APPENDICES
Appendix I
The Dema Wall Saltcellar
During the excavation of the Dema house, a nearly complete black-glazed saltcellar was discovered "built into the rubble fill of the Dema wall" ("Dema House," 100, no. 99). Through the kindness of Professor J. E. Jones and Dr. B. Petrakos, Ephor of Antiquities of Attica, in 1978 I was able to examine this saltcellar, which was being stored with the finds from the Dema house in the Areos Street apotheke of the Greek Archaeological Service in Athens. Professor Jones also described how the piece was spotted by Mr. Sackett as he was sitting atop the wall: it was wedged between stones of the fill of the wall and had to be pried out with some difficulty. The wall-section from which the saltcellar came, between the railroad and sally port 11, had been reduced in height, evidently by stone-robbing (see DEMA 161). As a consequence, the original fill of the wall was more exposed here than is usually the case. Originally, the saltcellar was buried well within the fill of the wall. The piece is therefore securely associated with the construction of the wall, and its date provides a terminus post quem for the construction.
Concave-walled saltcellar Figure 43
Dema House no. 99. Single fragment approximately three-quarters complete. H. 0.027 m, D. of rim 0.059 m, D. of foot 0.062 m. Flaring ring foot, underside of foot rounded. Underside of bowl convex. Outside of foot continuous with curve of concave wall; curve of wall nearly symmetrical, extending slightly further below. Point of minimum diameter at midpoint of wall. Rim rounded. Floor of bowl rises in a continuous curve, inward turning at junction with rim. Good black glaze on all surfaces. Attic.
Published as catalog no. 99 in "Dema House," 100 (note that the diameter given there as 0.081 is an error for 0.061) and p. 101, with figure 7, p. 92, and plate 29.
The date of this piece given in the publication of the Dema house is mid fourth century on the basis of comparanda from the Athenian Agora, and it is therefore regarded as substantive confirmation of the 337-336 B.C. date for the Dema wall given in DEMA 186-89. There are a number of such saltcellars from dated deposits in the Agora, and they range in date from the late fifth century to the beginning of the third century. A series of examples arranged according to their deposit dates reveals a corresponding shape development according to which a date may be given to the Dema wall saltcellar. Such a comparison shows that the Dema wall saltcellar cannot be as late as the middle of the fourth century, and a date for the wall a good deal earlier in the fourth century than that proposed by Jones, Sackett, and Eliot is entirely possible on the basis of this, the only closely datable artifact which has a direct bearing on the construction date of the Dema wall.
Within the series of Attic concave-walled saltcellars of this type, there are a number of variable features, such as details in the profiles of the resting surfaces and rims and variable height/diameter ratios, which seem to have no chronological significance. The one feature that does change in a consistent manner over time is the profile of their concave walls. Examples early in the series have symmetrically curving walls, with the point of minimum diameter no higher than midway up the wall. By the second quarter of the fourth century, the curve of the wall becomes noticeably sharper toward the top, and the point of minimum diameter has correspondingly moved to about two-thirds of the way up the wall. These traits continue to develop into the third quarter of the fourth century, with the difference between the shallow curve of the lower two-thirds of the wall and the sharp curve of the upper third becoming more pronounced and producing a rim that overhangs the wall more noticeably than do examples from the first half of the century (cf. the description in Agora XII, 137).
This shape development can be observed in the series of saltcellars from the Athenian Agora illustrated in figure 43. The pieces are arranged according to deposit dates, from left to right beginning with the middle row:
P17422, published by Young, Hesperia 20 (1951): 195 and note 178, with plate 66c, as part of a group of sherds which "probably belonged to [a] table service . . . in the late fifth and early fourth centuries." Cited by Sparkes and Talcott as a parallel to no. 935, dated 425-400 B.C. From deposit A 20:6b, dated ca. 425-400 B.C., see Agora XII, 383.
Uninventoried, unpublished. From deposit Q 15:2, dated ca. 420-400 B.C.; see Agora XII, 397-98; Thompson, Hesperia 24 (1955):69-70; Crosby, Hesperia 24 (1955): 76-84.
P16951, unpublished. From deposit A-B 21-22:1, dated ca. 420-390 B.C.; see Thompson, Hesperia 16 (1947):210-11, and Agora XII, 384.
P27336, unpublished. From deposit I 13:2, published by Shear, Hesperia 39 (1970):212-19, with notes 101, 104. The deposit is part of a fill, probably a household dump, consisting of pottery which was "made and accumulated during the later years of the fifth century B.C. and the early years of the fourth, with a few pieces going as far back as the mid fifth century, and a few, more significantly, dating as late as ca . 370 B.C. " (Shear 219). Cf. Agora XII, 393, where the deposit is dated to the early fourth century.
P20, published as Agora XII, no. 936, dated 375-350 B.C. From deposit H 6:1, dated ca. 375-350 B.C.; see Agora XII, 392.
P12397, published by Thompson, Hesperia Supplement IV, 133, with figure 98d, as part of deposit G 12:23, dated to the second quarter of the fourth century, pp. 132-34. See also Agora IV, 239, and Agora XII, 391, for deposit G 12:23. This piece is cited in Agora XII as a parallel to no. 936, dated 375-350 B.C.
P12821, published as Agora XII, no. 937, dated 350-325 B.C. From deposit O 18:2, dated ca. 350-320 B.C.; see Agora XII, 396; Agora IV, 243; Thompson, Hesperia 23 (1954): 72-87.
The parallel for the Dema wall saltcellar cited in the Dema house publication is P12397 above, which has its point of minimum diameter well above the midpoint of the wall, with a sharper curve above this point than below. As can be seen in figure 43, the Dema saltcellar has closer affinities with the saltcellars in the upper row of the Agora group, where the saltcellars have symmetrically curving walls with their minimum diameters at the midpoint. In particular, the Dema saltcellar closely resembles P27336, both in dimensions (P27336: H. 0.03 m, D. of rim 0.062 m, D. of foot 0.065 m) and in profile, with its nearly symmetrical curve, extended slightly further below, and with the point of minimum diameter in the center of the wall.
On the basis of this comparison, the Dema wall saltcellar can be dated no later than the early fourth century. More precisely, it might have been in use any time from the last quarter of the fifth century through the first quarter of the fourth. As a terminus post quem for the date of the Dema wall, this piece indicates that the wall was built no earlier than the last quarter of the fifth century at the very earliest, and most likely after the beginning of the fourth century.
Appendix II
Fighting in the Aigaleos-Parnes Gap in 1826-27
Standing more or less intact for almost two and a half millennia, the Dema wall has inevitably impressed itself as strongly as any major natural feature on the minds of those who have lived near it, especially upon the herdsmen who have driven their flocks through its gates and sally ports time and time again through the ages. It is therefore no surprise that, when war has come to the Aigaleos-Parnes gap and when those herdsmen have been involved in the fighting, the Dema wall should again emerge as a strategic feature. Such fighting occurred during the Greek War of Independence, and events of the years 1826-27 certainly drew attention to the Dema wall. A review of these events is pertinent here not only as a postscript to the history of this monument but, more important, as a way of explaining the peculiar northern extension of the Dema wall, a feature that has mistakenly been regarded as part of its original construction and that has consequently misled scholars seeking to explain its original purpose (see further in chapter 2).
Following the fall of Mesolongi to the Turks in the spring of 1826, Turkish forces under Reshid Pasha advanced through Boiotia against Greek forces at Athens and there began a siege that lasted from the summer of 1826 until the capitulation of the Greeks on the Acropolis in the spring of 1827. This eventual outcome resulted not from the successes of the besieger in its assaults against the besieged but from the failures of the Greek forces outside Athens in their attempts to drive off the Turks. The decisive battles of this campaign were fought around the plain of Athens. (This summary of events is based on the published accounts of Gordon 1832, 330-402; Finlay 1877, 401-33; Makriyannis 1947, 300-302; and Howe 1828, 394-97, who were eyewitnesses to many of the events around Athens and Peiraieus in 1826-27; reference has also been made to Dakin 1973, 184-217.)
