Appendix VI
Spartan, Theban, and Athenian Forces in 378
In chapter 5, I state that the infantry force fielded by the Spartans and their allies in 378 was roughly double the size of that fielded by the Athenians and Thebans. Diodoros 15.26.2-4 and 32.1-2 provides the only direct testimony about the numbers of men in the field on various occasions in 378. The figures given by Diodoros lead to the impression that something over 18,000 Peloponnesian infantry and 1,500 cavalry under Agesilaos confronted some 12,000 Theban and Athenian hoplites and over 2,000 cavalry in the campaign of 378 (so Munn 1987, 133 note 82, e.g.). I now believe that these numbers are essentially sound as far as Theban and Athenian forces are concerned but that the total force led by Agesilaos was significantly larger than the 18,000 infantry mentioned in 15.32.1.
My reasons for reconsidering the size of the force led by Agesilaos derive from an analysis of the system of the Peloponnesian levy described by Diodoros 15.31.1-2, the details of which will be set forth in a separate study. The essence of the evidence for a total Peloponnesian levy of some 30,000 infantry (mostly but not all hoplites) is the statement of Xenophon Hell . 5.4.15 that in the winter of 379/8 Kleombrotos left Sphodrias at Thespiai with one-third of the allied contingents (and money to hire mercenaries), combined with the statement by Diodoros 15.29.6 that Sphodrias invaded Attica with "more than 10,000 soldiers." These figures deserve to be taken at face value, and they yield the figure 30,000 as an approximation of the total Peloponnesian levy of 378. The figure given by Diodoros 15.32.1 for the size of Agesilaos' infantry force, over 18,000 men, refers specifically to the force brought by Agesilaos from the Peloponnese. These, combined with Sphodrias' "more than 10,000 soldiers"
already in Boiotia again yield a figure of close to 30,000 Peloponnesian infantry in the field against the Thebans and Athenians in 378.
Theban numbers can be estimated from Diodoros 15.26.2-4, where out of a total force of "no less than 12,000 hoplites and more than 2,000 cavalrymen" assembled at Thebes for the siege of the Kadmeia, 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalrymen are Athenian. Not all of the remaining 7,000 hoplites and 1,500 cavalrymen were Thebans, strictly speaking, since Diodoros reports that the Thebans were reinforced by many men from other Boiotian cities. The distinction is perhaps not very important, however, since Xenophon Hell . 5.4.46 notes that between the campaigns of 378 and 377, substantial numbers from Boiotian cities (literally, "the demos") moved to Thebes to continue their opposition to Spartan-supported oligarchies in Boiotia.
These numbers are controlled to some extent by the accounts of Xenophon Hell . 4.2.17, in which about 5,000 Boiotian hoplites and 800 cavalrymen fought at the battle of the Nemea River in 394 (when the numbers of both arms are said to be low owing to the absence of the Orchomenians); of Diodoros 15.52.2, in which a total levy of Thebans and all willing Boiotian allies before the battle of Leuktra in 371, when Theban fortunes were at a low ebb, amounted to not more than 6,000 men, presumably hoplites; and of Plutarch Pel . 31.2-3 and 35.1, which report levies of 7,000 hoplites not long after Leuktra (see the discussion of these figures by Anderson 1970, 197-98).
In addition to hoplite numbers, we must allow for a sizable force of peltasts and other light-armed troops at the disposal of the Thebans. We have no direct evidence for their numbers, however, and we can only conjecture. A figure of 4,000-5,000 light infantry, Boiotian and mercenary (Xenophon Hell , 5.4.54), seems a fair guess, and one more likely to be too small than too large. That the Thebans, and Boiotians generally, were able to field large numbers of light-armed troops is indicated by Thucydides 4.93.3, in which more than 10,500 light-armed and peltast troops accompanied a Boiotian levy of 7,000 hoplites at Delion in 424.
As to Athenian forces, we possess more numbers but not necessarily more certainty. Diodoros 15.26.2 and 15.32.2 report that the Athenians sent 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry to Thebes on the occasion of the uprising in 379/8, and again 5,000 infantrymen (probably hoplites) and 200 cavalry to Thebes during Agesilaos' campaign of 378. These expeditionary forces represent some fraction of the total Athenian levy, the remainder of which must have been available for home defense—a critical concern during this war.
