1. DOS, Occupation , 75. [BACK]

2. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 630-631. On his own initiative Harriman turned down the Soviet proposal. John McCloy said later it was fortunate Harriman had done so because Washington "was so keen to get the fighting stopped that it would have accepted about anything the Russians came back with" (Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 501). [BACK]

3. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 683-685; Blakeslee, The FEC , 2-11. [BACK]

4. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 813. [BACK]

5. Ibid., 765-773. [BACK]

6. MacArthur message to War Dept., CA 53682, Oct. 22, 1945, Leahy file, NRAW. [BACK]

8. PRJ , 740; MacArthur, Reminsicences , 292; SCAP message to DA, C-65957, Dec. 4, 1948, NSC 13/2 file, MMA, RG 5; Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 247. [BACK]

9. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 293. For a frank and authoritative account by a ranking member of its secretariat of a useful and much misunderstood international body, see Stratton, "The Far Eastern Commission." [BACK]

10. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 124. [BACK]

11. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 744-746, 762-765; PRJ , 440-441. [BACK]

12. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 667-668, 670. Truman's reply to Stalin (670) seemed to constitute recognition of the Soviet claim to all the Kurile Islands. See desp. 416, June 27, 1949, RG 84, B. 229, DOS file, NRAS. [BACK]

13. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 285 [BACK]

14. FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 785. Stalin complained to Harriman that the Soviet representative in Japan was being treated "like a piece of extra furniture" by General MacArthur's headquarters ( FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 791). [BACK]

15. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 531; YM, 52-53; Stephan, "Soviet Policy," 74. See FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 285-286, 337-339. [BACK]

16. DOS, Occupation , 55, 80. [BACK]

17. Borton, "The Allied Occupation," 401. [BACK]

18. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations , 6-7. [BACK]

19. Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 88. [BACK]

20. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 124. [BACK]

21. Asakai, Shoki tainichi senryo seisaku ; Gordon, "The United States and Japan," 24. [BACK]

22. SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities , 68, [BACK]

23. Fearey memo to Atcheson, Oct 13, 1945, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2275. [BACK]

24. WX 85811, JCS to CINCAFPAC, Nov. 30, 1945, NRAW, Leahy file; FRUS , vol. 8, 87-92. Ambassador Grew expressed the opinion in May 1945 that "the best we can hope for in Japan is the development of a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work" ( FRUS, 1945 , vol. 6, 546). See G. Sansom, "Can Japan Be Reformed?" [BACK]

25. Arisue, Shusen hishi , 212. [BACK]

26. CA 57235 , MacArthur message to Eisenhower, Jan. 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 395-397; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 59-60. This message bears traces of the thinking of MacArthur's psychological warfare expert, Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, about the role of the emperor. (See Fellers memo to CINC, Oct. 2, 1945, MMA, RG 5, Box 1-A.) SCAP records reflect only a perfunctory investigation of the emperor's prewar role in policymaking; the file consists mainly of letters to MacArthur sent by Japanese individuals after the war (IPS case no. 254, NRAS, RG 331). [BACK]

27. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 401. [BACK]

28. Ibid., 423-428. [BACK]

29. Ibid., 199-201. Edwin O. Reischauer asserted that in December 1945 while on military duty in Washington he drafted SWNNC 209, "Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan" (see FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 199-201), which advocated retention of the emperor institution as a constitutional monarchy. This position eventually became U.S. and Allied policy ( My Life , 106-107). The catalytic action, however, was without doubt the MacArthur telegram of January 25, 1946. [BACK]

30. F 1826/2/23, FO 371/54082, Gascoigne tels. to London from Sansom, no. 95 and 101, Jan. 31, 1946; F 1849/18442, FO 371/63690, Gascoigne ltr. to Dening, Jan. 22, 1947. [BACK]

31. Gluck, "'Dokuhaku' kara miete," 63; Kojima, Tenno , 141-151; Hata, Hirohito , 177-214. [BACK]