CANDIDATE MODER ATION IN THE CALIFORNIA BLANKET PRIMARY
I now consider the candidate moderation and polarization hypotheses in light of evidence drawn from the 1998 California primary and general election. Did primary and general election winners hold moderate or extreme policy positions relative to those of their challengers? Did they hold more moderate or more extreme policy positions than their counterparts previously elected under closed primaries? Did the competitive circumstances of the race matter? That is, were more moderate candidates nominated and elected in contested races? Uncontested races? Open seats? Was the moderation effect more important in some races than in others? Was the polarization effect more important in some races?
Governor's Race
The Governor's race represented a prime opportunity for crossover voting. Incumbent Governor Pete Wilson was prohibited from running due to term limits. In the Republican primary, former State Attorney General Dan Lungren ran unopposed,[8] while in the Democratic primary, three candidates—former Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis, former U.S. Representative Jane Harman, and businessman Al Checchi—competed for the nomination.[9] With the Republican nomination virtually unchallenged, Republican voters were free to cross over into the highly competitive and uncertain Democratic primary.
When they crossed party lines, however, Republican voters faced a field of three ideologically similar, centrist candidates. Harman's record in the U.S. Congress distinguished her as one of the most pro-business, fiscally conservative Democrats in the House.[10] Checchi's lack of political experience made his ideological position more difficult to assess, but even after
Nor did crossover voting into the contested Democratic primary appear to result in the nomination of a weak opponent to Lungren. Davis raised nearly $26 million in campaign contributions (California Secretary of State 1998a) and ultimately beat Lungren by nearly 20 percentage points in November (California Secretary of State 1998b). If raiders targeted Davis as the weakest Democratic candidate, it looks like they seriously miscalculated.
This is not to say that the blanket primary had no effect on campaign dynamics or the relative strength of the several candidates. Some of their centrist positioning may, in fact, have been the result of electoral pressures from the center felt during the blanket primary. Further, the fact that three moderates entered the Democratic primary and emphasized their centrist positions may reflect their beliefs that centrist candidates had a greater chance of winning the blanket primary. In fact, Checchi's campaign manager admitted that they saw the blanket primary as a unique opportunity for a candidate without traditional party ties to appeal to independents and moderate Republican crossovers (Institute of Governmental Studies 1999). However, it is clear that the blanket primary was not, at least in this case, decisive. Other factors, such as Checchi's lack of political experience, Harman's inability to mobilize financial support, and Davis's more convincing appeal as an "incumbent-like" challenger seemed to dominate any moderating effect of the blanket primary (see chapter 4 by Baldassare and chapter 7 by Salvanto and Wattenberg in this volume on the importance of incumbency in the 1998 elections).
U.S. Senate Race
The U.S. Senate race presented similarly favorable circumstances for crossover voting. In the Democratic primary, incumbent Barbara Boxer ran virtually unopposed, while former State Treasurer Matt Fong and businessman Darrell Issa competed for the Republican nomination.[11] So, in the same way that Republicans were able to cross into the competitive Democratic primary for governor, Democrats could employ their votes in a race where they might actually count—the Republican primary—while their incumbent Senator was assured of the Democratic nomination.
As in the Governor's race, however, it was less than clear which Republican Senate candidate was the more moderate and hence the more attractive to sincere crossover voters and hedgers. Issa, like Al Checchi in the gubernatorial primary, lacked political experience and spent much of the early part of the campaign staking out his ideological turf. Toward late spring, an image began to emerge of a candidate who was quite conservative on social issues and liberal economically. Fong, by contrast, tried to portray himself as more liberal on social issues and conservative on economic issues, although his endorsement by conservative Christian organizations undermined this image to some extent. Hence, it is safe to say that while the Republican primary candidates took different positions on the issues, neither was obviously more attractive to centrist independents and crossover voters.
Where the candidates did clearly differ is on their political records and ties to the political parties. Issa, like Checchi, had no prior political experience. In previous elections, when voters were in the mood to take out their frustrations about a sagging economy on incumbent politicians, this outsider status might have worked to Issa's advantage. In 1998, however, voters were in quite a different mood: incumbents and experienced politicians won up and down the ballot in both the primary and the general (see Baldassare, chapter 4; Salvanto and Wattenberg, chapter 7). To make matters worse, Issa's lack of ideological discipline and inconsistency of policy positions, no doubt a result of his political inexperience, were interpreted by the media as the mark of an erratic and unpredictable candidate. Thus, the lack of partisan ties and ideological rigidity—which should have helped Issa attract support from sincere crossovers and hedgers—failed to carry the day in 1998.
