Precipation
Athenian involvement in the Theban uprising against the Spartan garrison on the Kadmeia is further evidence that war was anticipated by the Athenians. At the beginning of the winter of 379/8, the return of the Theban exiles from Attica and their coup d'état at Thebes was supported by a corps of Athenian volunteers led by two generals. The affair was planned and executed in secrecy and, therefore, was not authorized by any public decree on the part of the Athenians. The Athenian officers and men in on the conspiracy were certainly aware of the gravity of the
situation and the probability that war with Sparta would result. They must have proceeded, nonetheless, with the expectation that what they were doing was opportune and would receive the endorsement of the Athenian assembly as soon as the uprising was announced. This is precisely what did happen, according to Isokrates, Deinarchos, Diodoros, Plutarch, and Aristides, and their testimony should be accepted despite the silence of Xenophon on this point.[12]
On the first day of the uprising, when it became known that the pro-Spartan polemarchs were dead and the city of Thebes was in the hands of the anti-Spartan faction, messengers were dispatched by both the conspirators and the beleaguered Spartan garrison to summon aid to their sides. The Spartans urgently requested support from the surrounding allied towns and a relieving force from Sparta to put down the insurrection. The Thebans, presumably seconded by their Athenian coconspirators, urgently requested a force from Athens in order to capture the Kadmeia before the Peloponnesian army should arrive. Within a day, the Theban appeal was heard at Athens and approved, and the following day, a force "as large as possible" was dispatched to Thebes (Diodoros 15.26.1).
Diodoros says that 5,000 Athenian hoplites and 500 cavalry were mobilized under the command of Demophon and that the Athenians prepared to follow this force
, with their entire levy, if necessary (15.26.2). The mercenaries of Chabrias were already on the scene. Operating out of Eleutherai on the main road to Thebes, Chabrias' men must have formed the bulk of the force led by the two generals, for no citizen levy could have been called out for that covert purpose without arousing widespread suspicion and speculation. As it was, the presence of these men in the vicinity of the frontiers seems to have been noticed by the Spartan commanders, who suspected that something was afoot and placed their allies on alert. This emerges from details in Plutarch's account of the events leading up to the uprising in Thebes in his On the Daimon of Sokrates . Although this is a largely fictionalized work, these particular details seem too circumstantially precise to be dismissed. Plutarch has one of the Theban conspirators, despairing of their chances
for success, point out that their enemies could not be altogether ignorant of the conspiracy of the exiles, since on the eve of the planned coup, the Thespians had been standing to arms for two days already, under orders from the Spartan commanders to be prepared in case they were summoned (Moralia 586e-f). A second circumstantial detail is that one of the three Spartan commanders, Lysanoridas, was away from Thebes at the time of the uprising (Moralia 586e, 594d, 598f). This detail is con-firmed by the fact that, of the three Spartan commanders held accountable after the surrender of the Kadmeia, Lysanoridas was the only one to escape the death sentence (Plutarch Pelopidas 13.2, Moralia 598f; cf. Diodoros 15.27.3). Considering the state of alert at Thespiai, it is most likely that Lysanoridas was in the field investigating the source of the alarm. Under the circumstances, Plataia would have been his most probable location, for there he could most readily gather intelligence about the movements of the Athenian force, whose presence in such strength was most unusual at any time, and certainly in this season. As events proved, if the Spartans and their allies suspected anything at this moment, it was the Athenians, not the conspirators within Thebes.[13]
Upon the arrival at Thebes of the main Athenian force and supporters from other Boiotian cities, the siege of the Kadmeia was more closely pressed. The mass of forces assembled (Diodoros 15.26.4 reports no less than 12,000 hoplites and 2,000 cavalry) was intended primarily to fore-stall any intervention by Spartan allies in the immediate vicinity, and in this it was entirely successful. The Thespians, whatever orders they may have received, kept quiet. Athenian citizen troops were most likely detailed to this deterrent role. Actual fighting was left to the Thebans and their Boiotian supporters and, probably, the mercenaries brought by the Athenians.
