1. For examples of political ideologies in the Islamic world similarly based in sanctified inequality see Bujra (1971) and Combs-Schilling (1989). For a discussion of the doctrinal support for sanctified inequality in Islamic (and specifically Philippine Muslim) tradition, see Majul ( 1973, 3-6). [BACK]

2. Two statements by Nur Misuari, founder and Central Committee chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front, may serve as illustration. In a 1975 policy paper entitled "The Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood," Misuari wrote, "[O]ne unalterable fact of history remains a cornerstone of the present revolutionary movement. This historical fact is inextricably linked to the Bangsa Moro people's inherent desire to be left free and sovereign having their own honoured place in the community of nations. Their national aspiration is nothing more than to enjoy again the prerogative of chartering their own national destiny with justice for all and to see the democratization of the wealth of their homeland" (emphasis mine; quoted in Mastura 1984, 111). In a 1977 speech titled "Cultural Genocide in the Philippines,'' he stated: "The Muslim people and homeland have 500 years of Islamic culture and civilization. They were once free, sovereign and an independent nation. As a matter of fact, they were once one of the strongest powers in Southeast Asia" (quoted in Majul 1985, 136). [BACK]

3. I use the term "precolonial Cotabato" to refer to the entire period prior to the American colonial occupation of the region in 1899. Although the Spaniards had consolidated colonial control of the northern Philippines by about 1600, they never accomplished the complete political subjugation of the southern sultanates. Downstream Cotabato was occupied in 1861 and formally included as a Spanish possession, but Spanish colonial control never extended much beyond a rudimentary military occupation of strategic points on the Pulangi River (see chapter 4). Political and economic relations within Cotabato seem to have been only slightly affected by Spain's formal possession of Cotabato in the late nineteenth century. It is therefore not inaccurate to extend the "precolonial" period in Cotabato to the turn of the twentieth century. [BACK]

4. This is a simplified compendium of the opinions of a number of public figures in Cotabato. For an example of this perception in written form, see Damaso (1983). For a rare dissenting opinion, see Lingga quoted in Gowing (1979, 241). [BACK]

5. I employ the term "traditional" here not in any essentialist sense but as a shorthand reference to a host of local sociopolitical practices, beliefs, forms, and expectations, some of which are described in detail farther on. Some "tra-

ditional" arrangements in Muslim Cotabato are more ancient than others and not all are self-consciously or universally regarded as "traditional culture" (in Magindanaon, adat betad ). They do, however, form a sociocultural domain largely uninfluenced by Western colonialism or the political domination of Christian Filipinos. [BACK]

6. Datu Mohammad Adil had a long career in the Philippine Constabulary, and when I met him in 1986 he held the rank of lieutenant colonel (ret.). His followers referred to him as "Datu," and I use that honorific in these pages. Most Christians and members of the Muslim elite in Cotabato city referred to him as "Major Adil," referring to the rank he had held for a number of years. In 1992, he was invested with the title "Sultan sa Kutawatu" (Sultan of Cotabato) by the members of the high nobility of Cotabato. [BACK]

7. Although the ethnographic material presented here reflects a broad range of positions and perspectives, it does present certain limitations. For one, it is somewhat removed, unavoidably, from the precolonial period; most narratives of past relations concern the very late precolonial or early colonial period. Another is that the voices of women, as well as detailed information on the social positions and political actions of women in the Cotabato sultanates, are mostly lacking here. There is somewhat more information on women available for the American colonial period, and I do attempt to make the voices of the women of Campo Muslim heard in the chapters concerning present-day Cotabato. [BACK]

8. The term "bangsa," or "bansa," is found throughout the Malay world and has been used to refer to descent lines, descent groups, nations, castes, races, or estates. There seems to be some disagreement about its origin. Dewey (1962, 231) suggests that the term is Chinese in derivation. Milner (1982, xv) identifies "bangsa" as having a Sanskrit origin. This latter foreign derivation seems the more plausible one. [BACK]

9. The term "sultanate" refers here to a political institution based on an Islamic legitimating ideology and headed by a sultan—a formally hereditary leader who possesses the authority to bestow titles and appoint individuals to specialized subordinate offices. [BACK]

