1. For the sense in which it is real, see Meno 82 A-B, where Socrates can prove , but cannot teach that learning is recollection; his exhibition will consist of an operation performed upon the slave boy, who will achieve the right answer not by learning , but by recollecting . Here Euthydemus' distinction is empty, for, whichever alternative Socrates selects, he will perform the same operation; see 274 A 10-B 1, where teaching and proving are not in opposition.

2. Here Socrates would be or , and learning would be bridging the gap between ignorance and knowledge by gathering knowledge of what he is learning or doesn't know; cf. 277 B 6-7 and 277 E 7-278 A 1.

3. By proof or , Euthydemus simply means to display the "fact" that Socrates has the knowledge, not to cause him to recollect what it is. The joke on the sophist will be that he cannot even prove the "that," much less the "what."

4. In this case, Socrates is or ; cf. 277 B 8-9, where knowing is , and 278 A 2-5, where it is .

5. Many have felt these echoes from the first eristic; see Paul Friedländer ( Plato , 2d ed. [Princeton, 1969], 2: 191), Hermann Keulen ( UPE , p. 49), and Michel Narcy ( Le Philosophe et son double [Paris, 1984], pp. 81 -82). Thus again we encounter one of the favorite tricks of these modern philosophers, the constant display of what is old and stale in new and tantalizing guises.

6. But as we can tell from 288 A 2-3, Socrates views his refutation as holding for both sophists, although he argues directly only against Dionysodorus.

7. His answer "many, but small" puts quantity and quality back to back. What Socrates knows is many small things, but what he wants to know is one great science that can determine the relative value of all things in the universe.

8. In the language of the first eristic Euthydemus has moved from

Socrates is "wise" to Socrates is "ignorant" and from "having knowledge already" to "not yet having knowledge"; see 276 A 7-B 2 and 277 B 8-C 1.

9. Note the adroit use of , again illustrating how the eristic copes with the immediate point at issue. Euthydemus can take Socrates' two claims, to be a knower and a not-knower, as if they were uttered without intervening qualifications because he regards Socrates' additions as mere noise, or what he will soon call ; see 296 A 8 and B7.

10. Here we have a hilarious parody of what may be called the "Euthydemian law of noncontradiction." His introduction of , almost as if it were an afterthought, is an amusing touch. The caps , continuing the illusion that Socrates' remarks were spoken without qualifications, and does not, as one might expect, refer to the objects of knowledge but to Socrates himself, qua knower. In connection with this passage Charlotte Stough has remarked ("Forms and Explanations in the Phaedo," Phronesis 21 [1976], 19 n. 25): "There is no evidence that Plato ever took seriously the sophistries based on failure to indicate the varying times, relations, and respects in which a subject might be said to 'suffer, be, or do opposites.'"

11. At Philebus 17 A, Socrates tells us that eristic differs from dialectic in that its practitioners pass from the one to the many (and vice versa) too quickly and in haphazard fashion and consequently disregard what lies in between ; see R. Hackforth ("On Some Passages of Plato's Philebus," Classical Quarterly 83 [1939], 23-24). Here (and in what follows, esp. 293 E 5-294 D 3), Plato presents a comic burlesque of this flight from the .

12. Socrates is thus doing precisely what he did earlier; see 286 C 3-6 and 288 A 2-7, as well as 298 B 4-5, where Ktesippus imitates the method.

13. Behind this startling revelation stands the serious presentation of its possibility in the Meno (81 C-D), where it is said that we can pass from one to all though the exercise of anamnesis ; see Keulen ( UPE , p. 53). But this possibility (and here is the joke) requires the existence of the soul, which eristic cannot and will not allow to arise in discourse; see 295 B and E.

14. The flip side of this thesis is: All men know nothing, if (and because) they do not know a single thing. If a subject knows one thing, he is a knower , and hence, omniscient ; if he fails to know something, then he is a not-knower , and hence, utterly ignorant . Thus, this eristic trick is just an-

other way of reworking the exclusive antinomy between and .

15. Here Keulen is correct to point out that Dionysodorus' is devoid of any content ( UPE , pp. 54-55). But this fact does not exclude Friedländer's interpretation that the ''Good" stands behind the one as its fulfillment. In the Euthydemus it is Plato's intention to hold together opposing perspectives at one and the same moment.

16. Friedländer, Plato , 2: 192.

17. Here we, too, can say with Socrates (294 A 4-5): .

18. At 294 B 10, expresses Dionysodorus' impatience with Socrates and so invites the change in speakers. As it did for Kleinias at 289 C 9, now signals that Ktesippus is about to take charge of the .

19. Contrast his behavior here with 283 E 1-6, 284 E, and 288 A 8-B 3.

20. From this question George Grote humorously concluded that they were "almost toothless" ( Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates [London, 1865], 1: 528).

21. Here Ktesippus again displays how quickly he can learn. Taking over Socrates' example of uncountables, he has just now called for an answer to something that can be counted.

22. The brothers are exhibiting an obsessive urge to avoid contradiction by conforming their thought to their version of the law of non-contradiction. The outcome of this rigid conformity has required them to reject "partial knowing" and to embrace "omniscience." Meanwhile Socrates and Ktesippus have tested their claim by applying it to excessively minute and even disgusting particulars. In this way the brothers are shown to be completely out of touch with real experience. The discrepancy thus created illustrates to perfection how pedantry becomes ludicrous; cf. Theaetetus 174 A 4-B 1. For the comic theory, see Schopenhauer ( Die Welt Ms Wille und Vorstellung , vol. 1, chap. 13), and for its practice, see Pangloss in Voltaire's Candide and Pancrace the Aristotelian and Marphurius the Pyrrhonian in Molière's Le Mariage forcé .

