Migration Policy and Access to Towns

Town growth creates new opportunities, making access to town a scarce and valuable resource. As a result, some officials charge fees for access to town or for work permits, while others try to limit migration. In towns, peasants increase their wealth and improve their quality of life and their status. For many, work in town is more lucrative than work in the countryside. According to data from Yueyang district, Hunan province, the incomes of thirty specialized households still in their villages averaged 415 yuan per capita and 811 yuan per laborer, while incomes of specialized households who had moved to the town averaged 592 yuan per capita and 1,224 yuan per laborer (He and Zhang 1985, 31–35).

Since rural-urban migration is a contentious issue, social and legal limitations exist on peasant access to towns. Important social groups pressure

cadres to restrict peasant migration.^[37] State laws allow cadres to redirect rural migrants away from the county seat and into lower-status market towns and county-towns (GWYGB 1984b, 919). Migrants must have (1) a permanent place to live in the town; (2) management skills or longtime jobs in a town enterprise or unit; (3) a license from the local Industrial and Commercial Bureau; (4) a sublease on their contracted farmland to another peasant (so land is not abandoned); and (5) an independent source of food.^[38] To ensure that migrants meet these criteria, local officials in larger towns lacking public security offices (paichusuo ) were to set up "registration offices" (huqi dengji bangongshi ) (GWYGB 1984, 920) to control population flows. After migrants get to town, Industrial and Commercial Bureau officials still control the permits needed for access to marketing opportunities.^[39] And in smaller towns illegal migrants probably find even fewer opportunities for illegal businesses or places to hide.

Many peasants who applied for permission to move were turned down. In Taishan county, Guangdong province, over a four-month period in late 1984, 15,000 peasants applied for permission to move to the county seat; 9,000 (60 percent) were not allowed to move (Lee 1985). In the first half of 1985, out of 4,000 prospective migrants to Longgang town, Jiangsu, only 515 (13 percent) were permitted to move (Lee 1988b). When 580 households applied to leave their villages in Changsanqiao county, Sichuan province, 369 (64 percent) failed to get permits (ZGNYNJ 1985, 101). In the town Helen Siu studied, only rural residents with immediate family members in town could register, and only as zili liang hu (households who supply their own grain).^[40] In Jiangpu, as of May 1986, only 268 peasants had moved into Zhujiang town and none had changed their residence status, receiving only "residence permits"

(chang zhu hukou ).^[41] Thus county-town officials still maintain serious controls over migration into town, although restraints on migration are breaking down year by year.^[42]

Yet peasant migration can make county-town governments less dependent on county financial assistance. Migrants are a major funding source for new housing and buildings, particularly where rural industry is less developed. In Yueyang district, Hunan province, migrants built 62.2 percent of the floor space for new housing and shops (He and Zhang 1985, 34). In Chenggu county, Shaanxi province, peasants in 1984 contributed 5.02 million yuan toward town construction (People's Daily , 30 April 1985). And in Anhui province, average investment by each migrant household in the towns ranged from 4,700 to 15,500 yuan in 1984 (Almanac of Anhui's Economy 1985, 269–70; An Jian 1986, 25). They also pay taxes and fees for licenses, market management, land use, and construction (Tang and Ye 1986, 346).

Moreover, cadres can charge peasants fees or "rents" for access to income-increasing opportunities in these towns. Township and county-town governments charge aspiring factory workers an entrance fee, ranging from 1,000 to 7,500 yuan, calling them "workers bringing capital to factories" (gongren dai zi ru chang ). Tangquan's government, hungry for funds for industry but unable to secure bank loans, pressured peasants and village leaders to give the factory a loan. Although some villagers resisted, brigade officials persuaded them to agree (Jiangpu 1986).

A main reason for small-town development is to channel rural laborers away from big cities. But small towns have limited resources and economic opportunities, so local officials often restrict access to these towns. In the parts of Jiangsu province covered by this study, they continue to control the number of peasants moving to town. The resulting floating population in cities such as Shanghai has passed one million, making it uncertain if the small-town strategy will alleviate demands for rural-urban migration.