Where Issa lacked political experience, Fong was viewed as a traditional, mainstream party candidate. He was a long-term member of the Republican party. His mother was the very popular (Democratic) Secretary of State for many years. Fong served as a member of the state Board of Equalization and then as State Treasurer. Over many years of public service, Fong established himself as an expert on taxes and fiscal policy, and promised to make reform of the tax code one of his top legislative priorities as Senator (California Secretary of State 1998d). Hence, while it is impossible to know how voters weighed the relative importance of policy positions and political experience, it is clear that Issa was not able to capitalize on his independent status as a party outsider to defeat Fong in the primary.
To the extent that Fong benefited from having greater political experience than his primary competition, and perhaps from being perceived as more moderate ideologically, he was no match for Boxer in the general election. Exit polls show that most of the Democrats that crossed over for Fong in the primary returned to their party in the general and supported
U.S. House Races
It is more difficult to generalize about the effects of the blanket primary on candidate positions in legislative races because (1) electoral circumstances vary greatly from race to race, and (2) much less is known about most candidates, especially those who lose in the primary. Furthermore, since House incumbents are reelected at an extremely high rate, there is very little competition in most House general election races and hence little opportunity for the primary to make much difference in terms of electoral outcomes.[13] Nevertheless, there are at least three types of races in which we might expect crossover voting to affect winning congressional candidates' policy positions. The first type is the open-seat race. In open seats, there are no incumbents, and so challengers have a real chance of winning. However, open seats often generate competition in both parties, and so voters may be reluctant to cross over if their own party's nomination is contested. The second type of race in which the blanket primary may matter is the contested-challenger primary. In such races, only one party is seriously contested, leaving members of the incumbent's party free to cross over into the challenger's primary. However, since challengers rarely beat incumbents in the general election, any effects on candidate positions in the primary are unlikely to translate into election outcomes in the general. The third type of race in which the blanket primary may matter is when a vulnerable incumbent faces a challenge from within his or her own party. These challenges are rare. When they do occur, they may signal to potential crossover voters that the seat is up for grabs and that their votes could matter.
Table 10.1 reports the primary election candidates, primary nominees (single asterisk), and general election winners (double asterisk) for each open seat, contested-challenger, and contested-incumbent race in 1998. I describe the results of these races in detail below.
Open Seats. There were four open House seats in 1998 due to incumbent retirements: Congressional District (CD) 1, CD 3, CD 34, and CD 36. In addition, three seats were filled in special elections in the spring of 1998 due to incumbent retirements or deaths, and although their occupants were listed on the ballot as incumbents, they were rematched with their primary competitors again in June (CD 9, CD 22, and CD 44). I refer to these races as "quasi-open" seats. I discuss these races in this section because
| District | Democratic Candidates | Ideology | Republican Candidates | Ideology |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C=conservative, I=incumbent, L=liberal, M=moderate. | ||||
| Nominees. | ||||
| Winners. | ||||
| Open and Quasi-Open Seats | ||||
| CD 1 | Mike Thompson[**] | M | Mark Luce[*] | — |
| Jim Hennefer | — | |||
| CD 3 | Sandy Dunn[*] | M | Barbara Alby | C |
| Bob Dean Kent | — | Doug Ose[**] | M | |
| CD 34 | Grace Napolitano[**] | L | Ed Perez[*] | — |
| James Casso | L | |||
| CD 36 | Janice Hahn[*] | — | Steve Kuykendall[**] | M |
| Rudy Svorinich | — | |||
| Susan Brooks | — | |||
| Robert Pegram | C | |||
| CD 9 | Barbara Lee[**] | L | ||
| CD 22 | Lois Capps[**] | M | Tom Bordonaro[*] | C |