Using Salamis as a staging point, the Greek forces launched various attacks on the Turks, either overland by way of Eleusis or by direct landings on the coasts of Peiraieus and Phaleron. The first of these attacks was intended to dislodge Reshid before the siege of the Acropolis could be closely pressed. On August 17, 1826, 3,500 regular and irregular troops under Colonel Fabvier and Georgios Karaïskakis advanced from Eleusis through the Daphni pass and took up a position at Khaidari on the west edge of the plain of Athens. Here Reshid met them with a strong force, and the two sides assailed each other's positions in turn. On the night of August 19, a Greek attack was turned back sharply, setting off a general panic and a rout of Greek forces. This setback dissuaded the Greeks from attempting direct attacks on Reshid until stronger forces could be mustered.
The next substantial movement against the Turks therefore involved a more subtle stratagem designed to disrupt Turkish supply lines while reinforcing the garrison of the Acropolis. On October 21, two forces set out from Eleusis, one under Fabvier moving northwest to cross Kithai-ron and attack the Turkish stronghold at Thebes, and one under Ka-raïskakis moving eastward again toward Khaidari. Karaïskakis' movement was a feint, intended to divert the Turks from attacking Fabvier's column and also to mask the movement of a third force of 450 men, which landed at Phaleron on the night of October 23 and succeeded in crossing Turkish lines to enter the Acropolis. Fabvier was less fortunate, for the irregulars he had assigned to guard his way back through Ki-thairon left their posts, and he was forced to retreat before his attack on Thebes could develop.
The successful reinforcement of the Acropolis on this and other occasions bought time for the Greeks, but decisive action was still needed if the fortress was not to fall, sooner or later. Over the winter of 1826-27, Karaïskakis was active throughout central Greece, from Boiotia to Aitolia, against Turkish posts and supply lines. His successes, and the unchallenged strength of Greek naval forces, led some to favor a vigorous and concerted land and naval campaign against Reshid's lines of supply as the most effective way to lift the siege of Athens; for Reshid's army depended on supplies conveyed from Thessaly in the north, both overland via Thebes and by sea via Negropont/Chalkis and Oropos. If these lines were ever interrupted for any length of time, his army would be compelled to withdraw. Others favored the renewal of frontal assaults against the Turks around Athens as the quickest way of raising the siege, and since those in highest authority were of this mind, plans were made accordingly.
The favored plan called for the landing of a force on the heights of Peiraieus overlooking the bay of Phaleron, where a strong position could be fortified to distract and divide the Turks and from which a drive to
Map 6.
Battlegrounds in the siege of Athens, 1826-27
the Acropolis could in due course be launched. To insure the safety of the initial landing, a diversionary force was to set out first from Eleusis, to march on Menidi north of Athens via the Aigaleos-Parnes gap. The landing at Peiraieus, on February 5, 1827, came off successfully, and the diversion had the desired effect of preventing the Turks from concentrating an immediate counterattack against the landing. The diversion-ary force itself, however, met with disaster in a battle on February 8 at Kamatero, on the northeasternmost foot of Mount Aigaleos.
On February 3, the force from Eleusis, something under 3,500 men commanded by Colonel Dionisios Bourbakis, Vasos Mavrovouniotis, and Panayotis Notaras, advanced to the village of Menidi where they attacked a Turkish unit on guard in the area. The Turks took refuge in a fortified church, and before Turkish cavalry could arrive, the Greeks withdrew into Mount Parnes toward the village of Khasia. Here the commanders became divided in their opinions about how to proceed. Bour-bakis, a regular army officer, was keen to advance toward Athens and challenge the Turks in the plain. Mavrovouniotis and Notaras, experienced leaders of Greek irregulars, favored remaining in the mountains and harassing Turkish supply lines. Bourbakis persuaded his colleagues to advance at least to the nearer slopes of Aigaleos, perhaps arguing that their diversionary threat against Athens must be made to appear more credible.
On February 6, the Greeks advanced across the gap between Parnes and Aigaleos and took up positions along the crest and slopes of Aiga-leos above the village of Kamatero. Here Bourbakis, eager for the battle that his colleagues sought to avoid, drew his own men out into the plain a little distance, where they threw up fieldworks to prepare for the anticipated attack. Bourbakis had indeed attracted the attention of Reshid, who began an attack on February 8 with a force of 2,000 foot and 600 cavalry supported by artillery. While Bourbakis' men were held in place by the Turkish artillery, the Turkish foot rushed against the Greeks who remained on Aigaleos. These, with their commanders, had no desire to be drawn into a general engagement, and they took flight, leaving Bourbakis unsupported. Reshid's cavalry finished the job with a charge that broke Bourbakis' position, and in the ensuing rout some 400 Greeks, including Bourbakis, were killed or captured. The Greek force was so completely dispersed that the Turks even succeeded in taking Eleusis. They withdrew from Eleusis after destroying the fieldworks of the Greek camp and filling the wells with rubble.
The remaining campaign against Reshid was distinguished only by the return of Karaïskakis a month after the battle of Kamatero and by the eventual ill-fated attack mounted by Greek forces from the coast two months later. On March 14, Karaïskakis advanced from Eleusis along
the coast and entrenched himself at Keratsini near Peiraieus. This development marked the expansion of the desultory war of positions in which the Greeks and Turks around Peiraieus had been engaged. Receiving further reinforcements toward the end of April, the commanders of the Greek forces were encouraged to attempt a drive on Athens. Poorly coordinated and executed (ill conceived from the very first, according to some), this attack badly misfired and resulted in another more serious rout for Greek forces on May 6. By May 27, the troops who still held the positions at Peiraieus withdrew, and messages sent to the Acropolis advised the Greeks there to negotiate a capitulation. This was done, and the Acropolis was turned over to the forces of Reshid Pasha on June 5.
The movements of February 3-8, culminating in the battle of Ka-matero, are the only events of this campaign that are known to have taken place in the Aigaleos-Parnes gap. There is no hint in any of our sources that the Dema wall was in any way involved in this sequence of events, nor is there any real reason to suppose that it might have been. Other fieldworks in the area, however, most likely were involved. The Kamatero wall in particular, a long and slight rubble fieldwork on the side of Aigaleos above Kamatero facing Athens (see map 6), must surely be one of the tambouria of the men of Mavrovouniotis and Notaras. (The Kamatero wall is noted on the Karten von Attika sheet vi, Pyrgos, 1883, and is described by Milchhoefer 1883, 44, and McCredie 1966, 71-72; it closely resembles the construction of the northern sector of the Dema wall.) A series of small circular rubble enclosures along Aigaleos to the south of Kamatero, on the brow of the ridge facing Athens, is likely to have been a line of outlying tambouria , the watchposts of the Greek forces noted by Howe when he wrote in his journal that "the fires of the Greeks under Vashos [Mavrovouniotis] and Bourbakis upon the sides of the mountains" were conspicuous from Peiraieus on the nights of February 6 and 7 (Richards 1906, 205; these remains are noted by Milch-hoefer 1883, 44, and DEMA , 175; see also the descriptions by Smith and Lowry 1954, 39-40, and Munn 1979b, 21-22; it is likely that a rubble wall adjacent to the Aigaleos tower is also a work of this episode).
If the Dema had no role in the events of February 3-8, the concentration of action around the plain of Athens over the whole course of the campaign of 1826-27, and especially the fact that Eleusis and Athens were the bases of opposing forces, with those at Eleusis seeking to attack and harass those around Athens, makes it most unlikely that the Dema wall would have been completely ignored. The Dema provided an excellent defensive position for the Turkish forces around Athens and Peiraieus, guarding against an attack to their rear. Furthermore, it served to fortify a vulnerable point along a supply route of considerable
importance to the Turks, the route from Thebes across the Skourta plain, through Khasia and Menidi to Athens. This route certainly was used, for we are told that soon after his embarrassing defeat at Khaidari, Karaïskakis repaired his reputation by raiding Skourta and carrying away 10,000 head of cattle which had been assembled there for the supply of the Turks at Athens (Gordon 1832, 339).
