Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China

  Acknowledgments

 collapse sectionOne  Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations
 The Starting Point: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model
 Fragmented Authoritarianism In Broader Perspective
 collapse sectionThe Volume In Perspective
 How Constant Has China's Bureaucratic Practice Remained?
 What About the Communist Party?
 How About Chinese Culture and Society?
 Organization Of The Volume

 collapse sectionPart One  National Issues
 collapse sectionTwo  A Plum for a Peach:Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China
 A Comparative Framework For Viewing Bargaining
 The Systematic Causes Of Bargaining Activity
 What Do Leaders Bargain Over?
 collapse sectionWater Projects: The Bargaining Process Up Close
 The Danjiangkou Dam
 The Three Gorges Project
 collapse sectionWho Bargains, In What Arenas, And What Strategies Are Employed?
 Who Bargains?
 In What Arenas Does Bargaining Occur?
 collapse sectionStrategies for Bargaining and the Necessary Resources
 Foot-In-The-Door And "Fishing Projects."
 Whipping Up Support and Faits Accomplis
 Painting a Rosy or a Black Picture—Cooking the Books
 A Little Something for Everyone
 Getting to Key Decision-Makers, "Old Friends," and Relatives
 The Implications Of A Bargaining System View
 collapse sectionThree  The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform
 The Relationship Between The Communist Party And The Government: Principal And Agent
 The Policy-Making Process: Management By Exception
 Policy Outcomes Under Management-By-Exception
 Center And Locality: Federalism In A Unitary State
 Conclusion: Evaluating The Political Record Of Economic Reform
 References

 collapse sectionPart Two  The Center
 collapse sectionFour  The Party Leadership System
 Evolution Of The Leadership System
 collapse sectionNorms Of The Leadership System
 Functional Systems and Coordinating Points
 collapse sectionDivision of Responsibilities
 Policy-making
 Coordination
 Innovation
 Supervision
 Personnel
 Lines of Authority
 collapse sectionChronic Problems And Post-Mao Reforms
 Continued Political Abuse of the Leadership System
 Trends under Zhao Ziyang
 collapse sectionPolitburo Leadership Arrangements
 The Sub-Politburo Leadership Structure
 A Working Model
 Variations and Conundrums
 Conclusion
 Appendix A: Typical Central Leading Units
 Appendix B: Leadership Mechanisms
 Appendix C: Evolution Of Political Reform Group
 Appendix D: Coordination Points For Management Of International Activities (1958)
 collapse sectionFive  Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy
 The Problem Of Policy Coordination
 The Coordination Problem In The Chinese Bureaucracy
 Research Centers: Organization And Mission
 collapse sectionResearch Centers: Impact On The Coordination Problem
 Information Effects
 Authority Effects
 Incentive Effects
 Conclusion: The Structure Of Authority And Models Of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior

 collapse sectionPart Three  Bureaucratic Clusters
 collapse sectionSix  Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System
 The Inherited Military System
 Revamping The Personnel System
 Military Command And Control
 The Budgetary And Resource Allocation Process
 Some Preliminary Conclusions
 collapse sectionSeven  The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China
 The Issue: Policy Related To Teachers
 collapse sectionFormal And Informal Structures In Teacher Policy
 The Formal Organization: A Horizontal View
 The Vertical View
 collapse sectionCase Study I: Standards For Teachers
 The Problem of Standards and Quality
 The Groping Pace of Bureaucratic Action
 collapse sectionActors in the Process: The Power of Subordinates
 Experimentation
 Interpretation
 Undermining Policy
 Shaping Conceptualization of Policy
 collapse sectionMultiple Coping Strategies
 Linking To Other Agendas
 Using Momentum of Other Educational Reforms
 Closet Reforms and the Spreading of Success Stories
 collapse sectionCase Study II: Improving The Lot Of Teachers
 The Problem
 collapse sectionStrategies for Improving the Teacher's Lot
 Social Work
 Political Efforts
 Economic and Material Reforms
 Summary And New Directions For Education Policy
 References
 collapse sectionEight  The Behavior of Middlemen in the Cadre Retirement Policy Process
 Sources
 Players And Organizational Context
 Policy Without Action Implications
 Execution Of Policy
 Deviation From Policy
 Conclusion
 collapse sectionNine  Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in the Reform Process
 The Command-Bureaucratic Economy
 The Central Government And The Control Of Investment
 Enterprises And The Two-Track System
 Bilateral Monopoly
 Conclusion
 Appendix

 collapse sectionPart Four  Subnational Levels
 collapse sectionTen  Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan
 Structural Reform And The Central-Cities Policy
 Negotiation
 Problems In Relations
 Financial Problems
 Implementation
 Distribution
 Prices
 Personnel
 Stalemate
 Conclusion
 collapse sectionEleven  Local Bargaining Relationships and Urban Industrial Finance
 collapse sectionCorporate Ties In Local Industry
 collapse sectionInstitutional Actors
 Enterprises
 Industrial Bureaus
 Finance and Taxation Bureaus
 Local Bank Branches
 Planning and Economic Commissions
 The Mayor's Office
 collapse sectionMunicipal Budgetary And Fiscal Processes
 The Redistribution of Local Resources
 Sharing Risk
 The Shared Responsibility of Collective Decisions
 collapse sectionRedistributive Politics: Bargains And Strategies
 Bargaining Positions
 Bargaining Strategies
 Conclusion: Bargaining In Perspective
 collapse sectionAppendix: Classified List Of Interviews
 Government Commissions
 Functional Bureaus
 Banks
 Industrial Bureaus (Corporations) and Companies
 Enterprises
 collapse sectionTwelve  Urbanizing Rural China: Bureaucratic Authority and Local Autonomy
 Rural Urbanization As An Issue Area
 The Prereform Structure Of Authority And Settlements
 Administrative Structures And Changes Since 1983
 collapse sectionAuthority And Hierarchy Under Rural Urbanization
 The Special Case of Jiangsu Province
 Indicators of the Persistence of County Control
 Planning and Bureaucratic Control
 Labeling County Towns
 Nesting and Bureaucratic Authority
 collapse sectionControl Of Resources For Town Development
 Taxes and Small-town Development
 Profits from Rural Industry and Small-town Development
 Banking and Small-town Development
 Migration Policy and Access to Towns
 Conclusion: The Politics Of Rural Urbanization

 collapse sectionAppendix
 Types and Characteristics of Small Towns in China
  Bibliography
  Contributors
 collapse sectionIndex
 A
 B
 C
 D
 E
 F
 G
 H
 I
 J
 K
 L
 M
 N
 O
 P
 Q
 R
 S
 T
 U
 V
 W
 X
 Y
 Z

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