1. Rudolf Smend, “Integrationslehre,” in Evangelisches Staatslexikon, 2nd ed., ed. Hermann Kunst, Roman Herzog, and Wilhelm Schneemelcher (Berlin: Kreuz-Verlag, 1975), 1075, col. 1026.

2. Hans Kelsen, Der Staat als Integration: Eine prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung (Vienna: Springer, 1930, reprint Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1974), 2.

3. Rudolf Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, in Rudolf Smend, Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968), 125.

4. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 134.

5. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 136.

6. Rudolf Smend, “Integrationslehre,” in Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1956), 299–302, reprinted in Smend, Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen, 481.

7. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 189.

8. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 190.

9. Huber criticized the integration doctrine's dynamization of the state and constitution as inconsistent with the necessity of firm structures of command in the new system. Ernst Rudolf Huber, Wesen und Inhalt der politischen Verfassung (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlaganstalt, 1935), 23 ff. He further criticized Smend's individualistic approach and his representation of integration as a purely spiritual phenomenon.

10. See Günther Holstein's report on the meeting of the Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer [Association of German Teachers of the Law of the State] of March 1926, Von Aufgaben und Zielen heutiger Staatsrechtswissenschaft: Zur Tagung der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, n.s., vol. 11 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1896), 1 ff.

11. Jellinek's own question of “types” (Georg Jellinek, Staatslehre, vol. 1, 3rd ed. [Berlin: O. Häring, 1914], 34 ff.), lacks both strict epistemological justification and fruitful results.

12. Erich Kaufmann, Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921); this is still, despite unavoidable limitations, the most impressive presentation of this context.

13. Recall the mutually exclusive alternatives of scholarship on causality and scholarship on norms, which can be explained only historically “as a desperate attempt to rescue the world of values from theoretical naturalism and mechanism,” Erich R. Jaensch, Über den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1923), 411 f. Heller rightly protests the Vienna School's ignoring the present state of scholarship, Hermann Heller, Die Souveränität: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats-und Völker rechts (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1927), 78. See also Alexander Hold-Ferneck, Der Staat als Übermensch (  Jena: G. Fischer, 1927), 19; Hans Oppenheimer, Logik der soziologischen Begriffsbildung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1925), 33.

14. As in Hermann Heller, “Die Crisis der Staatslehre,” Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik, vol. 55 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926): 310 ff.

15. At another level is the problem of individuality and norm, which Heller, in Die Souveränität, quite correctly brings to the fore.

16. See Theodor Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1924), 54 ff., 85; 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1926), 46 ff., 142 ff., 174 ff., 187 ff., and passim.

17. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., passim, especially 246 ff., 258 ff., 292 ff., 360 ff.

18. Litt, passim. See, e.g., Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 71 ff., 376 f. To this extent, Kelsen is right to see nothing leading from the “windowless monad”

19. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 312 ff., 373 ff. On the intentional limitation in meaning that does not change the structure of reality described, see 214 f., 338 ff.

20. See Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 10 ff. Particularly important applications: Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 2nd ed., 164 f.; Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 248 f., 284, 292 ff., 361 ff.

21. See Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 25 ff., 6. See, in its entirety, the brief summary in Siegfried Marck, Substanz-und Funktionsbegriff in der Rechtsphilosophie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1925), 96 ff. The program outlining his theory of the state, 148 ff., is unfortunate.

22. Holstein, Von Aufgaben und Zielen heutiger Staatsrechtswissenschaft: Zur Tagung der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 31.

23. On this, see Marck, Substanz-und Funktionsbegriff, 89 ff.

24. Thus to the point, Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 1st ed., 210.

25. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 222, 281 ff., 285 ff., 290 ff., 327 ff. Against [Alfred] Vierkandt's “psychophysical construction,” see 249 n. 2.

26. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 204 f., 227 ff.

27. See also Heller, Die Souveränität, 82.

28. Rudolf Smend, “Die politische Gewalt im Verfassungsstaat und das Problem der Staatsform,” in Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Wilhelm Kahl, ed. Universität (Berlin Ost) Juristische Falkultät, vol. 3 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1923), 16. The word has not yet become precisely the “fashionable word” Leo Wittmayer accuses it of being in “Schwächen der neuen deutschen Bundesstaatslehre,” Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 3 (Vienna: Deuticke, 1922/23), 530 n. 4, but it is no longer uncommon even in Germany. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920), 28 (= Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik, vol. 47, p. 75); Richard Thoma, Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 4th ed., vol. 7, ed. Ludwig Elster and Johannes Conrad (  Jena: G. Fischer, 1929), 725; Smend, Indi viduum und Staat, 18; and at least occasionally, also Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Wirtschaft als Leben (  Jena: G. Fischer, 1925), 522.

