Preferred Citation: Fritsche, Johannes. Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's Being and Time. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1999 1999. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft5k4006n2/


 
Notes

6 Epilogue

1. See above, pp. 150f.

2. Karl Löwith, "My last Meeting with Heidegger," in Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader , 142; see also MH 158; K. Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933: Ein Bericht , 57.

3. Löwith, "My last Meeting with Heidegger," 142 (MH 158; German edition, 57). Löwith goes on:

He had underestimated only two things: the vitality of the Christian churches and the obstacles to the Anschluss with Austria. He was convinced now as before that National Socialism was the right course for Germany; one had only to "hold out" long enough. The only aspect that troubled him was the ceaseless "organization" at the expense of "vital forces." He failed to notice the destructive radicalism of the whole movement and the petty bourgeois character of all its ''power-through-Joy" institutions, because he himself was a radical petit bourgeois.

In response to my remark that there were many things about his attitude I could understand, with one exception, viz., how he could sit at the same table (at the Academy of German Law) with someone like J. Streicher, he remained silent at first. Then, somewhat uncomfortably followed the justification . . . that things would have been "much worse" if at least a few intelligent persons [ Wissenden ] hadn't become involved. And with bitter resentment against the intelligentsia {"Gebildeten"} he concluded his explanation: "If these gentlemen hadn't been too refined to get involved, then everything would be different; but, instead, now I'm entirely alone {aber ich stand ja ganz allein}." To my response that one didn't have to be especially "refined" in order to renounce working with someone like Streicher, he answered: one need not waste words over Streicher, Der Stürmer was nothing more than pornography. He couldn't understand why Hitler didn't get rid of this guy—he must be afraid of him.

These responses were typical, for nothing was easier for the Germans than to be radical when it came to ideas and indifferent in practical facts. They manage to ignore all individual Fakta , in order to be able to cling all the more decisively to their concept of the whole and to separate "matters of fact" from "persons." In truth, the program of "pornography" [e.g., embodied in anti-Semitic publications such as Der Stürmer ] was fulfilled and became a German reality in November 1938; and no one can deny that Streicher and Hitler were in agreement on this matter. (Karl Löwith, "My last meeting with Heidegger," 142f.; MH 158f.; German edition, 57f.)

The English translation («but, instead, now I'm entirely alone») sounds as though Heidegger said that initially he had allies among «these gentlemen.» However, in the German text he said that he was alone from the beginning on. In German, there is a strong difference between «die Intelligentsia» (or «die Intelligentzia») and «die Gebildeten.» The former word is a polemical term used by conservatives or right-wingers to denote left-wing—or just liberal—intellectuals and «wurzellose,» rootless, Asphalt-Literaten and artists; in 1936, all of them had already been exiled or silenced. The latter word, however, refers to bourgeois individuals educated in the humanities, most notably, in the culture of antiquity and that of Goethe and his time. (This distinction of course does not imply that an «Intelligenzler» cannot be educated in the humanities, or it implies that only for conservatives or right-wingers.) Heidegger is polemicizing against the members of the «humanistic culture,» or against humanism, as he did throughout his career. The word Hitler uses, «Intelligenz» (see above, p. 82), is neutral toward that distinction.

Both English translators point out that Julius Streicher (1885-1946) was a notorious National Socialist demagogue and politician, who was the founder and editor of the rabidly anti-Semitic periodical Der Stüirmer , and that Löwith's allusion to November 1938 must be a reference to the so-called «Kristallnacht,» the «Crystal night,» 9 November 1938, the night in which synagogues were burned, the windows of Jewish businesses were shattered (the broken glass giving that night its name), Jews were killed, and thousands of Jews were sent to concentration camps.

In retrospect, Karl Löwith characterized Heidegger's clothing in the twenties as a picture-puzzle: «a kind of Black Forest farmers jacket with broad lapels and a semi-militaristic collar, and knee-length breeches, both made from dark-brown cloth—a "one's ownmost" style of dress, which was supposed to antagonize the 'they' and amused us then, but at that time we did not recognize it as a peculiar temporary compromise between the conventional suit and the uniform of the SA» ( My Life in Germany , 45; Mein Leben in Deutschland , 43).

4. See below, this chapter, n. 5.

5. The title of Gadamer's essay ("Superficiality and Ignorance: On Farías' Publication"; in German "Oberflächlichkeit und Ignoranz: über Victor Farías Buch") was chosen by the German editors, Kettering and Neske, of the German edition of MH in 1988 (MH 141). It is somewhat misleading insofar as it implies that the essay is dealing with Farías's book. However, the essay is not about Farías's book but about its reception in France and about Heidegger. According to Altwegg, it was originally published in Le Nouvel Observateur , 22 January 1988, as ''Comme Platon à Syracuse" (J. Altwegg, ed., Die Heidegger Kontroverse [Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1988], 246). Altwegg himself published Gadamer's essay under the title "Zurück von Syrakus?" (ibid., 176), that is, the famous «Back from Syracuse?» mentioned by Gadamer (MH 143) with which one colleague greeted Heidegger when he met the latter for the first time after Heidegger had resigned from the rectorate.