23. Keulen ( UPE , p. 52) has compared the language of 294 E with Phaedo 75 C-D. Here Plato is depicting the brothers' glee, as they anticipate the discussions moving into the region of "their" doctrine of recollection. On this point it is worth quoting Narcy ( Le Philosophe , p. 82): "En leur bouche le platonisme lui-même est rendu sophistique."

24. The demand that Socrates answer reminds us that this is an inviolable "rule" of eristic; see 275 C I and 287 C 4-D 6. For his part,

Socrates is most pleased to respond, for he views his upcoming "refutation " as an opportunity to be refuted out of his false notions.

25. If the eristician puts his question correctly, the answerer is supposed to respond with a simple yes or no; see SE 17.175 B 8-14. Here and in his next three questions (295 E 4-5, 296 A 5-7, 206 B 4-5), Euthydemus fails in his role as questioner, each time allowing Socrates to spike his gun with .

26. Keulen sees Socrates' counterquestion as an instance of the motif by which Socrates attempts to force the essential factor into the argument and thereby deflect the line of questioning in a significant way ( UPE , pp. 48-50); cf. Friedländer ( Plato , 2: 191-92). We should also recall that Dionysodorus has repeatedly dodged questions from his opponents by submitting counterquestions; see 285 E 1-4, 286 A 3-6, 287 A 4-B 5, 294 B 8-C 6.

27. Eristicians experience shame for failure to adhere to their rules of questioning and answering. For them, the proper response to such misbehavior is to blush or to fall silent; see 286 B 7, 297 A 8, and 299 C 8.

28. See 284 E 6, where Ktesippus violated eristic decorum with verbal abuse; 286 D 11-E 9, where Socrates foolishly asked whether they were merely arguing theses; 287 B 2-5, where Dionysodorus criticized Socrates for not responding to the point at issue; and esp. 287 C-D, where for the first time Socrates challenged Dionysodorus directly on his method.

29. The sudden and unexpected appearance of "soul" in this passage offers startling evidence of how and why Plato keeps his ideas in his pocket. In the Euthydemus he has carefully excluded the word from the prologue, epilogue, transitional passages, and even from the two protreptic episodes, where we might reasonably expect to find it. He has thus far allowed to surface only once (287 D 7-10), in an eristic context where it has its traditional animative sense of "life force"; there he put the word into Dionysodorus' mouth in order to demonstrate how the sophist could use "soul" as just one item among many, for his purpose of attaining a verbal victory; cf. 302 A 8 and E 1-2. But Plato has kept his own "cognitive'' sense of in reserve until this very moment, when he has Socrates innocently release it in such a way as to jar Euthydemus' expectations and to produce the maximum comic effect. David Claus has called attention to this "quite extraordinary'' use of in the Euthydemus and has also noted, with precision, what its presence in this passage entails: that given the

movement of the argument thus far (294 E 5-295 B 5), "Socrates can be said to have knowledge based on prior existence and to have such knowledge through the agency of his , an argument he will himself demonstrate for the slave boy in Meno " ( Toward the Soul [Yale University Press, 1981], pp. 173-174). Predictably, however, Claus slips into the orthodoxy in these matters and concludes that this use of anticipates "the epistemology of Meno. " But far from anticipating the Meno , the Euthydemus has become Plato's vehicle for parodying "philosophers" who produce arguments on the topics of learning and knowing without any, much less his own cognitive, sense of . In this way Plato provides a negative defense for his psychology, the positive aspects of which he works out in the Meno, Phaedo , and elsewhere. So this appearance of must constitute another irrefutable proof of the ''maturity" of the Euthydemus . And as if Plato doesn't want us to forget this fact, a few lines later he has Socrates again inform Euthydemus that he knows what he knows "by the soul'' (295 E 5).

30. Plato is here making a joke on . Socrates, who always tries to avoid in favor of philosophical discussion, is now being charged with "driveling"; but, of course, through the rhetorical figure of enantiosis, it is eristic that is . Further, although does carry the sense of "overly simple and silly" (Liddell-Scott-Jones; hereafter LSJ), here it also indicates that Socrates is old-fashioned and completely out of step with the way these "moderns" are doing philosophy.

31. The sophist is angry at Socrates for taking apart or poking holes in his speech. is not "to define precisely" (LSJ), but to expand assertions through qualifications in order to counter the tight-fisted argumentation of this pseudo-logician.

32. At the same time the boys can be the bait that lures these predators out into the open so that Socrates can trap them; see 272 D 2-3 and 304 B 5.

33. Socrates used at 294 E 9 to refer to an instance of everlasting time, whereas Euthydemus is now using it to refer to discrete moments in which the act of knowing occurs.

34. Robin Waterfield, Early Socratic Dialogues (Harmondsworth, 1987), p. 355.

35. Even as Socrates withdraws his addition, he manages to call attention to it again. The open way in which he subtracts should be contrasted with the covert way Euthydemus is about to remove .

36. Among English translators, W. H. D. Rouse appears to be the only one who recognizes that the two uses of at 296 B 2-3 are to

be taken more closely with than with ( Euthydemus , trans. W. H. D. Rouse, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato , ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns [Princeton, 1961], p. 409).

37. Aristotle, too, is aware of how Socratic qualifications can disrupt question-chains; see SE 17.175 B 8-14 and 176 A 15.

38. Thus Edwin H. Gifford ( The Euthydemus of Plato , rev. ed. [Oxford, 1905], pp. 49-50) in his analysis of this obscure argument. My only quibble with him is on the possibility that "all" and "all things" are synonyms; otherwise his interpretation is correct.

39. Socrates has already used the two terms indifferently at 293 D 5-6, and Euthydemus will do so at 296 C 10 and D 3-4.

40. Here "all " is either a harmless gloss on "all things " or, as Gifford notes ( Euthydemus , pp. 49-50), a reference to 296 B 5.