Meanwhile, Wittmayer himself has expressly raised the concept of integration to a central concept in his own discussions. Leo Wittmayer, “Die Staatlichkeit des Reichs als logische und als nationale Integrationsform,” in Walter von Schelcher, ed., Fischers Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (Leipzig: Freiberg, 1925), 57, 145 ff. Integration is defined here (145 n. 1) as “the epitome of all political notions and forces of standardization.” I will return at a later point to the substantive content of this essay.

The word has gained currency in sociology because of Herbert Spencer, who used it, however, in another sense. He sees the order of the state's life as thoroughly mechanical and static and calls it political organization (Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology [London: Macmillan, 1882], p. v, §§ 440 ff., pp. 244 ff.), while political integration (§ 448, pp. 265 ff.) describes mechanical growth through inclusion and amalgamation, with reflection (§ 451) on the starkly mechanical discussions of first principles (§ 169, pp. 480 ff.) in the third edition of 1870. Through Spencer it has passed into English and American sociology.

In any case, a direct line leads from there, if one takes an idealist turn, to the

Undoubted similarities of some of the views developed in the text with certain concepts of the vitalists, for example, that of regulation (see especially Hans Driesch, Die organischen Regulationen [Leipzig: Engelmann, 1901], 95: “regulations or organization and adaptation”), brought to my attention by Walther Fischer-Rostock, cannot be used as nomenclature.

29. Against the one, individualist approach, here once again, as a summary refutation, Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 226 ff.; against the other, 178 ff. (first of all against Spengler, whose static concept of the state Heller disconcertingly approves of: see Heller, Die Souveränität, 315 n. 75).

As the source of the worst errors in our social sciences in the broadest sense, static thinking deserves a comprehensive critique along the lines of Kelsen's. Its natural, most obvious root is the uncritical tendency of naive thinking in spatial terms (examples of typical errors of this sort in Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., passim, e.g., 10 f., 42, 47, 58, 62 ff., 92, 175, 222 f., 228 f., 286 note. In the legal literature, see those cited in James Goldschmidt, Der Prozeßals Rechtslage [Berlin: Springer, 1926], 177 n. 966; and Konrad Hellwig, Zivilprozeßrecht, vol. 1 [Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1903], 255; Ernst von Hippel, Untersuchungen zum Problem des fehlerhaften Staatsakts [Berlin: Springer, 1924], 132; Carl Schmitt, “Zu Gerhard Anschütz: Die Verfassung des deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919,” Juristische Wochenschrift [Leipzig: Moefer, 1926], 2271, upper left). In the history of ideas, it can be traced back primarily, and in its individualist transformation, to natural science and the individualist thought related to it (Ernst Troeltsch, Historismus [Tübingen: Mohr, 1922], 258), and only secondarily, and in its tendency to a naive ontology of the communities, to particular prerequisites of the German history of ideas. Kaufmann, Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie, 94.

30. Thus the irredescent concept of the “genuine life idea” or the “true Staatsrä son” of a state in Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1924 and ff.), 1 f. Largely similar to this critique, Carl Schmitt, “Zu Friedrich Meineckes ‘Idee der Staatsräson’,” Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik, vol. 56 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926), 226 ff.

31. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 333 f., 312 f.

32. Fascist corporativism thus expressly describes itself as “integral,” that is, as integrating, not in the sense of the familiar, older cases of political use of the word, where it means “complete,” that is, radical. See, e.g., Ludwig Bernhard, Das System Mussolini (Berlin: Schere, 1924), 93 f., 97 ff.

33. Eduard Spranger, Lebensformen, 5th ed. (Halle: Niemeyer, 1925), 432 ff., 413 f.; Eduard Spranger, Psychologie des Jugendalters, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1926), 3 ff.

34. Spranger, Jugendalter, 8 f.; Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 323; Hans Oppenheimer, Logik der soziologischen Begriffsbildung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1925), 74 ff.

35. From the scholarly literature, we mention only Max Weber's sociology of domination. See also Friedrich von Wieser, Gesetz der Macht (Vienna: Springer, 1926), 47 ff. Particularly rich in valuable observations are Friedrich W. Förster's (older) writings on political ethics, to the extent they justify the morally imperative behavior of a statesman, leader, superior, etc., by the integrating force of the required method of leadership—in his well-known working method, here as contestable from the standpoint of theoretical ethics as it is stimulating and fruitful for practical morality.

36. Quite correctly, e.g., Curt Geyer, Führer und Masse in der Demokratie (Berlin: Dietz, 1926), 10 ff.

37. Especially typical is Wieser, Gesetz der Macht.

38. Perhaps meaning something similar, see Meinecke's observation—in an otherwise quite opposite context (Die Idee der Staatsräson, 1st ed., 12)—that the people “with its own latent drives for power and life, also nourishes that of the rulers.”

A correct observation in this context, in a theoretically unfortunate, mechanistic setting, is Vierkandt's doctrine of the “spectator.” Alfred Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1923), 31.

