The Romance of American Psychology "nsd0e2726"

5 The Career of Cold War Psychology

1. John G. Darley, "Contract Support of Research in Psychology," American Psychologist 7 (December 1952):719.

2. Department of the Army, "Psychological Operations," Department of the Army Field Manual, FM 33-5 (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, January 1962), i.

3. Even decades later, this was still considered the most significant lesson of the World War II experience. See National Academy of Sciences, Behavioral and Social Science Research in the Department of Defense: A Framework for Management, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Management of Behavioral Science Research in the Department of Defense, Division of Behavioral Sciences, National Research Council (Washington, D.C., 1971), 6.

4. This phrase was used by Theodore Vallance, the director of Project Camelot's sponsoring organization, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at the American University. See Theodore R. Vallance, "Psychological Aspects of Social Change Mediated Through the Interaction of Military Systems of Two Cultures," in U.S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, Technical Report S-I, Psychological Research in National Defense Today (June 1967), 314. Although not published until 1967, Vallance presented this material as a talk at the September 1964 meetings of the American Psychological Association, before Camelot was canceled.

5. Darley, "Contract Support of Research in Psychology," 720. On the institutionalization and scope of psychological research for the military in the immediate postwar period, and articulation of the idea that defense research was an example of psychological professionals' public service in a democratic society, see Lyle H. Lanier, "The Psychological and Social Sciences in the National Military Establishment," American Psychologist 4 (May 1949), 127-147.

The critical postwar role of Department of Defense funding has been more widely acknowledged by historians of the physical sciences than by historians of psychology, probably because the sums involved and absence of other public sources of support were even more dramatic. By the early 1950s, 70 percent of all work conducted in academic physics departments was for the DOD, and university campuses were inundated with classified scientific research contracts. See, for example, Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-1960," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 18 (1987):149-229.

6. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science, 1950-51 and 1951-52 (Washington, D.C.):39-40, table F.

7. Quoted in Simpson, "U.S. Mass Communications Research and Counterinsurgency After 1945," 12-13.

8. Frank A. Geldard, "Military Psychology: Science or Technology?" American Journal of Psychology 66 (July 1953):335-348.

9. See Talcott Parsons, "Social Science: A Basic National Resource," in The Nationalization of the Social Sciences, ed. Samuel Z. Klausner and Victor M. Lidz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 41-112. This important document, although not published until 1986, was commissioned by the Social Science Research Council as part of its effort to persuade politicians that National Science Foundation funding for social science should be mandated from the outset. (The NSF was finally "allowed" but not "required" to support social research.) Although Parsons's report was thought ill-suited for its purpose because it considered philosophical issues as well as cataloging the practical effectiveness of government-supported social science, it does illustrate how thoroughly arguments for social science's inclusion in the government's expanded postwar science effort relied upon World War II successes. For a general discussion of the initial campaign to include social science in the NSF, see Otto N. Larsen, Milestones and Millstones: Social Science at the National Science Foundation, 1945-1991 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992), chap. 1.

10. Barton Meyers, "The Effects of Funding on Psychology in the United States after World War II" (unpublished paper, n.d.), 20.

11. Lerner and Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences.

12. Parsons, "Social Science," 107.

13. For one such prophetic warning, see E. A. Shils, "Social Science and Social Policy," Philosophy of Science 16 (July 1949):219-242, reprinted in Social Scientists and International Affairs, 35-49.

14. Henry W. Riecken, Assistant Director for Social Sciences, National Science Foundation, "National Resources in the Social Sciences," in Symposium Proceedings: The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research, 26-28 March 1962, ed. William A. Lybrand (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1962), 300. In 1938 the entirè budget for military research and development was $14 million. See Crawford and Biderman, eds., Social Scientists and International Affairs, 10.

15. Good sources for data on levels of military funding for psychological and social science research include: DDSFAR; Irving Louis Horowitz, "Social Science and Public Policy: Implications of Modem Research," in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship Between Social Science and Practical Politics, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), 339-376; Michael T. Klare, War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), apps. For a comparison with recent Department of Defense expenditures, see James E. Driskell and Beckett Olmstead, "Psychology and the Military: Research Applications and Trends," American Psychologist 44 (January 1989):43-54. This review is also useful for illustrating how little the perspective of military psychologists has changed over the fifty-year period since World War II. Driskell and Olmstead summarize the current relationship between psychology and the military as one of "reciprocal

exchange'' and conclude that "the 'growth potential' for military psychology is great."

