The Campaign of 377
Agesilaos left a new harmost at Thespiai, Phoibidas, and with him probably the same portion of the Peloponnesian levy that Kleombrotos had previously left, only rotating the allied contingents so that all might have their share of duty on the Boiotian front. In addition to keeping Kithairon open, Phoibidas' mission was much the same as that of Agis at Dekeleia some thirty-odd years earlier, to make war (
, Thucydides 7.27.4) by doing as much damage as he could to Theban property. This was a mutual preoccupation, and the Thebans likewise raided the territory of Thespiai and that of Sparta's other allies in the area. Probably toward the end of the summer of 378, the Thebans came out in force against Phoibidas, plundering Thespian territory and eventually routing Phoibidas' troops, slaying Phoibidas himself in the process.[50]
Xenophon remarks that this event encouraged not only the Thebans but also their supporters in other Boiotian cities, many of whom moved to Thebes, while at the same time it led to a growing need for support on the part of the friends of Sparta in Boiotia. Still, according to Xenophon, the Spartans did no more than replace Phoibidas with a new commander, who came to Thespiai with a Spartan mora . Numerically, this reinforcement amounted perhaps to no more than a replacement of the numbers lost with Phoibidas. Symbolically, it represented a deepening commitment on the part of the Spartans, for it was probably the first Lakedaimonian contingent to be committed to garrison duty alongside the allies in Boiotia. Sparta's allies felt the need for more than symbolic reinforcement, but at this point, the Spartans could do little more to support them. The new commander evidently had a more immediate worry. He had brought his force into Boiotia by ship across the Corinthian gulf. This suggests that after the death of Phoibidas, the Thebans and, possibly, the Athenians were encouraged to take the offensive on Kithairon. If this was the case, the new Spartan commander would be preoccupied with the restoration of Spartan control of Kithairon.[51]
With the coming of spring, the Spartan strongholds in Boiotia were in much the same state, in material terms, as they had been a year be-
fore. In terms of morale, especially among Boiotian allies, the Spartan cause was beginning to suffer and badly needed some conspicuous success in the field to buoy it. Agesilaos had to devise some way of achieving a more decisive victory in this campaign. For all the same reasons contemplated in 378, a campaign in Attica could be ruled out as unprofitable. Knowing now how the Theban-Athenian forces operated, how-ever, Agesilaos could see a way by which he might yet be able to achieve his goal of breaking this union. It required timing, surprise, and advance preparation.
As in 378, the Kithairon passes had to be strongly guarded before the approach of his army to assure that no Athenian force could dislodge his men before his own arrival. The dispatch of a supplementary force from the Peloponnese could satisfy such a requirement this year just as well as it had in the previous year. However, Agesilaos' plan required a different arrangement. He sent word to the commander at Thespiai to occupy the passes with the force already at his disposal (Xenophon Hellenika 5.4.47). This procedure had the advantage of allowing Agesilaos to join the army from Thespiai to his own without first going to Thespiai. It had the disadvantage of removing the extra garrison force from the pass upon his entry into Boiotia, making his return trip potentially more difficult. Agesilaos' primary concern, however, was to make head-way against Thebes during this campaign, and for this purpose, he required all available forces to accompany him. As will be seen, Agesilaos had specific plans for an additional force this season which precluded his leaving a strong force on Kithairon.
The arrangements for crossing Kithairon worked well, and Agesilaos arrived at Plataia at the end of a day's march with his force at full strength. Word was sent ahead to Thespiai that all preparations were to be made for the arrival of his army: a market was to be prepared for their provisioning, and such ambassadors as wished to have an audience with him should await him there. The Thebans were evidently taken in by these preparations and assembled their force at Kynos Kephalai, as they had the previous year, in anticipation of Agesilaos' approach from Thespiai. But here Agesilaos deceived his opponents by leaving Plataia at an unexpected hour in an unexpected direction. An early march at dawn the next morning enabled Agesilaos once again to penetrate the Theban stockade at an undefended point at Skolos, far to the east of Kynos Kephalai. It also placed his army directly astride the route of Chabrias' march to Thebes on the very day that Chabrias' army would come to the aid of the Thebans.[52]
No source even hints that Agesilaos intended to intercept the Athenians on this occasion. That this was his purpose can only be deduced from circumstantial evidence, but that evidence is compelling. Not only was Agesilaos in the right place at the right time to catch Chabrias and the Athenians, but such a stratagem was precisely what Agesilaos needed in order to avoid a repetition of the previous campaign's frustration. Further circumstantial evidence, moreover, suggests that Agesilaos had in mind to dose the routes between Thebes and Athens as a result of this campaign.
