Summary: The Bases of Traditional Rule

In synthesis, there existed in the Cotabato sultanates, from at least the mid-sixteenth century, a distinct ruling class that, although often absorbed in internal status competition, was nevertheless integrated by a well-developed ideology of nobility—one that entitled its members to exercise authority over, and extract tribute from, the Cotabato populace.

The fundamental basis of power of datus was their control over subordinates, both those legally free as well as unfree ones. Individual datus strove to acquire the greatest possible number of endatuan, ulipun, banyaga, and client Tiruray from whom to extract surplus directly. On this foundation they were able to build impressive personal retinues of armed and unarmed dependents. An ambitious datu with a large force of followers could further expand the scope of his power and wealth by subduing or sufficiently impressing lesser datus so as to convert them into vassals; by leading or financing large-scale external raiding and trading expeditions; or by entering into strategic alliances with other powerful datus in order to influence state-level or even regional politics.

What was the social cement that kept the Magindanaon political order intact? It was undoubtedly an amalgam of armed force, material remuneration, and cultural commitment. Datus effectively controlled armed violence, and the use or threat of physical coercion was a consequential source of social control in the Cotabato sultanates, even though it is the least acknowledged in written indigenous records. The

precolonial lords of Cotabato were, on the whole, capricious and, in some cases, ruthless autocrats. Domination was exercised directly and overtly; and if it was not openly acknowledged by subordinates, or only expressed metaphorically (with atrocious actions denoted by ogreish appearance), it was because obvious dissatisfaction would likely have invited additional repression.

Remuneration was also a significant source of political compliance in the Cotabato sultanates. However it did not play the key integrative role envisioned by W. H. Scott (1982) and others. Goods controlled by a datu were very unevenly distributed, with those closest members of his retinue receiving by far the greatest share. Neither were relations of redistribution between traditional leaders and followers simply a premodern version of the political clientelism found in the modern Philippine state. While followers were as essential to precolonial datus as they are to present-day politicians, datus had more means at their disposal to acquire clients and forcibly retain them once they had them. Subordinates were unable to attach themselves to more than one datu at a time and their ability to change datus was severely limited. In addition, despite the claim for such in the ruling ideology, the provision of legal and armed protection by datus was mostly illusory.

Finally, cultural commitment was an important factor for sociopolitical cohesion in precolonial Cotabato. Commoners (endatuan) and even debt-slaves (ulipun) presumably identified themselves, if only nominally, as Muslims. They felt themselves to be insiders—members of the dominant sociocultural category in the Cotabato Basin—and thus superior to Christian or pagan banyaga slaves or Tiruray clients. They were attuned to the symbolic role of the sultan and acquainted with the rudiments of the ideology of nobility. Evidence suggests, however, that ruling ideas were not shared nearly as well, nor as completely, by Cotabato subordinates as is imagined by those anthropologists who have been principally concerned with political culture in precolonial polities in Southeast Asia.

There is evidence also for the existence of independent perceptions and representations of the social order by Cotabato subordinates. In this unofficial transcript, power relations were not naturalized as the product of a self-evident hierarchical order. Instead, social power was denaturalized by according it a supernatural essence. Such images portrayed a profoundly unequal distribution of social force, vividly illustrating the belief, based on direct experience, in the power of certain rulers "to prevail in any encounter" (J. Scott 1990, 73). While such

beliefs may have had considerable ideological effect, they bear scant resemblance to the products of the hegemonic process posited by most analysts of cultural domination. In particular, subordinate images of datu rule were applied not only independently, but selectively, as only some ruling datus were endowed by Muslim subordinates with supernatural attributes. Moreover, as we shall see for contemporary Cotabato, such endogenous symbolizations of power also contain a large measure of counterhegemonic potential in that what has been endowed independently may be unilaterally withdrawn.