It doesn't come as a surprise that Birmingham doesn't quote Löwith at all. Guignon quotes from Löwith's entire account twice just the phrase «his concept of historicity was the basis for his political engagement» (HC 131, 141; see above, pp. 150 and 151), and doesn't comment on the notions. Wolin finds Heidegger's claim «far from unambiguous» (PB 75) in order thereupon to summarize his interpretation, and in order «once again» to find «a tantalizing contradiction» (PB 76), namely, the one between Being and Time's neutral formalism, conformism, and the presence of components of the conservative revolutionary worldview. However, Löwith as well as Hei- degger definitely meant something more simple than in Wolin's interpretation and less general than in Guignon's. For Löwith would not have used the formulations «im Wesen seiner Philosophie» («in the essence of his philosophy») and «stimmte mir ohne Vorbehalt zu» («agreed with me without reservation»), if Heidegger had answered something that amounted to Wolin's interpretation of historicality in Heidegger. Furthermore, someone who stumbled into all this just due to his strongly conservative attitudes, and who soon became disappointed, (or a disappointed opportunist, if this is not a contradiction in itself) would not have politicized the way Heidegger did in Rome, especially if he regarded himself to be the only one of his milieu (see this chapter, n. 3; he could have remained opportunistic in regard to his peer group). Löwith as well as Heidegger definitely meant more than Guignon reads out of their words, otherwise Löwith would not have spoken about «in seinem Wesen,» «stimmte mir ohne Vorbehalt zu,» and «Grundlage» («basis»). For if Being and Time just formulates the context of all possible decisions and is neutral toward each of them, none of these possible decisions lies in the «Wesen» («essence») of Being and Time . Rather, each of them would be accidental to Being and Time , precisely because the essence of Being and Time does not allow to prescribe or privilege any of them. Furthermore, most of the time—and definitely in an affirmative answer to a question framed in terms of the «essence»—the word «Grundlage» means more than a neutral basis on which one can built whatever one likes. A Grundlage is laid for a specific purpose. For instance, a foundation of a building is laid for building one particular house, and not any other. Or, conversely, on a given foundation one cannot erect just any kind of house. In a text published in 1934, in which he explicates the National Socialist understanding of state, people, and the National Socialist movement, and in which he rejects all efforts to interpret the so-called Ermäichtigungsgesetz, Enabling Act, of 23 March 1933 within the framework of the constitution of the Weimar Republic, Carl Schmitt argues that to interpret the Ermächtigungsgesetz in terms of the Weimar constitution means not to realize the fact «that the law of the present National Socialist state does not rest on a basis {Grundlage} that is alien and hostile toward its essence {wesensfremden und wesensfeindlichen}, but rather on its own basis {Grundlage}» ( Staat, Volk, Bewegung [Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934], 7). The fact that the preliminary constitution of 23 March 1933 was passed legally, namely, according to Article 76 of the constitution of the Weimar Republic, «does not mean that one is justified today in regarding the Weimar constitution as the basis {Grundlage} of the present state {Staatswesens}; rather it merely means that {the Ermächtigungsgesetz} represents a bridge from the old state to the new state, from the old basis {Grundlage} to the new basis {Grundlage}» (ibid., 7f.). Also, in 1925 Hitler said that «when not even memory will reveal the names of the entire present-day state conception and its advocates, the fundamentals {die Grundlagen} of the National Socialist program will be the foundations {Fundamente} of a coming state» (MKe 369; MK 404).

6. Maybe, there was not much of a need to conceal a general rightist tendency. After all, a «great philosopher» might enjoy some privileges, especially since many professors and students shared an indifference toward and ignorance of politics and opposition against liberalism and leftist ideas. (In his report on his life in Germany, written in 1940, Karl Löwith writes about the years prior to 1933: «I was indifferent to the political situation, and for years I did not even read a newspaper. It was only much later that I became aware of the growing threat from Hitler's movement. I was innocent {ahnungslos} about politics as were most of my colleagues» [Löwith, My Life in Germany , 69; German edition, 66].) However, concealment was probably required in the case of the more specific option for National Socialism. It could be significant in this context that Heidegger's English translators translated «erwidert» as though it were followed by a dative. After all, there is a sense of «erwidern» with the accusative which comes close to «erwidern» with the dative (see above, chapter I, sections B, C, and D); and, on a first reading, the context itself seems to suggest the dative. Heidegger never gave a seminar on Division Two of Being and Time ; section 74 is close to the end of the book; the attitude of many students was—as even Hans Jonas, by no means a minor figure in the philosophy of this century, put it in his recollection "Heidegger's Resoluteness and Resolve"—«I don't understand it, but that must be it» (MH 198; Jonas is asked: «But what is the connection between these two components, the magnificent thinker and teacher Heidegger and the chauvinist, who came out of his hiding place in 1933? Or were these components always connected subterraneously?» He answers: «Yes, one must say the latter. But it took a long time for me to realize it. In 1933, when he gave that infamous rectorial address, justifiably called treacherous in a philosophical sense and actually deeply shameful for philosophy, I was simply appalled and spoke with friends about it and said: "That from Heidegger, the most important thinker of our time." Whereupon I heard the reply: "Why are you so surprised? It was hidden in there. Somehow it could already be inferred from his way of thinking." That was when I realized, for the first time, certain traits in Heidegger' s thinking and I hit myself on the forehead and said: "Yes, I missed something there before"» [MH 200f.]). Perhaps Heidegger wrote section 74 intentionally in such a way that on a somewhat careless reading it could be read in as many ways as there are senses of «erwidern,» and that each could take out of it whatever he or she liked. As an expert on the history of categories, Heidegger, of course, was aware that the commentators in late antiquity wondered why, in Categories , Aristotle maintained that individual substances were primary substances whereas in some of his other writings Aristotle regarded the forms as common natures to be primary substances. The commentators' answer was that Categories was written for beginners and that for us the individual substances were first substances. Progressing in philosophy, talented students would recognize that, by nature, the common natures had priority over the individual substances (see, for instance, Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium , ed. A. Busse, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , vol. 13.1 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1897], 34.16ff.). In a similar way, Heidegger may have meant the passage on «erwidert» as a shibboleth. Arriving at the section on historicality, readers have finally reached the most «primordial» (BT 424; SZ 372) level of interpreting Dasein. For those who are able to read and listen, via the accusative «diese Möglichkeit» (SZ 386; «this possibility,» BT 438) behind the tortured, alienated, and often lonesome Daseine of the sections 1-71 there steps out of the «obscure» (BT 424: «Dunkel,» SZ 372) das Volk and das Völkische and presents itself as the one and only substance of the individual Daseine that will redeem them. Those who regard this suggestion as infamous should keep in mind that, given his love for the Greeks, Heidegger might have had reasons to adopt techniques of initiation from antiquity in his pedagogy; Löwith characterizes Heidegger's style in lectures in the following way: «His lecturing method consisted in constructing an edifice of ideas, which he himself then dismantled again so as to baffle fascinated listeners, only to leave them up in the air. This art of enchantment sometimes had the most disturbing effects in that it attracted more or less psychopathic personalities, and one female student committed suicide three years after such guessing games» ( My Life in Germany , 45; Mein Leben in Deutschland , 43; the English translation might sound as though the student committed suicide three years after she stopped taking courses with Heidegger; in the German, however, he says that she committed suicide at the end of the three years of courses with Heidegger). Furthermore, Heidegger himself interpreted his rectorate speech that way. For by saying, «I did not name Military Service {"Wehrdienst"} in either a militaristic or an aggressive sense but understood it as defense in self-defense {Wehr in der Notwehr}» ("The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," MH 20; SB 27), he probably does not deny that several or even all of his listeners related this to the National Socialist «Aufbruch,» and did not understand it as a «Wehr in der Notwehr.» Heidegger wrote the text in 1945 and later gave it to his son, Hermann Heidegger, who published it in 1983 along with the Rectorate Address (see MH 4, SB 6).

