The North-South War—Stage Two

Superficially, the cessation of hostilities in Hunan in November 1917 opened the way for a negotiated settlement of the issues that divided the north and the south. In reality, the cease fire only restored the unsettled conditions that had existed before the war began. There was still no consensus on how to reconstitute central authority in a way acceptable to all sides. Meanwhile, because political influence continued to be measured by military power, each "player" jealously guarded his military position. When the tenuous post-war military status quo was threatened, renewed civil war was inevitable. The potential for a military resolution of the political conflicts that divided the nation, however, was no greater than before. The war was fought by a hodgepodge of military forces, each with their own interests to consider. Instead of contributing to national reunification, the war increased the political autonomy of military commanders.

Efforts to resolve the issues that divided the north and the south peacefully were complicated by a lack of consensus within the two opposing sides. In the south, for example, Sun Yat-sen's supporters favored continuing the war to achieve all their original "Constitutional Protection" aims and the overthrow of Beiyang power in Beijing. In contrast, Guangxi's military leaders were willing to negotiate a settlement with the Beijing government, particularly if it recognized the new status quo. To encourage this end, Lu Rongting and Tan Haoming forced their Hunan allies to halt their advance short of Yuezhou as a gesture of good faith to the Beijing government.^[39] Although Guangxi military power was sufficient to force this concession, gaining acceptance of a negotiated settlement with Beijing was another matter.

In the north, Beiyang commanders also remained sharply divided, despite the apparent defeat of Duan's war policy. Only two weeks

after Duan's resignation, a rump dujuntuan of Duan's supporters met to demand a counterattack against the south.^[40] Duan also worked to rebuild a northern military coalition to force Feng to abandon his mediation efforts. His most important accomplishment to this end was the acquisition of Japanese military loans that would eventually total 77,838,213 yen (approximately 50,000,000 yuan).^[41] The ostensible purpose of these funds was to prepare Chinese forces for participation in World War I, and Duan was put in charge of these preparations by his appointment in mid December as head of a new office, the War Participation Board.^[42] Duan, however, used this military aid to court the support of military commanders for a renewed campaign against the south. The importance of the patronage power Duan gained from these funds should not be underestimated. Even Zhang Jingyao, one of Duan's most constant political supporters, only pledged his forces to the campaign after Duan agreed to a long list of demands, including the provision of weapons and funds to allow an expansion of Zhang's army.^[43] As in the case of the reorganization loans received by Yuan Shikai in 1913, foreign aid strengthened the inclination to turn to military force for the resolution of political conflicts.

Feng's efforts to reach a mediated settlement were also hampered by a general Beiyang reluctance, even among Feng's closest supporters, to yield any real power to the south. Duan could use this concern to his advantage. For example, in early 1918 one of Duan's allies, Xu Shuzheng, reminded northern military commanders that the south's real goal was "the overthrow of Beiyang military men." Thus Xu argued that military action against the south was necessary not only for the good of the nation but "in order to determine the survival or annihilation of the entire Beiyang military group."^[44] When events in Hubei and Hunan led to further Beiyang losses, the tide turned away from Feng's policy and back to Duan's program of military unification.

The first important threat to Beiyang interests after the retreat from Hunan came when non-Beiyang forces in Hubei declared independence. Shi Xingchuan, the Hubei 1st Division commander, broke with Beijing on December 1, 1918. The commander of the 9th Division, Li Tiancai, followed suit on December 16.^[45] Shi and Li had grown dissatisfied because of Wang Zhanyuan's tendency to give preferential treatment, and pay, to Beiyang-based units.^[46] By allying themselves with the advancing southern armies, Shi and Li saw a chance to end their subordination to Wang and perhaps even remove him from

Hubei. By this political move, Shi and Li also made the transition into warlordism.

