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Putting the Issue before the Voters

On July 20, the tobacco industry sued to stop the initiative. Two weeks before the deadline to submit ballot arguments, which the state mails to all voters, tobacco distributors filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and request for stay in the attempt to keep the initiative off the November ballot.[35] The distributors maintained that Proposition 99 violated California's 1978 property-tax-cutting initiative (Proposition 13), which they claimed allowed only the Legislature to increase taxes, and then only by a two-thirds vote. They also claimed that the collection of taxes for multiple purposes violated the “single subject” rule, a constitutional provision requiring that an initiative only deal with one subject. The tobacco industry's challenge failed, and the Coalition held press conferences labeling the suit as an “outrageous misuse of the legal process.”[35] The Coalition used the free media opportunity to further educate the voters about Proposition 99 and expose the tactics and misleading advertisements of the tobacco industry.

By early August 1988, Proposition 99 had established a substantial lead. The California Field Poll, released on August 10, revealed that 72 percent of the voters supported Proposition 99, 24 percent opposed it, and 4 percent had no opinion.[36] An August 11 memorandum from Charlton Research to Nicholl stated, “After several months of the opposition's paid media and our own free media exposure, voters favor the initiative more than ever before.”[37] Encouraged by the poll results, the Coalition launched another series of press conferences to generate free publicity.

In addition to the free media coverage that Proposition 99 was receiving, the Coalition also acquired a significant amount of free time for airing television and radio advertisements through the Fairness Doctrine, primarily because of the efforts of Campaign California. During the 1988 election, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Fairness Doctrine still required stations to broadcast both sides of controversial issues, even if only one side could pay for the advertisements.[38] Campaign California, which already had regional offices and staff throughout the state in all major media markets, negotiated with television and radio stations with the goal of acquiring one free pro-Proposition 99 advertisement for every three paid tobacco industry advertisements.[39] While not every station agreed with these terms or acknowledged the legality of the Fairness Doctrine, by the election campaign's end, Campaign


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California had negotiated approximately $1.5 million in free television and radio time using the Fairness Doctrine—in addition to the money and services Campaign California had already contributed to the effort.[31][40] The Coalition's use of the Fairness Doctrine was even more impressive in light of the FCC's stringent limitations on the application of the Fairness Doctrine, although the agency did not explicitly repeal it for ballot initiatives until later.[40][41]

Nicholl deliberately downplayed Campaign California's role during the campaign, in the interest of making Proposition 99 look very health-oriented and not political. As Nicholl explained,

You rarely saw Campaign California, you rarely saw Lloyd Connelly, you rarely saw the environmentalists, you only saw the health side, and that was conscious, that was my decision—to profile what was our primary selling point, which was a health measure. But I mean you shouldn't necessarily single out Campaign California in that regard, because the environmental thing was in a sense a weak link for us…and Lloyd, who was just absolutely instrumental in making this whole thing. But we didn't play him up either. And he was really wise in making sure that we didn't. But wise beyond our wisdom, I think.[6]

The Coalition spent what it could on paid advertising. One of the Coalition's more effective television commercials, produced by its media and public relations consultant, Sid Galanty, depicted James Almon, a smoker who later died of emphysema. The commercial showed a noticeably frail Almon, his labored breathing assisted with oxygen, admitting that it was too late for him. He went on to say that he wished he had known more about the dangers of smoking when he was younger and that Proposition 99 would help prevent people from starting to smoke. Almon had died by the time the commercial aired. Another effective commercial portrayed actor Jack Klugman asking voters which side they believed in the debate about Proposition 99—the tobacco industry or groups like the ALA, ACS, and AHA.

In August the Tobacco Institute's polls likewise showed that voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition 99—by 74.5 percent. Even after respondents were presented with every possible argument against Proposition 99, public support remained as high as 61.5 percent. This poll also showed the popularity of Proposition 99's anti-tobacco and education programs, which received the strongest approval rating (56.9 percent, compared with only 15.4 percent who somewhat or strongly disapproved), followed by wildlife habitats (55.9


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percent), hospitals (49.1 percent), and tobacco-related health research (45.1 percent). Money for doctors' services was much farther behind all other allocations, receiving the support of only 11.4 percent (48.5 percent somewhat or strongly disapproved).[42] The tobacco industry's commercials were affecting the public.

The Proposition 99 campaign also benefited from a reinvigorated ACS effort in September. ACS volunteers and staff had been assured that their principal contribution would be to gather signatures and that the campaign would be conducted by others. John Bailey, the new ACS executive vice president, was deeply offended by the tobacco industry's advertisements against Proposition 99 but discovered that, except for a few individuals, ACS was not involved in the campaign. Bailey, who had a background in politics, convinced the ACS volunteer leadership that “we won't have a chance like this one for the rest of the century and we better get off the sidelines and into the play.”[43] Bailey thereupon made passage of Proposition 99 the primary goal of ACS staff members throughout the state. When the PCL suggested a gimmick in the important Central Valley, “99 for 99,” a road tour of the major cities along Highway 99 from Redding to Chessfield, Bailey made sure ACS offices in Marysville, Stockton, Modesto, Fresno, and other valley communities got on board. The tour succeeded in gathering media coverage in this crucial vote-rich region.


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