41. But in spite of his efforts to the contrary, Euthydemus has been unable to prevent this true thesis from shining through the eristic elenchus: By the soul, always, whenever he knows, Socrates knows all things, at least what he knows . What is more, Socrates has been able to generate this thesis while abiding by the eristic rule to respond to what he understands on each occasion.

42. With his use of , Socrates indicates (as he will again at 298 A 9) that the conclusion is only apparent. Here, too, he harmlessly glosses with . Since both terms are empty, it doesn't matter which of the two he uses.

43. In this respect Euthydemus' behavior in argument contrasts most sharply with the spirit of inquiry expressed at Phaedo 95 E.

44. On this special talent of eristics, Lewis Campbell has remarked: "From the want of any true command of ideas, they distinguished in the wrong place and failed to distinguish in the right," ( The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato [Oxford, 1867], p. xii).

45. At 296 C 8, is again most naturally taken with (see Rouse in The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 410). Then, in the clause (296 C 9-10), which doesn't explain or justify the preceding sentence but confirms the "truth" of what Socrates is imagined to have stated, Euthydemus again drops out , leaving to go with . At 296 C 10, Euthydemus is using the same way he did at 293 D 1, as a (near) synonym for , carrying on the fiction that Socrates' qualifications are mere noise; but cf. R. S. W. Hawtrey's emendation ("Plato, Euthydemus 296 C 8-10," Liverpool Classical Monthly 4 [1979], 41) and J. N. O'Sullivan's revised punctuation ("Plato, Euthydemus 296 C 8-10 (Burnet),'' ibid., pp. 61-62).

44. On this special talent of eristics, Lewis Campbell has remarked: "From the want of any true command of ideas, they distinguished in the wrong place and failed to distinguish in the right," ( The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato [Oxford, 1867], p. xii).

45. At 296 C 8, is again most naturally taken with (see Rouse in The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 410). Then, in the clause (296 C 9-10), which doesn't explain or justify the preceding sentence but confirms the "truth" of what Socrates is imagined to have stated, Euthydemus again drops out , leaving to go with . At 296 C 10, Euthydemus is using the same way he did at 293 D 1, as a (near) synonym for , carrying on the fiction that Socrates' qualifications are mere noise; but cf. R. S. W. Hawtrey's emendation ("Plato, Euthydemus 296 C 8-10," Liverpool Classical Monthly 4 [1979], 41) and J. N. O'Sullivan's revised punctuation ("Plato, Euthydemus 296 C 8-10 (Burnet),'' ibid., pp. 61-62).

46. At 296 D 3, Euthydemus uses an oath for the first and only time.

47. On this final act of "megalomania," as Friedländer calls it ( Plato , 2: 192), see Keulen's most perceptive remarks ( UPE , pp. 71-72).

48. Those who have analyzed these portions of the Euthydemus cannot avoid seeing what Hermann Keulen calls "den Eindruck geradezu einer Persiflage des Menon " ( UPE , p. 51). See Friedländer ( Plato , 2: 192), Keulen ( UPE , pp. 25-40, 49-56, and 26 n. 56), Leo Strauss ("On the Euthydemus," Interpretation 1 [1970], 17), Hawtrey ( Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus [Philadelphia, 1981], pp. 141, 149, and 155-56), Thomas Alexander Szlezák ("Sokrates' Spott über Geheimhaltung: Zum Bild des in Platons Euthydemus,'' Antike und Abendland 26 [1980], 82), and Narcy ( Le Philosophe , p. 82).

49. Cf. Meno 81 E 1 and 86 B 6 ff., where Socrates opposes the "lazy counsel" of Meno's question.

50. For Euthydemus' words, see 296 A 2. Ktesippus will also parody the sophist's language at 300 C 6-7.

51. Dionysodorus thus interprets Socrates' proposition to be an example of ; cf. 284 B 4-7. Plato has carefully prepared the way for the sophist to reenter the debate by having Socrates mention his name at 296 D 8. But the last time he actually spoke in the work was some time ago, at 294 E 11. Thus we should imagine that though very eager to do so, Dionysodorus has been unable to join the fray for some time, so that now, when the opportunity comes, he just blurts out "Nowhere"; cf. 300 D 1, where he behaves in a similar way.

52. This blush, a comic touch similar to his smile (275 E 4), causes Dionysodorus to appear, in Henri Bergson's words: "Immersed and absorbed in the materiality of some mechanical occupation, instead of ceaselessly renewing his vitality by keeping in touch with a living ideal" ("Laughter," in Comedy , ed. Wylie Sypher, 4th ed. [Baltimore, 1986], p. 79).

53. Thus the point of Socrates' prediction (296 D 7-8), that Dionysodorus would have to join with Euthydemus in order to secure Socrates' omniscience.

54. At 297 B 2, foreshadows the quickening pace of the second half of the fifth episode. We are already familiar with Dionysodorus' artless moves to commandeer the ; see 287 C-D.

55. Flight is an attempt to escape the inescapable question .

56. See F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp. 208 and 256.

57. Twice, at 297 B 4-5 and 297 D 8-9, Socrates refers to this problem as something he wants Euthydemus to teach him.

58. Thus Cornford: "any statement (true or false) which conveys meaning cannot refer to 'absolute nonentity'" ( Plato's Theory of Knowledge , p. 205).

59. For the sources of and variations on this combat myth, see Joseph Fontenrose, Python (Berkeley, 1959), p. 356. Plato has carefully prepared for the introduction of these grisly monsters, first with (296 C 3), and then with (296 E 2).

60. We are accustomed to Socrates comparing the sophist to mythical figures, but here he renders the mythic figure intelligible by its likeness to sophistry; cf. 285 C 4 and 288 B 8.