For comparative data on levels of funding by the Defense Department and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (and other domestically oriented agencies), see National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science, 1950-62 (Washington, D.C.), followed by Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities, 1962-70 (Washington, D.C.). According to the statistics provided in these volumes, fiscal year 1961 was the first during which total HEW spending on psychological sciences surpassed total DOD funding. HEW spent $20.4 million during that year, fully half of the federal government's total for such research. The DOD, in comparison, spent only $15.7 million. See National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science, 1960, 1961, 1962 (Washington, D.C.), 102, table 16.

16. Arthur W. Melton, "Military Requirements for the Systematic Study of Psychological Variables," in Psychology in the World Emergency, John C. Flanagan et. al. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1952), 136.

17. John G. Darley, "Psychology and the Office of Naval Research: A Decade of Development," American Psychologist 12 (June 1957):305.

18. Psychologists, such as McGill University's Donald Hebb, whose work on sensory deprivation for the Canadian Defense Research Board emerged directly out of war-inspired concerns with "brainwashing" were not permitted to say as much in their published studies. See Gilgen, American Psychology Since World War II, 122. For a general discussion among psychiatrists of the issues raised by the Korean War controversy, see "Factors Used to Increase the Susceptibility of Individuals to Forceful Indoctrination: Observations and Experiments" and "Methods of Forceful Indoctrination: Observations and Interviews," in Psychiatry and Public Affairs: Reports and Symposia of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966, originally published as GAP symposia #3 and #4), 205-311.

19. For a general discussion of this development, see Simpson, "U.S. Mass Communications Research and Counterinsurgency After 1945."

20. The most important Central Intelligence Agency experiments of these kinds occurred from approximately 1945 to 1965, and included 149 projects, 80 institutions, 183 researchers (many of them academics), and $25 million. Known as MK/ULTRA and MK/DELTA, details of their existence were not exposed until the late 1970s. Much of the research involved laboratories at home, but the CIA also sent teams comprised of a psychiatrist, a hypnotist, and an interrogator to Communist countries to try out their scientific techniques. See John Marks, The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979).

There is evidence that the American Psychological Association continued its World War II practice of helping the government's secret agencies recruit psychological experts after 1945, although such covert activities were never publicly acknowledged. See, for example, Matthew W. Baird to Robert R. Sears, 26 March 1951, quoted in Napoli, Architects of Adjustment, 146.

CIA recruitment, as well as operations, required help from psychological experts. Aside from performing strenuous batteries of tests, CIA psychological

experts developed profiles of individuals, analyzed audio and video tapes, and aided case officers with a variety of human management problems. John Stock-well, personal communication, 23 October 1990.

One congressional estimate in the 1960s was that the CIA employed 13 percent of all the social scientists working for the federal government, but the actual number was never public information. See "The Case for a National Social Science Foundation," in Social Science and National Policy, 2nd ed., ed. Fred R. Harris (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1973), 221.

21. Quoted in John Marks and Patricia Greenfield, "How the CIA Assesses Weaknesses: The Gittinger Personality Assessment System," in The Power of Psychology, ed. David Cohen (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 25.

The extent of the CIA's nontherapeutic approach to personality assessment was illustrated when the architect of the agency's "personality assessment system," psychologist John Gittinger, was rushed to the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis to advise the Kennedy administration on Khrushchev's probable responses to a variety of moves (p. 13).

22. George W. Croker, "Some Principles Regarding the Utilization of Social Science Research within the Military," in Social Scientists and International Affairs, 189-192; Peter Watson, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (New York: Penguin, 1980), 216-223.

23. Proposed Consultant Panels, Records of the Psychological Strategy Board, quoted in Simpson, "U.S. Mass Communications Research and Counterinsurgency After 1945," 13a-13b.

