1. Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 50.

2. Eugene Bardach, "Problems of Problem Definition in Policy Analysis," Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management 1 (1981): 161, 163.

3. UL tests kerosene heaters, for example, using certified K-1 kerosene fuel as specified in the manufacturer's instructions. Testing for "flare up" would require the addition of at least trace amounts of gasoline to the fuel.

4. Henry E. Collins, UL vice president, government relations, Hearing Before the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C., October 27, 1982 (transcript), 261.

5. CPSC, "Memorandum to the Commission from the Office of Program Management on Criteria for Endorsement of Publications Developed by Outside Organizations," August 22, 1984.

6. See, for example, Hemenway, Performance vs. Design Standards.

7. For a survey of programs utilizing "technology-forcing," see Richard B. Stewart, "Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework," California Law Review 69, no. 5 (September 1981): 1256, 1296-1306.

8. This example is set forth in a letter dated June 11, 1979, from R. J. Finegan, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, to Sava Sherr, ANSI, included in a preliminary report of the ANSI Safe Work Practices Task Group, June 1985.

9. Ibid.

10. NFPA 408-1980, sec. A-5-3.3.

11. The other categories—careerists and politicians—have less application in the private sector. Other than at UL, there are few careerist standards-setters. Participants "volunteer" for standards-setting but make their careers elsewhere. At UL, professional influences are dominant among most careerists. Finally, there are few, if any, politicians, in the sense of employees "who see themselves as having a future in elective or appointive office outside the agency" (Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, 374-82).

12. Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 113, 122.

13. Thomas M. Deitz and Robert W. Rycroft, The Risk Professionals (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987).

14. Hamilton, "The Role of Nongovernmental Standards," 1350.

15. Earl F. Cheit, The Useful Arts and the Liberal Tradition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 57-82.

16. See, for example, Richard L. Meehan, The Atom and the Fault: Experts, Earthquakes, and Nuclear Power (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984) (geologists versus structural engineers).

17. Unlike in medicine, law, and many other professions, there is no centralized professional engineering organization. Engineering societies are organized around the special fields of engineering: civil, chemical, electrical, and nuclear, for example. Fire protection engineering is another specialty with its own professional society. Fire protection engineers also constitute a significant percentage of the NFPA membership.

18. Human factors engineering, a relatively new specialty with roots in psychology, attempts to "fit the machine to the person." In the 1950s, through applied research on human responses to various aircraft instrumentation, human factors engineers assisted the Air Force in improving the safety of airplanes. When applied to questions about motor capability, ergonomics, or human reflex, the field is well accepted. See, generally, Ernest McCormick, Human Factors Engineering, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955). A few engineers purport to apply this field to a broader gamut of human behavior, often in a manner that directly challenges existing notions of fault and responsibility. See, for example, R. Matthiew Seiden's discussion of "error-provocative" product designs; those that, in his words, "provoke, seduce, invite, mislead, or otherwise trap a user into making a mistake" (Product Safety Engineering for Managers [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984], 114). This philosophy is widely rejected by most engineers and may account for the skeptical view many have of human factors engineering.

19. Samuel C. Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 26. Florman is one of the few outspoken critics of the revolution in professional engineering ethics. He opposes the notion, now expressed in slightly different terms in several professional codes, that an engineer owes a special duty to protect public health and safety. Codes enacted at the turn of the century provided that an engineer's sole responsibility was to the employer. See also Edwin T. Layton, Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the Engineering Profession (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1971).

20. Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, 26. The distinction, by no means a clear one, is suggested by Florman's discussion of the engineer's role of "creator" and "guardian." He advocates a "balance" between the two, but clearly favors erring on the side of the former.

21. In the gas space heater proceedings, for example, an NBS engineeer informed the CPSC that "there is no apparent reason why a separate ODS pilot cannot be used in addition to the current pilot (except economics)" (Esher Kweller, NBS, memorandum of January 16, 1979).