1. Hornbeck reported on July 5 that the best intelligence reports agreed that although Germany was pressuring Japan to enter the war

against the Soviet Union, Japan intended instead to consolidate and expand its position in Indochina ( FR, 1941 , IV, 290).

2. Captain Schuirmann to Welles, July 9, 1941 in FR, 1941 , IV, 298-299.

3. Hull, Memoirs , II.

4. FR, 1941 , IV, 299. Chinese intelligence, which Chiang sent to FDR on July 8, confirmed these estimates ( FR, 1941 , IV, 1004).

5. Foreign Office minutes, July 7, 1941, F8054/8054/61, Public Records Office, London.

6. FR, 1941 , IV, 288. Sumner Welles argued along similar lines to Harry Hopkins on July 7. See Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1950), 403.

7. PHA Exhibits, XII, 1.

8. Matsuoka (Tokyo) to Washington, July 2, 1941, ibid., 2; also in Department of Defense, " MAGIC, " Appendix II, 56-57. This cable was not decoded until August 8, however.

7. PHA Exhibits, XII, 1.

8. Matsuoka (Tokyo) to Washington, July 2, 1941, ibid., 2; also in Department of Defense, " MAGIC, " Appendix II, 56-57. This cable was not decoded until August 8, however.

9. Barnhart, Japan Prepares , 264-266, notes that some naval officers were willing to give diplomacy more time and that some in the Imperial Army still hoped to shift the direction of Japan's expansion against the Soviet Union.

10. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 228-229.

11. PHA Exhibits, XX, 4363; FR, 1941 , V, 213-214, 220. Darlan informed Ambassador Leahy on July 15, 1941, that Japan would soon occupy bases in southern Indochina, preparatory to moving south. When he met Darlan and Petain again on July 19th, Leahy delivered a message from Washington to the effect that "if Japan was the winner, the Japanese would take over French Indo-China; and if the Allies won, we would take it." See William Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 44.

12. FR, 1941 , IV, 329.

13. PHA Exhibits, XII, 2. The State Department also knew that Ambassador Nomura himself was utterly frustrated with his government's bad faith. The uncompromising Japanese foreign minister, in fact, considered the embassy to be shot through with "fellow travelers" who "willingly allowed the United States to mold your opinions." See Nomura cable to Tokyo, July 14, 1941, and Matsuoka cable to Washington, July 14, 1941, in Department of Defense, " MAGIC, " Appendix II, 73, 77.

14. New York Times , July 17, 1941, and July 18, 1941; Wall Street Journal , July 18, 1941.

15. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 522; FR, 1941 , IV, 334-335.

16. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1013.

17. Department of Defense, " MAGIC, " Appendix II, 450-451. This cable was translated July 24.

18. Ibid., 1013-1014; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 525.

17. Department of Defense, " MAGIC, " Appendix II, 450-451. This cable was translated July 24.

18. Ibid., 1013-1014; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 525.

19. Department of State, Peace and War , 127; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 342.

20. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy , 48.

21. Department of State, Peace and War , 127; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 342. 503.

22. Wall Street Journal , July 24, 1941.

23. FR, 1941, IV , 340-341.

24. Department of State Bulletin , July 26, 1941, 71-72.

25. Barnet Nover, a columnist for the Washington Post , wrote on July 25 that if Japan seized the Netherlands East Indies, it "would make this Nation dependent, in turn, on Japan's good will for certain indispensable supplies such as rubber and tin. That is why action against Japan is called for at once." Royce Briar of the San Francisco Chronicle explained the same day that the U.S. stake in opposing Japan's southward expansion was "a rational self-interest in our supplies of rubber and tin." The New York Times editorialized on July 24: "The Japanese Government must be made to understand clearly that aggressive action on its part in any one of three possible areas—Siberia, the Netherlands Indies or Indo-China—will be met by prompt retaliation on the part of the United States. In Siberia this interest is geographical: only a few miles of open water separate Siberia from American territory in Alaska. . .. In the Netherlands Indies our interest is economic: most of our tin and rubber, commodities indispensable to us in times either of war or peace, come from these islands and the surrounding area; with the Netherlands Indies in unfriendly hands, both our national defense and our peacetime commerce would be jeopardized. In Indo-China our interest is strategic." The editorial concluded: "Any action by Japan that threatens a legitimate American interest in the Far East should be met at once by efforts on our part to deal Japanese finance and industry and trade a deadly blow."

26. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 528-529. Roosevelt cabled Hopkins in London on July 26, 1941 to relay news of the proposal to Churchill. The president wrote that Japan's response would probably be unfavorable, but he offered the deal anyway in order to make "one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific." See E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters , II, 1189-1190.