This sort of raid was probably just what Mavrovouniotis and Notaras had in mind when they argued with Bourbakis before their advance to Kamatero, and it is clear from our sources that such attacks against Turkish supply routes were contemplated more often than they were executed. Gordon, who was the commanding general of the Greeks at the time of the landing at Peiraieus, speaks of his preference for concentrating on disrupting the communications of Reshid's army (1832, 378, 383, 385, 399). Finlay, who was also present during this campaign, describes more explicitly a plan which was contemplated at the time:
The besiegers of Athens might also have been closely blockaded by a line of posts, extending from Megara to Eleutherae, Phyle, Deceleia, and Rhamnus. This plan was rejected, and a number of desultory operations were undertaken (Finlay 1877, 413).
If the Greeks were contemplating such moves and, in the cases of the raid on Skourta and the march to Kamatero, actually carrying out operations in strength in the vicinity of the Aigaleos-Parnes gap, the Turks must have been prepared to oppose them. The fact that there was a Turkish outpost at Menidi on February 3 shows that the Turks already recognized the importance of this route and the need to prevent a Greek force from operating in this area and cutting off the direct route to Thebes. The Greeks could have done this if they had established a strong camp in the vicinity of Khasia, within the foothills of Parnes where Turkish cavalry could not move and artillery could be transported only with great difficulty. Indeed, this seems to have been the intent of Mavrovouniotis and Notaras on February 3, and Makriyannis, who participated in the planning of this operation, states that Khasia was the original objective of this force (1947, 301,302).
The northern extension of the Dema wall is suited not so much to dosing the Aigaleos-Parnes gap, which the Wall already does, as to preventing a flanking movement around the wall to the north. This is precisely the direction of Khasia. The northern sector should be understood as a way to extend the line of the Dema up to the crest of the ridge that separates Khasia from the plain of Eleusis. The ridge itself completes the defenses of Khasia.
Would the Turks have undertaken such a project to defend an outlying village like Khasia? One might also ask, Would the Turks build
such a wall at al, a wall that is more appropriate to the tactics of Greek irregulars than of the Turkish army? The answer to both of these questions lies in the fact that the Turkish army was itself supported by substantial numbers of Greek, or in this case Albanian, irregulars, whose manner of fighting was precisely the same as that of the troops of Ka-raïskakis, Mavrovouniotis, and Notaras. Moreover, the Albanian villagers of Khasia and Menidi were active supporters of Reshid, as Finlay makes clear in his description of the advent of Turkish forces in June of 1826:
A great proportion of the Attic peasantry was driven to despair [by the rapacity of the Greek garrison commanders in Athens], and the moment Reshid's forces appeared in the Katadema, or hilly district between Parnes and the channel of Euboea, they were welcomed as deliverers. On advancing into the plain of Athens, they were openly joined by the warlike inhabitants of Menidhi and Khasia, who vigorously supported Reshid's government as long as he remained in Attica (Finlay 1877, 401).
The northern sector of the Dema wall, therefore, is most likely the work of these villagers, who, on their own initiative or under Turkish command, sought to strengthen their defenses against an attack like that of the forces of Mavrovouniotis, Notaras, and Bourbakis. The most probable time for its construction is after the battle of Kamatero, which marked the beginning of the campaign of 1827 for the Greeks, who had been relatively inactive since the beginning of the previous November, when Karaïskakis had left Eleusis for the interior. The Khasiotes and Menidiotes need not have seen a major threat developing to impel them to this work (although the return of Karaïskakis to Eleusis in March might well have provided them with the energy to undertake it), since it is quite possible that they had to be continuously on their guard against small raiding parties from the direction of Eleusis, who would prey on their flocks as if they were supplies for the enemy, which in fact they were.
One other fieldwork in this area deserves notice as a construction probably belonging to this campaign of the War of Independence. This is the long spur wall attached to the Thriasian Lager, an ancient fortified camp on a ridge some three kilometers southwest of the Dema wall (McCredie 1966, 66-71). As McGredie notes, the camp is best understood as the base of an army opposing a force at the Dema wall, and it seems to have been reused, with the addition of the spur wall, for this purpose in the age of firearms. Unlike the massive rubble enclosure wall of the camp itself, the spur wall, which runs from the camp on a summit down into the valley to the east, is a slight construction closely resembling both the
northern sector of the Dema wall and the Kamatero wall. This wall might mark a stage in the advance of the forces of Bourbakis, Mavro-vouniotis, and Notaras; it might have been built earlier and used as a place of ambush in a rout of the Turkish cavalry which took place somewhere in the plain of Eleusis in the course of the Turks' advance on Athens from the north (Gordon 1832, 331); or it might have been built at any time during the campaign as an outwork of a minor post established at the Lager to watch for possible movements of Turkish forces through the Aigaleos-Parnes gap, either against Eleusis or against the rear of the forces twice led by Karaïskakis through the Daphni pass to Khaidari.
Appendix III
Chabrias and His Mercenaries, 379/8
The Recall of Chabrias
The date of Chabrias' recall from Egypt may be narrowed to within less than a year by the testimony of our sources. Nepos 12.2.1 states that Chabrias secured the throne of Egypt for Nektanebis. Kienitz 1953, 174, has shown that this must refer to Nektanebis I, the eventual successor to Hakoris and founder of the thirtieth dynasty. Manetho's chronology places the first year of Nektanebis I in 379/8 (Kienitz 1953, 169); inscriptions from lower and upper Egypt attest that Nektanebis established his sway over the land by November of his first year (Kienitz 1953, 174 and note 7). If Manetho's date for the first year of Nektanebis I is correct, his rule was established in the latter half of 379, after which Chabrias left Egypt. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.14 proves that Chabrias was in Athens before the middle of winter 379/8. We may therefore place Chabrias' departure from Egypt within the second half of 379.
The chronology of the thirtieth dynasty, however, is far from secure, and one of the contested variables is the relationship of Chabrias to its founder. Kienitz (1953, 174), relying in part on the assumption that Chabrias was an elected general in the winter of 379/18 and therefore must have been in Athens by the spring of 379, placed the beginning of Nektanebis' reign, and Chabrias' departure, in 380. Cloché (1919, 230-32), accepting the same deduction about Chabrias' date of departure, preferred, on other evidence, to maintain the Manethonian date for Nektanebis' accession in 379, and in the process argued that Nepos' evidence (admittedly badly confused in other respects) for the association of Chabrias with Nektanebis I should be disregarded.
The problem is simplified if we dismiss not the explicit testimony of our sources but the modern assumption that Chabrias was an elected
general by the winter of 379/8. There is in fact compelling evidence to do so, quite apart from the question of the date of Chabrias' return from Egypt (see below). Having done so, and accepting the Manethonian chronology, as supported by Cloché, for Nektanebis' accession in 379, we may place the recall of Chabrias to Athens in the second half of 379. Again, quite apart from questions of Egyptian chronology, there are excellent circumstantial reasons for maintaining this date.
Diodoros 15.29.4 and Nepos 12.3.1 have both described Chabrias' recall as a response to Persian pressure to remove that commander from the service of Egypt. In chapter 5, the case is made at length that Chab-rias' recall was more immediately occasioned by a special need for his services at Athens and that Persian pressure was decidedly a secondary consideration. Nepos adds the detail that Chabrias was ordered to appear in Athens before a specified date on pain of death. In light of the interpretation advanced here, this should be taken as an indication of special urgency on the part of the Athenians.
Nepos 12.3, in another respect, presents a decidedly distorted and unflattering picture of Chabrias and his fellow Athenian mercenary commanders that derives from Theopompos (FGrHist 115 F 105). According to Theopompos, Chabrias and his ilk preferred a life of self-indulgence abroad to enforced self-restraint while under the public eye at Athens. Therefore, we may infer from Theopompos' way of thinking, in order for a recall to Athens to be effective, it had to have a powerful incentive attached to it. If we remove the tendentious embellishments of Theopompos from what is essentially an account of an urgent and specifically dated recall, then the most plausible scenario becomes a recall sometime in the fall of 379, when the plot to overthrow the Spartan garrison at Thebes was already afoot within certain circles at Athens, but when, because of the lateness of the season, Chabrias might otherwise have preferred to wait until the following spring to sail.