The talented students join their master to form the invisible church of those Daseine that are « authentically { themselves } in the primordial individualization of the reticent resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself» (BT 369; SZ 322), and whose «reticence» (BT 318; SZ 273) has been stressed throughout the section on conscience as a characteristic of authentic Dasein in contrast to the idle talk that passes among ordinary and inauthentic Dasein (BT 434; SZ 382). The talented students then wait for the situation to unconceal themselves and to turn the heads of the fallen Daseine. According to Caputo ( Demythologizing Heidegger , 52f.), it was in his lecture course of 1929-30, Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt Endlichkeit Einsamkeit that Heidegger became explicit, and it was in that same lecture that Heidegger quite clearly stated that the task of philosophy was to produce a «Grundstimmung» (GA 29/30 [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992], 89ff.), a basic, fundamental, or original mood. In this way, Being and Time might be a picture-puzzle: everything is already there and becomes visible when the situation is ripe.

7. "The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader , 38 (see MH 13; SB 19). Note the use of «Schein» («pseudo») (see above, pp. 200ff.). «Fuge» will become important for Heidegger. In his interpretation of Anaximander, he does not use «In den Fugen krachen» but rather «aus den Fugen sein»: «The word inline image immediately suggests that inline image is absent. We are accustomed to translate inline image as "right." The translations even use "penalties" to translate "right." If we resist our own juridical-moral notions, if we restrict ourselves to what comes to language, then we hear that wherever inline image rules all is not right with things {nicht mit rechten Dingen zugeht}. That means, something is out of joint {etwas ist aus den Fugen}. . . . How can what is present without jointure {ohne Fuge} be inline image , out of joint? . . . That which lingers perseveres in its presencing. In this way it extricates itself from its transitory while. It strikes the willful pose of persistence {Es spreizt sich in den Eigensinn des Beharrens auf}, no longer concerning itself with whatever else is present. It stiffens—as if this were the way to linger—and aims solely for continuance and subsistence. . . . What is present then comes to presence without, and in opposition to, the jointure of the while {ohne und gegen die Fuge der Weile}» (Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy , trans. D. F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi [San Francisco: Harper, 1984], 41-43; Holzwege , 326-328). As the Greek alpha-privativum, the German prefix «un-» is used to indicate the privation of something. As Heidegger notes ( Early Greek Thinking , 46; Holzwege , 332), the German word «Unfug» most of the time, if not always, is used in the sense of «nonsense.» Still, Heidegger uses it to translate inline image in Anaximander's fragment: «they let order belong, and thereby also reck {Ruch}, to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder {Un-Fugs}» ( Early Greek Thinking , 47; Holzwege , 333).

8. See ''The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 38; see also MH 11.

9. On «sich überliefern» see above, pp. 16ff.

10. "The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 38 (see MH 13; SB 19).

11. See above, p. 66, and chapter 3, n. 25.

12. "The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Wolin (ed.), The Heidegger Controversy , 38 (see MH 13; SB 19).

13. Ibid., 38; see MH 13; SB 19.

14. Ibid., 39; see MH 13; SB 19.

15. «Wir waren alle verblendet» («We all have been deluded») is what many Germans of Heidegger's generation say when asked about their experiences concerning National Socialism. Of course, as to the German professors in the twenties there were—to continue the somewhat floppy way of speaking—in addition to the «absentminded professors» and those whom I labeled the «non-absentminded» professors also liberals and/or social democratic professors. As to philosophers (also) concerned with Plato, the liberals and/or social democrats were represented by the Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. They focused on the theory of science and knowledge in Plato. The main representative of the non-absentminded professors was Werner Jaeger (before he left Germany in 1936). Unlike the Neo-Kantians, the non-absentminded professors focused on Plato's Republic as the countermodel to the Athenian democracy and to the Weimar Republic, and they paved the way for National Socialism. In his Platons Staat und Hitlers Kampf (Plato's State and Hitler's Kampf) (Berlin 1933), Joachim Bannes even explicitly parallels Plato and Hitler. Hitler is the repetition of the gewesene Plato, this time successfully. The basic motif is identical with Heidegger's. In liberalism and in the Weimar Republic, people have fallen away from Gemeinschaft. Living in Gesellschaft, the Neo-Kantians have distorted and covered up the «true» Plato. Looking through the work of ambiguity of the Neo-Kantians, the non-absentminded professors realize that Plato is not vergangen, but rather gewesen, and that Hitler will repeat the «true» Plato by destroying Gesellschaft and by rerealizing Gemeinschaft. In the last sentence of the Rectorate Address , Heidegger also caters to these non-absentminded professors and declares their victory in their and his Auseinandersetzung with the Neo-Kantians. On the German non-absentminded Platonists of that time see T. Orozco, Platonische Gewalt: Gadamers politische Hermeneutik der NS-Zeit (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 1995), 32-90. In his short chapter on Plato in The Myth of the State (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1946, reprint 1979), the Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer, who had to emigrate from Germany in 1933, mentions this contrast briefly (ibid., 62). His interpretation of Plato as «the founder and the first defender of the Idea of the Legal State» (ibid., 65) is also an implicit Erwiderung to the Plato of the non-absentminded professors.

16. See above, p. 12.

17. Aristotle, Categories , ch. 1, 1 a 14.

18. Metaphysics IV:2, 1003 a 33ff. Since Gwil E. L. Owen ("Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle," I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen, editors, Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century [Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960], 163-190; reprint in Owen's Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986], 180-199) Aristotle's notion of inline image is called «focal meaning.» Heidegger takes advantage of the rhetorical possibilities of the notion of focal meaning when he speaks of «us» «als Kämpfer dieses Kampfes» (see above, chapter 5, n.1), fighters in this fight, «as the warriors in this struggle» (see above, p. 189).

19. In marriage, wife and husband are united also im Fleische, in the flesh, as the ultimate subject in which we are here on earth. The flesh is ennobled by the Geist in it, as our human Geist is ennobled by the presence of the divine Spirit in it. Thus, divine Geist, human Geist, and Fleisch are related, so to speak, like Volk, Gemeinschaft, and Gesellschaft. Volk inspires Gemeinschaft. The result of their union, the Volksgemeinschaft, in turn inspires the Gesellschaft to liberate it from all its supposed foes and to transform it into a proper manifestation of the Volksgemeinschaft.

