1. That of General Federico Tinoco from 1917 to 1919. See Orlando Salazar Mora, "Le Système politique au Costa Rica, 1889-1919" (Ph.D. diss., Paris-III, Mimeographed), pp. 298-301.

For the problem of the army in Costa Rica we rely on the work of Constantino Urcuyo Fournier, espedally his Ph.D. diss., "Les Forces de sécurité publique et la Politique au Costa Rica, 1960-1978," (Paris-V, mimeographed), 432 pp.

2. See José Luis Vega Carballo, Costa Rica: Una interpretación sociopolítica de su desarrollo reciente (San José, 1977), p. 10, and the interview with José Figueres in Alfredo Peña, Democracia y Golpe militar. Entrevista a Juan Bosch (Caracas, 1979), p. 43.

3. Jose Figueres had a personal and paternalistic relationship to the members of the guard. He went to the funerals of those who had died, and assisted their families. See Constantino Urcuyo Fournier, "Les Raisons, les Fonctions et les Limites de l'abolition de l'armée au Costa Rica" (San José, 1979, Manuscript), p. 5.

4. Interview with Alain Rouquié, San José, Costa Rica, 29 April 1981.

5. According to the analysis of Rodolfo Cerdas, La Crisis de la democracia liberal en Costa Rica (San José, Costa Rica, 1976), p. 76.

6. Carballo, Costa >Rica, p. 16.

7. A Costa Rican deputy said recently to the author: "The Costa Rican people are very attached to democratic institutions. When two peasants have a conflict about their boundaries, they do not shoot each other as in our neighboring countries, they go to court."

8. On the rotation of members of the police force and their professional instability, see Fournier, Les Raisons, p. 9.

9. See Samuel Stone, "Las convulsiones del istmo centroamericano: raices de un conflicto entre elites," Estudios CIAPA (San José, Costa Rica), no. 1 (1979):23-24.

10. According to William Cline and Enrique Delgado, eds., Economic Integration in Central America (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 68.

11. Carballo, Costa Rica., pp. 12 ff.

12. According to Winfield J. Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-1959 (Columbia, Mo., 1972), p. 13.

13. Silvio Villegas, "La Politique extérieure de Juan Vicente Gómez," vol. 1 (Ph.D. thesis, Paris-III, 1980), pp. 277 ff. Domingo Alberto Rangel, Los Andinos en el poder. Balance de una hegemonía, 1899-1945 (Caracas, 1964), p. 169. See also Robert L. Gilmore, continue

Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens, Ohio, 1964).

14. See Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela since 1958: The consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, Md., 1978), p. 96, and Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed forces, p. 84.

15. Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed forces, p. 113.

16. Humberto Njaim et al., El Sistema política venezolano (Caracas, 1975), p. 12.

17. On the coalition AD, COPEI, URD (Democratic Republican Union) see Gene E. Bigler, "The Armed Forces and Patterns of Civil-Military Relations," in John Martz and D. Myers, eds., Venezuela: The Democratic Experience (New York, 1977), pp. 119-127.

18. We simply note that the income from petroleum helped to weaken if not to eliminate the large agrarian bourgeoisie as a social force and to retard the industrialization that no doubt facilitated the entrenchment of a stable representative system.

19. Njaim et al., El Sistema, pp. 41-56.

20. On 24 June 1960 Betancourt was the victim of an attack that cost the life of the head of his military staff. After they were arrested the organizers of the attack revealed that Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had been directly involved. See Rómulo Betancourt, Tres Años de gobierno democrático, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1962), p. 318.

21. See U.S. Army Area Handbook for Venezuela (Washington, D.C., 1965), chapter 18, pp. 545-547.

22. See Betancourt, "Palabras de optimismo y conciliación al comenzar 1961," in Tres Años, vol. 1, p. 413, as well as "Quatrième message présidentiel," ibid., vol. 2, pp. 320-321.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 390, 414.

22. See Betancourt, "Palabras de optimismo y conciliación al comenzar 1961," in Tres Años, vol. 1, p. 413, as well as "Quatrième message présidentiel," ibid., vol. 2, pp. 320-321.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 390, 414.

24. Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1979), p. 122.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 123.

24. Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1979), p. 122.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 123.

24. Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas, 1979), p. 122.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 123.

27. This is the term used by Casanova in "El partido del Estado, cincuenta años del PRI," Nexos (México) (April and May 1979).