It would in any event have been undesirable, because of both the expenses involved and the difficulty of providing a public explanation for the small mercenary army idling in the gymnasia of Athens (or, more likely, quickly moved into the frontier forts of Attica), to have had Cha-brias and his men in Athens much earlier. The Persian demand for his recall was a slender enough pretext as it was.
Chabrias' Election As General
Chabrias' status as a mercenary commander at Thebes in the early summer of 378 is nambiguous in Diodoros 15.32.5:
. I have argued elsewhere (Munn 1987, 118 note 39) that Chabrias was also the principal commander of Athe-
nian citizen soldiers on this occasion. I still believe that this judgment is essentially correct, but the situation, confusing to say the least, requires clarification.
The explanation is straightforward. The Theban campaign took place early in the summer of 378, before the end of the archonship of Nikon (379/8). The election of Chabrias to the generalship, recorded by Dio-doros 15.29.7, took place earlier in the archonship of Nikon, but Cha-brias' office formally began only with the archonship of Nausinikos (378/7) (see Rhodes 1981, 537, commenting on AthPol . 44.4, on the time of election and tenure of office of Athenian
). Although he did not yet have the legal authority of a as general-elect Chabrias could nevertheless exercise considerable influence, especially under the circumstances of early summer 378 discussed in chapter 5. But officially, he was still only , while Demeas (schol. Aristides Panath . 296, Dindorf 3.281; see chapter 5 note 41) was , in much the same way that Iphikrates and Kallias cooperated at Corinth in 390 (Xenophon Hell . 4.5.13) and as Chabrias and Demainetos cooperated on Aigina in 388 (Xenophon Hell . 5.1.10).
Chabrias' Peltasts
Corollary to this explanation of Chabrias' status in 378 and to the date of his recall as established above, is the observation that when he led at Eleutherai the preceding winter (Xenophon Hell. 5.4.14), he was a commander of mercenaries, not of Athenian citizen troops. It has been popular to suppose otherwise, namely, that he had already been elected
(Krause 1914, 16; Cloché 1919, 230; Beloch 1923, 229-30; Parke 1933, 62) and that the he commanded were mostly, if not exclusively, Athenians (Parke 1933, 76, accepted by Pritchett 1974, 104-5, and Ober 1985a, 94 and note 22). Reasons for rejecting the assumption that Chabrias was already an elected general have just been given. Best (1969, 93-96) has already argued against Parke, on other grounds, that Chabrias' peltasts were more likely foreign mercenaries than Athenian recruits or, as Parke suggests, volunteers.
To all of these arguments we may add the observation that Chabrias, on this occasion, was clearly among the Athenians who were supporting the Theban uprising and offering resistance to Spartan forces, both those in the Kadmeia and those led by Kleombrotos. Xenophon (Hell . 5.4.9 and 19) specifies that two (unnamed) Athenian
led the Athenians in their support of the Thebans and were later held accountable, and condemned, for their actions. That Chabrias did not share their fate implies that he did not share their authority at this moment.
In other words, he was not yet an elected
and he did not have the authority to lead either an Athenian citizen levy or a force of Athenian volunteers (however they might have been constituted) such as the generals are supposed to have led.
If Chabrias did not have the authority to lead citizen forces raised for this occasion, then his troops must have been, as Best argues, mercenaries. Athenians (like Chabrias himself) could and did serve as mercenaries and were certainly included in Chabrias' corps at this time (candidates include Nikias, an in-law of Aischines, named by Demosthenes 19.287; Nikostratos and Chariades of Isaios 4.7, 18, 26, 29; Astyphilos of Araphen of Isaios 9.14—all probably officers). It is highly likely, moreover, that some or all of the
taken by Chabrias along with his peltasts to Cyprus in 388 (Xenophon Hell . 5.1.10) remained in his service—as mercenaries—in Egypt and returned with him now to Athens.
Chabrias' peltasts are another matter, however. There is some likelihood that many of the eight hundred peltasts taken by Chabrias from Corinth to Cyprus in 388 returned with him from Egypt in 379. These were foreign troops, the
of Aristophanes Wealth 173. Parke (1933, 56), followed by Best (1969, 92), points to Chabrias' prior service in Hellespontine Thrace as the likely origin of both his qualifications as a commander of peltasts and of the peltasts themselves (cf. Parke 1933, 51). On the other hand, not all Athenian peltasts were recruited overseas. Lysias 19.21 describes preparations at Athens for the ill-fated mission to Euagoras that preceded that of Chabrias (cf. Xenophon Hell . 4.8.24), which included the hiring and arming of a peltast force. In all likelihood, these men were hired on the spot in Peiraieus, where a mixed crowd of foreigners and Athenians was ready to serve for hire as sailors or as soldiers (cf. Xenophon Hell . 1.2.1, 2.4.25, 4.8.34; Demosthenes 50.7, 10-16).
Diodoros 15.29.1 states that the mercenaries led by Chabrias in Egypt included "many Greeks." Out of this mixed lot there must have been a fair number of Athenians, both hoplites and peltasts, who would have been strongly motivated to return home, in paid service, with their commander. Ignorant of their total number, we are likewise ignorant of the proportion of these mercenaries that was Athenian. But, for present purposes, this issue really does not matter. They were seasoned mercenaries, not a citizen levy. That Xenophon describes the peltasts led by Chabrias in 379/8 as
is surely an acceptable description of "peltasts hired by the Athenians," just as means "the cavalry commanded by the Lakedaimonians," (Xenophon Hell . 6.4.13), which Xenophon acknowledges was made up mostly of allies and men hired for service (Hell . 6.4.9-11, Hipparch . 9.4).
The Size of Chabrias' Mercenary Force
Although we do not know the number of men brought to Athens by Chabrias, we are not without the means to make some rather rough estimates. The approximate size of the mercenary hoplite force led by Chabrias in 378 is the most accessible figure.
Mention has been made above of the hoplite force, of unspecified size, taken from Athens by Chabrias into mercenary service in 388. There is an a priori likelihood, therefore, that Chabrias had some number of mercenary hoplites with him when he returned. Diodoros' description of Chabrias as a mercenary commander at Thebes in 378, leading well-drilled hoplites, proves this supposition (15.32.5-6, 33.4, discussed in chapter 5, 158-60). The discussion of Chabrias and the campaign of 378 in chapter 5 shows that Chabrias' hoplites formed at least the first rank of the Athenian force arrayed against Agesilaos. The number of Chabrias' mercenary hoplites may be estimated on the basis of the number likely to have composed the first rank of the Athenian force.
That army consisted of 5,000
(Diodoros 15.32.2). Given Diodoros' specification elsewhere of (e.g., 15.26.2), perhaps not all of these infantrymen were hoplites. If as many as a thousand of them were peltasts, and if, as seems most likely, the remaining hoplites were arrayed eight deep, each rank would be composed of 500 hoplites. The number per rank might have been reduced to a minimum of 250 if the depth of the files were increased up to a maximum of sixteen (a most unlikely extreme, in view of the enormous size of the Peloponnesian army; see also the figures on depth of phalanx collected and discussed by Pritchett 1971, 134-43), or the number per rank might have been increased up to 625 if a greater proportion, or even the whole, of the expeditionary force of 5,000 were composed of hoplites. In fact, it seems most likely that the 5,000 infantrymen referred to here by Diodoros were all Athenian hoplites (such a figure would most easily be derived from the roster of 10,000—or, optimistically, 20,000?—Athenian hoplites drawn up that spring; see appendix VI). In that case, Chabrias' hoplite and peltast mercenaries would have been an addition to the numbers reported by Diodoros. In any event, it seems safe to assume that the Athenians would have deployed all of their hoplite mercenaries to the scene of action in 378. We may estimate that their number lay between 250 and 625, with the range of 500-625 representing a much more probable estimate than anything below 500.