20. For these reasons, one says someone commits an extraordinary deed «in stür-mischer Leidenschaft,» in stormy passion, but one does not say, «in windhafter/windischer Leidenschaft» or «im Wind seiner Leidenschaft.» For the same reasons and also because «Wind» can be used in the sense of «Furz» (fart), it would have been ridiculous, a slip of the tongue, truly «deconstructionist,» or a subversive joke, if in the presence of the Sturm Abteilung (see what follows above) Heidegger had concluded his speech with saying, «All that is great stands in the wind.»

21. Aristotle, Categories , ch. 1, 1 a 20ff.

22. As is known, the sentence in Republic 497 d 8-10 comes toward the end of the sixth book. The ideal city has been developed. Socrates maintains that only this city as developed in the first books is the appropriate one for philosophers. He then points out that no city nor any constitution or individual will be good unless there arises a necessity for the philosophers to take care of the city and to impregnate it with true philosophy and that the realization of the ideal city is not impossible. This is followed by the theory of the idea of the good and the similes of the sun and the line and, in the seventh book, by the simile of the cave and the theory of education of the philosophers.

23. See the accounts and analyses of Heidegger's becoming Rektor and the Rectorate Address in Farías, Heidegger and Nazism , 72ff., German edition, 131ff.; and Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life , 133ff., German edition, 131ff.; for the "Horst-Wessel-Lied" see Ott, ibid., 152, German edition, 149.

24. Can Heidegger have been unaware of the fact that his choice of the quote and its peculiar translation not only invited the, so to speak, regular extreme National Socialists such as my relative, but also, and especially, had to be understood as the subjugation to the extremely extreme National Socialists, namely to the members of the SA and to their vanguard, the editors and readers of the widespread journal that, according to his statement in Rome 1936, he regarded to be pornography (see this chapter, n. 3)? Deconstructionists might say that Heidegger meant that the university is «im Sturm» of National Socialism as in a danger against which it had to defend itself, and/or that precisely by falsely translating Plato he was able to implicitly point toward the obscureness of National Socialism. In German, rather colloquially one might erwidern, «wer's glaubt, wird selig» (You can tell that to the marines). See also the «buoyant storm» (IM 113; EM 86, «beflügelnder Sturm,» literally: a storm that gives one wings [and thus enables one to fly, not against, but rather with the storm]) that a «truly sapient man» —that is, the poet, the thinker, and the statesman; Hölderlin, Heidegger, and Hitler—has experienced on the path of being (see also above, chapter 3, n. 14). In his interpretation of amor fati, love of fate, in Nietzsche, Heidegger has nicely pointed out the emotional benefit the Right promised to all those it called upon to submit to fate. It is the transformation of need and desperation into love and enjoyment. We move into fate, because we are forced to open ourselves to it, to be de-cided upon as «one who is ever resolute {als Entschiedener}» ( Eternal Recurrence of the Same , 207; Nietzsche I 471; for the passive see above, p. 5), such that fate enters us, is within us, and rewards us with love and joy. In this section I have pointed out the enthusiastic quality of many occurrences of the German preposition and prefix «in,» which led Heidegger to his peculiar translation of line 497 d 9 in Plato's Republic . In the course of the book, the enthusiasm of the preposition «in» has already occurred several times. Scheler alludes to it by placing «in» into quotation marks in his elaboration on the notion of the highest community, the love-community (see above, p. 98). Heidegger draws on it when, in the winter of 1934-35, he replaces the line «and are able to hear from (of) each other» in Hölderlin with «we are placed into and at the mercy of the being as it reveals itself» (see above, p. 195). In the speech "The University in the National Socialist State" on 30 November 1933, he says: «We of today are in the process of fighting to bring about the new reality» (see above, p. 189). The emphatic use of «in» is also present in Heidegger's formulas «in collecting» (see above, p. 200 with n. 36 of chapter 5, «Advent») and «active in Logos» (see above, p. 202). Its soteriological quality is extensively exploited in the passage on sacrifice in "What is Metaphysics?" (see above, chapter 5, n. 54). See also his obituary on Scheler above, p. 146. Indeed, in this perspective also the preposition «in» in Heidegger's formula of «Vorlaufen in den Tod» (running forward into death) has enthusiastic aspects. See also the frequent occurrences of «in» in section 74 (to quote just a few, «to take over in its thrownness that entity which,» «The situation is one which has been resolved upon {Entschluß in die Situation},» «Existing fatefully in the resoluteness which hands itself down,» see above, chapter 1, n. 10, «the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness,» «brings Dasein into the {in die} simplicity of its fate ,» «Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free,» BT 434ff.; SZ 382ff.; though, of course the section also includes nonenthusiastic uses of «in»). It is always the same situation. Dasein has fallen away from, or out of, the origin. Thus, Dasein has to move back into the origin when the latter raises its voice to claim its proper rerealization. Through obeying the call of the origin, Dasein has become authentic and is already back in the origin even though the origin is not yet fully realized. (In the forties it is «essential thinking» that is already «in the indestructible» even though the latter will be fully realized only in a remote future; see my paper "On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger," 150, «das schon vorausgesprungene Stehen im Unzerstörbaren,» «the standing in the indestructible»; this standing has achieved itself by already leaping ahead into the realm of the indestructible.) In summer 1931—that is, after his lecture course Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (see above, this chapter, n. 6)—Heidegger gave a lecture course on book IX, chapters 1-3, of Aristotle's Metaphysics . In German, there is the adjective «imstande.» It means «to be capable of, to be able to.» In some contexts it has a somewhat aggressive or threatening overtone («I am imstande to beat up this person, if he doesn't return the money within the next twenty-four hours.»). However, it can also convey enthusiasm («I am imstande to embrace the world—just out of sheer happiness!»). Heidegger resolves the adjective «imstande» into its components and thus has another formula of enthusiasm and inspiration, namely, «im Stand sein zu.» One who is im Stand is so because he is, or has, his Stehen im (the indestructible, authenticity, origin, etc.; see above in this note; see, however, also chapter 5, n. 10). Heidegger's interpretation artfully culminates in an interpretation of lines 1047 a 24-26. As he points out, normally these lines have been taken as the definition of the notion of the possible: possible is that whose realization doesn't entail something impossible; i.e., it does not entail a contradiction. Heidegger derides this interpretation as a typical example of the way philosophy professors read. He himself illustrates his own interpretation with reference to a runner waiting for the call at the starting line:

Let us consider a sprinter who, for example, has (as we say) taken his or her mark {angetreten ist} in a hundred-meter race just before the start. What do we see? . . . Face and glance do not fall dreamily to the ground, nor do they wander from one thing to another; rather they are tensely focused on the track ahead, so that it looks as though the entire stance is stretched out towards what lies before it {sind gespannt in die Bahn nach vorn gehalten, so daß es so aussieht, als sei diese ganze Haltung von dem her, was da vorne liegt, gestrafft}. No, it not only looks this way, it is so . . . he is poised for the start {Er ist im Stand loszulaufen}. The only thing needed is the call "go ? {des Rufes "los!"}. Just this call and he is already off running {im Lauf}, hitting his stride, that is, in enactment {d.h. im Vollzug }. . . . The one who enacts is just that one who leaves nothing undone in relation to his capability, for whom there is now in the running actually nothing more of which he is capable {für den es jetzt im Laufen wirklich nichts mehr gibt, was er nicht vermag}. This, of course, is then the case only if the one who is capable comes to the running in full readiness, if in this readiness he extends himself fully {in der vollen Bereitschaft zum Laufen antritt, sich in dieser Bereitschaft voll aushreitet}. But this implies that he is then genuinely in a position to run {im Stande zu laufen} only if he is in good condition, completely poised, in full readiness {gut im Stand, vollkommen im Stand ist, in voller Bereitschaft stehend}. In a position to { Im Stand sein zu } . . ., this means first: he is fit for it. Yet not simply this, but at the same time it also means: he ventures himself, has already become resolved. . . . The full preparedness of being in a position to, which lacks only the releasement into enactment {das bereitschaftserfüllte Im-Stand-sein-zu, dem nur noch die Enthemmung in den Vollzug fehlt} . . . 1047 a 24-26: . . . In this concise statement, every word is significant. With Aristotle {An diesem knappen Satz . . . . Mit ihm} the greatest philosophical knowledge of antiquity is expressed, a knowledge which even today remains unappreciated and misunderstood in philosophy. ( Aristotle's Metaphysics Q 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force , trans. W. Brogan and P. Warnek [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995], 187-188; instead of «nothing more of which he is capable» one has to read «nothing left of which he is not capable»; instead of «Aristotle» in «is significant. With Aristotle» read «it» [= the concise statement]; instead of «stretched out towards» in «the entire stance is stretched out towards what lies before it» read «stretched out by and toward,» for in Heidegger's German text «stretched out» is passive, and «what lies before it» is at the same time that which stretches out the runner, and that toward which the runner is stretched out; for the German text see GA 33, 217-219)

Only a nostalgic Rightist, as it were, lets his «face and glance . . . fall dreamily to the ground,» while ordinary and inauthentic Daseine «wander from one thing to another» in curiosity, idle talk, etc. (BT 211ff.; SZ 167ff.). Authentic Dasein, however, cancels both sorts of behaviors and «has already become resolved.» On «im Vollzug» see above, chapter 3, n. 66, and chapter 5, n. 36. Heidegger's use of the phrase «im Stande sein» and his peculiar formulation «von . . . gestrafft» («stretched out by and toward») belong to the language of conservatives, right-wingers, soldiers, and adherents of the Turnvater Jahn, the authoritarian forerunner of gymnastics at the time. In the military the command for lining up was, and probably still is, «Antreten!» (or «Angetreten!»; in the quote from Heidegger occurring as «taken his or her mark») followed by «Stillgestanden!» and «Augen geradeaus!» Even in the fifties and early sixties in gymnastic clubs «Antreten!» was followed by «Brust raus!»; that is, already standing in line like in a military unit you had—like in the military through the commands «Stillgestanden!» and «Augen geradeaus !»—to stretch your chest out and forward. In following the command you could no longer «dreamily» look downward or «wander from one thing to another.» The command of the instructor «stretched out» your chest, and it stretched you «toward» the Sache the commander represented. Your chest «has already resolved {itself}» («hat sich bereits entschlossen»); that is, your chest has opened, unlocked, itself for the Sache the commander represents, which in this case means that your chest has been resolved upon (see above, p. 5). On Heidegger as the representative of the Sache of National Socialism toward whom, from summer 1933 onward, Dr. Georg Stieler—professor of philosophy and pedagogy and enthusiastic member of «Der Stahlhelm» (Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life , 151; German edition, 148; «The Steel Helmet,» an extreme right-wing organization of World War I soldiers) whom the rector Heidegger asked to draft the code of honor mentioned above (see chapter 5, n. 7)—stretched out the chests of the students and to whom Stieler «made his 'report' in the correct military manner, as if the rector {Heidegger} was the commander-in-chief of his military forces,» see Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life , 151f.; German edition, 148f.

To be sure, all the other words in the quote from Heidegger are also used, though by no means often, in everyday language («antreten,» «in Bereitschaft sein» was certainly used in the exercises of the SA, by Professor Dr. Georg Stieler, and by the young boys in the voluntary fire brigades, who were proud to have such an important job). In light of Heidegger's authoritarian language as well as of the abundance of the enthusiastic preposition «in,» however, the militaristic component is predominant. This was the end of the entire lecture course. It is remarkable that, in the very first example of his definition, Aristotle himself adduces just the opposite situation: «I mean, e.g., if [a thing] is capable of sitting and it's open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible [in this]» ( Metaphysics: Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota ( VII-X ), trans. M. Furth [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984], 63 [1047 a 26-28]; «give me a break,» so to speak). Heidegger refers to this passage in a longer note ( Aristotle's Metaphysics Q 1-3 , 189-193; GA 33, 219-224) that was written either during the lecture course or later, but at any rate was not part of the lecture itself (see ibid., 195; read «bottom of p. 188» instead of «bottom of p. 189»; see GA 33, 225).