39. Wieser, Gesetz der Macht, 127 f.

40. From the need to integrate changing trends and senses of identity through leadership emerges the democratic tendency to change leadership, not from the tendency towards responsibility and towards preventing a monopolized leadership (false, liberal-individualist explanation in Hans Kelsen, “Demokratie,” Verhandlungen des 5. deutschen Soziologentages [Tübingen: Mohr, 1927], 60).

41. A list of respective images for the functioning of the king appears in Carl Schmitt, Geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1923), 2nd ed. (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1926), 50.

A particularly instructive case, belonging to some extent in this context, is the enormous integrating effect of the fact of Hindenburg's remaining at the head of the headquarters of the returning army; cf. Gustav Noske in the Festnummer of “Heimatdienst” of 2 October 1927, Heimatdienst 19 (Berlin: Zentralverlag, 1927): 320 ff.

42. Briefly developed in Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Wilhelm Kahl, vol. 3, 23 f.

43. See Wieser, Gesetz der Macht, 364. The personalities of the founders of nations who become and remain heads of state, such as Bismarck or Masaryk, tend to serve integration as both historic and current figures.

44. Hugo Preuss, Wandlungen des Kaisergedankens: Zur Geier des Geburtstages Seiner Majestät des Kaisers am 27. Januar 1917 in der Aula der Handels-Hochschule (Berlin: Reimer, 1917), 20.

45. Thomas Mann, Königliche Hoheit, 13th ed. (Berlin: Fischer, 1910), 163, 25, 52.

46. Thus Max Weber apparently saw it as impossible that the Ostjuden might be leaders of the life of Germany's state, even in the revolution. Marianne Weber, Max Weber (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926), 672. Fine observations in Mann, Königliche Hoheit.

47. Thus Eulenburg reproaches the Kaiser with the unfavorable impression made by unnecessary imperial journeys during the most tense domestic political

48. Letter of 19 August 1790, in Leopold von Schlözer, Dorothea von Schlözer (Göttingen: Deuerlich, 1937), 242.

Classically, Leopold von Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 30, Zur Geschichte von Öster reich und Preußen zwischen dem Friedensschluß zu Aachen und Hubertusburg (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1886), 55 f., on the integrating function of the government, “which in the end represents its [the state's] spiritual unity, on which depend its development, its progress, its fate, which first shows it what it is, and which tears it from the sterile ideal into the midst of vital interests.”

49. Max Weber, passim, especially strongly in Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921), 134. Correctly, Richard Thoma, Max-Weber-Erinnerungsgabe, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Keip, 1889), 58 f.

Even less plausibly can one say that in a democracy the leaders “are limited in their specific functions to executing laws.” Kelsen, Verhandlungen der 5. deutschen Soziologentages, 55.

50. Expression from Hans Freyer, Theorie des objektiven Geistes (Leipzig: Teubner, 1923), 81.

51. Freyer, Theorie des objektiven Geistes, 23.

52. On this sociological side of the theory of natural law, Kaufmann, Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie, 88 ff.; Heller, Die Souveränität, 290 f.

53. As Kaufmann says, Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie, 90.

54. See Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Wilhelm Kahl, vol. 3, 23 ff.

55. Which is not to say that they are more typical of more genuine forms of state—the form of state depends on the overall constellation of values, which was less differentiated and more static in the beginning than later on, and therefore favored forms of state based on domination.

56. On the phenomenology of the battle in the aspect essential here, the works of Karl Groos are still fundamental, cf. especially Karl Groos, Der Lebenswert des Spiels (  Jena: Fischer, 1910). Also Georg Simmel, Soziologie (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), 247 ff.; Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 2nd ed., 83, 152.

57. On the developmental history of both, Wladymyr Starosolskyi, Das Ma joritätsprinzip, Wiener staatswissenschaftliche Studien XIII 2 (Vienna: Deuticke, 1916), 6 ff.

58. Thus Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 1st ed., 121 ff., especially 125 f.

59. Entirely incorrect is the undifferentiated equal treatment of the technical majority principle in offices and courts and of the political, integrating principle in elections and parliaments, as in Ruth Haymann, “Die Mehrheitsentscheidung,” in Edgar Tatarin-Tarnhey, ed., Festgabe für Stammler (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1926), 395 ff., e.g., 451.

60. As one can still observe today, as the basis of the old-German unanimity principle, in some rural Swiss municipalities.

61. All political theories that, following the example of Max Weber and Meinecke, fail to go beyond the “tensions” are insufficient, as they miss this element of political psychology and are also incapable of ethical solutions.

62. This effect can, incidentally, even come from a battle that has none of this institutional spirit, for example, a civil war; I am reminded of the formulation of this fact

63. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus; Richard Thoma, “Zur Ideologie des Parlamentarismus und der Diktatur,” Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik, vol. 53 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1924), 212 ff.; Carl Schmitt, “Der Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und moderner Massendemokratie,” Hochland, vol. 23 (Munich: Kempten, 1926), 257 ff., reprinted in its essence as the preface to the second edition of his aforementioned book.

64. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 61, 63.

65. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 22 f.