61. One head of the Hydra was said to be immortal and to extend all the way to Hades.

62. E. S. Thompson ( The Meno of Plato [London, 1901], p. 273) and Gifford ( Euthydemus , p. 52) interpreted the allusion to refer to Ktesippus, but R. K. Sprague ( Translation , p. 47 n. 75), G. J. De Vries ("Notes on Some Passages in the Euthydemus," Mnemosyne 25 [1972], 51), Hawtrey ( Commentary , p. 159), and Waterfield ( Early Socratic Dialogues , p. 358n. 1) have denied it.

63. At 293 A 2-3, Socrates first introduced the theme of coming to the aid of the , when he asked the brothers to rescue him and Kleinias. Now he returns to this theme at 297 C 7 with an allusion to Ktesippus as his helper ( ). This reference in turn looks forward to 303 A 5, where Ktesippus again comes to rescue Socrates for (D21), the final eristic argument.

64. In electing to convert the items that he does, Dionysodorus carefully avoids the primary objects of the simile: Socrates' allusion to sophists, heads of argument, adequate help in defense of the , and especially the Hydra and the Crab. The evidence of the Euthydemus indicates that eristics direct their attention toward the inessential, the decentered.

65. Of course, Socrates has just submitted a figurative sense in which Iolaus is his nephew; but since Dionysodorus has dragged him back into the eristic universe, he responds in the way he understands the question.

66. The emphatic position of "yours ," both here and in the trigger question, may suggest that Dionysodorus wants to turn (D11) on the possessive adjective. Perhaps he plans to argue, as he will in (D20), that since Patrocles is "yours," that is, belongs to Socrates, Socrates can sell or sacrifice his brother to anyone he wants, just as he

can the rest of his possessions . But since Socrates doesn't allow this ruse to get off the ground, we can only speculate.

67. Thus it is Socrates who introduces the problem of "is the same" and "is not the same," which Dionysodorus will cap with "is'' and "is not" (297 E 5-6) and then with "different from'' and "same as" (298 A s).

68. Here Plato shows how blindly Dionysodorus is committed to the Euthydemian law of noncontradiction by having him fancy that he can secure a refutation by simply tricking Socrates into asserting contrary predicates of one and the same subject; cf. SE 5.167 A 7-20. It now appears that the conclusion Dionysodorus has here established may be something like the one he was hoping to attain when at 297 B 2 he introduced the term brother .

69. At 298 A 2, the ambiguous , here rendered by "a" father, cannot be satisfactorily translated into English. Dionysodorus is hoping that Socrates will take it for the possessive "yours" and so answer simply "yes," thus giving him the opportunity to shift from "different from" to "is not." But Socrates derails the trick by adding to in order to make perfectly clear that Chaeredemus is different from his father Sophroniscus, who is another father; cf. J. L. Smith, "Plato and the Paradox of False Statements: A Study of the Euthydemus and the Sophist " (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1975), pp. 36-48.

70. So at 298 A 3, Dionysodorus is not referring to the proverbial stone (Gifford, Euthydemus , p. 52; Sprague, Translation , p. 48 n. 77; De Vries, "Notes," p. 52; Hawtrey, Commentary , p. 162; and Waterfield, Early Socratic Dialogues , p. 359), but simply to a rock that is not the same as Socrates. At 298 A 4, it is Socrates who comes back with the figurative or qualified sense of being rendered dull and stupid as a stone.

71. At 298 A 8-9, read with manuscripts B and T and with W. Inasmuch as he has already stipulated in what sense the two men are and are not fathers, Socrates feels no urge to contest the conclusion and so answers "apparently ." Since Dionysodorus is imparting force and meaning to words as he sees fit, Socrates responds to him the same way he did to Euthydemus at 296 C 6.

72. Euthydemus' sudden return and automatic urge to finish off the attack is reminiscent of his sally against Ktesippus at 284 E 2-3. To assist our understanding of (D11), Charles P. Bigger has provided this helpful analysis: "Schematically, we can exhibit the Megaric character of this language game as follows: Assume X is P and Y is P. Here 'X is P' is understood as 'X is same (identity) as P.' Thus if Y is other than X, it cannot be P. If both X and Y are P, then X = Y, by Leibniz's

law" ( Participation: A Platonic Inquiry [Baton Rouge, 1968], p. 62); cf. SE 5.166 B 32-36.

73. Having already designated eristic arguments as "knockdowns" at 277 D I and at 288 A 4, Plato need not refer to them here as such; cf. also 286 C 4: .

74. Thus a familiar feature of Plato's art of transition; cf. how Polemarchus takes over for Cephalus ( Republic 331 D) and Polus for Gorgias ( Gorgias 461 B-462 B). It is no accident that Plato has expressed this transition with . He has already used this word twice (276 C 2 and 277 B 4) to describe Dionysodorus taking over the eristic argument from Euthydemus.

75. This argument, (K12), is attributed to Ktesippus because he performs the role of questioner in the dispute.

76. Cf. at 298 B 5 with at 293 E 2-3.

77. Here again we come across the universal that eristic arguments suffer; see 286 C 4, 288 A 5, 293 E 2-3, and 303 E 1-4. Since eristic cannot stand its ground against its own attacks, it proves useless as a serious philosophical method for attaining truth. But in suffering what it dishes out, eristic becomes comical and is thus able to deflect any anger and hostility that its victims might otherwise feel; cf. 293 E 4-5 and 303 E 2-4.

78. Both here (298 G 1) and below (298 C 8-9), Plato has Ktesippus use the disjunctive formula in order to show how eagerly he is embracing this feature of eristic method.