10. The diminution of the significance of local ancestry is by no means an automatic outcome of the introduction of a political system based on an Islamic model. Gullick (1958) and Mednick (1965) each describe systems where local ancestry was not devalued with the adoption of an Islamic political idiom. According to Mednick (1965), the Maranao, after the introduction of Islam, developed a single, complex status system based equally on local ancestry and descent from the prime Islamic ancestor (also Sarip Kabungsuwan). The Maranao sociopolitical system also remained relatively uncentralized. Gullick (1958) describes the ruling class of the Malay states, which were relatively more centralized than the Cotabato sultanates, as having two principal groups: members of the royal line, from which the sultan was chosen, and members of a number of nonroyal but noble local lineages that produced local officials (datus). The noble status of these local lineages was based not on their kinship links with the royal lineage but on their right to fill various chieftainships. This conferral of high status on particular lineages on the basis of ancient

agreements is paralleled in the special situation of one local descent line in Cotabato, the Tabunaway bangsa (see below). [BACK]

11. Of the twenty tupus listed by Mastura (1984, 34) as having been under the administration of the Buayan Sultanate, only three are named after apical ancestors and two of these ancestors are immigrants who arrived after Sarip Kabungsuwan. Twelve of the tupus are named after their localities, one is not a descent line at all but a category for foreigners ( rafu ), and four represent caste-like groups of craft specialists who held a special dependent status under the sultan. [BACK]

12. In a Maranao version of this myth, Sarip Kabungsuwan accidentally marries his long-lost sister, a more exact means for establishing an exogenous and unadulterated aristocratic lineage from a single apical ancestor (see Mednick 1965, 97). Similarly structured origin myths for sultanates are found throughout the Malay world. For illustrations from Perak and Maluku see, respectively, Sullivan (1982, 1) and L. Andaya (1993, 53). [BACK]

13. The intermediate Kabuntalan Sultanate was established in the mid-eighteenth century by a branch of the Magindanao royal house (see Mastura 1984, 36). [BACK]

14. I am grateful to John Bowen for pointing out the strong parallels between the political and status-ranking systems of the Magindanaon and those of the Bugis of Sulawesi. The Bugis system of rank gradation is quite similar to that found in Cotabato, especially in its assignment of intermediate descentrank to children of unequally ranked parents (see below). Unlike in Cotabato, the central Bugis myth of noble descent is pre-Islamic, describing the Bugis nobility as descendants of "mysterious beings called " tomanurung " [in Bugis, literally, "One who descends"]" (Millar 1989, 43). For recent works in English on the Bugis see Millar (1989) and Pelras (1996). [BACK]

15. This is the datu version of the original agreement between Sarip Kabungsuwan and Tabunaway. In the version told by present-day Tabunaway descendants (dumatus), the agreement included a clause declaring that the descendants of Sarip Kabungsuwan could not be proclaimed as sultans without the consent of the descendants of Tabunaway, and if this were not done the descendants of Tabunaway would have the authority to cancel the proclamation and take the leadership themselves. The datu version mentions only participation (implying ceremonial participation) in the investiture of the sultan. Mastura (1984, 5) notes that "dumatu" is the future tense of the verb "datu" (to lead) but does not offer an explanation for that designation. As the descendants of Tabunaway, the former ruler of Cotabato, the past tense of "datu" seems a more appropriate appellation. However, if Tabunaway is believed to have reserved the right to reassume the leadership of Cotabato under certain conditions, the term ''dumatu" ("will lead") is descriptive. [BACK]

16. Traditional Magindanaon status groups have been categorized by scholars in various ways. In general, analogies to classical or feudal European stratification systems have engendered more confusion than clarification. To cite an example, the endatuan have been described as "serfs" (Beckett 1982, 411), "freemen" (Stewart 1978, 244), and "commoners" (Mastura 1984, 33); the dumatu (see below) have been classified as "nobles" (Damaso 1983, 76),