66. In regard to the parliamentary ideology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries I investigated earlier in similar fashion, see Maßstäbe des parlamentarischen Wahlrechts in der deutschen Staatstheorie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Enke, 1912), 4 ff.; “Die Verschiebung der konstitutionellen Ordnung durch die Verhältniswahl,” in Universität Bonn, Juristische Fakultät, ed., Festgabe der Bonner Juristischen Fakultät für Karl Bergbohm (Bonn: Marcus Weber, 1919), 280 ff. I expressed it so that here only the light rationalist exterior must be shed in order to get from this ideology to the actual meaning—described in the text—of the institution.

67. Suggested in Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Wilhelm Kahl, vol. 3, 23.

68. Carl Schmitt still has a correct notion; see his excellent discussion of secret, isolated voting, through which no people's will or opinion (which only exists in the sphere of publicity) can be expressed with vital strength. Schmitt, Die geistes geschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 22. The secret voter is the individual of liberal thinking, alien to the state, who is neither integrated nor needs integration. Of course, Schmitt also sees that what counts is no longer the “idea” or “principle” of a form of state, but the gaining of and ruling with a majority. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 11. But that was no different a hundred years ago; only the ideology and technique of integrating a small bourgeoisie in the age of liberalism were different from those of integrating the democratic masses.

69. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 216.

70. Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 7, 12 f.

71. Thoma, “Zur Ideologie des Parlamentarismus and der Diktatur,” 214.

72. Only express rejection of any idealist thinking has the right to such confusion, such as Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1925), 327, who radically equates the discussions of a council of ministers with those of a parliament. Similarly incorrect is Haymann, “Die Mehrheitsentscheidung.”

73. We can disregard here the fact that representation and relations among organs are not entirely congruent with deputation as conventionally understood.

74. Of course, its decisions, like all acts of will in the name of society that qualify as legal, belong retroactively to the integrating functions—just as the individual human personality creates itself while carrying out and experiencing its functions.

75. On the actual “leadership function of the parliament,” see, e.g., Curt Geyer, Führer und Masse in der Demokratie (Berlin: Dietz, 1926), 80 ff., 88 ff.

76. See, e.g., Leo Wittmayer, Die organisierende Kraft des Wahlsystems (Vienna: Fromme, 1903). See generally Hugo Preuss, Um die Reichsverfassung von Weimar

77. Bismarck accused the parties “rejecting the state,” in contrast to the parties “accepting” it, of a lack of a community of political values and thus, at the same time, of the will to political integration—a distinction justified in principle, and not at all the same as the dualism between good and evil, despite Friedrich Meinecke, Preußen und Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich and Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1918), 516.

What is stated in the text is often expressed in terms of party programs being only supplementing parts of a cosmos of values, or that they should be seen as such, or as various techniques for an identical goal. Jonas Cohn, “Die Erkenntnis der Welt and das Worrecht der Bejahung,” Logos: Zeitschrift für systematische Philosophie, vol. 10 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921/22): 225 (against Radbruch); Haymann, “Die Mehrheitsentscheidung,” 467; Rudolf Stammler, Rechtsphilosophie (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1922), § 174.

78. Rudolf Hübner, Die Staatsform der Republik (Bonn: Schroeder, 1920), 36 f.; Heinrich Triepel, Unitarismus und Föderalismus (Tübingen: Mohr, 1907), 27 f.

79. Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre, 392 ff.—not entirely in the sense of the text.

80. In this sense only superficially suggested here, even the “cranks and dreamers” not taken into account by Triepel, Unitarismus und Föderalismus, 27 f., in the end tend to be not only deniers, but at the same time supporters of law and the state.

81. See above, pages 220–21.

82. Because of this relationship to the values, domination itself is often strongly emphasized as a value—for example, as authoritarian decision by Carl Schmitt or, with reverse premises, as a disqualifying element of bourgeois order by socialists, for example, Max Adler, “Staatsauffassung des Marxismus,” in Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding, eds., Marx-Studien IV, vol. 1 (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1922), 209 ff., 214 f., 223, 198 f.; Paul Tillich, Die religiöse Lage der Gegenwart (Berlin: Ullstein, 1926), 43, 54, 64, 65, 81, 95, 125, where the science, technology, economy, constitution, education, and church of the bourgeois age appear as authoritarian and thus compromised.

Closely related to the differences between domination and representation suggested in the text is the fact that rulers and leaders can be considered, at the same time, factors of personal integration in a very different sense from representatives. See Aloys Fischer, “Herrschaft, Führung, Vertretung,” in Gustav Kafka, ed., Hand buch der vergleichenden Psychologie, vol. 2 (Munich: Reinhardt, 1922), 387 ff.

83. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 38 f.

84. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922), 122.

85. For example, in the spirit of Simmel's famous essay, “Vortrag am Begrüßungsabend, Mittwoch 19. Oktober, zu welchem die Frankfurter Akademie für So-cial-und Handelswissenschaften eingeladen hat,” in Verhandlungen des ersten deutschen Soziologentages von 1910, ed. Friedrich Heckmann (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1911), 1–16; especially on the integrating significance of games, p. 9.