24. Don K. Price, Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy (1954; reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1962 ), 89, 96.

25. DDSFAR, testimony of Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, pt. 2, 28 May 1968, 25.

26. Ibid., 26.

27. Earlier indications existed that social and psychological expertise was associated with gender nonconformity as well as sheer silliness. Consider, for example, the following statement from Ohio congressional representative Clarence Brown, during the 1946 debate over establishment of a national science foundation: "The average American just does not want some expert running around prying into his life and his personal affairs and deciding for him how he should live, and if the impression becomes prevalent in the Congress that this legislation is to establish some sort of an organization in which there would be a lot of short-haired women and long-haired men messing into everybody's personal affairs and lives, inquiring whether they love their wives or do not love them and so forth, you are not going to get your legislation." Quoted in Mark Solovey, "Shattered Dreams and Unfulfilled Promises: The Wisconsin Social Systems Research Institute and Interdisciplinary Social Science Research, 1945-1965" (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1990), 12.

28. Investigating the validity of this accusation was the 1953 mandate of the Cox Committee. It was joined by the Reece Committee in 1954, which denounced the "socialism" and "un-Americanism" of the social sciences. The Cox Committee is quoted in Gent M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership: Social

Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), 278. For the records of the congressional hearings, see House Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, November, December 1952, 82nd Cong., and House Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, May-July 1954, 83rd Cong.

For contemporary analyses of changes in congressional attitudes toward the social sciences during the 1950s, see Harry Alpert, "Congressmen, Social Scientists, and Attitudes Toward Federal Support of Social Science Research," American Sociological Review 23 (December 1958):682-686, and Harry Alpert, "The Government's Growing Recognition of Social Science," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 327 (January 1960):59-67. The best recent discussion can be found in Mark Solovey, "Shaping the Social Sciences: Private and Public Patronage Since World War II (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, in progress).

Although mainly a product of the McCarthy years, the socialist taint remained an undercurrent in many different areas of psychology's history. In the late 1960s, Fred Harris blamed the failure of the campaign for a National Social Science Foundation on the long-lasting confusion of social science and socialism. See "The Case for a National Social Science Foundation," 222.

29. The support of the Behavioral Science Division of the Ford Foundation in the 1950s (one of the private foundations suspected of left-wing inclinations) also did a great deal to promote the term. "Behavioral science" became shorthand for a subset of the more general category "social sciences." The term included psychology, anthropology, sociology, and those aspects of economics and political science devoted to the analysis of individual and group behavior rather than institutions or processes. Although the Ford Foundation's division was disbanded in 1957, the term stuck. See Peter J. Seybold, "The Ford Foundation and the Triumph of Behavioralism in American Political Science," in Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism, 269-303.

For a review of McCarthy-era attacks on social psychologists, see S. Stansfeld Sargent and Benjamin Harris, "Academic Freedom, Civil Liberties, and SPSSI," Journal of Social Issues 42 (Spring 1986):43-67. The best general overview of academic McCarthyism is Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford University, Press, 1986). Interestingly, she finds that physical scientists (especially physicists) were most likely to be the first targets of congressional investigation because of their collective reputation for radicalism and their actual participation in or connection to the Manhattan Project. Much of the House Un-American Activities Committee's interest in higher education in the late 1940s was inspired by its hunt for atomic spies.

30. Gordon Allport, "Social Science and Human Values/Wellesley Address," 17 May 1955, 1, emphasis in original, HUG 4118.50, box 3, folder 79, GA Papers. This lecture was actually delivered on 17 March 1955. The folder is dated incorrectly.

31. In the late 1960s, Jerome Wiesner, who had been John F. Kennedy's science advisor and an advocate for government support of behavioral science, was still warning professional colleagues that misgivings lurked in Congress.

See Jerome B. Wiesner, "The Need for Social Engineering," in Psychology and the Problems of Society, ed. Frances F. Korten, Stuart W. Cook, and John I. Lacey (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1970), 85. Even in the early 1980s, Tom Foley (then Speaker of the House), made the following comment about congressional attitudes toward social science: "Do the media respond, do your colleagues give a damn? Members of Congress can easily vote with the representative from Ohio [John Ashbrook] against social science because they gain credit with constituents for opposing nonsense and for saving money. Nobody else seems to care." Quoted in Larsen, Milestones and Millstones, xiii.

