1. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302. [BACK]

2. KJ , vol. 2. 60. The Japanese was Sato Tatsuo, former head of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau and author of one of the best works in Japanese on the 1946 constitution: Sato, Nihonkoku kempo . [BACK]

3. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 40, 87, 284, fn. 14. [BACK]

4. Atcheson memo to supreme commander, Oct. 4, 1945, NRAW, RG 84, Box 2276. [BACK]

5. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 739-740, 757-758.

     Shidehara may not have understood on October 11, 1945, that the supreme commander had "directed ... the prime minister to initiate a constitutional revision" (FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, 841). [BACK]

6. Ibid., 854-856. The basis for the supreme commander's optimism was not explained. [BACK]

7. Ibid., 882-884. The text of SWNCC 228, which was not a directive to the supreme commander, is given in FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 99-103. A careful study of SWNCC 228 by Williams of GS seemed to indicate that the drafters of the constitution knew of its existence and made some, but not extensive, use of it (Williams ltr. to Kades, Mar. 20, 1964, and Kades reply to Williams, Mar. 25, 1964, JWC). [BACK]

8. Blakeslee, The FEC, 65-66. [BACK]

9. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 855; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 169-172; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 23. [BACK]

10. J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 102-103; FRUS , 1946, vol. 8, 124; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 12. A specialist on the GS staff, Milo Rowell, was at the time making a study of constitutional issues. Kades got the impression from the questions asked by the Philippine representative and to some extent by the French member that they thought SCAP should be doing more about revising the constitution. His memo on the meeting was read by Whitney and MacArthur, and MacArthur "may have thought there was an implied criticism of him in the interchange" (CLKL). Two weeks later MacArthur decided to act on the constitution. [BACK]

11. PRJ , 622-623. Kades was assisted in drafting the study by two other GS attorneys, Alfred R. Hussey, Jr., and Milo Rowell. Kades said that he later had a long argument with his good friend, Ben Cohen, a prominent New Deal lawyer and postwar adviser to Secretary of State Byrnes, about the merits of the memo. [BACK]

12. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302; Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 247. [BACK]

13. Mainichi , Feb. 1, 1946, 1; PRJ , 611-618; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 53; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 108; Koseki, Shinkempo no tanjo , 73-80. Whitney thought the Mainichi article might have been a trial balloon floated by Yoshida to test U.S. reactions. [BACK]

14. Whitney memo to supreme commander, Feb. 2, 1946, Hussey Papers no. 2, NDLT. [BACK]

15. Whitney memo to CINC, Feb. 19, 1946, Hussey Papers no. 2, NDLT. [BACK]

16. More has been written in the United States and Japan about the constitution than about any other occupation subject. There are many good accounts: PRJ , 101-111; McNelly, "'Induced Revolution,'" 76-106; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 107-118; Takayanagi Kenzo, "Making the Japanese Constitution: What Really Happened," Japan Times , Mar. 16, 1959. One of the most authoritative accounts is contained in the documents prepared by one of the main participants, Alfred R. Hussey, and now filed as the Hussey Papers, Library of the University of Michigan, and a copy in the Shidehara Peace Collection, NDLT. The account of the making of the constitution by Sato, Nihon koku kempo , is more complete and analytical than those in English. Two important contributions appeared in 1989: Koseki's scholarly Shinkempo no tanjo , and Kades's authoritative "The American Role." If Japan's constitution could be said to have a father, Kades would have a strong claim. [BACK]

17. Hussey Papers, undated memo, NDLT, listing the GS personnel who wrote the draft; Rizzo ltr. to Hellegers, June 7, 1974, JWC. Among the political party drafts of a new constitution were one prepared by the Social Democratic Party and another by Takano Iwasaburo of the University of Tokyo. (See Koseki, "Shocho tennosei.") [BACK]

18. Whitney's statement about the use of force appears in the record of the meeting with the Japanese made by GS. But several of the GS participants including Kades do not recall it, and one wrote an affidavit challenging the accuracy of the GS record (CLKL). [BACK]

19. PRJ , 102. Why MacArthur suggested a unicameral legislature is not known. It may have been because the membership and function of the upper house in a restructured Diet would not be much different than that of the lower house, particularly because the peerage had been abolished, or possibly because MacArthur was impressed by the unicameral system in states such as Nebraska and Nevada (Rizzo ltr. to Hellegers, June 7, 1974, JWC). [BACK]

20. Whitney memo to CINC, Feb. 6, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Kades memo for record, Mar. 12, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Borton, Japan's Modern Century , 424, fn 7. [BACK]