79. Richard Robinson dearly underestimates the force of Ktesippus' remark when he cites it as evidence for Plato's unconsciousness of faulty analogy ("Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy," Mind 51 [1942], 104); cf. Waterfield ( Early Socratic Dialogues , p. 360 n. 1). If one views the line "not sewing like to like" in isolation from everything else Ktesippus says in the dialogue, then Robinson's judgment may seem plausible. But when we consider the young man's contribution to the falsehood problem (284 B 1-2, C 7-8), his detection of the equivocal (284 E 1), his use of the evidentiary criterion (294 G), his exposure of the tricky ''yours" (299 E 6), of the Euthydemian law of noncontradiction (300 A 6-8), of the fallacious question (300 G 4-D 5), and so on, we are justified in concluding that these illustrations are too numerous, too precise, and too consistent to be accidental and thus "Plato knew what he was doing'' (Paul Shorey, What Plato Said [Chicago, 1933], pp. 289-290).

80. Here, with Ktesippus' two uses of (298 C 7-9), Plato shows how eagerly he is imitating the eristic urge to drive one's oppo-

nent to the unqualified universal position without having to pass through the middle .

81. Here Bigger has remarked: "The condition of being a father will constitute an immanent nexus of paternal relations; but such nexus can be everywhere throughout nature, provided of course that there are beings who can exhibit this relation scattered about also. The only way out of the internal relatedness envisaged by the Sophist is to recognize that form has the status of a possible, that it functions as a limit ( peras ) of a Dedekind Schnitt and is of recurrent character" ( Participation , p. 63); cf. Szlezák ("Sokrates' Spott über Geheimhaltung," pp. 82-83), who sees in (K12) ''eine burleske Variation" of Meno 81 C 9-D 1: .

82. Ktesippus signals his conclusions, in eristic fashion, with three straight uses of . Although Hoeffer's conjecture (298 D 5) is remarkably clever and accepted by Burnet, it is better to trust B T and W, especially since all three manuscripts agree on .

83. Here we see a parody of the ridiculous sense in which two eristic debaters can reach agreement; see 286 A 4-7.

84. In a recent article ("Aristotle, the Fallacy of Accident and the Nature of Predication: A Historical Inquiry," Journal of the History of Philosophy [1988], 5-24), Aníbal Bueno has provided the Aristotelian analysis: "'the dog' is the subject, 'father' the accident and 'yours' the attribute. The fallacy consists in asserting that the attribute 'yours', which is true of the subject 'dog', is also true of the accident 'father'. What is true of the dog qua individual is not true of it qua father." "Of course, some of Aristotle's examples can also be explained in terms of other logical mistakes. Thus the famous dog argument exploits the ambiguity of the possessive pronoun 'yours'. 'The dog is yours' is an incomplete expression that can, if completed in different ways, convey a number of different relations. In the argument, it is an elliptic way of saying 'The dog is your property'. If the premiss is fully stated, we get a valid argument with the truistic conclusion, 'The father is your property'" (pp. 10-11). One can also explain (D13) as a fallacy of composition by calling attention to the fact that Dionysodorus has deviously subtracted from the clause and thus left "yours'' positioned beside "father"; cf. Sprague ( Translation , p. 50 n. 81) and Hawtrey ( Commentary , p. 164).

85. It is difficult to imagine why, without manuscript authority, Hawtrey would want to attribute 298 E 6-10 to Euthydemus ( Commentary , p. 165). "This little argument" is not, in his words, "a mere elaboration of what precedes it" (p. 165); but Dionysodorus is now using the conclusion "the dog is your father" as a way to attain the

coup de grâce , the "proof" that Ktesippus is a father-beater. It is better (with Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato , vol. 1, 4th ed. [Oxford, 1953], p. 238; and Rouse, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 412) to read at 298 E 4 as introducing a statement with giving the conclusion. In this way the sophist completes his joke without inviting Ktesippus to respond. At 298 E 9, he again uses inferential for his concluding statement.

86. His playful behavior here should be contrasted with how angry he was at 283 E 1-6. With the first mention of "laughter ," Plato not only undercuts Ktesippus' heretofore serious demeanor; he is also beginning to prepare us for his loud outburst at 300 D 3.

87. Even as he imitates the pair, Ktesippus can mock them as and their science as ; cf. 300 B 7. As the emphatic position of indicates (299 A 5), Ktesippus does in fact reverse (D13) by indicating that the brothers, too, are puppies and their father a dog.

88. For his trigger Euthydemus converts Ktesippus' reference to "enjoyment " to "need ." He then restricts need to that opportune moment ( and ) when in fact (good) drugs and (good) weapons are needed; cf. 299 B 6 and C 1-2 . Then he tries to reduce both occasions to absurdity by swinging the trigger term many to the extreme with and .

89. Euthydemus first slips "men " into the argument at 299 A 9. Then, after introducing a sick man and a soldier , he comes back with "man " at 299 B 6 to reinforce the standard against which the need for many goods will appear excessive. That Ktesippus knows his opponent is playing on the man / measure principle is indicated both by his reference to Delphi and to .

90. Cf. 286 B 7 and 303 E 1-3. (E14) is the first defeat for which Euthydemus is solely and unambiguously responsible. From here he will go down to defeat in (E16) and (E17) and thus depart from the dialogue with three straight losses.

91. Although (E14) and (D15) share the same topic (299 D 1), they do not form an argument-pair; so I have altered Bonitz's catalogue to reflect that difference.

92. With his use of "always" and "everywhere," Dionysodorus again exhibits that eristic impulse to swing the argument to the extreme limit. Familiar as we are with the move to attain the sense of ''time everlasting" from "always" (see 294 E), we might suspect that

the sophist is preparing to turn this trick on But as we shall see, he is here concentrating his attention on .

93. Aristotle has observed that a sophistical refutation can also be a joke; see his remarks on at SE 33.182 B 15.

94. This apparent refutation affords us the opportunity to contrast the eristic paradox with the Socratic. Both undermine the consensus omnium , that many goods and, in particular, gold are necessary and sufficient for the happy life. But for Socrates, the opinions of the many are a foil for the true account of the one good, wisdom. For the brothers, on the other hand, the eristic paradox is a tool by which they undermine any confidence in the power of to articulate the truth of . The eristic paradox leads to skepticism and misology; the Socratic inspires the listener to pursue wisdom.

