| Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China |
| Acknowledgments |
| One Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations |
| • | The Starting Point: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model |
| • | Fragmented Authoritarianism In Broader Perspective |
| The Volume In Perspective |
| • | How Constant Has China's Bureaucratic Practice Remained? |
| • | What About the Communist Party? |
| • | How About Chinese Culture and Society? |
| • | Organization Of The Volume |
| Part One National Issues |
| Two A Plum for a Peach:Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China |
| • | A Comparative Framework For Viewing Bargaining |
| • | The Systematic Causes Of Bargaining Activity |
| • | What Do Leaders Bargain Over? |
| Water Projects: The Bargaining Process Up Close |
| • | The Danjiangkou Dam |
| • | The Three Gorges Project |
| Who Bargains, In What Arenas, And What Strategies Are Employed? |
| • | Who Bargains? |
| • | In What Arenas Does Bargaining Occur? |
| Strategies for Bargaining and the Necessary Resources |
| • | Foot-In-The-Door And "Fishing Projects." |
| • | Whipping Up Support and Faits Accomplis |
| • | Painting a Rosy or a Black Picture—Cooking the Books |
| • | A Little Something for Everyone |
| • | Getting to Key Decision-Makers, "Old Friends," and Relatives |
| • | The Implications Of A Bargaining System View |
| Three The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform |
| • | The Relationship Between The Communist Party And The Government: Principal And Agent |
| • | The Policy-Making Process: Management By Exception |
| • | Policy Outcomes Under Management-By-Exception |
| • | Center And Locality: Federalism In A Unitary State |
| • | Conclusion: Evaluating The Political Record Of Economic Reform |
| • | References |
| Part Two The Center |
| Four The Party Leadership System |
| • | Evolution Of The Leadership System |
| Norms Of The Leadership System |
| • | Functional Systems and Coordinating Points |
| Division of Responsibilities |
| • | Policy-making |
| • | Coordination |
| • | Innovation |
| • | Supervision |
| • | Personnel |
| • | Lines of Authority |
| Chronic Problems And Post-Mao Reforms |
| • | Continued Political Abuse of the Leadership System |
| • | Trends under Zhao Ziyang |
| Politburo Leadership Arrangements |
| • | The Sub-Politburo Leadership Structure |
| • | A Working Model |
| • | Variations and Conundrums |
| • | Conclusion |
| • | Appendix A: Typical Central Leading Units |
| • | Appendix B: Leadership Mechanisms |
| • | Appendix C: Evolution Of Political Reform Group |
| • | Appendix D: Coordination Points For Management Of International Activities (1958) |
| Five Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy |
| • | The Problem Of Policy Coordination |
| • | The Coordination Problem In The Chinese Bureaucracy |
| • | Research Centers: Organization And Mission |
| Research Centers: Impact On The Coordination Problem |
| • | Information Effects |
| • | Authority Effects |
| • | Incentive Effects |
| • | Conclusion: The Structure Of Authority And Models Of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior |
| Part Three Bureaucratic Clusters |
| Six Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System |
| • | The Inherited Military System |
| • | Revamping The Personnel System |
| • | Military Command And Control |
| • | The Budgetary And Resource Allocation Process |
| • | Some Preliminary Conclusions |
| Seven The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China |
| • | The Issue: Policy Related To Teachers |
| Formal And Informal Structures In Teacher Policy |
| • | The Formal Organization: A Horizontal View |
| • | The Vertical View |
| Case Study I: Standards For Teachers |
| • | The Problem of Standards and Quality |
| • | The Groping Pace of Bureaucratic Action |
| Actors in the Process: The Power of Subordinates |
| • | Experimentation |
| • | Interpretation |
| • | Undermining Policy |
| • | Shaping Conceptualization of Policy |
| Multiple Coping Strategies |
| • | Linking To Other Agendas |
| • | Using Momentum of Other Educational Reforms |
| • | Closet Reforms and the Spreading of Success Stories |
| Case Study II: Improving The Lot Of Teachers |
| • | The Problem |
| Strategies for Improving the Teacher's Lot |
| • | Social Work |
| • | Political Efforts |
| • | Economic and Material Reforms |
| • | Summary And New Directions For Education Policy |
| • | References |
| Eight The Behavior of Middlemen in the Cadre Retirement Policy Process |
| • | Sources |
| • | Players And Organizational Context |
| • | Policy Without Action Implications |
| • | Execution Of Policy |
| • | Deviation From Policy |
| • | Conclusion |
| Nine Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in the Reform Process |
| • | The Command-Bureaucratic Economy |
| • | The Central Government And The Control Of Investment |
| • | Enterprises And The Two-Track System |
| • | Bilateral Monopoly |
| • | Conclusion |
| • | Appendix |
| Part Four Subnational Levels |
| Ten Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan |
| • | Structural Reform And The Central-Cities Policy |
| • | Negotiation |
| • | Problems In Relations |
| • | Financial Problems |
| • | Implementation |
| • | Distribution |
| • | Prices |
| • | Personnel |
| • | Stalemate |
| • | Conclusion |
| Eleven Local Bargaining Relationships and Urban Industrial Finance |
| Corporate Ties In Local Industry |
| Institutional Actors |
| • | Enterprises |
| • | Industrial Bureaus |
| • | Finance and Taxation Bureaus |
| • | Local Bank Branches |
| • | Planning and Economic Commissions |
| • | The Mayor's Office |
| Municipal Budgetary And Fiscal Processes |
| • | The Redistribution of Local Resources |
| • | Sharing Risk |
| • | The Shared Responsibility of Collective Decisions |
| Redistributive Politics: Bargains And Strategies |
| • | Bargaining Positions |
| • | Bargaining Strategies |
| • | Conclusion: Bargaining In Perspective |
| Appendix: Classified List Of Interviews |
| • | Government Commissions |
| • | Functional Bureaus |
| • | Banks |
| • | Industrial Bureaus (Corporations) and Companies |
| • | Enterprises |
| Twelve Urbanizing Rural China: Bureaucratic Authority and Local Autonomy |
| • | Rural Urbanization As An Issue Area |
| • | The Prereform Structure Of Authority And Settlements |
| • | Administrative Structures And Changes Since 1983 |
| Authority And Hierarchy Under Rural Urbanization |
| • | The Special Case of Jiangsu Province |
| • | Indicators of the Persistence of County Control |
| • | Planning and Bureaucratic Control |
| • | Labeling County Towns |
| • | Nesting and Bureaucratic Authority |
| Control Of Resources For Town Development |
| • | Taxes and Small-town Development |
| • | Profits from Rural Industry and Small-town Development |
| • | Banking and Small-town Development |
| • | Migration Policy and Access to Towns |
| • | Conclusion: The Politics Of Rural Urbanization |
| Appendix |
| • | Types and Characteristics of Small Towns in China |
| Bibliography |
| Contributors |
| Index |
| • | A |
| • | B |
| • | C |
| • | D |
| • | E |
| • | F |
| • | G |
| • | H |
| • | I |
| • | J |
| • | K |
| • | L |
| • | M |
| • | N |
| • | O |
| • | P |
| • | Q |
| • | R |
| • | S |
| • | T |
| • | U |
| • | V |
| • | W |
| • | X |
| • | Y |
| • | Z |