| James Harrison | M | |||
| CD 44 | Ralph Waite[*] | — | Mary Bono[**] | C |
| CD 46 | Loretta Sanchez[**] | M | Robert Dornan[*] | C |
| Lisa Hughes | — | |||
| James Gray | M | |||
| Contested-Challenger Primaries | ||||
| CD 10 | Ellen Tauscher (I)[**] | M | Charles Ball[*] | M |
| Donald Amador | C | |||
| Gordon Blake | C | |||
| CD 15 | Dick Lane[*] | M | Tom Campbell (I)[**] | M |
| Connor Vlakancie | — | |||
| CD 17 | Sam Farr (I)[**] | M | Bill McCampbell[*] | M |
| Mark Cares | — | |||
| CD 20 | Cal Dooley (I)[**] | M | Devin Nunes | M |
| Cliff Unruh[*] | C | |||
| CD 24 | Brad Sherman (I)[**] | M | Randy Hoffman[*] | M |
| Joe Gelman | C | |||
| William Westmiller | C | |||
| Contested-Incumbent Primaries | ||||
| CD 41 | Eileen Ansari[*] | — | Jay Kim (I) | C |
| Gary Miller[**] | C | |||
| CD 43 | Mike Rayburn[*] | — | Ken Calvert (I)[**] | C |
| Joe Khoury | C | |||
| CD 45 | Patricia Neal[*] | L | Dana Rohrbacker (I)[**] | C |
| Charmayne Bohman | M | |||
As mentioned above, we expect little crossover voting in open seats when both parties compete for the nomination, since members of both parties will be concerned, first and foremost, with their own party's nomination. However, in 1998, only one of the eight open or quasi-open seats was contested by both parties, so crossover voting is a real possibility.
Of these eight open or quasi-open seats, moderate candidates were elected in five races.[14] In CD 1, moderate former State Senator Mike Thompson beat Jim Hennefer in the primary and Republican Mark Luce in the general. In CD 3, both parties nominated moderates, and Republican Doug Ose beat Democrat Sandy Dunn in the general. In CD 36, moderate Steve Kuykendall beat a field of three other Republicans for the nomination and defeated Democrat Janice Hahn in the general. In the Twenty-Second District, Democrat Lois Capps faced no primary opposition and defeated conservative Tom Bordonaro in the general. And moderate Democrat Loretta Sanchez beat conservative Republican Bob Dornan in CD 46. Extremist candidates were elected in three districts. In CD 34, liberal Democrats Grace Flores Napolitano and James Casso met in the primary, with Napolitano advancing to the general and easily defeating Republican Ed Perez. In CD 9 and CD 34, liberal Democrat Barbara Lee and conservative Republican Mary Bono, respectively, faced the same opponents they had defeated in special elections just months before and won easily. Hence, these open-seat races provide some preliminary support for the moderation hypothesis.
A closer look at the open-seat races, however, reveals that circumstances were ripe for crossover voting—sincere, hedging, or raiding—in only five races (CD 1, CD 22, CD 34, CD 36, and CD 46). In these five races, only one party held a contested primary. All five produced moderate general election winners, but only two produced moderate winners in the contested primary (Democrat Mike Thompson in CD 1 and Republican Steve Kuykendall in CD 36). The nomination and election of these moderates suggests that in these races there may have been substantial sincere crossover and hedging. Note, however, that other factors besides the blanket primary, including superior political experience, campaign resources, and key endorsements, also played important roles in all of these races.
Contested-Challenger Races. House incumbents are rarely challenged in the primary (in 1998, three House incumbents from California faced serious primary challenges from their own party—see below). The most common scenario is a contested primary to nominate the challenger. In these races, the outcome of the incumbent's primary is virtually certain and members of the incumbent's party are free to participate in the contested challenger's primary. We therefore expect any effects of crossover voting to manifest predominantly in the contested-challenger primaries. Of course, the outcome of these contested-challenger primaries rarely affects general election outcomes, since congressional incumbents are reelected at extremely high rates. Nevertheless, other less direct effects of crossover voting into the challenger's primary may still be felt in the general election, particularly if such crossover voting results in a challenger who can force the incumbent to address new issues or take new positions on old issues.