95. Like inept boxers who telegraph their punches, the brothers are now revealing their strategy by calling for "agreement" at the very moment they fancy they have their opponent on the ropes; cf. at 299 B 5; in this regard, cf. also 298 D 8 and 296 C 5-9. Here, at 299 D 5-6, Dionysodorus has alerted Ktesippus with , which the young man caps with ; cf. 301 D 3-4. It is no accident that, after picturing the brothers "differing" with their opponents in the first and third episodes, Plato now has them seeking "agreement"; cf. also 294 B 10 and D 1-2; 295 A 5; and 302 B 1, D 7, E 1-7. Plato wants to show, in the words of Campbell, that "the devotees of this 'illogical logic' of disputation . . . confused verbal agreement with real agreement and difference'' ( Sophistes , p. xii); cf. Theaetetus 164 C 7-D 2.

96. In this way Ktesippus again returns tit for tat for what he suffered in (D13). But his youthful enthusiasm for eristic, together with his desire to display his skill openly for Kleinias (300 C 1), has led him to expose the fallacy once again. He will have to learn to conceal these devious tricks before he can become a full professor of eristic.

97. Here we should pause for a moment to note the remarkable way Ktesippus has countered every move of his adversary; he defends the commonsense attitude toward wealth, which Dionysodorus has tried to reduce to absurdity, by submitting "what they say "; he caps Dionysodorus' four uses of with and ; he picks up the reference to the happiest man with and then caps it with ; he matches the reference to "in the skull" with "in the skulls" of Scythians and returns to the desirability of having much gold (cf. 299 D 3); he overturns the of eristic (cf. 288 A 8) by submitting something even more amazing and then goes on to balance his opponent's

reference to "in the belly" and "in each eye socket" with "drinking out of" and "looking down inside"; and finally, he caps the whole by adding his own contribution with "in the hands.''

98. Contra Burner, I read this line (with Hawtrey, Commentary , p. 169) as a question.

99. Hawtrey is certainly right to puzzle over this strange use of ( Commentary , pp. 169-170). But on the assumption that the text is sound, I read (with Jowett, Dialogues , p. 240; and Rouse, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 413) to be elliptical for "But what [can they see quite dearly]?"

100. Ktesippus' remark at 300 A 6 has produced some confusion, with Jowett ( Dialogues , p. 240; cf. also the third edition, p. 163) and Rouse (in The Collected Dialogues of Plato , pp. 413-414) reading B and W, and Sprague ( Translation , p. 53) reading T. If we follow Jowett and Rouse and translate "Perhaps you don't think that they see ( )," then Euthydemus is being criticized for trying to uphold (2c), that their cloaks are things which cannot see. If we follow Sprague and read "You perhaps don't suppose you see them ," then Euthydemus is being mocked for supporting (2d), that their cloaks are things which cannot be seen. However, to appreciate the full force of the joke, we must see that here Ktesippus, too, is consciously employing the syntactic ambiguity embedded in the neuter accusative and infinitive construction so as to hold together both readings at the same time. Louis Méridier's translation, "Toi, tu leur refuses peut-être la vue," captures the Greek nicely ( Euthydème , vol. 5 [Paris, 1931], p. 186); cf. Hawtrey, Commentary , p. 170.

101. With , Ktesippus recalls 284 C 1-4 and 286 A 2, B 6, and C 6-8. With his reference to falling asleep, he goads Euthydemus for having become as dull and ignorant as a rock.

102. Having cut off the head of (D17), Ktesippus cauterizes it by taunting his opponent: "And so, because of your wisdom, you failed to realize that you said nothing on this point." Here, too, Ktesippus has provided a perceptive analysis of error: Dionysodorus has spoken falsely because of "ignorance."

103. As at 300 B 8 indicates, (E17) is the second limb of an argument-pair, thus requiring a correction of Bonitz's catalogue. Ktesippus is now so confident in his ability to play the game that he even invites his opponent to launch the next attack. Speculating on the cause of his aggressiveness, Socrates suggests that he is motivated by his . As the brothers play to their clique, so Ktesippus competes for his beloved.

104. Euthydemus' use of at 300 C 6 should recall Socrates' use of limiting at 296 B 5.

105. Cf. 275 E 5-6 and 287 E: .

106. Plato shows how carefully he has designed this finale to mirror the first eristic display by having Kleinias laugh at the moment of defeat and by having Ktesippus demonstrate his potential for orchestrating the eristic , so disruptive of serious philosophical discussion; cf. 276 B 7 and D 1, and 303 B 4-6.

107. In this way Plato shows how a young man who is generously endowed with the outstanding qualities that one must have to be a candidate for philosophy ( Republic 484 A-487 A) can have those very qualities warped by his "educators" in such a way that he is turned toward and finally comes to embrace the opposing measure.

108. In Lysis 211 B-C, Plato shows how eristic is spreading among Athenian youth by introducing Ktesippus as a teacher of eristic and Menexenus as his student; see Shorey, What Plato Said , p. 115. But Socrates never breaks off his association with him; see Phaedo 59 B 9. 109. For more on this pathology, see esp. Republic 489 D ff.

