The Closing of Kithairon

In one quarter of the frontier, we know that the Athenians were as active as the Thebans after the campaign of 377. The passage from Polyainos quoted above suggests that Agesilaos, upon his withdrawal, had been subjected to harassment on his way through Kithairon. This was the foreseeable consequence of his need to concentrate all available man-power in reinforcing Spartan allies in Boiotia. If the Megarians had been asked to assume responsibility for guarding Kithairon, they failed to do so, and the balance that had begun to swing against the Spartans at the time of Agesilaos' withdrawal had been turned decisively against them by the spring of 376. For by the time that Kleombrotos, replacing the ailing Agesilaos, approached Kithairon to make his crossing into Boiotia with the Peloponnesian army in 376, a Theban and Athenian force held the heights of Kithairon and was able to prevent his crossing (the ascent of the main road from the Megarid is shown in figure 41).^[62]

Xenophon's account of this affair represents only the climax of a process that must have involved a prolonged and energetic struggle by both sides to control Kithairon. Whatever actions might have gone on in the months before Kleombrotos' march, the moment of his arrival in the Megarid was crucial and was probably accompanied or immediately pre-ceded by an attempt to dislodge the Thebans and Athenians launched by the Spartan forces in Boiotia. It is hard to believe that Kleombrotos would not have made as much of an effort as Agesilaos to secure the passes before him, although Xenophon's silence on the matter would imply, to Kleombrotos' disgrace, that he did not. But Kleombrotos was not inexperienced with this route and could not have proceeded in ignorance of the situation ahead of him, and it is difficult to believe that he could have been as negligent or as timorous as Xenophon makes him out to be. In view of his own experience on Kithairon and his careful preparations in Boiotia during the winter of 378, and in view of Spartan experience in the preceding two campaigns, Kleombrotos must surely have ordered the commander at Thespiai to make every effort to clear

the passes for his arrival. This time, however, the Thebans and Athenians held the upper hand, and the attempt failed.^[63]

The closing of Kithairon was a major turning point in the war. It marked the achievement of what Theban and Athenian strategists two and a half years earlier had believed was feasible. Now it was a reality: Peloponnesian forces could no longer proceed overland into Boiotia and could likewise probably be prevented from entering Attica. Now, however, unlike the situation optimistically forecast in the winter of 379/8, the Spar-tans had strong forces based north of Kithairon. The allies could in no way afford to relax their vigilance, on Kithairon or in Boiotia, after the repulse of Kleombrotos.

For the Athenians, in fact, the repulse of Kleombrotos marked the beginning of more intensive pressures on themselves. For in 376, the Spartans and their allies shifted their offensive strategy away from Boiotia, where for the time being they had to content themselves with a war of raids and skirmishes while holding on to their allies and strongholds, to a naval strategy intended to cripple Athens. In the autumn of 376, Chabrias won even greater glory than he had in Boiotia by leading the Athenians in the naval victory at Naxos that put a stop to Spartan plans to blockade Athens by sea. But beginning this summer, if not even earlier in the war, the Athenians had to endure raids against their coasts and coastal shipping by Spartan forces operating out of Aigina. These circumstances required almost as much vigilance along the seaboard as along the land frontier.^[64]

The Spartans had meanwhile not yet completely lost hope of making headway in the war against Thebes. Xenophon informs us that, in the spring of 375, preparations were under way to transport a Peloponnesian army across the Corinthian gulf into Boiotia and that the Thebans prevailed upon the Athenians to forestall that event by sending a naval

expedition under Timotheos around the Peloponnese to Kerkyra and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf. This expedition had the desired effect, momentarily diverting Spartan naval forces to the waters of Akarnania, where Timotheos dealt the Spartans a second blow to their naval aspirations in the battle of Alyzeia.^[65]

The Thebans were now doubly benefiting from the support of the Athenians. Athenian forces on the Kithairon frontier were instrumental in deterring any attempt at an overland invasion this season, and Athenian naval forces had for the time being prevented the Spartans from conveying their army directly into Boiotia by sea. Encouraged by the course of events, "the Thebans were boldly campaigning against the neighboring cities of Boiotia and were in the process of recovering control of them" (Hellenika 5.4.63). One sign of the vigor of the Thebans was the notable victory of Pelopidas over more numerous Spartan forces at Tegyra early in the year. Substantive gains made at about the same time were the subjection of Thespiai and Tanagra to Theban domination.^[66]

By the midsummer of 375, the Thebans had even begun to carry the war against the Phokians, who were allies of Sparta. The Spartans, in turn, with the fleet withdrawn from Akarnania, conveyed Kleombrotos with two-thirds of the Peloponnesian levy across the Corinthian gulf into Phokis. Kleombrotos began to assemble an even larger allied army around his force from the Peloponnese, and for the moment he checked the progress of the Thebans, prompting them to prepare for an invasion now to come from the west.^[67] Under these circumstances, not long after midsummer, the Athenians and Spartans came to terms of peace.