In the 1998 California primary, fourteen congressional races witnessed some competition in the challenger's party's primary. In three of these races, there was also significant intraparty competition in the incumbent's own primary. However, since challengers are virtually assured of losing in the general, these contested-challenger races rarely attract strong candidates with well-developed policy positions. Moreover, even if they have welldeveloped positions, challengers can rarely mobilize sufficient resources to run professional campaigns that effectively disseminate information about the candidate's positions to voters. This means that during the election, potential crossover voters have little information on which to base their voting decisions. After the election, analysts have little information with which to classify candidates' positions. Recognizing these information problems, I therefore focus on the contested-challenger primaries with "serious" candidates. I define these as races in which at least one candidate received at least 20 percent of the total primary vote. There were five such races in 1998.
Moderates were nominated in four of the five contested-challenger primaries with serious candidates. In two races, there was one candidate who was clearly moderate and two who were clearly conservative, and the moderate was nominated in both races. In the Republican primary in CD 10, relatively moderate Charles Ball defeated conservative primary challengers Donald Amador and Gordon Blake; in the Republican primary in CD 24, moderate Republican Randy Hoffman defeated conservatives Joe Gelman and William Westmiller. In the other two races, none of the challenger primary candidates were clearly liberal or conservative, and moderate candidates Dick Lane (CD 15 Democratic primary) and Bill McCampbell (CD 17 Republican primary) were nominated. Thus, in all four of these races, conditions were ripe for crossover voting, and moderate candidates were
Contested-Incumbent Races. Congressional incumbents rarely face challenges from within their own party. When they do, the challenge usually results from extraordinary circumstances such as the incumbent's involvement in a scandal. The three intraparty incumbent challenges in 1998 (CD 41, CD 43, and CD 45) are cases in point. In all three races, the conservative Republican incumbent was involved in a major personal or political scandal. In CD 41, incumbent Jay Kim was defeated by a conservative opponent Gary Miller. In CD 43, incumbent Ken Calvert prevailed over a conservative opponent, Joe Khoury. In CD 45, incumbent Dana Rohrbacker prevailed over his moderate opponent Charmayne Bohman. Due to the extraordinary circumstances in each of these races, however, I hesitate to generalize from these outcomes about the effects of the blanket primary.
State Assembly Races
The State Assembly races provide even more opportunities to analyze the effects of the blanket primary on candidate positions. Due to term limits, there were many open seats and contested races for State Assembly in 1998. This should translate into ample opportunities for studying all types of crossover voting.
Due to the lack of reliable information on candidate positions in some low-profile races, I again restrict my analysis to the contested Assembly primaries with "serious" candidates who received at least 20 percent of the total vote cast for all primary candidates. I was able to obtain information about the winning candidate in thirty-four of thirty-seven such races. For each race, I obtained information on the winning candidate's ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal); party (Democratic or Republican); type of race (open seat, challenger's party, incumbent's party); and district ideology (safe D, strong D, split, strong R, safe R).[15] For sixteen races, I was also able to identify the losing candidate's ideology.[16] I report these raw data for 1998 in table 10.2.
One advantage of analyzing the Assembly primaries is that there were a sufficient number of contested races to conduct statistical analyses to test the moderation and polarization hypotheses directly. To test whether the blanket primary resulted in more moderate or more extreme candidates, I need to compare the results in these races to the results in races with a
| District | Party | Race Type | Winner's Ideology | Second-Place Candidate's Ideology | Third-Place Candidate's Ideology | District Ideology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Safe R | |
| 3 | Rep. | Open | C | C | Safe R | |
| 4 | Rep. | Inc.'s party | C | Safe R | ||
| 5 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Safe R | |
| 7 | Dem. | Open | L | Strong D | ||
| 9 | Dem. | Open | L | L | Strong R | |
| 10 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Strong R | |
