Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China |
Acknowledgments |
One Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations |
• | The Starting Point: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model |
• | Fragmented Authoritarianism In Broader Perspective |
The Volume In Perspective |
• | How Constant Has China's Bureaucratic Practice Remained? |
• | What About the Communist Party? |
• | How About Chinese Culture and Society? |
• | Organization Of The Volume |
Part One National Issues |
Two A Plum for a Peach:Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China |
• | A Comparative Framework For Viewing Bargaining |
• | The Systematic Causes Of Bargaining Activity |
• | What Do Leaders Bargain Over? |
Water Projects: The Bargaining Process Up Close |
• | The Danjiangkou Dam |
• | The Three Gorges Project |
Who Bargains, In What Arenas, And What Strategies Are Employed? |
• | Who Bargains? |
• | In What Arenas Does Bargaining Occur? |
Strategies for Bargaining and the Necessary Resources |
• | Foot-In-The-Door And "Fishing Projects." |
• | Whipping Up Support and Faits Accomplis |
• | Painting a Rosy or a Black Picture—Cooking the Books |
• | A Little Something for Everyone |
• | Getting to Key Decision-Makers, "Old Friends," and Relatives |
• | The Implications Of A Bargaining System View |
Three The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform |
• | The Relationship Between The Communist Party And The Government: Principal And Agent |
• | The Policy-Making Process: Management By Exception |
• | Policy Outcomes Under Management-By-Exception |
• | Center And Locality: Federalism In A Unitary State |
• | Conclusion: Evaluating The Political Record Of Economic Reform |
• | References |
Part Two The Center |
Four The Party Leadership System |
• | Evolution Of The Leadership System |
Norms Of The Leadership System |
• | Functional Systems and Coordinating Points |
Division of Responsibilities |
• | Policy-making |
• | Coordination |
• | Innovation |
• | Supervision |
• | Personnel |
• | Lines of Authority |
Chronic Problems And Post-Mao Reforms |
• | Continued Political Abuse of the Leadership System |
• | Trends under Zhao Ziyang |
Politburo Leadership Arrangements |
• | The Sub-Politburo Leadership Structure |
• | A Working Model |
• | Variations and Conundrums |
• | Conclusion |
• | Appendix A: Typical Central Leading Units |
• | Appendix B: Leadership Mechanisms |
• | Appendix C: Evolution Of Political Reform Group |
• | Appendix D: Coordination Points For Management Of International Activities (1958) |
Five Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy |
• | The Problem Of Policy Coordination |
• | The Coordination Problem In The Chinese Bureaucracy |
• | Research Centers: Organization And Mission |
Research Centers: Impact On The Coordination Problem |
• | Information Effects |
• | Authority Effects |
• | Incentive Effects |
• | Conclusion: The Structure Of Authority And Models Of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior |
Part Three Bureaucratic Clusters |
Six Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System |
• | The Inherited Military System |
• | Revamping The Personnel System |
• | Military Command And Control |
• | The Budgetary And Resource Allocation Process |
• | Some Preliminary Conclusions |
Seven The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China |
• | The Issue: Policy Related To Teachers |
Formal And Informal Structures In Teacher Policy |
• | The Formal Organization: A Horizontal View |
• | The Vertical View |
Case Study I: Standards For Teachers |
• | The Problem of Standards and Quality |
• | The Groping Pace of Bureaucratic Action |
Actors in the Process: The Power of Subordinates |
• | Experimentation |
• | Interpretation |
• | Undermining Policy |
• | Shaping Conceptualization of Policy |
Multiple Coping Strategies |
• | Linking To Other Agendas |
• | Using Momentum of Other Educational Reforms |
• | Closet Reforms and the Spreading of Success Stories |
Case Study II: Improving The Lot Of Teachers |
• | The Problem |
Strategies for Improving the Teacher's Lot |
• | Social Work |
• | Political Efforts |
• | Economic and Material Reforms |
• | Summary And New Directions For Education Policy |
• | References |
Eight The Behavior of Middlemen in the Cadre Retirement Policy Process |
• | Sources |
• | Players And Organizational Context |
• | Policy Without Action Implications |
• | Execution Of Policy |
• | Deviation From Policy |
• | Conclusion |
Nine Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in the Reform Process |
• | The Command-Bureaucratic Economy |
• | The Central Government And The Control Of Investment |
• | Enterprises And The Two-Track System |
• | Bilateral Monopoly |
• | Conclusion |
• | Appendix |
Part Four Subnational Levels |
Ten Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan |
• | Structural Reform And The Central-Cities Policy |
• | Negotiation |
• | Problems In Relations |
• | Financial Problems |
• | Implementation |
• | Distribution |
• | Prices |
• | Personnel |
• | Stalemate |
• | Conclusion |
Eleven Local Bargaining Relationships and Urban Industrial Finance |
Corporate Ties In Local Industry |
Institutional Actors |
• | Enterprises |
• | Industrial Bureaus |
• | Finance and Taxation Bureaus |
• | Local Bank Branches |
• | Planning and Economic Commissions |
• | The Mayor's Office |
Municipal Budgetary And Fiscal Processes |
• | The Redistribution of Local Resources |
• | Sharing Risk |
• | The Shared Responsibility of Collective Decisions |
Redistributive Politics: Bargains And Strategies |
• | Bargaining Positions |
• | Bargaining Strategies |
• | Conclusion: Bargaining In Perspective |
Appendix: Classified List Of Interviews |
• | Government Commissions |
• | Functional Bureaus |
• | Banks |
• | Industrial Bureaus (Corporations) and Companies |
• | Enterprises |
Twelve Urbanizing Rural China: Bureaucratic Authority and Local Autonomy |
• | Rural Urbanization As An Issue Area |
• | The Prereform Structure Of Authority And Settlements |
• | Administrative Structures And Changes Since 1983 |
Authority And Hierarchy Under Rural Urbanization |
• | The Special Case of Jiangsu Province |
• | Indicators of the Persistence of County Control |
• | Planning and Bureaucratic Control |
• | Labeling County Towns |
• | Nesting and Bureaucratic Authority |
Control Of Resources For Town Development |
• | Taxes and Small-town Development |
• | Profits from Rural Industry and Small-town Development |
• | Banking and Small-town Development |
• | Migration Policy and Access to Towns |
• | Conclusion: The Politics Of Rural Urbanization |
Appendix |
• | Types and Characteristics of Small Towns in China |
Bibliography |
Contributors |
Index |
• | A |
• | B |
• | C |
• | D |
• | E |
• | F |
• | G |
• | H |
• | I |
• | J |
• | K |
• | L |
• | M |
• | N |
• | O |
• | P |
• | Q |
• | R |
• | S |
• | T |
• | U |
• | V |
• | W |
• | X |
• | Y |
• | Z |