"lesser nobles" (Stewart 1978, 244), and "commoners" (Beckett 1982, 411); and the ulipun have been mentioned as "vassals" (Mastura 1979), ''servants" (Mastura 1984, 33), and "slaves" (Beckett 1982, 411). To avoid similar confusion, I endeavor to track as closely as possible the literal sense of the Magindanaon terms for these social categories. [BACK]

17. Jeremy Beckett's (1982, 411) treatment of slave status in precolonial Cotabato differs from my own. He lists banyaga as occupying the fourth tier of the stratification system. He then suggests that since the status of an ulipun, at least in theory, could be changed with the clearance of his or her debt, that the ulipun do not constitute an estate. In support of my categorization l add to the reasons outlined above that the term "banyaga" has the literal meaning of "foreigner" or "alien." Gullick (1958, 104) employs a classification similar to mine for slave status in the Malay states. At the same time, it should be noted that actual social relations between ulipun and banyaga—and between those two unfree statuses and the other social strata—were more complex than the necessarily simplified description I present here. For comparison, see W. H. Scott's (1982) detailed account of the subtleties and complexities of the Tagalog slave system. [BACK]

18. The conceptualization of maratabat among the neighboring Maranao is dramatically different from its use among the Magindanaon. Among the Maranao, maratabat primarily denotes rank honor and sensitivity about rank. It is a central and compelling social value that reflects pre-Islamic cultural traditions. Offended maratabat demands retribution that often takes the form of violent retaliation. The most distinctive aspect of Maranao maratabat is its relation to lineal descent and corporate kin responsibility. To defend one's maratabat is to uphold one's descent line. Both the responsibility for defending maratabat and the culpability for insulting it extend beyond the individuals involved in any particular incident of soiled maratabat. The pursuit of retribution for an offense to maratabat can last for generations. Individuals are socialized to seek revenge for long-past injuries to descent line honor by retaliating against a direct descendent generations removed from the original perpetrator. In a similar manner, badly soiled maratabat may be avenged immediately against a close kin of the offending party. In 1986, Manila newspapers luridly reported the murder of the seven-year-old daughter of a Magindanaon security guard at a Manila mosque by three young Maranao men whom he had publicly insulted the previous day. The reports did not explain the cultural logic behind the tragedy. The association between functioning local descent groups and the cultural intensification of maratabat (both lacking among the Magindanaon) is illustrated by a Maranao saying: "A man who has lost his bangsa has no maratabat" (Saber et al. 1974). [BACK]

19. "Pamalung ka sa kaing sa saken na kundang aku na manik sa tulugan na entayn muna salegan u bulawan datumanung?" [BACK]

20. Members of the ruling families of the three principal sultanates of the Cotabato Basin were linked by common descent and occasionally intermarried. Datu Kasim relates that those ties were recognized in the special three thousand-peso (or -dollar) bridewealth payment for marriages between two individuals of pulna rank. This represented one thousand pesos for each of the

three major royal houses of Cotabato. Compare Gullick's description of the "inner circle" of the Malay royal lineage (1958, 59-60). [BACK]

21. The Cotabato sultanates had neither the number of offices of the Sulu Sultanate (see Majul 1973) nor the elaboration in ranked titles found among the Maranao (see Mednick 1965). Mastura (1984, 35) lists eleven offices (including that of sultan) arranged in three orders of rank for the Magindanao Sultanate. [BACK]

23. Those who received such "gift wives" ( tawakim ) were not required to provide bridewealth in return. [BACK]

24. See Mednick (1965, 140-41) for a description of the use of a tarsila in the tracing of individual descent among the Maranao. For a fascinating, detailed illustration of written genealogies employed in a similar fashion elsewhere in the Islamic world, see Eickelman's (1976, 183-210) discussion of the uses made of silsila (name-chains) by the elite patrilineal descendants of a Moroccan marabout. [BACK]

25. Similar mechanisms are found, for example, in the traditional political system of the Bugis. For men regarded as extraordinary achievers, the rule of female hypergamy may be suspended and noble ancestors rediscovered. Millar's observation about the Bugis holds equally well for Cotabato: "Given the Bugis assumption that descent-rank is correlated with character, it is natural that low-ranking people with exemplary achievements frequently are thought to have a high-ranking ancestor about whom people do not know. It is also natural that they use the strategy of 'marriage-up' to adjust for these achievement/descent-rank anomalies" (1989, 5).