32. WCW, pt. 8, 15-16 January 1964, 1028.

33. How little military psychologists actually knew (as well as how much the military could do for psychology) was a refrain in virtually all the essays written for Flanagan et al., Psychology in the World Emergency.

34. Franz Samelson, personal communication, 23 June 1991. For another glowing report about how much World War II did for psychology, see John G. Jenkins, "New Opportunities and New Responsibilities for the Psychologist," Science 103 (11 January 1946):33-38. See also Edwin Boring to Helen Peak, 10 June 1946, HUG 4229.5, box 46, folder 1017, EB Papers.

35. Melton, "Military Requirements for the Systematic Study of Psychological Variables," 134.

36. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 May 1954 address at Columbia University Bicentennial Dinner, reprinted in "The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs," A Staff Study for the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pts. 1-4, April 1967, 164.

37. Ibid., 169.

38. For lists and descriptions of psychological think tanks founded in the postwar period, see DDSFAR, 38; Horowitz, "Social Science and Public Policy," 346, table 1; Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities, 1962, 1963, and 1964 (Washington, D.C.), 101-102; Watson, War on the Mind, app. 2.

39. Crawford and Biderman, eds., Social Scientists and International Affairs, 11 n. 1.

40. Ibid., 2.

41. In addition to Federal Contract Research Centers like RAND and the Special Operations Research Office, there were literally thousands of private research businesses contracting with the military by the late 1960s. See DDSFAR, 39.

42. Crawford and Biderman, eds., Social Scientists and International Affairs, 156. For a methodological critique of the concept following World War II, see Farber, "The Problem of National Character.

43. Report of Carl I. Hovland, 13 May 1946, Record Group 3.1, series 910, box 3, folder 10, RF Archives.

44. Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

45. Ibid., 225-226, emphasis in original.

44. Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

46. Ibid., 3.

44. Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

47. Ibid., app. C. This appendix includes a brief summary of all the hypotheses about "civilized" and "uncivilized" personalities discussed, in detail, throughout the book.

44. Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

48. Ibid., 60-66, app. B. For a discussion of the appeal of projective testing techniques in postwar cross-cultural research, see Gardner Lindzey, Projective Techniques and Cross-Cultural Research (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961).

49. William Henry, "Projective Tests in Cross-Cultural Research," in Studying Personality Cross-Culturally, ed. Bert Kaplan (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 587.

50. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), 337, 429.

51. Ibid., 387.

50. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), 337, 429.

52. Ibid., 105.

50. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), 337, 429.

53. Ibid., 437, emphasis in original.

50. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), 337, 429.

54. Ibid., 424.

55. Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Modern Communications and Foreign Policy." Part 10 of Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 8-9 February 1967, David McClelland testimony, 86.

56. McClelland, The Achieving Society, 427.

57. PAFP and PAIR.

58. PAFP, 1.

59. Ibid., 2.

60. PAIR, Jerome Frank testimony, 15.

61. Evidence of the seriousness with which nonpsychologists took psychological research can be seen, for example, in the activities of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs in the early 1960s. During the 1960-61 academic year, it sponsored a Faculty Seminar on Social and Cultural Aspects of Development whose purpose was to identify areas deserving of intensive future research. David McClelland was an invited seminar speaker and the report which summarized the seminar's conclusions identified "personality traits" as a top priority. See "Summary Report on Research Problems," 10 July 1961, HUG (FP) 42.25, box 1, folder: "International Affairs Seminar: 1961, vol. II," Talcott Parsons Papers, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

62. Robert Staughton Lynd, Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 160.

63. Wait W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Chapter 10 includes the most explicit discussion of Rostow's psychological assumptions.

64. WCW, pt. 6, 13-14 January I964 and 20 February 1964, 751.

65. Gabriel A. Almond, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1963), 13, emphasis in original. For the origin of the "political culture" concept, see Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics 18 (August

1956):391-409. For elaborations, see also Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

66. Almond, The Civic Culture, 11-12.

67. Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture and Political Development," in Political Culture and Political Development, 7-8.