At the beginning of the race the runner has a vision of the goal, but he does not yet see it clearly. In order to be able to do the latter he must first «ins (= in das) Ziel kommen,» to come into the finish, to finish. In this usage of «in» its spatial and its enthusiastic use coincide. At the beginning of the race the runner sees the goal only in a fragmented way, so to speak, only as «Gemeinschaft, des Volkes» (SZ 384; «the community, of {the} people,» BT 436). When Heidegger gave his rectorate address, the origin had already «become free» (BT 436; SZ 384). Thus, the listeners of his address are forced to see the origin clearly; the « direction { the call } takes { Einschlagsrichtung }» (BT 318; SZ 274; see chapter 4, n. 7) can no longer be «overlooked» and «perverted» (BT 318f.; SZ 274) by them: «The first bond is the one that binds to the ethnic and national community [ Volksgemeinschaft ] {Die erste Bindung ist die in die Volksgemeinschaft}. It entails the obligation to share fully, both passively and actively, in {Sie verpflichtet zum mittragenden und mithandelnden Teilhaben am} the toil, the striving, and the abilities of all estates {Stände} and members {Glieder} of the Volk. This bond will henceforth be secured and rooted in student existence [ Dasein ] through labor service . The second bond is the one that binds to the honor and the destiny of the nation {Die zweite Bindung ist an die Ehre und das Geschick der Nation} . . . military service . The third bond is the one that binds the students to {Die dritte Bindung der Studentenschaft ist die an } the spiritual mission {geistigen Auftrag} of the German Volk» ("The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 35; see MH 10; SB 15; emphasis with the prepositions mine, J. F.). Heidegger could certainly assume that not all listeners to his address were already National Socialists. Heidegger's phrase in the first sentence, «Bindung . . . in» («first bond . . . to»), is unusual. Normally one says, as Heidegger does in the context of the second and the third bond, «Bindung an.» A Bindung an A—say, the Volksgemeinschaft is a state in which one is bound to and by the Volksgemeinschaft. The Volksgemeinschaft keeps one in its grip. The state of the Bindung an the Volksgemeinschaft has to be established, and the «Bindung in» is the activity of the Volksgemeinschaft and its representative, Heidegger, to bind one to it in order from now on to be in the state of the Bindung an it. For in this case Heidegger's «Bindung . . . in» is an abbreviation of «Einbindung.» «Einbindung in» and Heidegger's «Bindung in» is a variation of «jemanden in die Fügung/Verfügung fügen,» that is, to command someone to submit to (the command of) destiny. Like «ins Ziel kommen,» «Bindung in» combines the spatial and the enthusiastic use of «in.» In addition, «Bindung in» instead of «Einbindung in» allowed him to use the phrase three times and thus to strongly emphasize the «Bindung.»

«To share fully, both passively and actively» translates Heidegger's «mittragenden und mithandelnden Teilhaben;» that is, a «participation {Teilhaben} (in the toil, the striving, and the abilities of all estates and members of the Volk) that co-carries and co-acts (the toil, etc., of the Volk).» Normally, one has not produced what one co-carries. For instance, Mitleid, compassion, is a Leid, suffering, of someone else that one co-carries; a Mittäter is an accessory to the crime; a Mitläufer, co-runner, is a conformist (see also my remarks on Aristotle's notion of inline image , per se accidents, "Genus and inline image (Essence) in Aristotle and Socrates," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19:2-20:1 (1997), 186f., 198, n. 13). The sense that one has not produced what one is made to co-carry is confirmed by the word «Teilhaben.» «Teilhabe» or «Anteilhabe» are the usual German translations of Plato's term inline image , participation. When Socrates participates in the idea of beauty, he has not produced the idea of beauty. The idea of beauty does not lose anything, if someone or something participates in it, and it exists, even if nothing participates in it. «Stände» («estates») is the conservative and right-wing term for «classes.» In the political language at Heidegger's time, a Glied is part of a Gemeinschaft as of an organism, and it is the latter's organ or instrument. The «spiritual mission of the German Volk» exists prior to the moment in which it «become{s} free» (BT 436; SZ 384). In the moment in which it «become{s} free» it calls upon the Daseine to co-carry it, and it claims them as its mere organs. Heidegger's «mittragenden und mithandelnden» corresponds to the proliferation of the preposition and prefix «mit» in the passage on destiny in section 74 of Being and Time («Mitsein mit Anderen» [«Being-with Others»], «Mitgeschehen» [«co-historizing»], twice «Miteinandersein» [«Being-with-one-another»], and «Mitteilung» [«communication»] [SZ 384; BT 436]). Already in Being and Time the actors and co-actors don't produce their fates. Rather it is destiny and the «community, of {the} people» (BT 436; SZ 384) that calls upon them, and destiny «is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates» (BT 436; SZ 384). Rather «our fates have already been guided in advance» (BT 436; SZ 384) by destiny and the Volksgemeinschaft. At some point in the downward plunge, destiny or Volksgemeinschaft raises its voice, puts itself together, steps out of the background onto the main stage, and becomes the main historical actor (see chapter 2, section C) that, as Heidegger develops in the passage ending with the sentences on Erwiderung and Widerruf, demands a rerealization of the Volksgemeinschaft (see chapter I, section C). The rerealization of the Volksgemeinschaft requires the disavowal of Gesellschaft and of the inauthentic Daseine, who want to go on living in Gesellschaft. Thus after the sentence on destiny guiding our fates in advance, Heidegger continues: «Only in communicating {In der Mitteilung} and in struggling {im Kampf} does the power of destiny become free» (BT 436; SZ 384).

This is already the second step in Heidegger's scenario. In the first step, authentic Dasein obeys the call and is brought «from the endless multiplicity of possibilities . . . of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly . . . into {in} the simplicity of its fate » (BT 435; SZ 384). This is the moment in which «heritage constitutes itself» (BT 435; SZ 383f.) and becomes the main actor, for authentic Dasein «hands itself down» (BT 436; SZ 384) to heritage and its claims. The second step either follows immediately upon the first, or between the first and the second there is a time in which the authentic Daseine live «in reticence {in der Verschwiegenheit}» (BT 343; SZ 296). At any rate, in the first step destiny has communicated itself to the authentic Daseine, and in the second step the authentic Daseine communicate destiny to the inauthentic Daseine, that is, to those Daseine that «'have' no fate» (BT 434; SZ 384). Authentic Dasein «brings {inauthentic} Dasein into the simplicity of its fate » (BT 435; SZ 384). Since inauthentic Dasein covers up heritage and clings to Gesellschaft, this communication cannot but take place «in struggling {im Kampf}» (BT 436; SZ 384) for authentic Dasein cancels Gesellschaft and forces inauthentic Dasein to do so too. Close to the end of the chapter on conscience, Heidegger already gave the shortest possible formulation of this thought: Authentic Dasein «can become the 'conscience' of Others.» This is followed by the sentence: «Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another {das eigentliche Miteinander}—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the ''they" and in what "they" want to undertake» (BT 344f.; SZ 298; see chapter 3, n. 25). Having been brought into its fate by the «Mitteilung» inauthentic Dasein has become authentic and «hat Teil an,» partakes in, destiny and has been made a co-carrier of destiny. Destiny «teilt sich mit,» communicates itself to, the authentic Daseine, and the authentic Daseine «teilen mit,» communicate, destiny to the inauthentic Daseine. Thus, in the Rectorate Address Heidegger fully spells out the Platonic implications of the term «Mitteilung.» A successful Mitteilung results in that those who receive the Mitteilung partake in it and become its co-carders. Thus, in the Rectorate Address the Volksgemeinschaft commits the Daseine «zum mittragenden und mithandelnden Teilhaben am» («to share fully, both passively and actively, in») «the toil, the striving, and the abilities of all estates and members of the Volk.» In this way, the inauthentic Daseine «werden eingebunden in,» are bound to, the Volksgemeinschaft and are promoted to being its co-carriers.