As to peltasts, Xenophon Hell. 5.1.10 reports that Chabrias, upon his departure for Cyprus in 388, had with him a force of 800 peltasts in addition to his hoplite mercenaries. This number need have no direct
bearing on the number of peltasts who returned with Chabrias, but it does fit within a range of sizes of expeditionary peltast forces that may be taken to suggest the probable limits to the size of Chabrias' force in 379. The 1,200-1,300 peltasts of Iphikrates and Dieitrephes mark an upper limit to such forces (Xenophon Hell . 4.8.34; Thucydides 7.27.1, 29). The 800 of Chabrias and the 600 of Ktesikles (Xenophon Hell . 6.2.10) mark a midrange, close to which (between 500 and 800) fall several peltast contingents (associated with hoplite contingents of various sizes) brought to Cyrus on the eve of his expedition against Artaxerxes (Xenophon Anab . 1.2.3-9), while a contingent of 300 peltasts (with an equal number of hoplites) marks a low figure (Anab . 1.2.3).
The forces of Iphikrates and Dieitrephes were composed only of peltasts and are perhaps unusually large. We should be safe, therefore, in lowering the upper limit of probability for Chabrias' peltast force in 379 to 1,000. The lower limit of 300 peltasts seems reasonable, for it is hard to believe that any smaller force would be adequate for manning and patrolling passes and ridges over a fairly wide front in Kithairon.
According to these deductions and comparisons, a probable absolute minimum for Chabrias' original mercenary force is 550 (300 peltasts and 250 hoplites); around a thousand seems a good deal more probable, and a total of 1,600 (1,000 peltasts and 600 hoplites) is well within the range of possibility. An even larger force, which would allow more men to be assigned to garrisons and patrols, is by no means out of the question. As an initial mercenary corps, then, Chabrias probably brought between 550 and 1,600 men (over 1,000 being distinctly more likely than under 1,000) with him from Egypt to Athens in the autumn of 379.
Appendix IV
Xenophon and Diodoros on the Surrender of the Kadmeia
One point in the narrative of the events of 378-375 on which Xenophon seems to contradict Diodoros outright is the length of time the garrison held out on the Kadmeia. Hellenika 5.4.10-11 suggests , but nowhere states, that the surrender took place the day after the uprising began. Diodoros 15.27.1, on the other hand, describes a process whereby the defenders were resolute, as long as they had supplies, but as they began to run out, and as the expected relieving force from the Peloponnese was long in coming, they lost courage and surrendered. Deinarchos 1.39 says that these events transpired over "a few days" (
), and Plutarch Pel . 13.1-2 emphasizes that the surrender took place just before the arrival of Kleombrotos with the army from the Peloponnese, which could hardly have happened less than ten days from the beginning of the uprising, and more likely was somewhat more.
This issue is inextricably bound with the other discrepancies between Xenophon and the tradition represented by Diodoros concerning the events of 379/8, and here, as elsewhere, the weight of the evidence supporting Diodoros must be acknowledged (see chapter 5, pp. 134, 137). Xenophon's authority in the present instance is no greater because he was a mature contemporary of these events, nor because he "is more trustworthy on military operations," as Kallet-Marx (1985, 141 and note 57) has asserted in reference to Xenophon's account of the surrender of the Kadmeia.
The issue here, in the first place, does not concern strictly military operations. Expertise in this field (which Xenophon surely had) had no bearing on the issues involved in the accounts of the surrender of the Kadmeia. On the contrary, the surrender itself was a diplomatic, not a military, event, and it involved many participants on both sides. In fact, those on the Spartan, or Peloponnesian side, both were fewer in number
and had a more impelling motive (the deflection of blame) to distort events than those on the Theban and Athenian side.
Neither Xenophon's military expertise, therefore, nor his contemporaneity requires us to believe that he provided a more reliable account or that he had access to more reliable sources than Diodoros did. At Skillous in the Peloponnese, Xenophon would have learned of these events secondhand, at best, which makes him no more credible than Deinarchos or Ephoros, who wrote of events that occurred in their fathers' generation. For, even on Xenophon's own account, a sizable number of Athenians must have participated in the events at Thebes, and even more must have joined in the political and legal debates that followed. Moreover, the generation of Ephoros and Deinarchos was not the first to commit these events to written record. Isokrates, just over five years later, in the Plataikos , gave explicit support to the version of events as described by Deinarchos and (through Ephoros) Diodoros (see appendix v). Among other historians who preceded Ephoros in their accounts of this period was Androtion, who was politically active at Athens during this period, and whose Atthis covered the events of this era in great detail (see Munn 1987, 110-11 and note 20). There is considerable weight, therefore, behind the consistency of the accounts which oppose the mere suggestions which Xenophon's account provides.
Finally, we can turn to military considerations for an appraisal of probability in terms that are independent of questions of the expertise or reliability of either account. Given the size of the Kadmeia (and hence the likelihood that substantial provisions were on hand within it), the strength of the garrison, and the ultimate purpose of the post (which was to hold Thebes for Sparta), a surrender on the first day of the siege seems, at the very least, improbable. There were supporting forces on hand at Plataia and Thespiai (Xenophon Hell . 5.4.10; Plutarch Mor . 586e-f), and one of the three Spartan commanders, Lysanoridas, was away from Thebes at the time, presumably among these forces, and probably at Plataia (Plutarch Mor . 578a, 586e, 598f; see chapter 5, pp. 138-40). Although a small relief force from Plataia was quickly cut to pieces by the Thebans (Hell . 5.4.10), there would have been reason to believe that more substantial local support might soon be organized and, failing that, that an army from the Peloponnese ought to arrive in due course. Consistent with his picture of the desperate and ineffectual garrison commander, Xenophon does not report the dispatch of a messenger to Sparta from the garrison at Thebes, though this is reported by Diodoros 15.25.3, whose account, like Plutarch's, also stresses the urgency felt by the Thebans and Athenians to complete the reduction of the Kadmeia before the arrival of the Peloponnesian army. In fact, Xenophon does report the dispatch of messengers to Plataia and Thespiai (Hell . 5.4.10), and these certainly indicate, despite Xenophon's ignorance or willful
misrepresentation, that Sparta was notified and, therefore, that those in the Kadmeia had reason to anticipate help from the Peloponnese. As a final consideration, we may note that forty-three years later, a Macedonian garrison under siege in the Kadmeia under remarkably similar circumstances, though with even less hope of immediate relief, held out for well over two weeks until Alexander arrived with his army (Arrian Anab. 1.7-8). Overall, we must conclude that the impression of an abrupt surrender given by Xenophon carries no weight in view of the testimony of the other sources.
An apparently more important discrepancy emerges from Xenophon's account of the fate of the Spartan commander of the garrison, which lends support to his implication of the abruptness of the surrender. The sequence of his narrative at 5.4.13 indicates that the Spartans both learned of the uprising and put to death the harmost of the garrison before they summoned their allies and dispatched the army of Kleombrotos:
. This again is contradicted by Diodoros 15.27.2-3, who says the Spartan commanders withdrew to the Peloponnese while the Peloponnesian army, already on its way, arrived just barely too late; Plutarch Pel . 13.2 likewise reports that the Spartan commanders met Kleombrotos in Megara, and in Mor . 598f he adds that the two of the three Spartan officers who were condemned to death for their failure were executed at Corinth, before returning to Sparta.
In all other cases, apparent discrepancies can be resolved without outright rejection of one or another account, but here we have the one and only instance in which we must decide whether to accept Xenophon and reject Diodoros and his supporters, or the reverse. The implications of the decision are considerable, for entire sequences of events depend upon it. As in all other cases in which the immediate inferences from Xenophon must be set aside and reconciled with the authority represented by Diodoros, so here the decision must go against Xenophon. This leaves us with the question of how, or why, Xenophon would misrepresent events at this point.