86. Yorck to Dilthey, 7 May 1879, in Wilhelm Dilthey and Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, eds., Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Yorck v. Warten burg 1877–1897 (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923), 13.

87. For example, the constitutional as opposed to the statutory regulation of taxes and finance, etc. I will return later to this example and others.

Such examples make it particularly clear that an integrating effect does not depend on awareness of an integrating intention on the part of the legislator or the parts of the state that are to be integrated.

88. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 323 ff., 320 ff.

89. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 333 f., 375 ff.

90. Therefore, every state suitably expresses its essence when it links its state, and especially military, symbols with symbols of victory; and Anatole France is only half correct in joking about the tendency of every army to call itself the first in the world (L'Ile des Pingouins 1,V, chap. IV). For its task, its point is to be invincible, and thus the first, and at the same time the state, not unsuitably, expresses its essential “invincibility as a nation of culture.” Wieser, Gesetz der Macht, 280, 393.

One of the gaps in criticism of the Versailles Treaty is that Germany's demilitarization is generally combated only from the point of view of its impairment of technical means, rather than of the vital functions and quality of a great nation-state. It is understandable that this distinction is incomprehensible to Americans—but painful that it is so to many Germans as well. This also includes the thoughtlessness with which German pacifists before the world war hoped for the military defeat of Prussian militarism, not the German people (testimony of Hans Wehberg, Als Pazifist im Weltkrieg [Leipzig: Neue-Geist Verlag, 1919], 21). The army is not merely an organization or tool, but above all a form of life of the citizenry.

Details on this question follow.

91. Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 360 f.

92. Expression from Wieser, Gesetz der Macht, 104 ff.

93. See, e.g., the observations on the psychology of power in Spranger, Lebens formen, 5th ed., 230.

94. There is almost nothing on precisely this aspect of the issue in Siegfried Kracauer, “Die Gruppe als Ideenträger,” Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik, vol. 49, 594 ff.

There is much, on the other hand, in Karl Rothenbücher, Über das Wesen des Geschichtlichen (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926), e.g., 15 f.

95. An excellent presentation of this situation in Litt, Individuum und Gemein schaft, 1st ed., 174 ff., 179 ff.

Here lies the special paradox of the problem of substantive integration, which consists in the fact that participation in a more comprehensive and substantively more important group is more difficult to experience, or at least consciously to experience, than one that is lesser in number, content, and duration.

96. Integration through symbols, however, can never be anything other than integration through their symbolized content. Therefore, one cannot “invent” symbols for a nonexistent content, as Robert Coester, Die Loslösung Posens (Berlin: Stilke, 1921), 62 f., demands in retrospect. The difficulties experienced by the [republican] black-red-gold Reich colors due to the unclarity of the positive content they symbolize, in contrast to [the imperial] black-white-red, are partially of this nature.

There is a great deal on the theory and practice of political symbols in the literature on fascism—including the link between myth and symbol, of which Kierkegaard is also thinking when he tries through nonrational symbolization to withdraw from

The concept of the symbol is defined here considerably more narrowly than in Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 153, or that of the “sign” [Zeichen] in Freyer's Theorie des objektiven Geistes.

97. This generation can only be taught by events [English in the original], 22 March 1889, Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914, vol. IV, ed. Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927), 405.

On symbolized events, see especially Rothenbücher, Über das Wesen des Geschicht lichen, 38 ff. A good example (the battle of Morgarten, 1315, which made the Swiss aware of the historical significance of their struggle and thus of their political unity) in Andreas Heusler, Schweizer Verfassungsgeschichte (Basel: Frobenius, 1920), 85.

Here, in part, lies the significance of the constant emphasis on the revolutionary character of the march on Rome of Mussolini and fascism; only if interpreted in this way is it the symbolic event in the break with the old world and the inauguration of a completely new state content, and precisely for this reason does its unique integrating effect, the justification of specific fascist legitimacy, lie in this revolutionary character.

98. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), § 334.

99. See the excellent discussion in Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 1st ed., 117 ff., 129 ff.

100. I recall the familiar liturgical experience that a doctrinal content in the form of religious poetry never encounters the problem that blocks its integrating effect on the community when the same content appears as the theologumenon of a formulated, settled article of faith [Bekenntnis].

101. The contrast is not quite in the spirit of, for example, Georg von Lukacs, Theorie des Romans (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962), 31.

102. At least to some extent, the relationship between the integrating bond to the state and the religious bond to a god can be explained through contexts like the one developed here; it has been observed, for example, in Simmel's sociology of religion (Die Religion, vol. 2 of Gesellschaft, ed. Martin Buber, 1906, 22 ff.), and is in a deeper sense one of the basic ideas in Emanuel Hirsch, Reich-Gottes-Begriffe des neueren europäischen Denkens (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1921), but is also employed practically in the policy of the political myth by [Georges] Sorel and the fascists. See, e.g., Johannes Mannhardt, Faschismus (Munich: Beck, 1925), 125, 219, 262, 278 f., 327 ff. In the usage suggested here, the political myth means integration through a symbolically formulated totality of political values that is thus made capable of being experienced as an intensive totality.