The translation of «Mitteilung» with «communicating» (BT 436; SZ 384; Stambaugh has «communication,» Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, 352) is misleading, if «to communicate» is normally understood as a mutual process, as a back and forth between several individuals or groups, that is, as an Auseinandersetzung or Erwiderung in Guignon's and the translators' understanding of the sentence with « erwidert » in Being and Time (SZ 386; « reciprocative rejoinder, » BT 438). Heidegger did not say «Gespräch,» «Verständigung,» «wechselseitige Mitteilung,» «Unterhaltung,» or «Auseinandersetzung.» He chose «Mitteilung» because in that way he could use a further word with the—in this context—-emphatic prefix «mit-.» As I already indicated, however, the main reason for his choice was certainly a different one. «Gespräch,» «Verständigung,» «wechselseitige Mitteilung,» «Unterhaltung,» and «Auseinandersetzung» are all words for verbal exchanges, and none of them implies that the participants are unequal. A Mitteilung, however, is by definition not an exchange but a one-way-street-communication, as it were. In addition, often the one who issues a Mitteilung is in a superior position to the recipient of the Mitteilung. An «Amtliches Mitteilungsblatt» is a brochure in which a bureaucratic or administrative institution announces its «binding» decisions to the public. Or, «herewith, I teile Ihnen mit, inform you, that you are dismissed from your job,» «yesterday, I received the Mitteilung that my lease was not renewed.» A Mitteilung often amounts to a command or is one. In most other cases, the logic of a Mitteilung follows the logic of Platonic participation. I already have something, and when I teile es mit to someone else, I make him share, or I impose onto him, something that I already have. In the Mitteilung, I don't lose what I already have. That which I teile mit to someone is not diminished by the fact that I and later on the one to whom I mitteile it have it. On the contrary, by passing it on to others so they have it, I help it communicate, spread, itself and enlarge its dominion. (In regard to this aspect, the Mitteilung corresponds to the programmatic sentence 105 a 3-5 in Plato's Phaedo ; see my paper "Genus and inline image (Essence) in Aristotle and Socrates," 192ff., n.7.) In sum, quite appropriately in dictionaries one finds as translations of «Mitteilung» «announcement,» «notification,» «(administrative) communication,» «memo,» and as translations of «mitteilen» «impart a thing to a person,» «communicate a thing to a person,» «inform someone of something,» «pass on something to someone,» «spread something.» All these expressions designate one-way communications. None of them implies that the recipient of a Mitteilung argues with its sender. To the contrary, often a Mitteilung implies that the recipient, as is said in bureaucratic and administrative language, «die Mitteilung zur Kenntnis nimmt und entsprechend danach handelt,» takes notice of the Mitteilung and acts accordingly, that is, obeys without arguing with the sender. Note also that Heidegger does not use the plural, and he does not add Daseine in the plural as those who conduct communications. Instead, he uses the singular with definite article («In der Mitteilung und im Kampf,» SZ 384; BT 436) (on the definite article see above, chapter 1, n. 17). This further emphasizes the Platonic structure of communicating something from «the haves» down to «the have-nots.» Some Mitteilungen are «fürchterlich,» dreadful, and others are «freudig,» joyful, «überraschend,» surprising. In any case, a Mitteilung is almost by definition «wichtig,» important. In section 74 of Being and Time , Heidegger responds to the kairos of the twenties in Germany. In that context, Heidegger's «Mitteilung» (SZ 384; BT 436) might be his pagan rendering of the Christian «Verkündigung,» Annunciation, «Frohe Botschaft,» gospel. As I showed, Scheler pursued a certain Christian platonism. In World War I, God breaks into the fallen world and reveals the true order of things that «we» have to realize at the expense of the Gesellschaft we have lived in up to that point. As the example of Hitler shows, the same motif can be used in conjunction with an ontology that was not acceptable according to usual philosophical standards. The motif itself was probably shared by many rightists. For if one assumes that Gesellschaft is a downward plunge, the salvation must come from something outside of Gesellschaft (see above, chapter 4, n. 7). Heidegger did not accept Scheler's ontology. Still, he shared the general motif present in Scheler and Hitler. Thus it is not coincidental that he finished his Rectorate Address with a quote from the metaphysician Plato, and that, in section 74 of Being and Time , he did not choose a word of the early Socrates but took advantage of a word that belongs to Plato's metaphysics of participation.

