1. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 517, 542, 590.

2. Ibid., pp. 593, 595, 596, 598. Bundy adds, in qualification, that Europe is safe from nuclear danger "as long as the countries of that region are self-confident and the tradition of mutual trust between them and the United States is maintained" (p. 598).

1. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 517, 542, 590.

2. Ibid., pp. 593, 595, 596, 598. Bundy adds, in qualification, that Europe is safe from nuclear danger "as long as the countries of that region are self-confident and the tradition of mutual trust between them and the United States is maintained" (p. 598).

3. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 52, 68.

4. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Miller, p. 109 (first published in International Security 7, no. 2 [Fall 1982]).

5. Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 47-49.

6. Details on these incidents are from Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 106-122.

7. See Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International Security 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985-1986), p. 20.

8. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," pp. 118-121.

9. Ibid., pp. 121-122; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 78-79. Some of this information had not been revealed before the publication of Garthoff's important book.

8. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," pp. 118-121.

9. Ibid., pp. 121-122; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 78-79. Some of this information had not been revealed before the publication of Garthoff's important book.

10. Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 58; Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 28, 47; Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," p. 28.

11. Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," pp. 6-8.

12. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

13. Ibid., pp. 13, 29. Ball cites several other factors besides those we mention, such as the U.S. Navy's antisubmarine warfare strategy, as risk factors for unintended nuclear war at sea. This article is required reading for all serious students of how nuclear war might begin.

11. Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," pp. 6-8.

12. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

13. Ibid., pp. 13, 29. Ball cites several other factors besides those we mention, such as the U.S. Navy's antisubmarine warfare strategy, as risk factors for unintended nuclear war at sea. This article is required reading for all serious students of how nuclear war might begin.

11. Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," pp. 6-8.

12. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

13. Ibid., pp. 13, 29. Ball cites several other factors besides those we mention, such as the U.S. Navy's antisubmarine warfare strategy, as risk factors for unintended nuclear war at sea. This article is required reading for all serious students of how nuclear war might begin.

14. Johnson, cited in Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 218-219; Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row and the Reader's Digest Association, 1979), p. 136. We do not know if the reports were true. The important thing is that such an action by Schlesinger would be quite plausible.

15. Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 7; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 246.

16. Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," International Security 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 99; H. W. Brands, Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management

in the Taiwan Strait," International Security 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 124, 138.

17. I. F. Stone, "The Brink," in The Cuban Missile Crisis, ed. Robert A. Divine (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971), p. 156 (first published in New York Review of Books, April 14, 1966, pp. 12-16); Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, p. 16.

18. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 481-482, 485 (emphasis added); Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 596-597, 616; Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 202; William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970," in Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 281.

19. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 641, 886, 895, 898, 903, 914, 916; Nixon, RN, p. 527.

20. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 468, 520, 521, 536.

21. Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, pp. 71-72.

22. Daniel Ellsberg, "A Call to Mutiny," in The Deadly Connection: Nuclear War and U.S. Intervention, ed. Joseph Gerson (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1986), pp. 36, 39 (emphasis in original); Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, pp. 47-49.

23. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, pp. 54-60; Garthoff, Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 41; Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," pp. 129-130.

24. Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis," in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An "International Security" Reader, ed. Stephen E. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 296; Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 531.

25. Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 974. For the original, see Presidential Documents 16 (January 28, 1980).

26. See Ellsberg, "Call to Mutiny," pp. 37-39, 45. At this writing, commentators such as Charles Krauthammer are citing the Carter Doctrine to justify the Reagan administration's intervention of nuclear-armed U.S. Navy ships in the Iran-Iraq wary—even though there is no connection between the two. The Carter Doctrine refers specifically to defense against an "outside force"; the Iran-Iraq war is a conflict between gulf states in which the United States is the outside force.

27. Christopher Paine, "On the Beach: The Rapid Deployment Force and the Nuclear Arms Race," in Deadly Connection, ed. Gerson, pp. 113, 117; Ellsberg, "Call to Mutiny," p. 44.

28. Joseph J. Kruzel, cited in Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, p. 55 (from "Military Alerts and Diplomatic Signals," in The Limits of Military Intervention, ed. Ellen P. Stern [Sage, 1977], p. 89); Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," pp. 99, 130, 132, 135-136.

29. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," p. 131; Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, p. 103.

30. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 536.

31. David Woods, Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1982, cited in Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985), pp. 171-172. According to Chomsky, "Lehman said he envisioned a conventional rather than a nuclear global war with the USSR—conceivable, but hardly likely."

32. Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 69-70, 91, 147.

33. Peter Hayes, Walden Bello, and Lyuba Zarsky, "Korean Tripwire," Nation 245, no. 8 (September 19, 1987), p. 256; see also their American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (New York: Penguin, 1986), pp. ix, 1, 2. American Lake is a crucial study of the Pacific's many nuclear dangers.

34. "Who's Who, and Why, in Angola," Economist, June 14, 1986, p. 33.

35. Spector, Undeclared Bomb, pp. 288, 293, 284.

36. Bernard Avishai and Avner Cohen, "Time to Heed the Nuclear Threat in the Middle East," Boston Globe, April 3, 1988; Pranger and Tahtinen, quoted in Taysir N. Nashif, Nuclear Warfare in the Middle East: Dimensions and Responsibilities (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1984), p. 60.

37. Spector, Undeclared Bomb, pp. 164, 180, 32, 162.

38. Ibid., pp. 186-187; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad; Avishai and Cohen, "Nuclear Threat," p. 67.

37. Spector, Undeclared Bomb, pp. 164, 180, 32, 162.

38. Ibid., pp. 186-187; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad; Avishai and Cohen, "Nuclear Threat," p. 67.

39. Spector, Undeclared Bomb, pp. 179-180, 162.

40. Avishai and Cohen, "Nuclear Threat," p. 67; Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, p. 1.

41. New York Times, June 24, 1987; "Iranian Guns Aimed at Soviet Convoy," Patriot Ledger (Quincy, Mass.), November 20, 1987, p. 4; Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 1, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 244-278; Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: A Complete Inventory, Neptune Papers No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace and the Institute for Policy Studies, 1988), pp. 39-73; Paine, "On the Beach," p. 119.