26. Anthony Reid notes that for Southeast Asia in general in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "state pageantry was the most effective way in which the citizenry was incorporated into the hierarchic state" (1988, 181). "For the majority of the population [royal and religious] festivals served three important purposes: participation in the majesty and hierarchy of the state; economic activity, such as marketing and rendering tribute; and entertainment" (ibid.). [BACK]

25. Similar mechanisms are found, for example, in the traditional political system of the Bugis. For men regarded as extraordinary achievers, the rule of female hypergamy may be suspended and noble ancestors rediscovered. Millar's observation about the Bugis holds equally well for Cotabato: "Given the Bugis assumption that descent-rank is correlated with character, it is natural that low-ranking people with exemplary achievements frequently are thought to have a high-ranking ancestor about whom people do not know. It is also natural that they use the strategy of 'marriage-up' to adjust for these achievement/descent-rank anomalies" (1989, 5).

26. Anthony Reid notes that for Southeast Asia in general in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "state pageantry was the most effective way in which the citizenry was incorporated into the hierarchic state" (1988, 181). "For the majority of the population [royal and religious] festivals served three important purposes: participation in the majesty and hierarchy of the state; economic activity, such as marketing and rendering tribute; and entertainment" (ibid.). [BACK]

27. The Bugis formally acknowledge the distinction between authority based on "proven superiority" (Millar 1989, 34) and that based in inherited nobility by recognizing a distinct category of individuals known as tau matoa , or "outstanding leaders" (1989, 6). That category crosscuts the status ranking system inasmuch as not all tau matoa are members of the high nobility. Many tau matoa do eventually obtain noble status for themselves or their descendants by means of the social mechanisms noted above. [BACK]

28. Shelly Errington reports similar conceptions of highly potent individuals as inherently, and often unintentionally, dangerous in Luwu, South Sulawesi: "[T]he potent stinging energy of rulers and high nobles exists quite apart from their intention" (1989, 61).

Beliefs in the possession of special divine powers by rulers (in Malay, daulat ; in Javanese, wahyu ) that could be harnessed for the welfare of the community are found throughout Islamic Southeast Asia and have been shown to

have pre-Islamic origins (see, e.g., B. Andaya 1975, 1979; L. Andaya 1975a, 1975b, 1993; Gullick 1958; Reid 1993).

Throughout the Malay world we find related belief in the punitive effect of such powers, with supernatural punishment (in Malay, timpa daulat ) automatically befalling those who disobey or disrespect rulers (see, e.g., B. Andaya 1975, 1979; L. Andaya 1975; Gullick 1958). Such beliefs are also found beyond the Malay world. Errington reports them for Luwu, noting that "a person who failed to get off a horse or close an umbrella when passing in front of a high noble's house" would suffer supernaturally inflicted malady or misfortune (1989, 62). In other precolonial Islamic polities such beliefs seem to have been less developed (L. Andaya 1975) or nonexistent (L. Andaya 1993). I have found no explicit evidence for belief in supernatural sanctions for violations of rank honor in precolonial Cotabato. [BACK]

29. Datu Adil, for example, tells of how as a boy he was sent by his father to a guru to learn the kamal arts. [BACK]

30. In the preface to his work on Malay political culture on the eve of colonial rule, Milner (1982) describes his analytical goals—goals that seem representative of this interpretive approach as a whole: "I wanted to understand Malay political activity in Malay terms. In order to investigate the process of change during the colonial period, it was necessary to examine first not political institutions or the flow of "real power," but what Clifford Geertz has described as the "meaningful structures" by means of which Malays gave shape to their political experience. I needed to explore Malay political culture" (1982, viii). [BACK]

31. The three most important informants cited by Geertz in his book Negara belonged to the traditional Balinese ruling class. Two of the three were members of the core nobility (1980, 142). For her work Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm , Shelly Errington relied on informants most of whom were the descendants of the former ruling family of the kingdom of Luwu in South Sulawesi (1989, 22). [BACK]

