Pollution in a Promised Land "ss1.71"

WATER WARS: ROUND 1

The project's most conspicuous obstacle was geopolitical. Of the three main tributaries of the Jordan, only the Dan lay squarely inside Israeli ter-ritory. The Hatzbani came from Lebanon, and the Banias was still in Syrian hands. More important, diverting or even tapping the Jordan River would change the flow and water quality of the river. Along with the Yarmuk, the Jordan River was Jordan's primary source of surface water. The Hashemite Kingdom's consternation should not have surprised anyone.

In 1953 Blass pushed to begin the work to divert the Jordan River any-way. The area was technically under Israeli jurisdiction but was part of a

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demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria. Beyond concern about inter-national pressure, there was fear for the safety of the construction crews. At the time, the general in charge of Israel's northern command was Moshe Dayan. He decided to gamble that Syrian ruler Adib al-Shishakli's own domestic problems and unrest would serve to neutralize him. Dayan ventured that not a single bullet would be shot in response. He was right. On September 2, 1953, Israel sent two bulldozers to begin the diversion at the Jordan River's B'not Yaakov bridge, ten kilometers north of the Kinneret. While the Syrians quickly massed troops across the river from the construction site, they held their fire. Israel expanded its workforce.^[52]

Syria had other means of voicing its displeasure. It complained to the commander of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force, Danish general Wagen Benika. Benika demanded an explanation from the Israelis. The Syrians told him that the water was to be channeled to the Kinneret for hydroelectric power (which was part of the Hayes plan). Syria then lodged a formal complaint with the Security Council. And so it was that in October 1953, the United Nations got its first lesson in the politics of Middle Eastern water resources.

It was Lebanon's and Pakistan's turn to join the Security Council rota-tion in addition to the five permanent members. Although they did not have veto power, their hostile presence weakened Israel's position. Under pressure, the peerless Anglo-Israeli diplomat Abba Eban agreed to halt work along the river until the hearings commenced. During the interim two weeks, Israel did its homework. Blass flew across the United States col-lecting the equivalent of affidavits from three of America's top water man-agement experts, who confirmed that not only did Israeli utilization of the Jordan not contradict a regional development scenario—it actually expe-dited it.^[53]

At the United Nations session itself, Syria's representative, Dr. Zein al-Din, made a strong two-hour speech in front of a packed auditorium, ac-cusing Israel of violating the cease-fire, stealing his country's water, and eventually causing the starvation of fifteen thousand citizens. Abba Eban responded with one of his typically eloquent presentations. Eban coun-tered that the demilitarized zone was under Israel's sovereignty and that, according to the preexisting Sykes-Picot agreement between France and England, the British Mandate received all rights to the Jordan River. Israel, he argued, inherited these rights. Eban charmed the diplomats, but he could not stop the Soviet representative from vetoing an American reso-lution that would have allowed Israel to continue its diversion work.^[54]

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To try to defuse the volatile situation, American President Eisenhower launched an independent diplomatic initiative. Eric Johnston arrived in the Middle East in 1953 as the president's personal emissary and “roving am-bassador” to the Middle East to work out a compromise. Johnston im-pressed the Israelis. A tall, trim, youthful sixty-year-old businessman, his experience in mergers and acquisitions in the corporate world had honed his negotiating skills. Most important, he was not part of the State Department's foreign service establishment, whose sympathies were felt to lie with Arab interests.^[55]

During five trips from 1953 to 1955 he hammered out the “Johnston Plan.” Lake Kinneret was to be the main reservoir for waters of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers. A dam would be constructed on the Yarmuk, and Israel would transfer water to Jordan via a canal. Under the plan, Israel would receive 40 percent of the available water allocation. (Israel's open-ing position demanded 60 percent, and the Arabs agreed to 20 percent.) Jordan and Syria were allocated 45 percent and 15 percent respectively. More important, Johnston's package explicitly recognized the legitimacy of Israeli transfer of water to its southern regions.^[56] The United States sweetened the deal by agreeing to bankroll many of the spin-off develop-ment projects, which it assumed would provide employment for Palestinian refugees.

Just as the agreement was about to be finalized, the Arab League got cold feet. Rather than embarrass President Eisenhower openly, their October 1955 debate on the proposal was “postponed.” Then they directed their energies towards blaming Israel for collapse of the negotiations.^[57] While Johnston did not achieve a de jure arrangement, his plan became the de facto baseline for water allocation in the region. Its ground rules also gave Israel the green light it needed to begin the National Water Carrier.