CROSSOVER VOTING: WHAT WE EXPECT
We consider three possible reasons behind crossover voting. These reasons correspond to the three motivations for crossover voting discussed in the introduction to this volume. First, as an example of sincere crossover voting, voters may cross party lines to support an incumbent when one is on the ballot. This is a form of sincere crossover voting in the sense that the voter prefers the incumbent to the other candidates by virtue of the former's incumbency status. We may attribute this preference to available information: incumbents enjoy a strong advantage in name recognition (Jacobson 1992), particularly in local and district-level contests. This factor might play an especially large role in a blanket primary, as voters who are faced with a long list of candidates might simply gravitate to the most recognizable name. By and large, incumbents also have more money and more avenues through which to communicate with the voters, and (if they are popular) they are likely to have supporters among nonpartisans and members of the other party. For these reasons, we expect to see large numbers of voters crossing party lines to vote for incumbents.
Electoral competition may suffer as a result of such behavior. Opponents of the blanket primary argued that the new system would greatly benefit incumbents. To the extent that voters engage in this sort of crossover voting, incumbents draw votes not only from supporters in their own party but also from any other voters who might approve of their performance, or who simply recognize their names. Meanwhile, candidates challenging incumbents for a nomination could rarely hope to match that influx of votes from outside their party. We expect that incumbents, when challenged, will receive the vast majority of all the crossover votes cast in the race.
A second hypothesized reason behind crossover voting is that voters might be drawn to where the action is: they might cross party lines to vote in competitive nomination fights whenever their own party offers an uncontested or noncompetitive race. This voting would not necessarily be sincere, as their most preferred candidate might still be the one running unopposed in their own party, but the chance to cast a meaningful or even decisive vote in the competitive race could provide enough incentive to make them cross (Downs 1957). In the language of the introductory chapter, these voters are engaging in strategic hedging. Such voting could also be inspired by a heavier flow of campaign information emanating from the close races, which usually produce more advertising and more news stories—thus making more information available. Information leads to participation:
In a more general way, a lopsided flow of information could spur crossover voting among registered partisans who live in districts dominated by the other party. These voters would likely be exposed to a steady stream of political information from the other party—and the blanket primary would now give them a chance to act on it. We expect to see them do so.
Under a blanket primary system, voters also have the chance to use their votes in a malicious way: they could try raiding into another party in an attempt to sabotage outcomes there. This is the third possible motive behind crossover voting that we consider. Registered members of one party can, conceivably, study the other party's candidates and try to pick out the weakest one—that is, the one with the least chance of winning the general election. These partisans could then cross party lines in the primary and vote for that weak candidate in an attempt to throw the nomination to her. If they prove successful, then their own party's candidate would face that weaker nominee in November.
Although it represents an insincere vote choice, such strategic behavior might sound like an irresistible, even ingenious, idea for party loyalists. Indeed, many opponents of the blanket primary feared that this type of sabotage would unfairly swing some election results. Yet we expect that raiding in a blanket primary system will be very rare. First, the amount of political knowledge required to engage in such behavior is very high, and probably beyond the level of most voters. It would involve not only learning about candidates in the other party, but also making savvy predictions about their long-term fortunes. Second, without a massive and coordinated effort from thousands of voters, any single person considering a raiding strategy would probably come to see it as a wasted vote. If she did not fully anticipate like-minded fellow partisans acting in concert, then her vote would be squandered on a weak candidate from another party who was probably certain to lose.