Of course, Kelsen's parallel between god and state, most recently in his Allgemeine Staatslehre, 76 ff., has nothing to do with this.

103. Yorck to Dilthey, 13 January 1887, in Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck v. Wartenburg 1877–1897, 66.

104. See above, pages 226–27.]

105. Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1917), 110. In a

106. Friedrich Curtius, Hindernisse und Möglichkeit einer ethischen Politik (Leipzig: Verlag Naturwissenschaften, 1918), 6, is excellent. However, it is incorrect in providing an explanation “from this confusion of nature and reason,” rather than from the nature of spiritual life itself.

107. The most important case of this type in contemporary state doctrine is Kelsen's “mask” theory; see Hans Kelsen, “Gott und Staat,” Logos, vol. 11 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1923): 267 f.

108. I will return to this issue in individual applied cases, cf. Schmitt, Geistes geschichtliche Lage des Parlamentarismus, 39 ff.; Heller, Souveränität, 19; Fritz Marschall von Bieberstein, Vom Kampf des Rechtes gegen die Gesetze (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1927), 128 ff., note 381 f.

109. See, e.g., the literature in Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 80, note 1, and in Max Scheler, Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1924), 115 f., note.

The rich book by Rothenbücher falls victim to an incorrect alternative of criti-cism—see in particular Rothenbücher, Über das Wesen des Geschichtlichen, 59, 74 ff.—and thus fails to place its wealth of excellently observed details in the idealist context they deserve.

110. This duality is unclear in Ludwig Waldecker, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin-Grunewald: Rothschild, 1927), 481 f.

111. E.g., Robert Sieger, Staatsgebiet und Staatsgedanke, Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in Wien 62 (Vienna: Östereichische Geographische Gesellschaft, 1919), 1 ff., especially 8.

112. As representative of many, Friedrich Ratzel, Der Lebensraum (Tübingen: Laupp, 1901). Only within the limits of what is stated in the text can one justify the rejection of “geopolitics” for the theory of the state in Heller, Die Souveränität, 83 and n. 2. It is a big step even from the excesses of geopolitics to the pure subordination of political to physical geography in contemporary Italian literature (on the Napoleonic model); in comparison, even the famous passage in Johann G. Fichte, “Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters,” Werke, vol. 7, ed. Immanuel Fichte (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1871), 212, is correct in refusing to see the Fatherland in clods of earth, rivers, and mountains.

113. Particularly characteristic passages, to which many others could be added, in Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrecht (Tübingen: Mohr, 1928), 73; Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1925), 294.

114. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrecht, 73, and at many other places; Walter Henrich, Kritik der Gebietstheorien (Breslau: J. U. Kerns Verlag [Max Müller], 1926).

115. Bernhard Braubach, “Zum Einfluß der Stoa auf die französische Staatslehre,” Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, vol. 48 (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1924), 232.

This integrating effect of the territory and its borders is particularly apparent when it spreads to the free, extra-state “society,” as in the adaptation of many

For a view that deviates in many respects, see Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Werteethik (Halle: Niemeyer, 1921), 580 f.

116. Georg von Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1968), 319 ff.

117. Karl Bilfinger, Der Einfluß der Einzelstaaten auf die Bildung des Reichswillens (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922), 85.

118. Thus Freud's mass psychology, here cited without further ado from Kelsen, Soziologischer und juristischer Staatsbegriff, 31 f.—an especially representative statement, including the confusion, unavoidable today, of crude naturalism with the romanticism of leadership [Führerromantik].

119. Karl Loewenstein, “Zur Soziologie der parlamentarischen Repräsentation in England nach der großen Reform. Das Zeitalter der Parlamentsouveränität (1823–1867),” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 51 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1924), 671, 683.

120. E.g., Friedrich Engels, Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft, 11th ed. (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1921), 277.

121. Quite typical is Max Adler at the Third Reich Conference of Young Socialists (Berlin: Arbeiterjugend-Verlag, 1925), 12: “There has never been another means of making people's minds unanimous and bringing their wishes into a common line in which they can first achieve lasting strength, than science [Wissenschaft] … Only in one area must all ways meet, only one force can be avoided by no one, and that is the power of logical thinking,” etc.

That is, scientific truth and its realization as the single integrating factor. No dialectic can deny that the “state” is abolished [aufgehoben] in this intellectualist theorem: Max Adler, “Staatsauffassung des Marxismus,” in Marx-Studien, 4th ed., vol. 2 (Glashütten im Taunus: Avermann, 1918), especially 209 ff., also 129, 146, 223, and passim.