| 15 | Dem. | Chal.'s party | Strong R | |||
| 20 | Dem. | Open | M | Strong D | ||
| 20 | Rep. | Open | M | Strong D | ||
| 23 | Dem. | Inc.'s party | L | Safe D | ||
| 24 | Rep. | Inc.'s party | M | C | C | Strong R |
| 29 | Rep. | Open | C | M | Safe R | |
| 30 | Dem. | Chal.'s party | L | Split | ||
| 33 | Rep. | Open | M | Safe R | ||
| 35 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 35 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 37 | Rep. | Open | C | M | Safe R | |
| 47 | Dem. | Open | M | Safe D | ||
| 49 | Dem. | Open | M | L | L | Safe D |
| 50 | Dem. | Open | L | L | Safe D | |
| 53 | Dem. | Open | Split | |||
| 54 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 54 | Dem. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 55 | Dem. | Inc.'s party | M | Safe D | ||
| 57 | Dem. | Inc.'s party | L | Safe D | ||
| 60 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 61 | Rep. | Open | C | Split | ||
| 62 | Dem. | Open | Strong D | |||
| 65 | Rep. | Inc.'s party | C | Safe R | ||
| 67 | Rep. | Inc.'s party | C | M | Strong R | |
| 68 | Rep. | Open | C | M | Safe R | |
| 73 | Rep. | Open | C | C | Safe R | |
| 75 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Safe R | |
| 76 | Rep. | Chal.'s party | C | M | Strong D | |
| 78 | Rep. | Chal.'s party | M | Split |
Table 10.4 compares the percentage of contested Assembly primaries won by moderate candidates in 1996 (under the closed primary) and in 1998 (under the blanket primary). The first row shows that moderates won half of all contested primaries in 1998, compared to 37 percent in 1996. A one-tailed difference of proportions test produces a p-value of .12, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the proportions of moderate winners in the two elections are the same (or that the 1996 proportion is higher) with 88 percent confidence. A two-tailed difference of proportions test produces a p-value of .24. While these tests fail to achieve the standard 95 percent level of confidence, due largely to the small number of races in both election years (forty-one in 1996, thirty-four in 1998), they do indicate some support for the moderation hypothesis.
To test the robustness of the moderation effect, subsequent rows in table 10.4 break down the races in a number of ways. We see that the percentage of open-seat and challenger party primaries won by moderates is higher in 1998. Both moderate (i.e., less liberal) Democrats and moderate (i.e., less conservative) Republicans were more likely to win in 1998. These results are starker when the winner faced an extreme challenger and when voters in the district were moderate.
These comparisons indicate that, while the moderation effect holds across the various subsamples of races, there are also important differences in the overall level of candidate moderation in the different races. In other words, factors such as race type, party, presence of an extreme challenger, and district ideology appear to affect the probability that moderates will be nominated, independent of the effect of the blanket primary. To test this more complete model of candidate policy positions, I ran a multivariate logistic regression analysis. Table 10.5 reports the results of this analysis. The dependent variable is whether or not a moderate was elected in each race. The logit coefficients report the effect of each independent variable on the log of the odds ratio, that is, on the log of the ratio of the probabilities that a moderate candidate is and is not nominated.
The logit coefficients in column 2 (Model 1) show that once we control for the other factors that affect the probability of nominating a moderate
| District | Party | Race Type | Winner's Ideology | Second-Place Candidate's Ideology | Third-Place Candidate's Ideology | District Ideology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dem. | Open | L | M | L | Split |
| 1 | Rep. | Open | M | M | Split | |
| 4 | Rep. | Open | C | Safe R | ||
| 8 | Dem. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 8 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 9 | Dem. | Open | L | M | Safe D | |
| 11 | Dem. | Open | L | Safe D | ||
| 14 | Dem. | Open | L | L | L | Safe D |
| 15 | Rep. | Open | C | M | Strong R | |
| 16 | Dem. | Open | M | L | Safe D | |
| 19 | Dem. | Open | L | M | Safe D | |
| 22 | Dem. | Open | M | Strong D | ||
| 22 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Strong D | |
| 23 | Dem. | Open | L | M | L | Safe D |
| 26 | Dem. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 27 | Dem. | Open | L | Strong D | ||
| 27 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Strong D | |
| 28 | Rep. | Chal Open | C | M | Safe R | |
| 47 | Dem. | Open | M | Safe D | ||
| 49 | Dem. | Open | M | L | Safe D | |
| 50 | Dem. | Open | L | Safe D | ||
| 53 | Dem. | Open | Split | |||
