1. The thrust of these efforts has shifted somewhat over time. Earlier works pointed out the contradictions and contestations contained within systems of domination (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod 1986; Comaroff 1985; Ong 1987; Stoler 1985). More recent treatments, responding to perceived simplifications in the literature on everyday resistance generated mostly from outside anthropology (see, e.g., Scott 1985, 1990; Willis 1981), have focused on "rethinking resistance" and its relation to domination (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod 1990; Kaplan and Kelly 1994; Kondo 1990; Lagos 1993; Linger 1993; Reed-Danahay 1993; Woost 1993). [BACK]

2. This occurred earliest and most prominently in the work of Eugene Genovese (1974) on plantation slavery. [BACK]

3. Perry Anderson notes, for example, that in some of his writings Gramsci contrasts the terms "hegemony" and "domination"—equating hegemony with "consent" and domination with "coercion.'' Elsewhere, however, "Gramsci speaks of hegemony, not as a pole of "consent" in contrast to another of "coercion," but as itself a synthesis of consent and coercion . . . This version cannot be reconciled with the preceding account, which remains the predominant one in the Notebooks" (1976, 24-25). [BACK]

4. Raymond Williams's interpretation is also shared, in many of its general features, by such other analysts of the cultural politics of Western capitalism as Ernesto Laclau (1977) and Stuart Hall (1985). [BACK]

5. In his 1977 work, Williams defines hegemony similarly as "a whole body of practices and expectations . . . a lived system of meanings and values—constitutive and constituting—which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming" (1977, 110). He notes also that hegemony "is continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own" (112). [BACK]

6. Williams seems to recognize this problem in his remark that "[t]he sources of any alternative hegemony are indeed difficult to define" (1977, 111). [BACK]

7. Some of these anthropological usages display a similar internal inconsistency in speaking, on the one hand, of hegemony's power to shape the experience of subordinates and, on the other, of its susceptibility to challenge by those same subordinates. Comaroff and Comaroff argue that hegemony—"that order of signs and practices . . . that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world"—is "habit forming" and so "is rarely contested directly" (1992, 23). At the same time they note that hegemony "is always intrinsically unstable, always vulnerable" (1991, 27). Michael Woost declares that hegemony comprises "both domination and resistance" and is best "understood as the tendential outcome of a struggle for order" (1993, 503). He also observes that "hegemony works behind the backs of those it dominates . . . in the sense that those who become the objects of the dominant ideological discourse are not freely formed subjects/individuals who deliberately decide whether or not to assign legitimacy to a social order" (1993, 516). Maria Lagos criticizes the tendency "to separate resistance from hegemony . . .

as if they were two different processes with different dynamics" (1993, 53). Daniel Linger defines hegemony as "the maintenance of a political structure through the cultural shaping of experience," while also declaring that "hegemony thrives on discontent" (1993, 4). [BACK]

8. Numerous other anthropological treatments of nationalism have been produced. Some of these (see, e.g., Dominguez 1989; Handler 1988; Spencer 1990; Verdery 1991) have focused predominantly on the discursive productions of nationalist elites rather than on the popular reception of nationalist ideologies at the community level. Others have examined popular responses to national ideas without recourse to the notion of hegemony (see, e.g., Bendix 1992; Bowman 1993; Sluka 1989, 1995) or have applied it in a somewhat different manner than Raymond Williams (see, e.g., B. Williams 1991). Bruce Kapferer has developed the separate notion of "ontologies" (1988) to explain the motivational force of nationalist ideologies—a concept which, though clearly distinguishable from it, resembles hegemony in many respects. [BACK]

9. Michael Woost faults Scott for failing to recognize the "shifting, uneven character of hegemony" (1993, 503). Deborah Reed-Danahay is troubled by a "disturbing simplification" in Scott's distinction between an official and a hidden transcript of power relations (1993, 223.) Aihwa Ong, more specifically, accuses Scott of "misrepresent[ing] social realities in rural Malaysia as a simple dichotomy between a national hegemony and a resistant village subculture" (1995, 188). [BACK]

10. A separate, ethnography-based critique has been recently leveled at Scott by Sherry Ortner (1995) and (in more detail) by Michael Peletz (1997). It is that by not considering ambivalence (mixed emotions) as a significant phenomenon among subordinates, Scott produces an "ethnographically thin" account of dominant-subordinate relations (Ortner 1995, 190). More generally, studies of domination and resistance that do not devote analytical attention to the problem of ambivalence run the risk of being "highly anemic with respect to their treatment of the cultural psychology of the social actors who are at the center of their inquiries"(Peletz 1997).

