Preferred Citation: Cain, Bruce E., and Elisabeth R. Gerber, editors Voting at the Political Fault Line: California's Experiment with the Blanket Primary. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c2002 2002. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt2779q1hf/


 
Openness Begets Opportunity

THE PEACE AND FREEDOM PARTY'S EXPERIENCE WITH CALIFORNIA'S BLANKET PRIMARY

Along with the influence of nonregistrants in the nomination process, minor-party plaintiffs raised concerns about the blanket primary being used for mischievous purposes. Though it remained unknown to many, such an instance occurred in 1998 in the PFP, the minor party known for having the most primaries and the one that had the most in 1998. The story of their experience with the blanket primary in California is instructive, giving observers insight into how the change in primary rules can particularly affect minor parties—for better and for worse.


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As the only explicitly socialist party active in California politics, the PFP has traditionally had difficulties with envious parties attempting to "raid" its nomination procedures. This, along with a reputation for passionate political infighting, has fueled many primary battles over the years. Tom Condit, a longtime Bay Area activist in the PFP who lost a bid to be the party's candidate for Insurance Commissioner in 1998, explained that the PFP has had more contested primaries for two reasons: (1) because "a small party is a natural target for ‘takeover bids' " and (2) "a lot of people in PFP take their politics very seriously and are willing to fight over them." He explained that, prior to 1980, "candidates were mostly picked by consensus within the ranks of party activists." But in 1980, the Communist Party "asked if we would be upset if they ran Gus Hall in our presidential primary. People who thought that the excitement of contested primaries might attract more interest to the party opened the Pandora's Box and it hasn't been closed since."[6]

Marsha Feinland, a gubernatorial candidate who, like Condit, lost in a contested PFP primary in 1998, agreed:

As a small party, we are particularly vulnerable to challenges by other groups that want to use our ballot line. … Specifically, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Internationalist Workers Party, the New Alliance Party, and the Workers World Party have all sought to run people for office as Peace and Freedom Party. Some of these groups have worked as active PFP members, while others have just tried to "raid" PFP.

Thus the PFP has seen its secured position on the ballot serve as a lure for nonqualified left parties who want to run candidates. According to Jan B. Tucker, a "second-generation member" of the PFP who has been with the party since its inception in 1968, many groups over the years—communists, socialists, and even libertarians in the early 1970s—have used the PFP's "ballot access as battle ground." This, he contends, is because the PFP has not been organizationally strong and active in campaigns, but has served only as an insular and ideological "ballot status party." This has given "leftist invasions," in Tucker's terms, the incentive and opportunity to continually attempt to influence the PFP's nomination procedures.

In 1998, however, the party's battles did not come from external invasion, but from insurrection—led by Tucker himself. Dissatisfied with the established wing of the PFP led by Condit and Feinland, and with the party's perceived electoral weakness—"our party's structure resembles the organizational principles of the Marx Brothers more closely than those of Karl Marx," he once wrote—Tucker formed an alternative slate of candidates to challenge the officially endorsed party slate. Support for the blanket primary and more democratic reforms was at the heart of Tucker's dissention. But his biggest gripe was that the PFP too often "ran nothing but


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white males" (from the Bay Area) and that the party needed to offer a more diverse slate of candidates in order to make inroads with the state's voters.

Conscious of the strategic possibilities available in the blanket primary, Tucker assembled a slate of two Latinos and two women (whom Condit contends were "a group of [Tucker's] friends and acquaintances, none of whom had previously been active in the [PFP]") to appeal to potential crossover voters. Along with gubernatorial candidate Gloria La Riva (who was endorsed by, but not an official part of, the slate), two of Tucker's candidates won PFP nominations. But most significantly, especially in light of the data in table 11.3, all of the three candidates on the PFP ballot with purely Latino surnames—including one not on the Tucker slate—were victorious.

Though the division between the Tucker slate and the established wing of the party did not result in the type of embarrassing scandal that opponents of Proposition 198 feared, the PFP has suffered since the election. Failing to gain 2 percent of the vote in any of the statewide offices for which it ran in 1998, the PFP was subsequently disqualified from the state ballot. As of this writing, it is mounting a drive to register roughly fourteen thousand more voters to get back on the ballot for 2002.[7] Ironically, the party that had staked out an official position against Proposition 198—and had seen itself torn asunder by the new primary—turned to using the reform as part of its sales pitch to gain more registrants. "Your party registration," read the Party's official website in late July 1999, "will not affect your right to vote for whichever candidate you prefer in either the primary or general election" (www.peaceandfreedom.org, July 26, 1999). Tucker and other PFP members have since joined the Green party.


Openness Begets Opportunity
 

Preferred Citation: Cain, Bruce E., and Elisabeth R. Gerber, editors Voting at the Political Fault Line: California's Experiment with the Blanket Primary. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c2002 2002. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt2779q1hf/