One impediment to Shi and Li's aspirations was their inability to secure the backing of all their subordinates. Li Tiancai's main support came from the Yunnan-Guangxi officers and men, concentrated primarily in his 17th Brigade, who had served under him since before the 1911 Revolution. The 18th Brigade, led by Zhang Liansheng, rejected Li's overtures and pledged continued allegiance to Wang Zhanyuan. It was no coincidence the 18th Brigade consisted primarily of officers and men from northern and central China who had been attached to Li's command during the 1911 Revolution. Indeed, although Zhang was a native of Beijing, many of his officers and the majority of men came from Shandong, facilitating co-provincial ties with Wang Zhanyuan.^[47] Liu Zuolong, commander of the Hubei 1st Division's 2d Brigade, also declined to follow his commander's lead. Liu's brigade was garrisoned in small scattered units in eastern Hubei. Cut off from Shi Xingchuan's main base at Jingzhou in central Hubei, Liu may have seen continued loyalty to Wang as his only alternative.^[48] Whatever combination of factors influenced Zhang Liansheng and Liu Zuolong to remain loyal to Beijing, the fact that they were forced to make such a decision again showed how civil war politicized military men. Zhang and Liu were confronted with a situation that divided their allegiances. Whether moved by political principles or personal interests, their decision not to follow their immediate superiors into independence was a political choice. In the end, Zhang and Liu made the most politically perspicacious decision. Rather than Shi and Li riding to success on an advancing wave of southern victories, the Guangxi-ordered halt before Yuezhou left them stranded in a vulnerable position.

Despite their inability to maintain control over all their forces, Shi and Li's independence did present a threat to Beiyang interests in central China. Garrisoned at Jingzhou and Xiangyang respectively, Shi and Li controlled a wide swath of counties reaching across central Hubei from Hunan to Henan. Whoever held this territory could block the northern approach to Sichuan, provide a path for a southern encirclement of Wuhan, or even facilitate a southern drive into north China. Wang Zhanyuan originally attempted to prevent an outbreak of hostilities by accepting Shi and Li's initial public explanation that their assertion of independence was merely an attempt to preserve local order while adding pressure for peace negotiations. In his own negotiations with the two men, Wang even appeared willing to recog-

nize their autonomous military status, but only if they returned administrative control of their territories to his government. Shi and Li, though, demanded the removal of all northern troops from Hubei as their price for a settlement.^[49] This Wang could not accept. The rise of other "Constitutional Protection" forces in Shi and Li's territories, often led by revolutionaries supporting Sun Yat-sen's anti-Beiyang goals, increased the threat of the Hubei independence movement to northern power. By early January, all Beiyang leaders, including members of the peace party, agreed on the necessity of suppressing the independent Hubei forces.^[50]

The northern attack on Shi and Li began in mid January 1918. From the north, the 3d Division under the command of Wu Peifu attacked Li Tiancai's forces along the Han River. At the same time, Wu Guangxin, who had retreated to the Sichuan-Hubei border after his failure in Sichuan, attacked Shi Xingchuan's army from the west along the Yangzi. Caught between these attacking forces and the heavily garrisoned Wuhan area held by Wang Zhanyuan, Shi and Li were soon defeated. Shi's forces split into two parts, some going south to join the Hunan army while the rest retreated to Hubei's southwestern border, while Shi himself retired to Shanghai. Li Tiancai led his troops in retreat from northwestern Hubei into eastern Sichuan.^[51] Although the Hubei independent forces would survive for several years, they ceased at this point to be a serious threat to Beiyang power in Hubei.