68. Gertrude Blanck and Rubin Blanck, Ego Psychology: Theory & Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chap. 1.

69. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development, 516.

70. Almond, The Civic Culture, 30-35.

71. Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, vii.

72. Lucian W. Pye was the chairman of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on Comparative Politics. Members included: Gabriel A. Almond, Leonard Binder, R. Taylor Cole, James S. Coleman, Herbert Hyman, Joseph LaPalombara, Sidney Verba, Robert E. Wood, and Myron Weiner. For a summary of the work of the Committee on Comparative Politics, see Seybold, "The Ford Foundation and the Triumph of Behavioralism in American Political Science," 286-292. For an overview of the political development literature during this period, see Jean Hardisty Dose, "A Social and Political Explanation of Social Science Trends: The Case of Political Development Research" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1976).

73. Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), xv.

74. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," 529-535.

75. Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," Social Forces 28 (March 1950):270-279.

76. Ibid., 270.

75. Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," Social Forces 28 (March 1950):270-279.

77. Ibid.

78. Rex D. Hopper, "Cybernation, Marginality, and Revolution," in The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 328.

79. See HUG (FP) 42.25, box 1, folder: "Princeton Symposium on Internal War, 1961," Talcott Parsons Papers. Papers from the Princeton Symposium were eventually published as Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (1964; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980).

80. Cina, "Social Science for Whom?" 302, 399.

81. Edward A. Tiryakian, "A Model of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators," in The Study of Total Societies, ed. Samuel Z. Klausner (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 69-97. This book collects pieces from a conference connected with the just canceled Project Camelot. It was held on 28-29 July 1965 in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the army through the Special Operations Research Office "as part of SORO's long-term research interests in the problems of analyzing societies." Samuel Klausner, the editor, had been a Camelot consultant.

82. Paul Fitts et al., Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Psychology and

the Social Sciences, 19 December 1957, p. 8, Record Group 179, Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, 1957-63, box 2, folder: "Director of Defense Research and Engineering," Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

82. Paul Fitts et al., Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Psychology and

83. Ibid., 3.

82. Paul Fitts et al., Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Psychology and

84. Ibid., 12.

85. Remarks of Dr. John W. Riley, Jr., Second Vice-President and Director of Social Research, Equitable Life Insurance Society, in Symposium Proceedings, 155.

86. E. K. Karcher, Jr., Office Chief, Research and Development, "Army Social Science Programs and Plans," in Symposium Proceedings, 348.

87. Lybrand, ed., Symposium Proceedings, x, emphasis in original.

88. The term "technology of human behavior" was used to describe the Smithsonian Group's work by Dr. Carroll L. Shartle, Chief, Psychology and Social Science Division, Office of Science, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense. See Symposium Proceedings, 336. It was also the title of an article Bray published right after the conference. See Charles W. Bray, "Toward a Technology of Human Behavior for Defense Use," American Psychologist 17 (August 1962):527-541.

On the importance of leaving one's political philosophy at home, see Guy J. Pauker, RAND Corporation, "Sources of Turbulence in the New Nations," and E. K. Karcher, Jr., "Army Social Science Programs and Plans," in Symposium Proceedings, 178-179, 359.

89. Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, "Welcoming Address," in Symposium Proceedings, 11-12.

90. Lybrand, ed., Symposium Proceedings, vii.

91. For one example, see the remarks of Elmo C. Wilson, President, International Research Associates, in Symposium Proceedings, 193-199. Wilson himself had been chief oft he Office of War Information Surveys Division.

92. Frederick T. C. Yu, "Images, Ideology and Identity in Asian Politics and Communication," in Symposium Proceedings, 214.

93. Ibid., 218.

92. Frederick T. C. Yu, "Images, Ideology and Identity in Asian Politics and Communication," in Symposium Proceedings, 214.

94. Ibid., 215.

95. Lucian W. Pye, "The Role of the Military in Political Development," in Symposium Proceedings, 167.

96. Vallance, "Psychological Aspects of Social Change Mediated Through the Interaction of Military Systems of Two Cultures," 315.