28. See Franklin D. Margiotta, "Civilian Control and the Mexican Military: Changing Patterns of Political Influence," in C. Welsh, ed., Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany, N.Y., 1976), p. 233.

29. See Guillermo Boils, Los Militares y la Política en México, 1915-1974 (México, 1975), p. 54. break

30. This is the thesis of, among others, Jean Mayer, in La Révolution mexicaine, 1910-1940 (Paris, 1973), passim and pp. 305-307.

31. Jorge Alberto Lozoya, El Ejército mexicano, 1911-1965 (México, 1971), p. 65.

32. With around seventy thousand men in the armed forces, Mexico has spent less than 10 percent of the national budget since 1950 on defense. See Joseph Loftus, Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938-1965 (Santa Monica, Calif., 1968). pp. 11-36.

33. Mexico, which has the second-largest population in the continent, is only in fourth place in numbers in the military, far behind Brazil (200,000 men), Cuba (120,000), and Argentina (150,000).

34. Novedades (Mexico City), 6 May 1967.

35. See Margiotta, Civilian Control, p. 234.

36. Ibid., pp. 236 and 237.

35. See Margiotta, Civilian Control, p. 234.

36. Ibid., pp. 236 and 237.

37. See Boils, Los Militares, pp. 112-113, and Margiotta, ibid., pp. 225-226.

38. Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversation among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Linz and Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democracy (Baltimore, Md., 1979), p. 28.

39. Gilhodes, "Les eléctions colombiennes de 1978," Problémes d'Amériaue latine (Paris), no. 3 (July 1979):63-88.

40. In 1922, the Colombian infantry only had 1,500 men and 139 officers. See J. León Helguera, "The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia," Journal of Inter-American Studies (July 1961): 351-357, and Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerillas and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, Mass., 1973), pp. 6-56.

41. Francisco Leal Buitrago, "Polftica e intervención militar en Colombia," Revista mexicana de sociología 33, no. 3 (May-June 1970): 501-502.

42. See "Los sueldos militares," La República (Bogotá), 19 November 1980.

43. There are many works on la violencia . The classic work is that of Germán Guzmán et al., La Violencia en Colombia, 2 vols. (Bogotá, 1962, 1964). For an interpretative synthesis see Gilhodes, "La violence en Colombie, banditisme et guerre sociale," Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-brésilien-Caravelle (Toulouse), no. 26 (1976): 69-81.

44. Thus the Firmes movement in which Gabriel García Márquez participated was led by Enrique Santos Calderón and Daniel Semper Pizano, both journalists and sons of the Liberal oligarchy linked to the large daily newspaper. El Tiempo .

45. This is the title of the penetrating article by Alexander Wilde cited in note 38, this chapter. break

46. Gilhodes, Politique et Violence. La question agraire en Colombie (Paris, 1974), p. 503.

47. According to Wilde a veritable "explosion of participation" took place in 1946 with a 60 to 70 percent voting turnout ("Conversation," p. 41.)

48. See Gilhodes, Politique et Violence, and Paul Oquist, Violencia, Conflicto y Politica en Colombia (Bogotá, 1978), pp. 277-290.

49. According to the interpretation of L. A. Costa Pinto, "Clase, partido, poder: el caso colombiano," Aportes (Paris) (October 1971): 100.

50. See Wilde, Conversations, pp. 62 ff. and Oquist, Violencia, pp. 327-332.

51. "Hablan los generales Gabriel Paris y Deogracias Fonseca," El Espectador (Bogotá), 18 December 1979.

52. See Jaime Carrillo Bedoya, Los Paros cívicos en Colombia (Bogotá, 1981), pp. 144 ff.

53. Gustave Gallón Girardo, Quince Años de estado de sitio en Colombia, 1958-1978 (Bogotá, 1979).

55. The Movimiento 19 de abril, because it is not Marxist and still less Leninist but rather is anchored in a national political tradition supposedly "based on the frustration of the Anapista masses after the electoral fraud carried out by the oligarchy in 1970" (pamphlet, May 1981) is more dangerous to the system. We recall that it was the seizure of the Dominican embassy where a number of diplomats were kept hostage by a commando group of M19 in February 1980 that made that organization known to the world.

56. Some headlines in the major newspapers: "New Military Court for Cocaine in the Gloria" (the navy training ship). El Tiempo, 7 March 1978; "Four Sergeants to Military Court for Drugs," E; Tiempo, 8 April 1978; "Eight Military Men Arrested for Marijuana," El Colombiano (Medellín), 21 September 1980; "Military Court for Military Men Linked to Drug Traffic," El Tiempo, 21 September 1980; "No Members of the Military Involved in Drug Traffic: Minister of Defense," El Espectador, 1 November 1980.