The reason no source mentions this stratagem is, most likely, that it did not even come close to working. The Athenians at this time were nothing if not vigilant. Scouts and lookouts from Panakton, or in advance of Chabrias' own force, would have had no difficulty spotting in time the danger that lay in their path. The Asopos valley is wide, and the land between Thebes and Tanagra is dissected by many hills and ravines. An army could not guard all possible ways. Theban cavalry was probably the first force to approach Agesilaos from Kynos Kephalai, and it was strong enough to discourage a wide dispersal of Agesilaos' army. If Agesilaos did position his army in a central location—and Skolos was perhaps the most suitable such position—in expectation of moving quickly to intercept Chabrias wherever he might attempt to pass, Chabrias need only have waited for the cover of night to make his passage possible without significant interference. In any event, within two or three days of Agesilaos' arrival at Skolos, the Athenians had success-fully united with the Thebans.[53]
In Xenophon's narrative, Agesilaos' entry into Theban territory at Skolos was followed by his movement farther to the east, to the borders of Tanagraian territory, for the purpose of devastating Theban land in this quarter.[54] Further devastation was not what was needed in this campaign, however, and there is good reason to believe that Agesilaos' accomplishments even in this regard were greatly exaggerated by Xenophon for the benefit of his hero's reputation. Destruction of the enemy's force in the field was what was needed, and this Agesilaos knew could only be done by dividing his opponents or by catching them before they
had united. His failure to intercept Chabrias was probably soon apparent to him. To have achieved it, Agesilaos would have needed as much advance intelligence specifically in this quarter of the Attic-Boiotian frontier as the Athenians had. Only by turning Tanagra into a second major base of Spartan operations could this have been accomplished.
Xenophon informs us that Agesilaos "devastated Theban territory to the east of Thebes as far as the territory of the Tanagraians; for at that time Hypatodoros and his associates, friends of the Lakedaimonians, still held Tanagra. After this he returned" (Hellenika 5.4.49). Aside from devastation, Xenophon gives no reason for Agesilaos' march in this direction. His reference to the friends of Sparta in power at Tanagra suggests that they had some relevance to his campaign, but as it stands, their mention serves only to inform us why Agesilaos desisted from plundering when he reached the borders of the Tanagraia. Xenophon's prior mention (Hellenika 5.4.46) of the growing need for support among the friends of Sparta in Boiotian cities adds to the suspicion that Agesilaos did more than just turn back once he reached the frontier with Tanagra. Actual evidence of his purpose emerges from a reference to the harmost Panthoidas and a strong force (
) under his command at Tanagra, whose defeat in battle is mentioned in passing by Plutarch (Pelopidas 15.4). Although it is dangerous to base an argument on Xenophon's omissions, it seems unlikely that Panthoidas was stationed at Tanagra before Agesilaos' campaign of 377, for in that case (and especially in light of Hellenika 5.4.46) Xenophon ought to have mentioned him and his garrison, and not merely Hypatodoros, in de-scribing how Tanagra was disposed toward Sparta. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Xenophon, whether deliberately or through ignorance, mistook Agesilaos' incidental activity (devastation) for his primary purpose and failed to report that Agesilaos had installed Panthoidas with a strong garrison at Tanagra. This must have been part of the original plan of his campaign, and it demonstrates that Agesilaos was still thinking of the future and how an increased presence in this quarter might yet shift the balance decisively in favor of Sparta in the war against Thebes.[55]
Agesilaos' return westward from Tanagra was marked by a second encounter with the Thebans and Athenians not unlike his first. This
time, however, the two sides did come to blows, although only after their opposing phalanxes had broken formation in a complicated series of feints and pursuits. I have discussed the setting and sequence of these events in detail elsewhere.[56] Here the only matter of consequence is to note that the action resulted in the Thebans erecting a trophy after repelling the Peloponnesians and slaying one or more Spartans in the process. Xenophon makes a partial and grudging admission of the Theban success but points out that Agesilaos encamped after the battle on precisely the same eminence, the hill known as Graos Stethos, on which the Thebans and Athenians had originally arrayed themselves in an effort to prevent Agesilaos' passage. Xenophon could not overlook any symbolic victory in describing Agesilaos' accomplishments, no matter how short of their intended goal they might have fallen.
On the following day, according to Xenophon, Agesilaos withdrew to Thespiai, achieving nothing more against the Thebans, except that his Olynthian cavalry, in a rearguard action, cut down a number of Theban peltasts who had pressed their pursuit too far in advance of their hoplite support. In the course of this minor incident, Xenophon makes a passing reference to Chabrias (Hellenika 5.4.54). This is the only point at which Xenophon mentions that Chabrias, or any other Athenian, was fighting alongside the Thebans. To have given Chabrias his due would have meant revealing Agesilaos' shortcomings. Chabrias is mentioned here only to point out how he failed to support the peltasts in an incident that, in fact, rather contrasts the peltasts' hotheaded enthusiasm with Chabrias' cautious discipline at the sight of Agesilaos' retreat.
Once again, Agesilaos had failed to make his strength in arms tell against the Thebans and Athenians, and this year he had still more Spartan and Peloponnesian dead to bury outside of Thespiai.[57] Allies and supporters of Sparta, in Agesilaos' army and elsewhere, were becoming demonstrably discouraged. Agesilaos now found that he had to intervene in the domestic politics of Thespiai to halt a schism that threatened to lead to civil war in that city. Disaffection for the war among the ranks of Agesilaos' army is anecdotal. One such anecdote, preserved by Polyainos, seems to describe Agesilaos' withdrawal from Boiotia on this oc-
casion, when he had to cross Kithairon without a friendly force holding the passes for him:
Agesilaos, when he had drawn up his army in battle order and saw that they had no will to fight, withdrew. The way out was through a pass in the mountains, in which he expected the Boiotians to attack. Therefore he ordered the Lakedaimonians to lead the van, and the allies to bring up the rear, so that when the enemy attacked the rear guard they would have reason to fight bravely.[58]