As to why Xenophon was content to imply that the garrison commanders displayed a shockingly un-Spartan resolve in failing to stand to their posts, he is surely representing what must have been the general emotional reaction to these events among the Spartans and their supporters: How could these men have surrendered so quickly, without waiting for Kleombrotos? Any surrender, in other words, was too soon. The first day, the tenth, or the twentieth, it did not matter; it was all too soon . So Xenophon's account omits any indication of the passage of time before the surrender.
As to why Xenophon described the execution of the harmost before the resolution to send out Kleombrotos, here he may have yielded to his own emotional response to the news. While he refers to the surrender of
as a communal action (5.4.11), Xenophon also speaks of "the harmost," without naming him (5.4.10, 13). Diodoros speaks of three , two of whom were executed, one of whom was heavily fined (15.27.3). Plutarch, who calls all three commanders harmosts, also provides their names: Herippidas and Arkissos (or Arkesos), who were executed, and Lysanoridas, who was fined and went into exile (Pel . 13.2, Mor . 598f). Plutarch also specifies that Lysanoridas was the third Spartan to succeed in command of the garrison of the Kadmeia after its original establishment by Phoibidas (Mor . 576a). This would indicate that Lysanoridas was the harmost at Thebes, and so he has been accepted by Stern (1884, 58-59 note 1), Parke (1927), and Cartledge (1987, 297). But Xenophon explicitly reports that the harmost was executed. Lysanoridas was the one Spartan commander who was not executed, according to Plutarch. How is this apparent contradiction to be resolved?
Parke (1927) showed the way, by pointing out circumstantial evidence indicating that, while Lysanoridas was harmost specifically of Thebes, Herippidas was harmost for a military command in central Greece, where he had recently seen to the establishment of a pro-Spartan government at Oreos on Euboia (Diodoros 15.30.3-4, correcting
to , after Casaubon). Herippidas, then, would have been wintering his force at Thebes, a circumstance that explains the remarkable strength of the Theban garrison at this time, 1,500 men, compared to the 700 who garrisoned Athens under Kallibios in 404/3 (Aristotle AthPol . 37.2). By this explanation, both Lysanoridas and Herippidas could be legitimately described as harmosts, and Herippidas, who was at Thebes at the time of the surrender (Plutarch Mor . 586e, 598f) could therefore have been the harmost referred to by Xenophon. Parke has concluded otherwise, however, by suggesting that the third commander, Arkissos, whose precise rank we do not know, was most likely a second-in-command to Lysanoridas and was therefore, in Lysanoridas' absence, acting harmost of Thebes at the time of the surrender. Arkissos, therefore, would have been the harmost of Thebes at the time of the surrender, and it is to him, according to Parke, that Xenophon refers. Xenophon thereby omits "what it would pain him to record" (Parke 1927, 164), namely, Herippidas' similar fate, since Herippidas was personally known to Xenophon (see below).
This is a peculiar explanation, though not entirely implausible in light of Xenophon's personal quirks and their influence on his choice of subject matter. But it does not get us any closer to an explanation of the
problem posed above, namely, why Xenophon gave notice of the execution of the harmost priority over his description of Kleombrotos' rescue mission. Another explanation of Xenophon's allusion will serve us better. We must admit that we do not know anything of the rank of Arkissos. He could well have been a second-in-command at Thebes, possibly a polemarch (cf. Xenophon Hell . 5.4.46), or as Parke also admits (and in accordance with Plutarch's designation of all three men as harmosts),like Herippidas he could have been the commander of another force detailed to this area. What is truly striking, however, is that, outside of this episode, we know nothing of either Lysanoridas or Arkissos. Herippidas, by contrast, is known to have had a distinguished career up to this point and ought to be regarded as the senior commander in the area at the time, and the one most likely to be referred to anonymously by Xenophon.
Even before the episode at Oreos mentioned above, Herippidas had already served in central Greece, probably as a harmost, and had proven himself ruthlessly efficient in holding down a difficult command at Herakleia in Trachis, beginning in 399 (Diodoros 14.38.4-5; Polyainos 2.21). In 396 we find Herippidas closely associated with Agesilaos as his special emissary in Asia (Xenophon Hell . 3.4.6), and in 395 Herippidas replaced Lysander as the leading spokesman of the thirty Spartiate officers accompanying Agesilaos (Hell . 3.4.20). In that year, Herippidas also took over command of the Cyreans, and accompanying Agesilaos back to Greece the following year, he led that body of troops in the battle of Koroneia (Hell . 3.4.20, 4.3.15, 17; Ages . 2.10-11). For well over a year, then, at the end of Xenophon's service as a mercenary in Agesilaos' army, Herippidas had been Xenophon's immediate superior officer. As Parke has suggested, but, as I suggest, for different reasons, this personal connection must be the basis for Xenophon's aberrant account of Herippidas ' execution. Cartledge notes that Xenophon speaks with "disparagement" of Herippidas and that his leadership at Koroneia was "not to the satisfication of Xenophon" (1987, 156, 321). In one instance (an episode described by Xenophon Hell . 4.1.20-28), Herippidas does draw sharp criticism for his lack of tact, while Xenophon also makes a point of his inability to motivate his men sufficiently (a significant factor in 379/8, according to Diodoros 15.27.2). In the latter instance, however, I am unable to detect any reproach in Xenophon's account of the rout of their opponents by Herippidas' men, Xenophon among them. Nevertheless, on balance, and in view of Herippidas' deeds at Heraldeia (though these were not recorded by Xenophon), I agree with Cartledge, and I suggest that Xenophon found Herippidas to be a harsh and insensitive commander. Although he did not name the man (an avoidance of reference to personal involvement or connection so characteristic of Xeno-
phon; cf., e.g., Hell . 3.1.1-2, and 7.5.15-17), it would seem that Xenophon chose to highlight the fate of the senior and most famous harmost from Thebes by placing it here, in 5.4.13, before beginning his lengthy account of the expedition of Kleombrotos. In so doing, moreover, he lent more emphasis to the impression of a precipitate surrender by the garrison. How ineffectual a commander! How well deserved his fate!
Appendix V
Isokrates 14, Plataikos, and Rhetorical Distortion
The historiographical nexus to which all issues involving the outbreak of the Boiotian War return is the common view that the account of Diodoros and all sources that support his account are supposed to be distorted by an Athenocentric rhetorical invention, namely, that the Athenians gave immediate and enthusiastic public support to the Theban uprising. Thus, whereas Xenophon speaks only of private and covert support to the Thebans before the raid of Sphodrias, the supposedly contaminated sources suggest, and even plainly state, that the Athenians, collectively and publicly, deserve credit for the delivery of Thebes from Spartan tyranny. The claim is made outright by Isokrates (14.29), Deinarchos (1.38-39), and Aristides (Panath . 172-73, Dindorf 1.283-84); it underlies more general statements made by Demosthenes (16.14), Aischines (2.117), and Xenophon (Poroi 5.7).
Although the rich circumstantial detail of the supposed Athenian invention must give pause to those who wish to dispose of it, their position might be tenable if the infected sources were all "late" (as is sometimes stated, e.g., Ryder 1965, 55 and note 1). But Isokrates 14, Plataikos , was composed only five years after the event, and 14.29 makes an explicit reference to the salvation and restoration of the Theban exiles through the power of Athens (
), after which the ungrateful Thebans went so far as to send an embassy to Sparta indicating their willingness to abandon the Athenians and give allegiance to the Spartans. The passage makes it clear that this vacillation took place before the eventual reunification of Thebes and Athens against Sparta, which came as a resuit of the raid of Sphodrias.
Although attempts have been made to impugn the historicity of the
Plataikos (e.g., Cloché 1934, 81-84), it has been defended by Momigliano (1936, 27-31) and Cawkwell (1963, 84-85) (as it was earlier by Grote 1852, 220, and Jebb 1876, 177-83), who together find no demonstrable anachronism in the speech nor any apparent reason to invent the speech later for this particular occasion. The passage under discussion here, then (and 14.6, 17, 24, 36, which all allude to the same circumstances), can only be discounted if evidence can be adduced to demonstrate that here, at least, there is an invention.
