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Ten Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan
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Implementation

Once the financial arrangements had been negotiated, the Center on 13 October 1984 officially announced that Wuhan would be granted jihua danlie beginning with the 1985 plan. The central documents state that "in all aspects of planning, finance, banking, taxation, prices , industrial and commercial administration, labor and wages, electric power, materials distribution, foreign trade and foreign economic relations, post and communications, environmental protection, medical administration and inspection, tourism, and so forth, Wuhan enjoys provincial-level status in economic management power (xiangyou sheng yiji jingji guanli quanxian) " (emphasis added).[50] This seems comprehensive. City officials took it at face value and proceeded to exercise provincial-level rights in all these areas, no doubt taking, as was mentioned above, "too many steps too fast." They interpreted the above statement to give Wuhan rights in economics and administration. Hubei officials, however, read this much differently. To them, Wuhan's rights are limited to economic management (jingji guanli quanxian ) and do not include critical items of administration, such as distribution, pricing, and personnel.

The problem for both parties is the lack of any definition of where economics ends and administration begins in a planned economy. Hubei, therefore, has been able to block several Wuhan initiatives in policy areas that directly pertain to the city's economic development. As one economist with close ties to the city said, "In some areas Hubei continues to hold power. They simply refuse to give it up. The line where economics ends and administration begins is very, very thin. There is no definition and I don't know how long it will take before we can get one."[51]

According to a business source with close ties to Hubei and Wuhan, the central documents were purposely left vague. Without the resources to adequately enforce its will on lower levels, the Center is left with little choice but to set general guidelines and let the implementing parties involved bargain-out any disputes between them. "This vague writing is done purposely. They [the Center] are not stupid. They know it will cause problems. But what else can they do?"[52]

Given the already poor relations between the two governments, this differing interpretation has set the stage for a continuing series of prob-


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lems between them that require bargaining. Knowing this, both sides have established "leadership groups" to handle problems as they arise. When problems are too critical or solutions too difficult to obtain, the mayor and the governor become active participants in negotiating a bargain that would settle the issue.[53]

The problems caused by the new relationship between Hubei and Wuhan can be found in almost every sector, but brief discussions involving distribution, price setting and food subsidies, and personnel provide clear examples of the bargaining necessary when policies such as jihua danlie are adopted in the absence of the appropriate political and legal means to determine definitions of authority.


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Ten Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan
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