| 54 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 54 | Dem. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 55 | Dem. | Inc.'s party | M | Safe D | ||
| 57 | Dem. | Inc.'s party | L | Safe D | ||
| 60 | Rep. | Open | M | Split | ||
| 61 | Rep. | Open | C | Split | ||
| 62 | Dem. | Open | Strong D | |||
| 65 | Rep. | Inc.'s party | C | Safe R | ||
| 67 | Rep. | Inc.'s party | C | M | Strong R | |
| 68 | Rep. | Open | C | Safe R | ||
| 73 | Rep. | Open | C | Safe R | ||
| 75 | Rep. | Open | M | C | Safe R | |
| 76 | Rep. | Chal.'s party | C | M | Strong D | |
| 78 | Rep. | Chal.'s party | M | Split |
| 1996 | 1998 | p<z (1-tailed) | p<|z| (2-tailed) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average value lower in 1998; hence 1-tailed test is p > z. | ||||
| All | 37% | 50% | .12 | .24 |
| Open | 41 | 58 | .10 | .20 |
| Challenger's party | 25 | 33 | .40 | .81 |
| Democrats | 32 | 46 | .20 | .40 |
| Republicans | 41 | 52 | .23 | .45 |
| Extreme challenger | 42 | 60 | .18 | .36 |
| Moderate district | 48 | 63 | .18 | .36 |
| Vote margin (VM) | 18.66 | 21.03 | .26 | .52 |
| VM—Open seats[a] | 18.65 | 16.31 | .28 | .56 |
| VM—Challenger's party [a] | 21.25 | 16.25 | .29 | .59 |
| No. of candidates[a] | 3.61 | 3.51 | .40 | .80 |
| No. of candidates—Open seats[a] | 3.88 | 3.88 | .50 | 1.00 |
| No. of candidates—Challenger's party[a] | 2.25 | 2.00 | .31 | .62 |
| Independent Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. | |||
| p < .10, 1-tailed test | |||
| p < .05, 1-tailed test | |||
| Blanket | 1.02[**] | 0.99[**] | 0.45 |
| (0.54) | (0.54) | (0.83) | |
| Open seat | 1.67[**] | 1.74[**] | 1.20 |
| (0.69) | (0.70) | (1.24) | |
| Moderate district | 1.49[**] | 1.46[**] | 1.53 |
| (0.55) | (0.56) | (0.89) | |
| Democrats | −0.39 | −1.73[**] | |
| (0.54) | (0.89) | ||
| Extreme challenger | 2.23[**] | ||
| (0.98) | |||
| Constant | −2.92[**] | −2.78[**] | −3.59[**] |
| (0.86) | (0.88) | (1.47) | |
| Pseudo-R2 | .13 | .14 | .26 |
| N | 75 | 75 | 46 |
Model 2 adds a dummy variable scored 1 if the race is a Democratic primary and scored 0 otherwise. The negative coefficient is small relative to the other estimated effects and not significant. Thus, once we control for primary type, race type, and district ideology, Democrats are no more likely to elect moderates than Republicans. Finally, Model 3 adds a dummy variable indicating whether the winner faced an extreme challenger. The coefficient on the extreme challenger variable is positive and significant, indicating that moderates are more successful when they face extreme challengers.[18] Inclusion of the extreme challenger variable increases the size and significance of the Democratic primary dummy. However, it also decreases the size and significance of the blanket primary variable. Further research, perhaps analysis of elections in other blanket primary states, is necessary to determine whether these effects are due to limited observations or some other considerations.[19]
Since logit coefficients express the estimated effect of each explanatory variable on the log of the odds ratio, they are difficult to interpret on their own. Therefore, it is common to report how the independent variables of interest affect the predicted probabilities of the event (in this case, of nominating a moderate candidate), holding constant the values of the other independent variables. I therefore convert the coefficients from column 2 into predicted probabilities. Table 10.6 reports the predicted probabilities of nominating moderates associated with closed and blanket primaries, under various combinations of race type and district ideology.
The main finding from table 10.6 is that for all combinations of race type and district ideology, the probability of nominating a moderate candidate is higher under the blanket primary. In the least favorable setting—when there is an incumbent running and the district is safe Democratic or safe Republican—the probability of nominating a moderate increases from .05 under a closed primary to .13 under a blanket primary. In the most favorable setting—where the race is an open seat and the district ideology is moderate—the probability of nominating a moderate increases from .56 under a closed primary to .78 under a blanket primary.
| Blanket | Open Seat | Moderate District | Z | P |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | −2.92 | .05 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | −1.43 | .19 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | −1.25 | .22 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.24 | .56 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | −1.90 | .13 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | −0.41 | .40 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | −0.23 | .44 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.26 | .78 |