It is not enough to allege that the vehemently anti-Theban tone of the speech should induce us to be skeptical of any reproach of Thebes, such as in this passage, as if this were sufficient to dismiss the supposedly factual basis of any reproach (so, e.g., Buckler 1979, 52). The anti-Theban tone of the speech is essential to its authenticity. Skepticism of allegations made against Thebes is certainly justified, but the nature of those allegations must be examined before deciding where fact leaves off and innuendo begins.
In this case, we must recognize that Isokrates' argument at this point does not involve an assertion that the Athenians gave open support to the returning Theban exiles; rather, it cites it as a fact already known to the audience, to support the assertion that is being made. And the assertion is that, in sending an embassy to Sparta offering terms of submission, the Thebans were behaving in a most ungrateful and even treacherous manner toward the Athenians. A further assertion is built upon this, namely, that if the Spartans had accepted that offer of submission, nothing would have prevented the Thebans from marching with the Spartans against the Athenians, their own benefactors. We may be skeptical of these assertions, but it must be acknowledged that if the factual premise of Isokrates' argument, dealing as it does here with a point of recent Athenian public policy, were not a matter of common knowledge, the argument would seem very queer to his audience and would not serve at all to advance his case against Thebes. On the basis, then, of the logical coherence of Isokrates' argument, and even more so on the basis of the sequence of events expounded in chapter 5, we must accept the premise of Isokrates' argument as true.
The assertions arising from the premise do indeed deserve our skepticism. If they were true, or rather, if they were deeply and strongly believed by Isokrates' audience (which I accept as the Athenian public in general), then it is surprising that this powerful reproach of Thebes plays so small and incidental a part in the overall structure of Isokrates' castigation of Thebes, ranging as it does from the legendary march of the Argives against the Kadmeia (53-54) through the Persian and Peloponnesian wars (31-32, 57-62) to the most recent disputes over Oropos (20, 37). The fact is, the allegations had little credibility.
As demonstrated in chapter 5, Athenian fears brought on by Kleombrotos' campaign turned back the tide of Athenian support for Thebes in the winter of 379/8. Motivated by perceptions of their own sudden vulnerability, the Athenians divorced themselves from the Thebans and set about negotiating their own entente with Sparta. The Athenians, in other words, were the treacherous party in this relationship. Theban desperation at this point is amply attested (Xenophon Hell . 5.4.20; Plutarch Pel . 14.1). The genesis of the fantastic story related by Plutarch about how Pelopidas and Gorgidas covertly induced Sphodrias to attack Athens and thus embroil her in war with Sparta is easy to understand in the atmosphere of mutual Theban-Athenian animosity, always latent but now deeply intensified. Also understandable, in this moment of desperation, is the Theban diplomatic mission to Sparta (reported by Isokrates as a fact), offering to respect all former agreements between Thebes and Sparta, which included the conventional stipulation that an ally of Sparta would march wherever the Spartans would lead (Isokrates 14.27; Plutarch Pel . 4.3-5.1; cf. Xenophon Hell . 2.2.20, 5.3.26). This was the ultimate Theban gambit to forestall the inevitable, and the Spartan ultimatum (again reported as a fact by Isokrates) that the Thebans must take back the Spartan supporters who had fled during the uprising and must expel those who had murdered the polemarchs, only confirmed the helpless isolation of Thebes at that point.
If the Athenians knew all this (and I believe they did), then how could Isokrates make such assertions against the Thebans? In Greek culture, blame never rests except on an inanimate object or a sacrificial victim (hence the Athenians' swift condemnation to death of the two generals who led them to support Thebes). The Athenians could not admit that they were to blame for the plight of the Thebans. Indeed, were they? Had not the Thebans, as much as or more than their own generals, been responsible for allowing Kleombrotos to cross Kithairon? An Athenian audience would therefore be predisposed to approve of such slander, even if they knew that they themselves had left the Theban conspirators to meet their doom alone. The important feature of this argument, however, the most pleasing part to the Athenian ear, and the fact which could not be denied, was that the Athenians had acted resolutely, in the name of autonomy and freedom, to restore the rights to those who had been wronged by Sparta (cf. 14.17), and the Thebans had never acknowledged this service. The shame that had intervened since that glorious moment did not bear mentioning.
Appendix VI
Spartan, Theban, and Athenian Forces in 378
In chapter 5, I state that the infantry force fielded by the Spartans and their allies in 378 was roughly double the size of that fielded by the Athenians and Thebans. Diodoros 15.26.2-4 and 32.1-2 provides the only direct testimony about the numbers of men in the field on various occasions in 378. The figures given by Diodoros lead to the impression that something over 18,000 Peloponnesian infantry and 1,500 cavalry under Agesilaos confronted some 12,000 Theban and Athenian hoplites and over 2,000 cavalry in the campaign of 378 (so Munn 1987, 133 note 82, e.g.). I now believe that these numbers are essentially sound as far as Theban and Athenian forces are concerned but that the total force led by Agesilaos was significantly larger than the 18,000 infantry mentioned in 15.32.1.
My reasons for reconsidering the size of the force led by Agesilaos derive from an analysis of the system of the Peloponnesian levy described by Diodoros 15.31.1-2, the details of which will be set forth in a separate study. The essence of the evidence for a total Peloponnesian levy of some 30,000 infantry (mostly but not all hoplites) is the statement of Xenophon Hell . 5.4.15 that in the winter of 379/8 Kleombrotos left Sphodrias at Thespiai with one-third of the allied contingents (and money to hire mercenaries), combined with the statement by Diodoros 15.29.6 that Sphodrias invaded Attica with "more than 10,000 soldiers." These figures deserve to be taken at face value, and they yield the figure 30,000 as an approximation of the total Peloponnesian levy of 378. The figure given by Diodoros 15.32.1 for the size of Agesilaos' infantry force, over 18,000 men, refers specifically to the force brought by Agesilaos from the Peloponnese. These, combined with Sphodrias' "more than 10,000 soldiers"
already in Boiotia again yield a figure of close to 30,000 Peloponnesian infantry in the field against the Thebans and Athenians in 378.
Theban numbers can be estimated from Diodoros 15.26.2-4, where out of a total force of "no less than 12,000 hoplites and more than 2,000 cavalrymen" assembled at Thebes for the siege of the Kadmeia, 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalrymen are Athenian. Not all of the remaining 7,000 hoplites and 1,500 cavalrymen were Thebans, strictly speaking, since Diodoros reports that the Thebans were reinforced by many men from other Boiotian cities. The distinction is perhaps not very important, however, since Xenophon Hell . 5.4.46 notes that between the campaigns of 378 and 377, substantial numbers from Boiotian cities (literally, "the demos") moved to Thebes to continue their opposition to Spartan-supported oligarchies in Boiotia.
These numbers are controlled to some extent by the accounts of Xenophon Hell . 4.2.17, in which about 5,000 Boiotian hoplites and 800 cavalrymen fought at the battle of the Nemea River in 394 (when the numbers of both arms are said to be low owing to the absence of the Orchomenians); of Diodoros 15.52.2, in which a total levy of Thebans and all willing Boiotian allies before the battle of Leuktra in 371, when Theban fortunes were at a low ebb, amounted to not more than 6,000 men, presumably hoplites; and of Plutarch Pel . 31.2-3 and 35.1, which report levies of 7,000 hoplites not long after Leuktra (see the discussion of these figures by Anderson 1970, 197-98).
In addition to hoplite numbers, we must allow for a sizable force of peltasts and other light-armed troops at the disposal of the Thebans. We have no direct evidence for their numbers, however, and we can only conjecture. A figure of 4,000-5,000 light infantry, Boiotian and mercenary (Xenophon Hell , 5.4.54), seems a fair guess, and one more likely to be too small than too large. That the Thebans, and Boiotians generally, were able to field large numbers of light-armed troops is indicated by Thucydides 4.93.3, in which more than 10,500 light-armed and peltast troops accompanied a Boiotian levy of 7,000 hoplites at Delion in 424.