Frequent assaults were made on the walls, and soldiers were encouraged by the promise of great rewards to the first man to enter the acropolis, all loudly announced for the effect it would have on morale on both sides. The garrison of 1,500 men held out stoutly for days, but as provisions began to dwindle and no relieving force was in sight, the pressure began to tell. Finally, after at least two weeks of ceaseless right-
ing, all in the gloom of winter, the Peloponnesian followers compelled their Spartan commanders to accept terms of surrender and to evacuate the Kadmeia.[14]
The surrender was a decisive victory, for if the Kadmeia had not fallen by the time the Peloponnesian army arrived, the Spartans would have been able to lay siege to the Thebans and their allies from within and without, reducing the anti-Spartan forces to a state from which there would have been no easy recovery. The victory was a narrow one, for the relieving army was little more than a day away at the time of the evacuation. Did the Thebans and Athenians realize that success hung by so slender a thread?
There is no doubt that they realized the urgency of reducing the Kadmeia, but they may well have felt confident in their ability to press the siege to a successful conclusion no matter how long it took. The reason for their confidence was the presence of Chabrias' peltasts together with a Theban force on the Kithairon frontier, whose purpose was to halt the army of Kleombrotos when it finally arrived in the Megarid. Determined opposition could dose the Kithairon passes to an invading army, as Kleombrotos was to discover in 376. On this occasion, however, Kleombrotos did force his way through, although it is likely that his progress north from the Megarid was significantly delayed before he was able to find a way to do so.
Xenophon describes the position of Kleombrotos' foes at the moment that Kleombrotos made his passage through Kithairon "on the road leading to Plataia" (Hellenika 5.4.14). Chabrias and his peltasts were guarding the road through Eleutherai while a force of some 150 men from Thebes were on guard in the pass on Kleombrotos' route. It is sometimes assumed, as Xenophon's simple description seems to imply, that Chabrias at Eleutherai had forced Kleombrotos to make a detour out of the best route across Kithairon into a byway where a small de-fending force was taken by surprise. This is an erroneous assumption, however, for Kleombrotos' route to Plataia was in fact the direct route for his purposes (see map 5 and figures 41, 42).[15] At the moment of his crossing, Chabrias' force was in no position to hinder Kleombrotos' passage into Boiotia. Only the "men released from prison [in the uprising at Thebes], who were about one hundred and fifty in number," as
Xenophon describes them, were in Kleombrotos' way, and these Kleombrotos' vanguard of peltasts surprised and slaughtered or dispersed.
This is a remarkable set of circumstances, in view of the fact that the approach of Kleombrotos' army was no secret and that the men from Thebes were, presumably, on the lookout for his army. Why were there so few of them, and why were they taken by surprise? The answer to these questions must be that they did not expect Kleombrotos to cross Kithairon at that moment, and the only reason for them to have been so careless is that they believed their task was done.
The garrison on the Kadmeia had already surrendered, and its commanders had been allowed to withdraw to Megara, there to meet Kleombrotos with their shameful news (Plutarch Pelopidas 13.2). There is every reason to believe that until that time the Thebans, almost certainly rein-forced by Chabrias' peltasts, had stood watch in force over the southern entrances to the Kithairon passes, preventing Kleombrotos from making any attempt to cross.[16] Standing guard for weeks on these ridges and summits in the bitter cold of the midwinter season would have taken its toll on these men. After they had seen the Spartans from the Kadmeian garrison make their dismal way across the passes, they must have been ordered to withdraw and return to sheltered quarters. Most of the Thebans returned home, but 150 miserable souls were left to stand guard over the northern entrances to the Kithairon passes, where their object would have been to keep watch on Plataia, ready to intercept any movement that Lysanoridas and his small force there might make to cross out of Boiotia. Chabrias' mercenaries took up quarters at Eleutherai to keep watch over another northern entrance to Kithairon. Neither party noriced the force that broke camp at Megara and moved swiftly across the passes behind them. The Thebans and Athenians no longer expected Kleombrotos to cross Kithairon, and the fact that he did so came as a shock.