122. Therefore, the focus of all future democracies will lie not in politics, but in education. Adler, “Staatsauffassung des Marxismus,” 185.

123. Adler, “Staatsauffassung des Marxismus,” 197 note.

A socialism that accuses bourgeois society of reinforcing its values and sets the new education the goal of a “formal, universally functional educational product,” Anna Siemsen, Erziehung im Gemeinschaftsgeist (Stuttgart: Moritz, 1921), especially 13 f., is to this extent not grounded in socialism.

124. Adler, “Staatsauffassung des Marxismus,” 193 ff.

125. Hellpach-Graf Dohna, Die Krisis des deutschen Parlamentarismus (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1927), 8.

126. As a more recent example, we may mention here Max Scheler, Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1924), 99, 109, n. 99 (against Engels), 28, 30, 31 ff., 37 f. Methodologically questionable is the conventional contrast between “ideal and real factors,” 9.

127. Hardly to be considered, Norbert Einstein, Der Erfolg (Frankfurt am Main: Ruetten & Loening, 1919), especially 50 f.

On the relationship between types of integration, see also above, page 228.

128. Not only are the constitutional theories of the main political tendencies to

129. Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Wilhelm Kahl, vol. 3, pp. 17 f. I interpret Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Europäische Gespräche, vol. 1 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlaganstalt, 1923), 168, as the agreement of an authority.

130. See, especially, the excellent discussion of the “interconnection of areas of life” in Litt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 379 ff., especially 381.

131. W. R. Seeley, “The Morality of Nations,” International Journal of Ethics, vol. 1, no. 4 (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1891): 444 f. I cannot explain how to make consistent the same writer's better-known and apparently contradictory thesis on the connection between external pressure and internal constitution.

132. J. J. Ruedorffer's Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1914) can be mentioned as an example representative of many.

133. For Bismarck's numerous statements on the monarchic constitution as a prerequisite for a lasting politics of federation and alliance, see, e.g., the compilation in Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Metternich-der Staatsmann und der Mensch, vol. 2 (Munich: Bruckmann, 1925), 662 [endnotes] to 551, also 553 below [another work in the Staatrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze; Smend cites Bismarck's book, Die Grosse Politik—eds.]. In addition, for the fact that only control over internal forces makes it possible to take advantage of conditions in foreign policy insofar as domestic policy determines foreign policy, see Helmut Göring in “Die neue Front,” 397.

134. On this, see Festgabe der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Wilhelm Kahl, vol. 3, p. 18. If, for example, one state from a group of states achieves an advantage, the remaining states demand compensation, not because each wants the same amount, but because the nature of them all, determined through foreign-policy power relations, would otherwise be impaired. As an example of the nuances possible here of a foreign policy without object and one that stresses an object, see Detlev Vagts, Europäische Gespräche, vol. 1 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlaganstalt, 1923), 261.

135. Helmut Göring, Die Großmächte und die Rheinfrage in den letzten Jahrhunderten (Berlin: Hobbing, 1926), 72.

136. Göring, Die Großmächte und die Rheinfrage, 80.

137. Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson, 1st ed., 516.

138. One is reminded of the famous words of Bismarck's Reichstag speech on 11 January 1887, in Horst Kohl, Politische Reden (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1892), 12, 217.

This does not exclude the possibility that for this very reason, political negotiations are more elastic than simply technical ones; see Kiderlen's well-known discussion of the fleet treaty of 1909, in Ernst Jäckh, Kiderlen-Wachter, der Staatsmann und Mensch, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1925), 50, 57.

I need only recall the honorary clause [Ehrenclausel] and other phenomena in international law belonging in the same category.

139. See the quotation from Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, above page 231, note 98.

140. See, e.g., Kurt Riezler, “Die Agonie des deutschen Parlamentarismus,” in Die deutsche Nation: Eine Zeitschrift für Politik (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1922), 991, and especially Mannhardt, Faschismus, 88, 128, 39, 121, 119, 274 f., 142 f.

141. Carl Schmitt, “Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes,” in Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 48, fasc. 2 (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1924), 774 ff.; Heller, Die Souveränität, 118; Maurice Hauriou, Précis de droit constitutionnel (Paris: Sirey, 1923), 446, 397; Sieger, Staatsgebiet und Staatsgedanke, 11. Very certain, in contrast to the majority of historians, Max von Szczepanski, “Rankes Anschauungen über den Zusammenhang zwischen der äußeren und der inneren Politik der Staaten,” Zeitschrift für Politik, vol. 7 (Berlin: Heymann, 1920), 489 ff., especially 620. This is generally more obvious to those outside the country than to ourselves. Article 1, sec. 2 of the Charter of the League of Nations, with its requirement that member states “se gouvernent librement,” probably means internal and external freedom in equal measure.

142. Introduction and conclusion of the Idee der Staatsräson.

143. Georg Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung: Eine staats-rechtlich-politische Abhandlung (Berlin: Häring, 1906).

144. Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung, 72.