The Platonic structure of Heidegger's «Mitteilung» in section 74 is already present in Division One of Being and Time . For in sections 33 and 34 Heidegger interprets «assertion» as a « "communication " [ Mitteilung ]» and reads the word «Mitteilung» in the Platonic sense (BT 197; SZ 155). His main concern in both sections is whether those who receive an authentic Mitteilung hear it properly or not (BT 197f., 206f., 207f.; SZ 155, 163, 164f.). In section A of chapter 1 I pointed out that the English phrase «anticipation of death» reverts the meaning of Heidegger's «Vorlaufen in den Tod.» For anticipating something, I, so to speak, stay within the wall of the city and rely on a temporal interval between the moment of anticipation and the moment in which the anticipated event occurs. In running forward into death, however, I cancel both the spatial security zone and the temporal interval. In addition, I discussed Heidegger's notion of the second positive mode of solicitude according to which authentic Dasein « leap { s } ahead » (BT 158; « vorausspringt, » SZ 122) (see above, chapter 3, n. 25; see also chapter 2, n. 5), and I also quoted several times the passage with the call of conscience as a call that «calls us back in calling us forth» (BT 326; «vorrufenden Rückruf,» SZ 280). In the English translation one cannot see that all German phrases have the same prefix, namely, «vor-.» The prefix «vor-» functions like a focal meaning in Aristotle (see above, p. 222, with n. 18). Native German speakers are probably slightly amused about Heidegger's notion of «vorausspringen» as the only way of becoming « authentically bound together» (BT 159; SZ 122). However, the notion fits well into the extensive vocabulary of falling and leaping in Being and Time . In addition, in the light of the Rectorate Address the focal meaning of «vor-» in Being and Time amounts to the focal meaning of «Sturm-» in the Rectorate Address as the Sturmtrupp runs ahead of the other troops. Running vor one is «schon,» already, or «bereits,» already, at a site where the others are not yet or never want to be. In this sense, Heidegger says in the Rectorate Address : «But it is our will that our Volk fulfill its historical mission. We will ourselves. For the young and youngest elements of the Volk, which are already {schon} reaching beyond us, have already {bereits} decided this» ("The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy , 38 [see MH 13; SB 19]). Having already achieved the historical mission they mitteilen, communicate, it to the others. In this way, they become the conscience of the others and force them into their fate. Guignon remarks that it «is important to keep in mind that the term "Dasein" does not refer simply to individual human beings» (HC 131). Since the notion of fate was polemical against liberals and leftists, it might be possible that Heidegger's notions of «vorausspringen» and «vorlaufen» are his version of the notion of the proletariat as the vanguard of the proletarians in Lukács. Both the proletariat and the authentic Dasein run vor all the others. The major difference on which the other differences hinge is that the proletariat only moves forward while authentic Dasein runs vor in order to be called «back» (BT 326; SZ 280) since it «wants to be brought back» (BT 316; SZ 271) (see above, chapter 2, n. 35, and chapter 3, n. 25). For authentic Dasein wants to cancel Gesellschaft and to rerealize the «Gemeinschaft, des Volkes» (SZ 384; «the community, of {the} people,» BT 436; see above, chapter 1, n. 17).

As was mentioned above, «Mitteilung» can easily be regarded as the general notion for «participation,» «Frohe Botschaft» (gospel), and bureaucratic ways of communication. In the kairos of the twenties, each group wanted to establish its notions as the commonly accepted ones or to «fill» the general notions with its meaning. In other words, the art of political propaganda consists in offering phrases that many individuals and groups can recognize as their own. Heidegger' s gathering of Platonists, Christians, and bureaucrats under the umbrella of a National Socialist «Mitteilung» might serve as an example of Heidegger's capacity I mentioned in note 13 of the preface.

Note finally that in the passage from the Rectorate Address Heidegger says quite openly what, as I tried to show, is the «finish» of Being and Time : «The first bond is the one that binds to the ethnic and national community [ Volksgemeinschafi ] {and not a bond that binds to, say, Scheler's love-community}.» To carry out the " Task of Destroying the History of Ontology " (BT 41; SZ 19) Heidegger also destroyed one of the most prominent representatives of ontology at his time, namely, Scheler.

25. Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain , 715. The song reads in German: «Und seine Zweige rauschten, als riefen sie mir zu.» Thus, a literal translation would be: «And its branches rustled, as if calling to me.»

26. Ibid., 145 (section 9 of chapter 4 ["Mounting Misgivings; of the Two Grandfathers and the Boat-ride in the Twilight"]; the German text has «durch Mark und Bein»).

27. Ibid., 716.

28. In the second sentence of the short text Der Feldweg , published in 1953, Heidegger mentions «the old lime-trees of the palace gardens» in Meßkirch ( Der Feldweg , 1). However, the moral of the text is conveyed, not through them, but rather through «the oak-tree by the path» (ibid., 2). On the moral of the text see my paper "On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger," 152ff.

29. St. Augustine, Confessions , trans. R. S. Pine-Coffine (London: Penguin, 1961), 177 (book 8, ch. 6).

30. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of MechanicaI Reproduction," Illuminations , 222f.

31. Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street, Reflections , 68.

32. On the slight irony of the sentence with the «good ground» see Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980), 238; see, however, also Marleen Stoessel, Aura: Das Vergessene Menschliche. Zu Sprache und Erfahrung bei Walter Benjamin (Munich: Hanser, 1983), 49ff. I made no effort to translate the rhythm, the alliterations, and the onomatopoetic quality of these sentences. Thus, here is the original:

DER BAUM UND DIE SPRACHE

Ich stieg eine Böschung hinan und legte mich unter einen Baum. Der Baum war eine Pappel oder eine Ere. Warum ich seine Gattung nicht behalten habe? Weil, wáhrend ich ins Laubwerk sah und seiner Bewegung folgte, mit einmal in mir die Sprache dergestalt yon ihm ergriffen wurde, daß sie augenblicklich die uralte Vermählung mit dem Baum in meinem Beisein noch einmal vollzog. Die Äste und mit ihnen auch der Wipfel wogen sich erwägend oder bogen sich ablehnend; die Zweige zeigten sich zuneigend oder hochfahrend; das Laub straubte sich gegen einen rauhen Luftzug, erschauerte vor ihm oder kam ihm entgegen; der Stamm verfügte über seinen guten Grund, auf dem er fußte; und ein Blatt warf seinen Schatten auf das andre. Ein leiser Wind spielte zur Hochzeit auf und trug alsbald die schnell entsprossenen Kinder dieses Betts als Bilderrede unter alle Welt. (''Kurze Schatten," Gesammelte Schriften , IV. 1, 425f.)

In July 1911, in the journal Der Akademiker , a poem, "Auf stillen Pfaden" (On still paths) was published by someone who signed his name only as «-gg-.» Ott attributes it to Heidegger ( Martin Heidegger: A Political Life , 68; German edition, 71). Given Heidegger's strong love for the mountains of the Black Forest (for instance, ibid., 125; German edition, 123), one is almost inclined to assume that this poem could not have been written by Heidegger since it centers on the «weisse Birken in der Heide» («white birches on the heath») in the context of a nocturnal experience of relief from sorrows and complaints. Those who love the mountains in the Black Forest usually don't like birches on the heath that much, and vice versa. Birches often evoke (at least for city-dwellers) pretty much the opposite of that «Härte des Willens» that, according to Heidegger, the Black Forest calls forth (see above, chapter 1, n. 33). Perhaps, however, it was the special situation of the summer 1911, Heidegger's struggle with Catholicism, his insecure professional future, and his delicate health, that had «alienated» him somewhat even from the mountains of the Black Forest and made him refer to birches. In this case, this short poem would be, so to speak, the analogue to Goethe's journey to Italy.

33. Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street, Reflections , 76.

34. Ibid., 92-94.

35. Ibid., 88-90.


Notes
 

Preferred Citation: Fritsche, Johannes. Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's Being and Time. Berkeley:  University of California Press,  c1999 1999. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft5k4006n2/