1. I shall follow the practice of listing at the beginning of the appropriate chapters all the relevant remarks Aristotle makes on exactness in the ethical treatises, starting with those from the N.E . I will also append any relevant remarks from M.M ., although I shall not draw any conclusions that are based solely on them since the authenticity of this treatise remains in doubt. I shall number Aristotle's remarks by using a system that indicates by the first digit of the number assigned to a remark the chapter in which the remark occurs. This system will make it easier to refer to Aristotle's remarks throughout the various chapters of this study. At times, I will also number some other passages that I quote from Aristotle and Plato in order to facilitate subsequent reference to them.

Following standard practice, I shall refer to passages in Aristotle's works by identifying the appropriate Aristotelian treatise followed by a Bekker page (e.g., N.E . 1097a15). Occasionally, I refer to a portion of Aristotle's text by identifying the appropriate Aristotelian treatise followed by the book and chapter of that treatise which contains the text (e.g., N.E . 1.x). Where the identity of an Aristotelian treatise is obvious from the context, I omit identification of the treatise in referring to a passage. Again following standard practice, I refer to passages in Plato's works by identifying the appropriate Platonic work followed by a Stephanus page (e.g., Republic 602B).

2. Xenophon, Atheniensium Respublica , 1.5.3.

3. Euripides, Hippolytus , 460ff., 1115. For a discussion of the different aspects the ancients associated with exactness, see D. Kurz, AKRIBEIA (Goppingen: Verlag Alfred Kummerle, 1970).

4. A. Grant argues in his commentary on the N.E . that its method is demonstrative, that the investigation proceeds by giving deductions from a priori principles—see his The Ethics of Aristotle (New York: Arno Press, 1973), pp. 396-397. More recently, T. Upton in his "Aristotle's Moral Epistemology," The New Scholasticism 56 (1982), pp. 169-184, and A.M. Wiles in her "Method in The Nicoma- chean Ethics," The New Scholasticism 56 (1982), pp. 239-243, defend a view which

is quite similar to that of Grant. D. Keyt's reconstruction of Aristotle's derivation of the human good in the N.E. provides the best evidence for the use of the deductive method; see his "Intellectualism in Aristotle," in J. P. Anton and A. Preuss (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy , vol. 2 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 364-387. H. D. P. Lee, in his "Geometrical Method and Aristotle's Account of First Principles," Classical Quarterly 29 (1935), pp. 113-124, argues that Aristotle's epistemological model is that of the axiomatic-deductive method we encounter in Euclid's works and that Aristotle's views influenced Euclid. That the inductive method is the method of Aristotle's own ethical investigation has been advocated by J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), vol. 1, p. 48, and more recently by R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, Aristote: L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain: Publicationes Universitaires, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 19-20, and N. O. Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 70ff. And that the method is dialectical has been advocated by J. Burnet in his text of and commentary on the N.E., The Ethics of Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1900), p. v, L. H. G. Greenwood, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), pp. 131-133, and H. H. Joachim, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 3. More recently, some version of the dialectical method has been defended by T. Irwin in his "Aristotle's Methods in Ethics," in D. J. O'Meara (ed.), Studies in Aristotle (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), his ''First Principles in Aristotle's Ethics," Midwest Studies in Philosophy , vol. 3 (1978), his translation and commentary of the N.E. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), and his Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), as well as by J. Barnes, "Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 (1980), pp. 490-511. For some critical comments on the view that the method of ethics is dialectical, see W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 32-45.

5. G. E. L. Owen, " Tithenai ta Phainomena ," in Aristote et les Problemes de Methode (Louvain: Publicationes Universitaires, 1961), pp. 83-103. For further discussion on the issues Owen raises, see M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 8, and T. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Irwin in the latter work distinguishes between strong and weak dialectic.

6. Of course, as Hardie, op. cit. , p. 36, has suggested, it is not obvious that we should be speaking of the method in ethics.