Diodoros 15.29.7 reports that at the beginning of the war in 378, the Athenians voted to enroll 20,000 hoplites and 500 cavalrymen. There are problems with these figures. The number of cavalrymen is unduly small if it represents a total enrollment, since the Athenians fielded expeditionary forces of around 600 cavalrymen in 394 (Xenophon Hell . 4.2.17) and 400 cavalrymen in 364 (Xenophon Hell . 7.4.29), and by the 350s the Athenians had a statutory enrollment (perhaps not always maintained) of 1,000 cavalrymen (Xenophon Hipparch . 9.3; see the discussion of Bugh 1988, 145-58). It is, moreover, hard to believe that the 500 cavalrymen sent to Thebes early in 378 (Diodoros 15.26.2) constituted the entire Athenian cavalry force. The true number must have been somewhere between 500 and 1,000.
The number of 20,000 hoplites is incredibly large. The Athenians never put anything like that number into the field on this or any other occasion. The number is either an absurdly optimistic and impossible goal set by the demos (which is perhaps a possible explanation, in view of the desperate situation), or it is an outright error. Polybios 2.62.6 states that the Athenians put 10,000 soldiers into the field in 378 (
), which is a much more plausible fig-ure, but one that is still vague in certain respects. The figure does not distinguish hoplites from cavalry (both called by Diodoros 15.29.7) nor from light-armed infantry. It might represent the total of all of these arms put into the field by the Athenians, but I think that it more likely represents the number of Athenian hoplites, metics as well as citizens, mobilized during the war. With 5,000 hoplites regularly sent to reinforce the Thebans, this would leave a plausible 5,000 more hoplites on guard in Attica.
The 5,000 hoplites for home defense would not have been the choicest troops. They would have been composed largely of the youngest (18-19-year-old) and oldest (40-59-year-old) age-classes, and possibly of men whose qualifications for hoplite service were otherwise marginal. They would have been best suited for garrison duty in Athens and Peiraeius and in the forts of Attica (cf. Thucydides 1.93.6, 105.4, 2.13.6-7). This number, divided roughly in half with about 2,500 hoplites for the walls of Athens and Peiraieus and the rest for the garrison forts of Attica, is plausible as an absolute minimum estimate for defensive forces at a time when a large enemy army was operating nearby. Strengthening these forces through the addition of mercenaries was probably a continual concern of the Athenians (see chapter 5, pp. 168-70 and note 61 on garrison strength at this time).
The figure of 10,000 for a total Athenian hoplite force, at least half of whom were required for home defense, derives support from expeditionary numbers attested before and after 378. Xenophon Hell . 4.2.17
reports that about 6,000 Athenian hoplites fought in the battle of the Nemea River in 394. Assuming that this force comprised all eligible hoplites in the 20-49-year-old age-classes, the figure indicates a total hoplite force of men 18-59 years old of 9,375 (see the percentages provided by Hansen 1985, 12, and cf. the calculation of Athenian hoplites in 394, before casualties, at a minimum of 9,250 by Strauss 1986, 80). Diodoros 15.63.2 reports that the Athenians sent a force of 12,000
under Iphikrates into the Peloponnese in 369. This was a full levy, that even included the , the 18-19-year-olds, the cavalry, and quite likely light-armed Athenians as well (Diodoros 15.63.2; Xenophon Hell . 6.5.49, 52). On these numbers and their relation to the total Athenian citizen population, see the discussion of Hansen 1985, 36-43.
The number of light-armed troops available to the Athenians is strictly a matter of conjecture. Strauss 1986, 81, estimates the number of Athenian thetes, the poorest Athenian census class, in 394 at 5,000-7,000. Allowing for an increase in numbers by 378, we could conjecture that Diodoros' figure of 20,000 refers to a combined mobilization of 10,000 hoplites and 10,000 thetes. We are still far from any estimate of Athenian light-armed troops, however, since it is highly probable that the vast majority of Athenian thetes performing military service did so as rowers in the fleet. For light infantry, the Athenians must have been heavily dependent upon mercenaries.