rome and of Roman favor they served well to advertise and affirm that imperium .