109. For more on this pathology, see esp. Republic 489 D ff.

110. Cf. Republic 539 B. In presenting this clash between Ktesippus and the brothers, Plato has given a vivid picture of the "distorted lawlessness " that had currently infiltrated the practice of dialectic and rendered it base ; see Republic 537 E. As Socrates tells us (300 D 7-9), Ktesippus has been able to pick up eristic through his "distorted auditing " of their method, for wisdom of this kind does not belong to any other "moderns" . In Philebus 16 C-17 A, Plato unambiguously stigmatizes eristics as "moderns" ( ) and contrasts them with the ''ancients" , who, because they lived closer to the gods, practiced dialectic properly. As is now clear, when Plato calls these eristics wise , he does not mean what he says. They are again the ignorant , who always seem to be too much with us; cf. Phaedo 101 E 5 and 90 C 2 , Lysis 216 A 7 , and Meno 75 C 8 .

111. By having Dionysodorus once again employ the antinomy between sameness and difference against Socrates (cf. 298 A 2-9), Plato not only provides a structural device by which he links (D18) to (D11); he also shows how easily and mechanically this concept juggler can slip into a familiar line of attack.

112. We have in this argument, as Friedländer puts it, "an undeniable reference to what is called Plato's 'theory of forms'" ( Plato ,

2:192); and Shorey adds: "The joke about in the Euthydemus is a distinct and familiar allusion to the Platonic idea of beauty" ( The Unity of Plato's Thought [Chicago, 1903], p. 31). For others who see the Idea in this passage, see Harold Cherniss ( Selected Papers [Leiden, 1977], p. 263); R. K. Sprague ( Plato's Use of Fallacy [London, 1962], pp. 25-30; Translation , pp. 55-57; and "Parmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox," Phronesis 12 [1967], 91-98); Strauss ("On the Euthydemus ," p. 18); R. E. Allen ( Plato's "Euthyphro" and the Earlier Theory of Forms [New York, 1970], p. 122); Keulen ( UPE , pp. 56-58 and esp. n. 66, where he surveys German scholarship on this problem); Hawtrey ( Commentary , p. 175); Richard Mohr ("Forms in Plato's Euthydemus,'' Hermes 112 [1984], 296-300); Szlezák (''Sokrates' Spott über Geheimhaltung," p. 83), D. G. Stuart ("An Interpretation of Plato's Euthydemus " [Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1980], pp. 254-263); and Narcy ( Le Philosophe , pp. 87-91). Gregory Vlastos ( Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher [Ithaca, 1991], p. 74) passes over the significance of ; cf. Shorey ( Unity , p. 31 n. 199).

113. It has not gone unnoticed that the antinomy between sameness and difference is one of the best devices that eristic has for generating controversy; see Republic 454 A-C. But it has not been appreciated how brilliantly Plato has satirized this very antinomy by employing it in his dramatic portrayal of the brothers themselves. Are they one or two? We might feel an inclination to say that the Tweedle-pair are so much alike that it doesn't matter which of the two performs the lead role in the questioning; that, in short, the two are the same ( ), or what geometers call "enantiomorphs," mirror-image forms of each other. As such, Dionysodorus does not differ from Euthydemus, and so any merely apparent differences between the two may be swept aside. And yet Plato has left a word here, a word there, to indicate that the one is different from the other . After all, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are not one but two (271 A 6-7), and besides, they have different names. So are the brothers the same or different? Neither and both.

114. We are doubtless to imagine that Dionysodorus delivers this joke with a grin from ear to ear; cf. 275 E 4. To be funny, the joke requires that both sameness and difference exist between the objects compared. That Socrates is not unlike an ox in appearance is obvious. But the possibility that he could be Dionysodorus forces him to say .

115. Thus Sprague ("Parmenides' Sail," p. 93).

116. The question , which Dionysodorus uses to express his attack against presence, is a simple,

idiomatic way of asking "How can one thing (Socrates) be another (an ox)?" But the task of rendering these words into English has overwhelmed translators; see Sprague ( Plato's Use of Fallacy , pp. 26-27, and Translation , pp. 56-57), W. K. C. Guthrie ( HGP , 4:278 and esp. n. 2), and Hawtrey ( Commentary , pp. 176-177). Dionysodorus is not trying to speak "cryptically" (Sprague), nor is he trying ''to confuse" Socrates and reduce him to ''meaningless repetition" (Hawtrey). The problem is how to capture the Greek in such a way as to be "lucid" and "to make sense" (Guthrie), without at the same time obscuring the rest of the argument. For Socrates will come back with the same words ( ) at 301 B 8 and C 1-2, but in a different sense . And again to capture this transition from the one to the other requires us to use the same English words for both passages. Sprague's translation "How can the different be different?" achieves this goal but leaves her open to attack from Guthrie for "making no sense." His translation, on the other hand, "How can one thing be made different?" is lucid but then he undervalues the rest of the argument.

117. "Plato, of course," as Shorey says, "is not going to discuss the theory of ideas in this connection. So Socrates attacks the Sophists with their own weapons" ( What Plato Said , p. 166). And Szlezák adds: "Wir sehen Sokrates seine Kenntnis der Anamnesis- und Ideenlehre . . . in der Tasche behalten" ("Sokrates' Spott über Geheimhaltung," p. 87).

118. The importance of (D11) for (D18) is now clearly evident. Just as

1. Chaeredemus, who is different from a father, is not (a father); and

2. Socrates, who is different from a stone, is not (a stone); so too

3. The Idea itself, which is different from its instance, is not (its instance).

119. See Gifford ( Euthydemus , p. 60), Hawtrey ( Commentary , p. 178), and Waterfield ( Early Socratic Dialogues , p. 367 n. 1).

120. It is not important what the subject is, for identity holds on all three levels. What we need to observe here is that Socrates is just juggling words eristically. We need not fear that in deflecting one eristic quibble Socrates may be undone by another, the self-predicating fallacy; see Cherniss ( Selected Papers , pp. 330-336), R. E. Allen ( Studies in Plato's Metaphysics [New York, 1965], pp. 43-47), Sprague ( Plato's Use of Fallacy , p. 27 n. 15), and Stuart ("An Interpretation," p. 273 n. 27).