145. Nearly thus, Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung, 2.

146. It is telling that Jellinek in Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung gives only an empirical description of important cases and types, not a theory, and especially not a legal one.

147. See above, pages 235 f.

148. Thus the harsh criticism by Erich Kaufmann (Kritik der neukantischen Rechts philosophie, 207 f.) of the “edifice of paragraphs” of the written constitutional document, especially that of Weimar, is not entirely justified.

149. On the importance of receptions in intellectual life in general, see Litt, In dividuum und Gemeinschaft, 3rd ed., 181 f.

150. The cases enumerated by Jellinek are clearly not of this type, but are found in the self-structuring of the integration process stimulated or at least permitted by the constitution.

151. In this sense also the concept of the constitution in Gerhart Husserl, Rechtskraft und Rechtsgeltung (Berlin: Springer, 1925), 73.

152. Thus the popular comparison with state functions, Montesquieu, Esprit sprit des lois, III.1, translated into the juridical sphere, e.g., by Fritz Fleiner, Institu tionen des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1913), 3. The date of its abandonment in German thought is instructive: the analogy is still found in the

153. It is probably meant this way in Heller, Die Souveränität, 81, when he finds the state's distinction from other organizations in the fact that “the acts implementing it represent a guarantee of the overall cooperation in this area,” thus are themselves without such heteronomous guarantees, or in Marck, Substanz-und Funktionsbegriff, 123, where, somewhat too generally, the autonomy of associations of public law is contrasted with the character of those in private law, as “artificial products of the legal order.”

154. Heller, Die Souveränität, 102.

155. The trivial fact that the state does not “consist” of people must unfortunately still be emphasized: thus, correctly, in Heller, Die Souveränität, 81.

156. See Felix Stoerk, “Das Ausfuhrverbot und die partielle Suspension völkerrechtlicher Verträge,” Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, n.s. 9 (Freiburg im Breisgau and Leipzig: Mohr, 1894), 38.

157. See above, pages 242–43.

158. Examples of such skepticism in Hans Nawiasky, “Die Auslegung des Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung,” Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, n.s. 9 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1925), 13 f.; “Zu den Begriffen Versammlungen und Umzüge unter freiem Himmel,” Lam mers Juristische Wochenschrift (Leipzig: Moefer, 1925), 986, note r. The resolution is thus left to the delimitation in criminal law of the “essential principles of the constitution” as an object of high treason, e.g., Entscheiden des Reichsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court], in Strafsachen [Criminal Cases], vol. 56, pp. 173 ff., 259 ff. The literature on this issue shows that here, constitutional theory has left unanswered a pressing question of positive law.

See, on this question, in particular Karl Bilfinger, “Verfassungsumgehung. Betrachtungen zur Auslegung der Weimarer Verfassung,” Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, n.s. 11 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926): 181 ff.

Ernst Wolgast draws my attention to a particularly characteristic application in Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution (unalterability of the “principles” of the constitution).

159. At any rate, not as simple as Carl Schmitt's formula: organization = normal order. Carl Schmitt, “Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung,” Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, vol. 1 (Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1924): 91 f.

160. As in Georg Jellinek, Staatslehre, vol. 1, 3rd ed., 505.

161. Declaration of 10 November by the Board of the Independent Social Democratic Party, in Ferdinand Runkel, Die deutsche Revolution (Leipzig: Grunow, 1919), 118; Treaty of 22 November between People's Commissioners [Volksbeauftragter] and the Berlin Executive Council [Vollzugsrat], in Gerhard Anschütz, Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, 3rd and 4th eds. (Berlin: Stilke, 1926), 14 n. 12.

162. Decree of 14 November 1918, Reichsgesetzblatt, no. 1311.

163. Heinrich Triepel, “Streitigkeiten zwischen Reich und Ländern,” in Festgabe

164. Carl Schmitt, “Der Begriff des Politischen,” Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik, vol. 58 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1927), 1 ff., reprinted as Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Walther Rothschild, 1928).

165. Anschütz, Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, note 6 on Article 15 of the Weimar Constitution.

166. Ernst von Hippel, “Über Objektivität im Öffentlichen Recht, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, n.s. 12 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1927): 417.

167. See Rudolf Smend, “Das Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung,” Veröf fentlichung der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, vol. 4 (Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1928), 48 f.

168. Leo Wittmayer, Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1928), 38.

169. On the following, see also Bilfinger, “Verfassungsumgehung. Betrachtungen zur Auslegung der Weimarer Verfassung,” 175 ff.

170. Heinrich Triepel, Die Staatsverfassung und die politischen Parteien (Berlin: Liebmann, 1928), 24.

171. For example, Otto Koellreutter, Der deutsche Staat als Bundesstaat und als Parteienstaat (Tübingen: Mohr, 1927), 29.

172. Willi Hellpach, “Parlaments-Zukunft,” Neue Rundschau, no. 7 (Berlin and Leipzig: Fischer, 1927): 3 ff.