1. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was established in 1968 by a group of young intellectuals as a breakaway party from the older,

Moscow-oriented Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. In 1969, the CPP formed the New People's Army as its military wing. In 1973, a revolutionary front, the National Democratic Front (NDF), was established by the CPP and other underground organizations, including the Christians for National Liberation. Observers agree that the NDF was effectively controlled by the Communist Party of the Philippines. The armed insurgency conducted by the New People's Army did not become active in more than a very few parts of the country until the end of the 1970s and was not considered a major threat by the government until the early 1980s (Schirmer and Shalom 1987). [BACK]

2. For a detailed account of the extraordinary staying power of certain datu politicians in Cotabato, see McKenna (1992). [BACK]

3. A presidential election was held in June of 1981, not long after the formal lifting of martial law. President Marcos ran for reelection unopposed by any meaningful opposition candidates. He won the election with about 86 percent of the vote (Bonner 1987). [BACK]

4. Despite the KBL money distributed at the barangay level during the 1986 presidential campaign, I heard of not a single case of vote-buying in Maguindanao Province and of very few attempts among Muslims in the city. This was due to the absence of a tradition of vote-buying in Muslim Cotabato prior to martial law but also because of the coercive apparatuses available under martial law in Cotabato for repressing the popular vote. [BACK]

5. This use of Magindanaon in a public speech by the soon-to-be appointed governor of the province was in itself unprecedented. English is the language of public political discourse in the Philippines. Every one of the speeches made at the KBL rally just two weeks earlier had been delivered in English (occasionally interspersed with Filipino, the other official national language). Even Datu Udtug Matalam, who spoke almost no English, endeavored to deliver his short and infrequent political speeches primarily in that language. Zacaria Candao's use of Magindanaon in his first public speech of the post-Marcos era—one delivered to Christians as well as Muslims—sent the clear message that, for the very first time, a Muslim nationalist had attained an official position of power in postcolonial Cotabato. [BACK]

6. In Filipino, "Kalimutan ang Nakaraang Politika at Harapin ang Krisis." [BACK]

8. I was never able to determine the origin of the curious, and untranslated, English term "prayer rally" for the MILF's mass demonstration. The rally was not called in order to pray for divine assistance in achieving the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, or for any similar divine favor. Insofar as prayer ( salat ) in orthodox Islam consists solely of devotional worship, not supplication, it would have been quite surprising had that in fact been the goal of the rally. The term was likely borrowed from Roman Catholic practice and used with a Roman Catholic audience—the mainstream media and national administration—in mind. The "prayer rally" label accentuated the formal leadership of the rally by Muslim clerics and emphasized the religious character of the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front. [BACK]

9. The previous record had been set just a few months earlier when more than thirty thousand people attended the Cotabato City campaign rally for Corazon Aquino on January 26. No one I spoke with at that time was able to remember a crowd as large as that ever having gathered in the city plaza. [BACK]

10. I do not mean to suggest that the provincial voting resembled the North American ideal for democratic elections. Presumably there was a fair amount of vote-buying and other formally illegal activities (see below). However, it was the first-ever opportunity for individuals in a number of municipalities to cast their own ballots for freely chosen candidates without impediment from local authorities. [BACK]

11. Such an attitude on the part of established Muslim political figures is certainly not unique to Cotabato. Eickelman and Piscatori provide examples from throughout the Islamic world of political leaders using various arguments against the mixing of religion and politics, including the rather extraordinary 1993 statement of King Hassan II that Moroccans should "render unto God that which is God's and unto Caesar ( Hiraql ) that which is Caesar's"(2996, 52). [BACK]

12. Despite the implication in Congressman Mastura's speech of widespread ulama participation in political office-seeking, only one Cairo-educated cleric ran as an IPP candidate in either the provincial or city races. He won his race as the highest vote-getter of all candidates running for the eight-member provincial board. While many ustadzes were active IPP officers or members, no other ustadz ran for political office in Cotabato in 1988. I am not certain why this was so. A number of possible reasons come to mind, including the intention of the IPP to avoid just the sorts of charges leveled by Congressman Mastura. [BACK]

13. There were some fifty-six thousand registered voters in Cotabato City in 1988—approximately twenty-nine thousand of them Christians and twenty-seven thousand Muslims. By contrast, Muslims comprise roughly three-quarters of the population of Maguindanao Province. Because of confusion over new rules promulgated by the National Commission on Elections after 1986, it was unclear until less than two weeks before the gubernatorial election whether or not Cotabato City residents would be able to vote in the provincial elections. They had never been allowed to before, and many Christian city residents, especially those associated with city government and the