121. Thus Benson Mates ("Identity and Predication in Plato," Phronesis 24 [1979], 222): "It is striking that in the dialogues no inter-

locutor ever hesitates a moment before agreeing to ('the beautiful is beautiful'), ('the just is just'), and the like; nobody ever says 'Wait a minute; that doesn't make sense' or even 'I don't quite follow you, Socrates.' The reason, I think, is that for any Greek such a sentence would be a logical truth, in the Quinean sense that (a) it is true, and (b) every result of substituting another adjective for its only non-logical constant is equally true. In short, such a sentence would be felt as obviously and trivially true."

122. Here Socrates is hoisting Dionysodorus on Euthydemus' lemma (cf. 293 B 8-C 1 and 298 C 4-5). Just as

1. He, who is a father, is a father; and

2. He, who is a man, is a man; and

3. Gold, which is gold, is gold; so too

4. The different, which is different, is different.

Therefore, Socrates has indeed established a positive sense in which the different can be different, one that is the same as Dionysodorus' thesis in word , but different in meaning .

123. Plato has shown how being "present with" eristics forces Socrates to imitate their wisdom. In fact, (D18) is ideally suited to serve as a model for how eristic, under the guidance of wisdom, can be used for a good end. Therefore, Socrates can argue "eristically" if he so chooses, as Bonitz noted in his polemic with Susemihl ( Platonische Studien , 3rd ed. [Berlin, 1886], p. 117 n. 13).

124. Thus Sprague ( Plato's Use of Fallacy , p. 29) and Narcy ( Le Philosophe , p. 91).

125. In this argument Dionysodorus' ascent and descent are reminiscent of his brother's in (E9) and illustrate the problem of generalizing "too hastily both in the way of induction and deduction" (Campbell, Sophistes , p. xii); cf. 279 E-280 A for the properly Socratic way to conduct these leaps.

126. Hawtrey ( Commentary , p. 179) and Waterfield ( Early Socratic Dialogues , p. 367).

127. A Greek writer normally uses the article to avoid any confusion that may arise in an ambiguous construction of this type. By contrast, Dionysodorus made no effort to avoid this ambiguity at 300 B 1-3 by limiting and with the article. That Socrates is not fooled by this amphiboly is dearly indicated through his plea for "forgiveness" (301 D 4).

128. For the serious counterpart to this parody, consider the testimonial of Alcibiades from the Symposium (221 E 1-222 A 6): "If anyone consents to listen to the arguments of Socrates, they will at first

appear quite ridiculous ; with such words and phrases are they wrapped on the outside . . . for he speaks of pack-asses, smiths, cobblers and tanners. . . . But when someone opens them up and, crawling inside as it were, obtains a fresh view, then he will find that they alone have intelligence . . . they alone pertain to what is fitting for a good man to consider."

129. So we should not be put off by critics who find here "Plato somewhat below his best" in this "verbose" argument (Hawtrey, Commentary , pp. 180-181). No one knew better than Plato how tedious eristic cavils can be; yet that fact did not prevent him from seeing the need to critique them. Plato can, of course, dismiss eristic disputes if the occasion warrants it; see Republic 436 C-437 A.

130. In just this second move Dionysodorus has already converted the term into what he wants, for most naturally refers to Socrates' household goods or property.

131. After (D11) and (D13), this verbal machine returns to the possessive adjective "yours" for a third time. Thus Plato continues to parody the eristic mind for the way it automatically falls into familiar grooves and habitually retraces decayed ground.

132. Moreover, the role played by the three verbs ( , , and ) in assisting these slight equivocations should not be underestimated. Dionysodorus begins the questioning as if he wanted to know whether Socrates has some way of "recognizing" and "knowing" what is his own, and then finishes by establishing a criterion for what Socrates ''regards" or "holds'' to be the conditions for the ownership of cows and sheep.

133. For the serious counterpart to this ironical pondering, see Phaedo 95 E 7-8.

134. Socrates of course does not want to suspect where the will end; see Gorgias 454 B 8-C 5.

135. As he explains below (302 D 1-2), Socrates can answer "no" to this question because the epithet is not properly applied to "his" Zeus. At 302 C 4-D 3, Socrates responds to Dionysodorus the way he did at 297 E 1-298 A 2, by detailing the facts of his family history as if the sophist were again asking for real information.

136. See Phaedo 62 B-D for a text that pictures the proper ordering of God, man, and beast.

137. This is not the silence that supervenes upon the defeated in eristic controversy, but that of the dialectician who can no longer endure contact with his antipode. Throughout (D20), Plato has carefully prepared the way for Socrates' withdrawal by picturing his growing impatience with the Crab; see 302 A 5-6, C 2-3, D 8, and E 6.

138. By bringing back Ktesippus as and showing Dionysodorus operating on Heracles again (303 A 5-8), Plato carries us back to 297 C-D in order to leave us with the eerie feeling "Here they go again."

139. Familiar as is from Olympian 1.52, the term is particularly apt for signaling Ktesippus' withdrawal and for prefiguring the epinician ode with its concluding reference to "water is best." For the evidence that a philosopher never "stands aside" from real dialectical encounters, see Theaetetus 169 B 6-8. Socrates brings his narration to a close with a stylish use of asyndeton (303 A 9); cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.19.1420 A 7.

140. See Sprague ( Plato's Use of Fallacy , p. 17), Friedländer ( Plato , 2: 336 n. 9), and Waterfield ( Early Socratic Dialogues , p. 300).

141. Shorey ( Selected Papers , 2: 131); also A. E. Taylor ("it is precisely those who have been most occupied in the construction of anti-nomies who are most in danger of ending as sceptics and misologists"; " ," in Varia Socratica [Oxford, 1911], p. 91) and Campbell ("a vain-glorious scepticism''; Sophistes , p. xii).