21. James Michener, "The Secret of America," Parade Magazine , Sept. 15, 1985, 6. [BACK]

22. The first draft of this provision, prepared by two young reserve officers, Richard A. Poole and George Nelson, stated that "an Imperial Throne shall be the symbol of the State, and an Emperor shall be the symbolic personification thereof." The word symbol in reference to the future role of the emperor seems to have been in the minds of several leading figures in Washington and Tokyo, as was the concept of a pacifist Japan. Prince Takamatsu, the emperor's brother, once asked Whitney and Kades what "symbol" meant, and they replied that for Americans it was something like the American flag (CLKL). [BACK]

23. See Kawashima, "The Americanization." [BACK]

24. PRJ , 104; Kades, "Revisiting." Kades, "The American Role," contains much of the same material. [BACK]

25. Account based on Hussey Papers, NDLT. "Aghast" is the adjective used by Masumi, Postwar Politics , 55. [BACK]

26. Hussey Papers, NDLT. [BACK]

27. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 252; Hussey Papers, NDLT. [BACK]

28. YM , 133. [BACK]

29. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 251; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 41-42. Shirasu told the author that the GS account was all a "lie" and that no B-29 flew over at any time during the meeting (int. with Shirasu). [BACK]

30. PRJ , 624; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 219-223. [BACK]

31. GS memo for record, Feb. 18, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 204-210. [BACK]

32. Ashida Hitoshi, "Nikki," Tokyo shimbun , entry of Mar. 12, 1979, 8. Ashida was welfare minister in the Shidehara cabinet. [BACK]

33. Whitney memos to MacArthur, February 19 and 21, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT. [BACK]

34. Ashida, "Nikki." [BACK]

35. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 61; Hata, Hirohito , 216. [BACK]

36. PRJ , 106, states the emperor fully supported the SCAP draft. Yoshida's views are contained in a recording of his recollections published in Asahi shim-bun , Apr. 18, 1977, 2, and in YM , 135. [BACK]

37. Memo of conversation between Narahashi and several GS officers, Feb. 25, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT. [BACK]

38. Memo of meeting, Feb. 22, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT. The GS drafters opposed an amendment procedure requiring a two-thirds vote of all members of each house of the Diet and favored a two-thirds vote of the members of each house present and voting. Kades was at a loss to explain how the final version of the constitution came out with the more stringent provision and thought that General Whitney must have decided to go along with the Meiji Constitution version and Matsumoto Joji's position (CLKL). At the meeting with Matsumoto on February 22, 1946, Whitney had seemed amenable to compromise on this issue. [BACK]

39. PRJ , 625-630; int. with Kades. The Americans claimed that the Japanese used translation devices to change the meanings of Japanese words. For example, they tried and failed to substitute the word seiji , meaning "politics," for the word seifu , meaning "government," and shiko , meaning "supremacy," for shuken , meaning "sovereignty." (See Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 239.) [BACK]

40. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 236; ints. with Kades and Poole; CLKL. The first part of the thirty-hour session on March 4-5 was stormy. Not only did Matsumoto walk out of the meeting after his quarrel with Kades about translation points, but they had a curious tiff earlier over an unusual provision in the SCAP draft providing that "the ultimate fee to the land and to all natural resources reposes in the state as the collective responsibility of the people." Matsumoto opposed this. Williams called it the "Red Clause." The Americans agreed to delete the clause. (J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 115-116.) In land-short Japan, especially in urban areas, this provision might have helped control large private holdings of real estate and exorbitant prices. See comment of Tsuru, "Nihon senryo," 208. [BACK]

41. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 174; PRJ, 657 ; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 259-279, 279-288. When Shidehara showed the Tenno the final draft, he expressed the hope that the peerage could be retained, and Shidehara replied that would be quite impossible (int. with Eto). SCAP's original plan had been that the peerage would disappear as living peers died off, but when the Japanese side proposed immediate abolition, SCAP agreed (Takemae, "Kades Memoir," 284-285). [BACK]

42. Borton, Japan's Modern Century , 424, fn. 7. [BACK]

43. Blakeslee, The FEC , 48-55. [BACK]

44. Ibid., 49. [BACK]

45. Ibid., 50-51. [BACK]

47. Eto (ed.), Senyo shiroku , vol. 3, 43. [BACK]

48. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302-303; McNelly, "The Renunciation of War." [BACK]

49. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 411; U.S. Congress, Selected Speeches — Douglas MacArthur , 86; McNelly, "General MacArthur's Pacifism." [BACK]

50. Borton, Japan's Modem Century , 419-421; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 153-155; FRUS, 1947 , vol. 6, 221. [BACK]

51. Williams ltr. to author, Nov. 17, 1983; int. with Shirasu. [BACK]