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Chapter 10 Muslim Nationalism after Marcos
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Muslim Mass Action: The MILF "Prayer Rally"

By the end of March 1986, Zacaria Candao had attained unprecedented authority in the region. He had been designated by the new national administration as both acting governor of the province of Maguindanao and acting chairman of the Executive Council of the Regional Autonomous Government for Central Mindanao. The MILF, in contrast, had, by late March, been repeatedly frustrated in its efforts at national-level recognition as a result of the nearly exclusive attention paid by the Philippine government and national media to the original MNLF under Nur Misuari. Misuari had shown no inclination to


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reunite the separate rebel factions under one banner to present a united negotiating front and, for its part, the government of Corazon Aquino appeared willing to reopen formal talks with Misuari's group alone on regional autonomy as outlined in the Tripoli Agreement.

In the competition for government recognition as the legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro insurgents—and, by extension, of the "Bangsamoro people"—Misuari's MNLF held a number of advantages. Misuari was a signatory to the Tripoli accord while Salamat was not. Misuari had also met for a series of talks with Benigno Aquino in Damascus in 1981, and later, after Aquino's assassination in 1983, with his younger brother, Agapito, in Madrid. He was therefore more familiar to President Aquino and her advisors. In addition, as a result of a long history of media coverage, Misuari and the MNLF were both more familiar to Philippine Christians and more skilled in the techniques of obtaining media access than were Salamat and the MILF.[7]

By late March 1986, the MILF in Cotabato had decided to demonstrate to the Aquino administration exactly why it should be given due consideration. In self-conscious imitation of the Manila "people power" demonstrations that forced the flight of Ferdinand Marcos and brought Corazon Aquino to power, the MILF chose to stage a mass rally. As portrayed by Zacaria Candao in our interview, the MILF rally was conceived as an "exercise to determine if [the MILF] still had the support of the masses." As the MILF remained, at least formally, an illegal organization, its preparations for what became known as the "prayer rally" were carried out through the public leadership of the aboveground ulama.[8] The chairman of the organizing committee for the rally, like the rest of its official organizers, was a prominent aboveground ustadz. It was nevertheless clear to all concerned that it was the MILF leadership initiating and sponsoring the rally.

Campo Muslim residents were among those who participated in the preparations for the MILF rally. In the last week of March, an organizational meeting for the heads of Muslim student and community organizations was held at the public market mosque, attended by more than fifty people including Kasan Kamid and the two Islamic activists from Campo Muslim, Nur Miskin and Zamin Unti. Most of those in attendance had received letters inviting them to a meeting sponsored by "the Bangsamoro People."

One week later, about thirty of those attending the previous meeting were invited "inside" to the MILF camp in the mountains north of the city. They rode jeeps or pedicabs to the end of the road and walked


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three kilometers uphill to reach the camp. Some five hundred people attended that meeting, including community leaders and ustadzes from throughout Cotabato. The "facilitator" for the meeting was Hadji Murad, the commander of the Cotabato MILF forces. His minister of information was also present. They presented the formal objectives of the rally and described the form it would take. The participants, arriving from all parts of Cotabato, would march to the city plaza from different directions. Various areas of origin were identified by zone numbers corresponding to the zones of operation enumerated by the rebels during the armed insurgency. Ustadz Omar Pasigan, the founder of the Mahad in Campo Muslim and the finance chairman for the rally, noted that the expenses for the rally would total about seventy-five thousand pesos (approximately four thousand dollars), and he assessed individual organizations (mostly madrasahs) various sums to finance transportation, food, medicine, and placards. Those organizations would in turn collect contributions of goods and services from individuals.

Organizers began announcing the rally on Magindanaon-language radio programs just one week before it was scheduled to take place. Broadcast messages tended to be quite vague, announcing only that there would be "activities" (pedsuwan-suwan ) in the city of Cotabato beginning on April 13. Announcers neither reported the purpose of the rally nor the fact that it was sponsored by the MILF, but did name the ustadzes involved in its organization. More precise news of the rally spread rapidly by word of mouth in Campo Muslim. Although there was never a formal announcement of the rally during Friday congregational prayers in the mosque, community residents quickly became aware that this was an MILF rally in support of Hashim Salamat and the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. I included a question about the prayer rally on a formal instrument I administered later to a random sample of community household heads. Of 122 interviewees, 93 (76.2 percent) reported that they had attended the rally. Another 8 (6.6 percent) replied that they were unable to attend but had contributed goods or services to rally organizers.

The gathering they attended was indeed an impressive display of organizational capability. With between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand people attending the prayer rally on each of its three days, it was by far the largest, and longest, mass demonstration ever staged in Cotabato City.[9] MILF supporters poured into the center of the city, preventing most businesses on or near the plaza from operating


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normally for two of the three days. Some 750 marshals appointed to control traffic and patrol the ranks of the rallyists effectively policed the entire central city for the duration of the rally. Marshals established checkpoints at the eight points of entry to the rally site and inspected parcels and conducted body searches of all individuals—participants or nonparticipants—entering the center of the city. Participants arrived from provinces as far away as South Cotabato and Davao Del Sur, but the majority of those present were reported to be from Maguindanao Province and Cotabato City. Most of the participants came at their own expense, carrying enough food for three or more days. From their headquarters at the Mahad in Campo Muslim, rally organizers arranged the stage program and managed the logistics of supervising a massive group of demonstrators.

On the opening day of the rally, the "mass media chairman"—also an ustadz—stated the objectives of the rally as follows:

1. To show the public, the government, and the world that the Bangsamoro people—Muslims, Christians, and the tribal Filipinos—support Hashim Salamat.

2. To respond to the peace and reconciliation leadership of President Corazon C. Aquino.

3. To push for the immediate and full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 as the only sound and just political solution to the Mindanao problem.

4. To make known that before any implementation of the Tripoli Agreement there should first be negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government.

5. Before these can be brought about, there should first be a strengthening of the cease-fire agreement (Mindanao Cross , April 19, 1986).

On the plaza stage, successive speakers—almost all of them ustadzes—called on the Aquino government to resume negotiations immediately with MILF leaders for the full implementation of the Tripoli accord under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Some speakers vowed that the rallyists would remain in the plaza until President Aquino responded to their demands. Between speeches, and in the evenings, demonstrators were entertained by singers performing rebel and religious songs, but not dayunday. On the last day


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of the rally, the demonstrators stood without complaint in the rain to listen to Zacaria Candao. Performing a dual role unique in the history of the Philippine republic, he both spoke in support of Hashim Salamat and the MILF and, in his capacity as government representative, accepted the manifesto of the rallyists for presentation to President Aquino.

Despite its impressive scale and coordination, the MILF rally drew almost no national media attention; only one Manila daily newspaper carried as much as a single short article on the mass demonstration. That lack of national notice was partly due to the extraordinarily Manila-centric focus of the national media but was also a consequence of the inexperience of the rally's organizers in attracting media attention. The rally also failed to prompt a specific response from the Aquino administration.

Unable to communicate effectively to the government or the Philippine public (let alone "the world") the extent of popular support in Cotabato for Salamat and the MILF, the prayer rally did not accomplish any of its stated objectives. Nevertheless, as an experiment to gauge the ability of its sponsors and organizers to mobilize Cotabato Muslims, it proved a tremendous success and doubtless influenced the next phase of Muslim nationalist politics in the region—the formation of an Islamic political party. To gain the attention of the national government and media, the MILF soon reverted to a well-practiced method and produced more favorable results.


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Chapter 10 Muslim Nationalism after Marcos
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