Conclusion

In the years between the expiration of the armed rebellion in 1979 and the overthrow of the martial law regime in 1986, Campo Muslim residents found themselves situated, materially and metaphorically, between two contending Muslim elites. While neither group was integral to the community, both were intent on exercising authority there. Both were also able to apply considerable coercive force to enforce their claims, but there the resemblance ends.

The datu establishment was concerned with Campo Muslim only insofar as activities there posed a threat to their continued control of the province. Datu officeholders under the martial law regime made

few direct attempts, in Campo Muslim or elsewhere, to seek legitimation for their rule from ordinary Muslims. The revitalization of the myth of sanctified inequality, as seen by the spate of royal proclamations during this period, seems not to have been aimed primarily at non-elite Muslims. It was associated instead with the Marcos regime's effort to legitimize the unilaterally established regional autonomous government (and thus delegitimize the MNLF and MILF) in the eyes of foreign observers, particularly Arab states.

The Muslim counterelite, composed of an aboveground coalition of ulama and professionals supporting (and supported by) an armed underground organization (the MILF), viewed Campo Muslim quite differently.^[30] Intent on augmenting the separatist struggle (now reformulated as a struggle for genuine Muslim autonomy) with unarmed efforts, the counterelite regarded the people of Campo Muslim (and by extension all the ordinary Muslims of Cotabato) as an important political resource. As religious speech remained one of the few forms of public discourse permissible under martial law, members of the aboveground ulama quickly became important spokespersons for the Muslim opposition. While the ustadzes promoted Islamic renewal in order to perfect religious belief and practice in Cotabato, their reform project had direct political implications as well, most pointedly in its explicit challenge to the Islamic authority of the traditional nobility.

Zacaria Candao, the organizer of the aboveground opposition, proved exceptionally adept at employing Islamic renewal as a cultural frame for political activity under martial law. He organized Islamic conferences, established an Islamic radio program, and encouraged the formation of "Islamic family organizations." The da'wah parade and demonstration he coordinated combined Islamic rhetoric, political protest, and popular participation and became the model for subsequent mass actions in the post-Marcos period.

During the years of the armed rebellion, Campo Muslim residents (and ordinary Muslims in general) received little of the official ideology disseminated by leaders of the Muslim separatist movement. I have noted that, as one consequence, they constructed their own representations of the rebellion based on understandings that sometimes differed markedly from that of the rebel leadership. Beginning in 1980, when the al-Azhar-trained ulama began to speak out in mosques and Islamic schools in Cotabato City, Campo Muslim residents heard at last the Islamic core of the official separatist message. Some of that message appealed immediately, particularly when the ustadzes proclaimed politi-

cal equality and economic justice to be essential aspects of Islam. The ustadzes also seemed altogether more admirable authority figures than most datus. Yet other pronouncements provoked considerable resistance from community residents. Calls by ustadzes to forsake therapeutic rituals and gratifying celebrations disheartened many.^[31] Rumors of harsh applications of Sharia law in "liberated areas" of the province caused apprehension. Attempts by the ustadzes to remove the only social welfare program in Campo Muslim without providing a replacement generated resentment among its poorest residents.

With the assistance of such cultural mediators as Imam Akmad, community residents quietly but firmly opposed many of the changes promoted by the ulama without embracing the brand of traditionalism advocated by local datus. On the whole, Campo Muslim residents remained remarkably self-sufficient in terms of both ritual and political practice. Some looked to the Mahad (and by extension to the MILD for political instruction or services, and others to the barangay captain (representing the government), and a number maneuvered in either direction depending on circumstances. For the most part, however, they lived their lives in between, and independent of, the opposed political camps.^[32] The following chapter examines the termination of martial law in Cotabato and the nature of popular participation in the dramatically altered Muslim nationalist politics of the post-Marcos era.