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Chapter 7 Muslim Separatism and the Bangsamoro Rebellion
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The Aims and Consequences of Sectarian Violence

These four episodes are meant to illustrate some notable aspects of the period of sectarian violence in Cotabato and throughout the southern Philippines.[18] While in all four episodes it was Christians who were the primary instigators of violence, in two of them—at Upi and Ampatuan—the initial targets of the attacks were specific Muslim datus aligned with the Marcos administration. In the other two episodes—at Manili and Buldun—the primary targets were ordinary Muslims. The dissimilar nature of this initial targeting suggests that the apparently sectarian violence was neither uniformly structured nor monocausal. The first type consisted of more or less spontaneous uprisings by ordinary Christian settlers (or Tiruray farmers) aimed at oppressive Muslim datus. By 1970, the Sinsuats and the Ampatuans were the two most powerful Muslim political families in Cotabato. That their close connections with the ruling national party did not deter the Christian attacks upon them suggests strongly that their attackers were not simply agents engaged in a Marcos administration master plan to control the province. The hundreds of ordinary Muslims who were spillover victims of these two episodes of violence certainly experienced the attacks as sectarian in nature but also, one may imagine, directed blame at the datus who drew the Christian fury down upon them.

The second form of sectarian violence consisted of organized assaults on Muslim communities. The episodes of violence in the Cotabato Valley and Buldun point to the conspicuously non-neutral attitudes and activities of representatives of the state. At no time during the sectarian conflict in Cotabato did the Philippine Constabulary or Army assault a Christian armed camp the way they did Buldun. Further, when Muslim noncombatants were attacked by Ilaga gangs, the Philippine constabulary was invariably slow in coming to their defense. Most distressing to Cotabato Muslims was the ample circumstantial evidence implicating the Philippine Constabulary in Ilaga terror. An often-cited example was the fact that Manili, where the Ilaga massacred scores of Muslim civilians, was under formal constabulary control at the time of the massacre. The incidents in Buldun occurred just two months after the Manili massacre, and it is understandable that the Muslim inhabitants of Buldun reacted to the arrival of the Philippine


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Constabulary with armed apprehension. By the end of 1971, with the man who was commander of the provincial constabulary at the time of the Manili massacre and the battle of Buldun now the governor-elect, Cotabato Muslims had good cause for intense distrust of the provincial and national administrations.

No documentary evidence exists to suggest that the apparent collusion of agents of the state with armed Christian terrorists was part of a political strategy formulated by the Marcos government. Nevertheless, incidents such as the Manili massacre and the battle of Buldun left many with the impression that such a "genocidal" state policy existed. That impression was consequential in at least three ways. First, the perception of a government-endorsed anti-Muslim policy reached the international Muslim community and led to protests and other activities on behalf of Philippine Muslims. Most important for subsequent events, that impression was gained by Libyan Premier Muammar Kadaffi, who heard news of the Manili massacre from a BBC radio broadcast (Majul 1985). In the United Nations, Kadaffi charged the Philippine government with genocide and threatened to give aid to Philippine Muslims (George 1980; Noble 1976). Evidence suggests that Rashid Lucman was the principal link at this time with both Tun Mustapha and Muammar Kadaffi.[19]

Second, the perceived anti-Muslim strategy of the state also spurred the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an underground organization founded by Nur Misuari. According to Mercado (1984), in mid-1971 Misuari held an organizational meeting in Zamboanga that was attended by the most committed of the ninety original Malaysia trainees. At that meeting, certain traditional leaders, such as Datu Udtug, were repudiated for their opportunism, and the MNLF was organized with Nur Misuari as its chairman. Its goal was the liberation of the homeland of Philippine Muslims from the Philippine state. Although the MIM under Datu Udtug was rejected at the meeting, some traditional leaders, most notably former congressman Rashid Lucman, were approved for leadership positions in the MNLF.

Finally, the biased and aggressive actions of the Philippine Constabulary and Army left the ordinary Muslims of Cotabato with the lasting impression that those who held state power not only had little interest in protecting them but actively meant them harm. Associated with this impression was the developing realization that datu officeholders were either unable or unwilling to protect them against the hostile forces of the state. That knowledge, and the consequent search for new


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protectors, conditioned the response of ordinary Muslims to the next major episode of state aggression.


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Chapter 7 Muslim Separatism and the Bangsamoro Rebellion
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