As to Athenian forces, we possess more numbers but not necessarily more certainty. Diodoros 15.26.2 and 15.32.2 report that the Athenians sent 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry to Thebes on the occasion of the uprising in 379/8, and again 5,000 infantrymen (probably hoplites) and 200 cavalry to Thebes during Agesilaos' campaign of 378. These expeditionary forces represent some fraction of the total Athenian levy, the remainder of which must have been available for home defense—a critical concern during this war.
Diodoros 15.29.7 reports that at the beginning of the war in 378, the Athenians voted to enroll 20,000 hoplites and 500 cavalrymen. There are problems with these figures. The number of cavalrymen is unduly small if it represents a total enrollment, since the Athenians fielded expeditionary forces of around 600 cavalrymen in 394 (Xenophon Hell . 4.2.17) and 400 cavalrymen in 364 (Xenophon Hell . 7.4.29), and by the 350s the Athenians had a statutory enrollment (perhaps not always maintained) of 1,000 cavalrymen (Xenophon Hipparch . 9.3; see the discussion of Bugh 1988, 145-58). It is, moreover, hard to believe that the 500 cavalrymen sent to Thebes early in 378 (Diodoros 15.26.2) constituted the entire Athenian cavalry force. The true number must have been somewhere between 500 and 1,000.
The number of 20,000 hoplites is incredibly large. The Athenians never put anything like that number into the field on this or any other occasion. The number is either an absurdly optimistic and impossible goal set by the demos (which is perhaps a possible explanation, in view of the desperate situation), or it is an outright error. Polybios 2.62.6 states that the Athenians put 10,000 soldiers into the field in 378 (
), which is a much more plausible fig-ure, but one that is still vague in certain respects. The figure does not distinguish hoplites from cavalry (both called by Diodoros 15.29.7) nor from light-armed infantry. It might represent the total of all of these arms put into the field by the Athenians, but I think that it more likely represents the number of Athenian hoplites, metics as well as citizens, mobilized during the war. With 5,000 hoplites regularly sent to reinforce the Thebans, this would leave a plausible 5,000 more hoplites on guard in Attica.
The 5,000 hoplites for home defense would not have been the choicest troops. They would have been composed largely of the youngest (18-19-year-old) and oldest (40-59-year-old) age-classes, and possibly of men whose qualifications for hoplite service were otherwise marginal. They would have been best suited for garrison duty in Athens and Peiraeius and in the forts of Attica (cf. Thucydides 1.93.6, 105.4, 2.13.6-7). This number, divided roughly in half with about 2,500 hoplites for the walls of Athens and Peiraieus and the rest for the garrison forts of Attica, is plausible as an absolute minimum estimate for defensive forces at a time when a large enemy army was operating nearby. Strengthening these forces through the addition of mercenaries was probably a continual concern of the Athenians (see chapter 5, pp. 168-70 and note 61 on garrison strength at this time).
The figure of 10,000 for a total Athenian hoplite force, at least half of whom were required for home defense, derives support from expeditionary numbers attested before and after 378. Xenophon Hell . 4.2.17
reports that about 6,000 Athenian hoplites fought in the battle of the Nemea River in 394. Assuming that this force comprised all eligible hoplites in the 20-49-year-old age-classes, the figure indicates a total hoplite force of men 18-59 years old of 9,375 (see the percentages provided by Hansen 1985, 12, and cf. the calculation of Athenian hoplites in 394, before casualties, at a minimum of 9,250 by Strauss 1986, 80). Diodoros 15.63.2 reports that the Athenians sent a force of 12,000
under Iphikrates into the Peloponnese in 369. This was a full levy, that even included the , the 18-19-year-olds, the cavalry, and quite likely light-armed Athenians as well (Diodoros 15.63.2; Xenophon Hell . 6.5.49, 52). On these numbers and their relation to the total Athenian citizen population, see the discussion of Hansen 1985, 36-43.
The number of light-armed troops available to the Athenians is strictly a matter of conjecture. Strauss 1986, 81, estimates the number of Athenian thetes, the poorest Athenian census class, in 394 at 5,000-7,000. Allowing for an increase in numbers by 378, we could conjecture that Diodoros' figure of 20,000 refers to a combined mobilization of 10,000 hoplites and 10,000 thetes. We are still far from any estimate of Athenian light-armed troops, however, since it is highly probable that the vast majority of Athenian thetes performing military service did so as rowers in the fleet. For light infantry, the Athenians must have been heavily dependent upon mercenaries.
Appendix VII
The Treaty of 375—Bilateral or Multilateral?
Much discussion has been devoted to the question of whether the treaty of 375 was bilateral, between Athens and Sparta, or multilateral, as "Common Peace," koine eirene , open to all Greeks, combatants and noncombatants alike. The terms of the debate are set forth most explicitly by Ryder (1965), who posits that "Koine Eirene had a generally accepted technical meaning" (xi) and that this technical definition can be recognized in the following key features of such "Common Peace" treaties:
First, that their principal clause laid down that all Greek states should be free and autonomous; second, that the treaties were made between all the Greeks, that is to say that they were not bilateral agreements limited to the two sides fighting a war, but were agreements of a general nature applicable to all Greeks equally, whether or not they had taken part in the preceding war (Ryder 1965, xvi).
Ryder concluded that by this measure the peace of 375 was indeed a multilateral treaty, a koine eirene , as Diodoros 15.38.1 in fact so calls it (Ryder 1965, 58-63, 124-26). Applying similar, but not always identical, criteria, other scholars have reached the same conclusion (so Momigliano 1934, 482-86; Hampl 1938, 12-19; Roos 1949, 279-82; Hamilton 1991, 190-95).
This approach is misconceived, however, for it forces the evidence to conform to a rigid definition that is nowhere made explicit in our sources. In so doing, it neglects the skill of the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, at shifting definitions to suit immediate needs. By the very form and nature of their confederacy, the Athenians had provided the basis for claiming that they were the best-qualified arbiters of freedom and autonomy for all Greeks (see chapter 5, notes 17 and 26). The Spartans, of course, made the same claim. When these two powers came to
an understanding between themselves, as Xenophon (Hell . 6.2.1), Diodoros (15.38.4), Nepos (13.2.2), and Isokrates (14.41, 15.109) state or imply that they did, they would certainly have announced the result of this bilateral agreement to be a Common Peace, affording freedom and autonomy to all Greeks.
The two powers could claim that such a treaty had the consent of, and was open to, all Greeks. For the two powers, after having agreed on the terms of peace between themselves, would next each convene the assemblies of their own allies to have them vote whether or not to accept the peace on the terms proffered. This process is attested among the allies of Athens in the oath of allegiance of the Kerkyraians and Athenians (IG II2 97 = Tod 127, lines 21-23, 31-35), and the very event in 375 was the occasion of the speech by Epameinondas
(that is, to the assembly of Athenian allies) mentioned by Diodoros 15.38.3. Among the allies of Sparta, the process is best attested earlier in the bilateral treaty known as the Peace of Nikias (Thucydides 5.17.2-18.1). In the case of the treaty of 375, who among the allies of either side except the Thebans would have had any reason to dissent publicly and leave themselves ekspondoi , outside of the treaty? As to the theoretical extension of this treaty to all Greeks, any other Greeks who wished to be embraced by the terms of the treaty could do so by joining the alliance of one or another of the two powers.
Many states did in fact join the Athenian alliance during the peace of 375-373 (see Cargill 1981, 61-66). This proves that the Athenian perception that this peace treaty secured their ascendency better than any other had (Isokrates 15.110) was held by others as well. The hegemonia now shared by Sparta and Athens, one ruling the land, the other the sea, according to Diodoros 15.38.4 (cf. Nepos 13.2.2 and Eusebius, p. 196 Karst), was the inevitable product of such a treaty made at this moment. There is no reason to believe that any clause of the treaty so referred to the hegemonia of Athens and Sparta.