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Law 1—
That Which Is Currently Taking Place Is Not Impossible

The perception of U.S. dominance as assured and perpetual is severely flawed. The U.S. may soon cease to be the world's commercial leader in the field of supercomputers and has rapidly lost ground in other areas,


422
 

Table 1. Parameters of Various High-Performance Systems


Machine


Peak Performance

Number of
Processors

Year of First Productiona

American

     

CRAY X-MP

   0.87 GFLOPS

4

1983

CRAY X-MP

     2.7 GFLOPS

8

1988

CRAY-2

       2  GFLOPS

4

1984

CRAY-3b

      16 GFLOPS

16

N/A

CRAY C90

      16 GFLOPS

16

 

Soviet

     

BESM-6

        1 MIPS

1

1965 (1964)

ES-2701

    530 MIPS

48

N/A (1984)

ES-2703

        1 GIPS (32-bit)

64 macroprocessors

N/A (1985)

ES-2704

    100 MIPS

24 computational

1990 (1980)

   

48 communications

 
   

12 switching

 

El'brus-1

12–15 MIPS

10

N/A (1979)

El'brus-2

      94 MFLOPS

10

1985 (1984)

El'brus-3b

    6.4 GFLOPS

16

N/A (N/A)

El'brus-MKP

   560 MFLOPS

1

1991 (1988)

Electronika-SSBIS

   450 MFLOPS

2

1991? (1990)

PS-2000

  200 MIPS (24-bit)

64

1981 (1980)

PS-2100

   1.5 GIPS (32-bit)

640

1990 (1987)

European

     

Parsytec MultiCluster

 

64 (max.)

 

Parsytec SuperCluster

 

400 (max.)

 

AMT DAP/CP8 510C

  5,000 MIPS
    (140 MFLOPS)

1,024

 

AMT DAP/CP8 610C

 20,000 MIPS
     (560 MFLOPS)

4,096

 

ESPRIT SUPRENUM-1

         4 GFLOPS

   

Japanese

     

Fujitsu VP-200

        4 GFLOPS

1

1983

Hitachi S-810/20

  0.63 GFLOPS

1

1983

Hitachi S-820/80

      3 GFLOPS

1

1988

NEC SX-2

   1.3 GFLOPS

1

1985

NEC SX-3

    22 GFLOPS

4

1990

Fujitsu VP-400E

   1.7 GFLOPS

1

1987

Fujitsu VP-2600

      5 GFLOPS

1

1990

a   For Soviet machines, "year of first production" is not necessarily a good benchmark, so in parentheses appears the year that prototype testing and refinement began. N/A indicates that the machine never entered serial production.

b   Projected values.


423

as well, including machine tools, consumer electronics, semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, and high-performance semiconductors. Even areas of U.S. strength, such as aircraft and computer hardware and software, may soon be at risk unless strong action is taken. American competitiveness, much less dominance, in these and other high-technology areas can no longer be assumed.

Alarms have been sounded at many levels. The National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, in its recently released second annual report, refers to the semiconductor industry as "an industry in crisis" and urges the federal government to act immediately or risk losing the semiconductor industry in its entirety and with it, the computer industry, as well. The Administration itself has just identified 22 critical technologies vital to U.S. military and economic security, a list of technologies virtually identical to those identified earlier and individually by the Departments of Defense and Commerce as vital to the future of the U.S. in world geopolitical and economic competition.

A concerted effort on the part of the Japanese, combined with complacency on the part of American industry and unfavorable trade conditions between the U.S. and Japan, have brought about this situation in which spheres of U.S. industry have lost former dominance and competitiveness in certain international markets. The world has changed. The U.S. is no longer predominant.


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