A second incident increasing north-south tensions was the occupation of Yuezhou by southern forces on January 27, 1918. Hoping to encourage peace negotiations, Tan Haoming had initially resisted pressure from the Hunan army either to drive the northern armies from Yuezhou or to provide military assistance to Shi and Li in Hubei. Nonetheless, he conceded that a northern attack on the independent Hubei forces might necessitate the seizure of Yuezhou to safeguard Hunan's northern border. When the attack on Shi and Li came, there was a noticeable buildup of northern troop strength in Yuezhou. This compelled Tan to give in to Hunan demands to seize Yuezhou. As the Hunan army advanced, Yuezhou's defending northern forces yielded the city without a fight.^[52]

As these events unfolded, northern and southern peace advocates continued to seek ways to prevent the spread of war. The northern units at Yuezhou were primarily allied to Feng Guozhang, and their withdrawal was an attempt to avoid a conflict that would harm Feng's mediation efforts. Lu Rongting in turn sought a settlement based on a

tradeoff between the defeat of the independent Hubei forces and the northern withdrawal from Yuezhou. Feng quickly found, though, that he could no longer restrain the growing impatience of the Beiyang war party. Therefore, only several days after the fall of Yuezhou, Feng ordered preparations for a counterattack on Hunan. The rehabilitation of Duan's war policy was completed when Duan returned to the premier's office on March 23, 1918. However, Duan's policy had already been implemented several weeks before with the renewal of hostilities in Hunan.^[53]

The northern counterattack on Hunan that began in early March 1918 sought to overwhelm its southern opponents with a massive deployment of troops. In the vanguard of the invasion was Wu Peifu, leading the 3d Division and four Zhili mixed brigades in a direct assault on Yuezhou. Following in Wu's wake was a second major northern force led by the 7th Division commander, Zhang Jingyao. Finally Zhang Huaizhi, the military governor of Shandong, led a flanking attack on eastern Hunan from Jiangxi with an expeditionary army of Jiangsu, Shandong, and Anhui units. The total number of northern troops involved in this campaign eventually reached around 150,000 men.^[54] The defending Hunan and Guangxi armies were unable to withstand this onslaught. On March 18, Wu Peifu took Yuezhou. On March 26, his troops entered Changsha. By April 21, Wu's troops had reached Hengyang, the gateway to southern Hunan. Despite a counterattack by Hunan forces that inflicted a serious defeat on Zhang Huaizhi and cost Liu Jianfan his life, the northern advance could not be stopped. The Guangxi army retreated to the Hunan-Guangdong border, leaving the Hunan army with only a tenuous hold on Hunan's southern and western counties.^[55]

The Hunan army was only saved from complete defeat when the northern military alliance created for the attack on Hunan began to unravel over the distribution of the war's spoils. Wu Peifu's forces had been responsible for most of the northern victories in both Hubei and Hunan. Nonetheless, after the capture of Changsha Duan promoted Zhang Jingyao, whom he considered a more loyal supporter, to the position of Hunan military governor. Duan then ordered Wu to continue his advance into Guangdong. Much like Wang Ruxian and Fan Guozhang before him, Wu was unwilling to continue expending his military forces for someone else's benefit, and soon after the capture of Hengyang, he halted his advance. Acting on his own authority, Wu then negotiated a cease fire with the southern armies.^[56] Given the importance of Wu's forces to the whole northern campaign, this action

effectively ended the fighting. The result was a military and political stalemate that would last for two years.

Wu Peifu's decision to defy his orders and cease fighting was a perfect example of the triumph of warlordism. Duan's dependency on commanders like Wu to enforce his military policy enabled them to provide or withhold their support on their own terms. In early July 1918, Wu publicly justified his action, saying: "Although military men are duty-bound to obey orders, they must also weigh the advantages and disadvantages in order to follow suitably. This would not be disobedience."^[57] With this bold, if disingenuous, rationale for the political autonomy of military commanders, Wu was claiming his right to decide the appropriateness of the orders he received. In this instance, Wu justified his cease fire as a suitable response to the "policy of national doom" he purported to see in the war in Hunan. Although originally a strong supporter of Duan's war policy, he now called for the opening of peace talks. This rather sudden conversion from the advocacy of war to the promotion of peace suggests that the "advantages and disadvantages" that Wu considered included a recalculation of his own personal interests. Whatever reasons actually influenced Wu's behavior, his assertive political autonomy was a logical outcome of the militarization of Chinese politics.