Posterity

In 379, on the eve of the Boiotian war, Xenophon remarked, "The Athenians were left destitute of allies, while on the other hand  . . . it seemed that [the Lakedaimonians] had at length established their empire most excellently and securely."^[89] In the winter of 379/8, bold schemes had

been launched at Thebes and at Athens to upset the supremacy of Sparta. At the heart of the strategy lay the recognition that an overwhelming land army such as Sparta possessed could be rendered ineffectual by holding key mountain passes against it. Success depended upon a well-coordinated plan of deployment which could anticipate the movements of the enemy. The dangers involved in failure were considerable, and there were limits to how far the Athenians would expose themselves for the sake of the adherence of Thebes. The Spartans were able to demonstrate those dangers to the Athenians when, beyond all expectation, they crossed Kithairon after the liberation of Thebes and proved that they could still make war in Boiotia or in Attica. Demonstration and diplomacy brought the Spartans to within an ace of achieving their goal of isolating Thebes. Only a bungled attempt to make the ultimate demonstration of Spartan power forced the Athenians to enter the war in alliance with Thebes.

The achievements of the Athenians in the war that followed were an often-remembered inspiration to the next generation:

Some of you have been told, others know and remember, how formidable the Spartans were, not many years ago, and yet how at the call of honor and duty you played a part not unworthy of your country, and entered the lists against them in defence of your rights. I remind you of this, Athenians, because I want you to know and realize that, as no danger can assail you while you are on your guard, so if you are remiss no success can attend you. Learn a lesson from the former strength of the Lakedaimonians, which you mastered by strict attention to your affairs.^[90]

Strict attention to needs and capabilities had been the way out of dire straits in 378. The result became a model for the conduct of territorial defense, reflected in the writings of Aeneas Tacticus, who probably marched with Agesilaos in 378 and 377, and of Plato, with whom Chabrias was later to associate in the Academy.^[91] Under the guidance of

Chabrias in the spring of 378, a strategy was developed by which the strength of the Lakedaimonians might be neutralized along a second line of defense, after the Spartans had brought their army through the Kithairon passes. The Dema wall assured that Attica would be only minimally affected by an invasion of the Peloponnesian army, while a network of lookout and signal posts enabled the Athenians to support their frontier garrisons against raids and to dispatch their forces to the right place at the right time. That this system was never put to the ultimate test was a tribute to its efficacy. The Spartans preferred to concentrate their efforts on the Theban and Athenian army at Thebes, where their strength could be more effectively brought to bear. Yet even there, on the one occasion when the Spartans nearly succeeded in breaking the enemy, Chabrias, facing Agesilaos, proved, in the words of Aristides, to be "the most fearsome commander."^[92] In perhaps the most remarkable feat of generalship in the history of Greek warfare, Chabrias was able to project, through the expert drill of his men, a confidence in the face of overwhelming odds that, in effect, neutralized those odds. In a land war with no land battles, the Spartans could not win.

Because the effects of the peace of 375 were overtaken a few years later by the consequences of the battle of Leuktra, the genius of Chabrias never achieved the fame that later came to Epameinondas. Chabrias nevertheless received his due from posterity. "Recall," Demosthenes later eulogized, "how skillfully, as your commander, he drew up your ranks at Thebes to face the whole power of the Peloponnese."^[93] This image was called to mind often enough by the statues of Chabrias in his famous pose of disdainful contemplation of the enemy, one of which stood in the Athenian Agora.^[94] Although he preferred to omit an account of this episode

from his history, Xenophon later did acknowledge that Chabrias "was regarded as a very good general."^[95] And though Xenophon avoided it, the comparison between Chabrias and Agesilaos was made by others. An anecdote recounted by Polyainos, referring to another occasion early in the career of Chabrias, has Agesilaos himself accord Chabrias the ultimate tribute, exclaiming, "A most excellent general is Chabrias!"^[96]