32. Similar criticism has been made of those using an exclusively dyadic alliance perspective in examining modern political relations in the Philippines (see, e.g., W. Wolters 1984; Davis 1986; Kerkvliet 1990). [BACK]

33. Beckett reports an oral tradition that the followers of Datu Utu, the last independent Sultan of Buayan, deserted him for his rival and former protégé, Datu Piang, because he refused to open his granaries to them during a time of famine (1982, 399). I suspect, however, that this is less an illustration of a norm of redistribution and the consequences of its violation, than of a typical response by followers to a critically weakened ruler who had lost most of his coercive power (see Ileto 1971, 95; and below). [BACK]

34. Because an adjudicator's payment was most often taken as a percentage of the fine assessed, impartiality in the dispensation of justice was probably a practical impossibility (see Mednick 1974, 19-20). [BACK]

35. Based on the ethnohistoric data she collected, Ghislaine Loyre notes that "lilt would . . . seem that the [Luwaran] was hardly known and hardly used except by the legal specialists who advised the Sultans" (1991, 69). She also remarks that physical punishments, including executions, were very often

commuted to fines by adjudicators, citing for example the report of an eighteenth-century chronicler that "robbers could have a choice between having their hands cut off or paying three times the values of the stolen property" (1991, 47). While she explains such commutations as "intended to put a limit to violence" (1991, 46), it seems more probable that they reflected the political ecology of precolonial Southeast Asia—a region with plentiful land and relatively low populations in which local rulers competed for relatively scarce followers (see Reid 1988; and below). [BACK]

36. Anthony Reid (1993, 268-69) provides several additional examples of arbitrary power from various precolonial Southeast Asian polities but notes that this form of political culture was not immutable: "[T]here were other times and places—Melaka around 1500, Banten and Patani around 1600, Aceh apparently in the 1580s and certainly in the 1650s, sixteenth-century Banda—when the great merchants were secure against arbitrary power and tended to build fortified compounds and brick warehouses" (1993, 269). [BACK]

37. Forrest was a British East India captain who spent eight months at the capital of the Magindanao Sultanate in 1775-76, ninety years after Dampier's visit. His mission (ultimately unsuccessful) was to attempt to arrange the establishment of an English factory at the Magindanao Sultanate. His account of his visit is considered the best and most complete description of Cotabato during the eighteenth century. [BACK]

38. Datu Adil recalled tales of how Utu's fierce and unpredictable nature made even his datu vassals fear for their lives: "Datu Utu would develop a craving for venison and send his datus out to hunt for him. The datus would encircle a valley, send in slaves as beaters, and shoot any deer they flushed. It was said that any datu who let a deer escape by missing his shot would immediately flee the territory rather than face the wrath of Datu Utu." [BACK]

39. These accounts present a one-sided picture of class relations. Covert acts of resistance, such as those detailed in James Scott's Weapons of the Weak (1985), are absent in historical accounts and are not recounted in oral traditions. Subordinate behavior such as false compliance, foot dragging, and pilfering (see Scott 1985, 29) is conducted individually and ""offstage""(1985, 25) and is often not susceptible to public retelling. Of course "offstage" telling, such as relating the "secret" sins of particular datus, is itself a form of resistance. One of the few examples of overt resistance related to me was a story, told by Datu Adil, concerning the melitan , a castelike group of potters who were bound to the Sultan of Buayan. The sultan, at one time, had a member of the melitan put to death arbitrarily. In response, the melitan as a group refused to make any more pots and were able eventually to extract a promise from the sultan not to execute any more melitan without legal cause. [BACK]

40. Like the janissaries of the Ottoman Empire, these bodyguards were Christians who were enslaved, trained, and formed into a military corps by a Muslim ruler. While the janissaries were acquired from the subjected Christian communities of the Balkans by means of the devshirme , a tribute of boys paid to the Ottoman sultan, the Cotabato bodyguards were taken in slave raids by Muslims on the Spanish-controlled Christian communities of the central Philippines. [BACK]