This critique may appear similar to one above but is quite separable. Ambivalence on the part of subordinates may arise from divided interests (stressed by Ortner) or as the result of moral constraints (emphasized by Peletz) or from various other sources, and may under certain circumstances produce political paralysis. But such paralysis is not brought about by the workings of hegemony. Ortner and Peletz seek primarily to "thicken" the ethnography of domination and resistance by adding the element of psychological ambivalence on the part of subordinates. See chapter 9 for a discussion of ambivalence as a factor influencing the behavior of Campo Muslim residents. [BACK]

11. It has become increasingly commonplace to find in postcolonial situations mobilized peasants or urban workers fighting for or actively supporting armed ethnonationalist movements aimed at exchanging one set of state-level elites for another. Most of the armed secessionist struggles of recent occurrence have been carried out by populations exhibiting significant internal disparities in social power. Those struggles include, as a modest sample, armed movements for the creation of independent states or autonomous regions for Kurds,

Eritreans, Palestinians, Sikhs, Sri Lankan Tamils, Kashimiris, Basques, Shans, Ibos, Croatians, Abkhazians, Chechens, Sudanese Christians, and Philippine Muslims. [BACK]

12. The distinction between nationalist killing and nationalist dying is not an unimportant one. There is, for one, a very great symbolic separation between the "giant exorcism" of the murderous Sinhalese rioting described by Kapferer (1988, 101) and the ritual self-sacrifice of Irish Republican Army's hunger strikers. In addition, the communal rioting provoked by nationalist passions that has erupted in India, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere is a far less dangerous undertaking for individual members of nationalist mobs than is rankand-file participation in an armed separatist movement, even given that a fair proportion of the violent activity of separatist insurgents may be directed against unarmed civilians. [BACK]

14. For examples of such studies see Bowman (1993), Feldman (1991), Lan (1985), Mahmood (1996), Pettigrew (1995), Sluka (1989, 1990, 1995), Swedenburg (1990, 1991, 1995), and Zulaika (1988). Of these, the works by Bowman, Lan, and Sluka (1989) are principally focused on ordinary adherents and local communities. Those by Feldman and Zulaika take as their subject not nationalist struggles per se but political violence, specifically the ways in which violence is culturally constructed, ritually enacted, and reciprocally exchanged between political antagonists. Mahmood and Pettigrew have produced very different works, each of which focuses primary (though by no means exclusive) attention on the political and military leadership of the Sikh separatist movement. Swedenburg's work (1990, 1991) considers how popular memories of an earlier armed revolt have "undergone secondary revision for the sake of the [contemporary struggle for the Palestinian] nation" (1991, 177). David Lan's work, on nationalist guerrillas and peasants in Zimbabwe, is neither concerned with armed separatism nor, strictly speaking, with ethnonationalism. It is a study of a "popular" revolutionary struggle—one of the last of the twentieth century's "peasant wars" (Wolf 1969) of national liberation. It also remains one of the very best ground-level ethnographic accounts of an armed insurgency. [BACK]

15. Similar observations have been made in theoretical form by Brackette Williams (1989) and ethnographically by Bowman (1993). [BACK]

16. In a more recent work, Swedenburg provides more detailed depictions of the "popular" memories of Palestinian revolt he was able to elicit from informants—memories that "led a submerged existence in the everyday realm of private conversation rather than being expounded in the public arena" (1995, 27). He is more concerned, however, with how "popular memory and official Palestinian histories fused into a fairly unified picture" (1995, xxvi). Swedenburg defends his lack of interest in uncovering the "objective truth" of local resentments and rank-and-file dissension by noting that ''solidarity requires us to

learn from and (to a certain extent) be tactically complicit with the silences... of the people with whom we live and study" (1995, xxviii).

While Swedenburg's stance may be an appropriate tactic in his particular circumstances, it represents a counterproductive strategy for the anthropological analysis of nationalism in general. By accepting public silence as genuine consent to the official versions of events and thereby ignoring the profound political tension between local concerns and nationalist goals, we achieve neither solidarity with, nor understanding of, those ordinary citizens caught up in nationalist movements, citizens who, like Slavenka Drakulic in Croatia, feel diminished by nationhood. [BACK]

17. That refashioning may already be seen under way in various forms in the work of Hermann Rebel (1989) and William Roseberry (1989, 1991, 1994), as well as Derek Sayer (1994). [BACK]