Chamber of Commerce, preferred it that way. They felt threatened by provincial involvement in city affairs and did not want the economically independent city to become entangled in Muslim-dominated provincial politics. A Supreme Court decision shortly before the election exempted Cotabato City from the new rules, and city residents did not vote in the provincial elections. [BACK]

14. Campo Muslim residents reported, and reviews of back issues of the local newspaper confirmed, that there was no attempt by any candidate in the 1980 city elections, or in three previous city elections, to appeal, in any specific fashion, to the urban poor. [BACK]

15. The use of English here suggests that the term "urban poor" had become part of Philippine political vocabulary along with "poll-watcher," "people power," and "snap election." [BACK]

16. After months of lawsuits and judicial hearings no substantial evidence of ballot box tampering or related voting fraud was established to support the charges made against any candidate, and the winners were officially proclaimed. [BACK]

17. Voter turnout figures by precinct for the 1988 election were not available before I left Cotabato City. However, figures for the 1986 presidential election—which showed a similarly high level of preelection interest and a similarly low overall turnout (57.5 percent)—may be useful for illustration. Voter turnout in the seven precincts at which most Campo Muslim residents were registered was 54 percent. In seven similarly sized precincts in a middleclass Christian area of the city, 67 percent of registered voters cast their ballots. [BACK]

18. Mary Hollnsteiner, in her 1963 book, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality , provides a definition of the term "lider":

The word "lider" though originating from the English word, "leader," has been incorporated into Tagalog speech . . . with a very precise connotation . . . [It] refers to the person with a large following in a barrio [barangay] who utilizes this support during political campaigns, where he pledges himself to campaign for a certain candidate or group of candidates. These candidates call him their "lider" referring to his dominance over his particular followers rather than to any superordinate position he holds in relation to the candidates. On the contrary, the "lider" . . . is a staunch follower of the candidate he is supporting. The "lider'' has no official position as such but is repaid by candidates with favors which can in turn be distributed to his followers, reinforcing his position. (1963, 41, fn. 16)

As shall become apparent, Muslim liders in Cotabato City did not always exhibit all the attributes or behaviors included in Hollnsteiner's definition. [BACK]

19. Fifty pesos (approximately $2.50) was reported to be the minimum cash price being paid for votes during the 1988 election. It was the equivalent of two day's wages for many of the residents of Campo Muslim. [BACK]

20. Neither of these two individuals accepted the offers made to them. In my conversations with them, I was able to determine that their refusals were not based on any moral discomfort associated with brokering votes per se, or with brokering votes for Christian candidates. Instead they had to do with

concerns about their personal reputations. The purok leader planned to run for public office himself eventually and did not want to become indebted to, or associated with, that particular candidate. Nur Miskin, the Islamic activist, was attempting to build an organization and did not want it associated with "politics." He was also concerned with the potential problems associated with the sublider role. As he told both the lider and me: "If I took the money and distributed it all to my men, many would still say that I received much more. I would be considered just like Bapa Pantal [a well-known lider of Angka Biruar, the leading Muslim mayoral candidate]. Some of his followers are accusing him of taking money from Angka Biruar and not distributing it." [BACK]

21. Although a Christian, this candidate was a member of a Chinesemestizo Muslim family, had long-standing connections with certain prominent Muslim figures in the city, and was the "unofficial" IPP candidate for mayor. The IPP nomination panel had refused to endorse him, but some prominent IPP members apparently favored his candidacy. [BACK]

22. It should be remembered in respect to this first sort of breakdown that while vote-buying was a long-established practice in multi-ethnic Cotabato City (as in the rest of the Christian Philippines), it was relatively rare in rural areas of Muslim Cotabato prior to 1986 insomuch as autocratic local rule usually made it unnecessary. In the 1988 elections, the incidents reported to me of subliders failing to distribute a candidate's funds invariably occurred in Muslim rural communities (such as Bokhana) within the city limits. [BACK]

23. Votes gained by the eight leading candidates represented about 75 percent of the total votes cast in the six precincts. [BACK]

24. It is doubtful that any of the Muslim candidates for mayor expected to attract significant numbers of Christian voters that would be alienated by the candidate's embracing the IPP. Their political calculus was more likely based on the knowledge that some Christian city residents had recently expressed anxiety at pronouncements of the IPP and MILF concerning their intention to have Cotabato City included in a Muslim autonomous region without holding a popular referendum on the issue. Given the level of Christian apprehension at the time, a candidate's affiliation with the IPP would be self-defeating in that it would certainly prompt a higher voter turnout among Christian city residents and might even provoke the leading Christian candidates to cooperate to prevent an IPP victory. As it happens, a government-sponsored referendum on the issue of autonomy did occur in November of 1989. Maguindanao Province was one of four Muslim-majority provinces in the Philippines that voted to form the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, while Cotabato City voted against inclusion in the autonomous region. [BACK]