57. "Convening of Military Court to Judge Indians of the Cauca," El Espectador, 17 January 1980.

58. Not only Amnesty International or the International Association continue

for Human Rights, but a forum on human rights in which members of the Conservative and Liberal establishments participated, such as Vásquez Carrisoza and Díaz Callejas.

59. "La República tropical," El Espectador, 16 December 1979.

60. That is, following the Uruguayan model of a prolonged coup d'état during which the military kept the elected civilian president, Bordaberry, as head of state but took away his real power (see chap. 8).

61. After the Dominican embassy affair, El Espectador received (and published) numerous letters from readers who called for military rule to save the country's institutions (El Espectador, 29 March 1980). El Siglo (Conservative) has specialized in exaggerated praise for the virtues of the military. The following appeared in its number of 1 June 1979: "In an indolent and decadent country in which the modes of behavior are insipid, the stem confident and lofty presence of the military is an unusual phenomenon which provokes both admiration and hatred."

62. See on this point the view of the general who was head of the army in 1979, Fernando Landazábal Reyes, in his book La Subversión y el Conflicto social (Bogotá, 1980), pp. 112-113.

63. As is demonstrated by the operation of the Coffee Producers Federation, an autonomous but quasi-governmental agency.

64. This is the view of Fernando Rojas H., El Estado en los ochenta, un régimen policivo? (Bogotá, 1978).

65. See Daniel Pecaut, "La Colombie de 1974 a 1979, du 'mandat clair' à la 'crise morale,'" Problèmes d'Amériique latine 52, pp. 46-47, and Bedoya, Los Paros civicos, passim.

66. The Confederation of Colombian workers (CTC) is Liberal, the Union of Colombian workers (UTC) Conservative. The extreme left is strong in the independent unions (teachers, petroleum workers) and the Communist Confederation of Colombian Workers Unions (CSTC) has become stronger at the expense of the traditional parties. See Pecaut, ibid., pp. 42-45.

67. Pierre de Charentenay, "Bourgeoisie nouvelle en Colombie," Amérique latine (Paris), no. 5 (Spring 1981):50.

68. At least this seems to be indicated by the interviews with generals Matallana and Puyana that appeared in Alternativa (De cember 1979) (see El Espectador, 18 February 1979). General Valencia Tovar seems to share their point of view in "El pensamiento militar," El Tiempo, 22 February 1979. See also "La desilusión de los generales" by Femando Cepeda Ulloa in El Tiempo, 23 March 1979.

69. "'Communist subversion is spreading' says General Forero in continue

Conference of American Commanders," El Espectador, 31 October 1979. The appointment of General Landazabal Reyes as chief of the general staff follows the same lines. General Landazábal Reyes is the author of many works on subversion: Estrategia de la subversión y su desarrollo en América latina, Politica y tactica de la guerra revolucionaria, Guía de asuntos civiles para el mantenimiento del orden público, etc .

70. See Leal Buitrago, "Política e intervendon," pp. 509-510.

71. Bigler, "The Armed Forces," p. 128.

72. See "Doubts Plague Big Oil Producer," Financial Times Survey, 8 June 1981, and "Venezuela Growing Pains," Newsweek, 22 June 1981.

73. Hundreds of students demonstrating peacefully in the Plaza of the Three Cultures in the Tlatelolco section on the eve of the Olympic Games were dispersed by the army using its weapons. The exact number killed is not known but the figure involves several dozen. See Jorge Carrión et al., Tres Culturas en agonía. Tlatelolco (Mexico, 1968), 1971.

74. Rafael Segovia in Vuelta (Me xico City), August 1977, reprinted in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, vol. 2. (Mexico City, 1977): p. 506.

75. Javier Lopez Moreno, La Reforma politica en Mexico (Mexico City, 1979).

76. In evaluating that figure it should be noted that participation in legislative elections is always lower than in those for the presidency. In addition, as Rafael Segovia notes in a study of the federal elections of 1979 in Foro Internacional (Mexico City) 20, no. 3, p. 398, the drop in participation may be due to increased reliability of voting lists because of the presence of representatives of the opposition parties.

77. To use the expression of Susan Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico (Princeton, N.J., 1977).

78. See Fournier, "Les Forces de securite," p. 290 ff.