27. On his own, Grew had decided to speak with the Japanese foreign minister, Admiral Toyoda, "not only [to] make sure that Admiral Toyoda had clearly understood the full purport of the proposal but that I should also exert every ounce of my own influence to secure it acceptance." The ambassador was shocked to find that the foreign minister knew nothing of the plan, which Nomura had hardly men-

tioned in his reports back to Tokyo. Nomura was immediately instructed to send a complete report, but by then the embargo and freeze were in effect. See Grew diary entry for July 27, 1941, in Ten Years in Japan , 411-412. Even so, Japan probably would not have accepted the proposal, as it granted them nothing they did not already have and would have prevented them from pursuing their course of expansion. Roosevelt's chief intent, probably, was to expose the false pretenses behind Japan's foreign policy.

28. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 317-318.

29. New York Times , July 26, 1941; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 266-267. The embargo actually overcame resistance by the Japanese Navy to pursuing its southward advance, which now saw the Indies as a vital source of its own raw material needs (Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-US Relations, 1938-1941," Journal of Peace Research (1968), 97-115). Within the United States itself, the freeze order also seemed to portend war. Roosevelt put the Philippines on a war footing on July 26 ( Washington Post , July 27, 1941). News of the Japanese seizure of Indochina and the resultant freeze caused sharp advances on the commodity markets—a sign of expected trouble. Wall Street Journal , July 26, 1941; see also National City Bank of New York, Economic Conditions, Governmental Finance, United States Securities , August 1941; and "Threat to Far Eastern Supplies," Barron's 21 (August 4, 1941), 6.

30. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 245, 246-247; Washington Post , July 29, 1941.

31. New York Times , August 2, 1941; Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 248. Much of the responsibility for making the embargo total, possibly without Roosevelt or Hull intending it so, rests with Dean Acheson. See Irvine Anderson, Jr., The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 178; Barnhart, Japan Prepares , 232; Utley, Going to War , 153-156.

32. Department of State, Peace and War , 88.

33. "Gallup and Fortune Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly 4 (March 1940), 114. On the administration's cautious attitude, see Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids , 233 (August 4, 1939 entry) and Ickes, Secret Diary , 96.

34. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 81. A few days earlier, Long noted that it would be a mistake to provoke Japan, because the Navy's inability to mobilize far from the United States' shores "lays bear the route to the Dutch East Indies" (Long diary, April 5, 1940, in Long papers, Library of Congress).

35. This episode has been described above, but see Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," 33. See also Dooman's statement to Ohashi,

supra. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 92-93; Blum, Morgenthau Diaries , 350-353; State Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 351-352.

36. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 10.

37. Ibid., 150.

36. Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , October 10.

37. Ibid., 150.

38. E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters , II, 1077.

39. Ickes admitted the possibility that Japan would attack the Netherlands East Indies if cut off from U.S. petroleum products. See Ickes, Secret Diary , III, 132, 299, for his views in 1940 and pages 537, 543-548, 552-560 for his correspondence with Roosevelt in June. Roosevelt's reply is printed in the Ickes diary, 567-568, and in E. Roosevelt, Personal Letters ,II, 1174. T. A. Bisson commented on the discrepancy between the great hostility shown by the administration to Tokyo and its refusal to embargo oil to Japan: "[T]he Administration firmly resisted considerable popular pressure for an embargo on oil shipments, which remained high despite the reduction in exports of other war materials. In June an oil shortage threatened to develop on the east coast of the United States. . .. To meet this situation, exports of petroleum products were placed under the license system on June 20 and an embargo was imposed on shipments from east coast ports except to the British Empire, Egypt and the western hemisphere. No restriction was placed on shipments from the west coast. These regulations did not, therefore, seriously interfere with the Japanese trade, except in the case of Pennsylvania lubricating oil. Further evidence that the United States was handling Japan with gloves was seen in the omission of any reference to Japan in the President's speech of May 27 proclaiming a national emergency, and in the failure to include Japan in the general order of June 14 freezing the assets of Axis nations in this country" (Bisson, America's Far Eastern Policy , 121-122).

40. Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," 202; see also Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 227.

41. Hornbeck memorandum, July 16, 1941 in box 145, Hornbeck papers.

42. PHA Hearings, V, 2384.

43. Ibid., 326.

42. PHA Hearings, V, 2384.

43. Ibid., 326.

44. FR, 1941 , IV, 325.

45. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 527-528.

46. Ibid., 531.

45. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 527-528.

46. Ibid., 531.

47. Department of State Bulletin , July 26, 1941, 72. The Volunteer Participation Committee was a civilian defense organization. Roosevelt's statement is reprinted in most collections of official foreign policy documents from this period. Its official quality may also be gleaned from Acheson, Present at the Creation , 25, and Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 23.

48. Looking back on the debate, Joseph Grew noted that he had opposed sterner measures against Japan in 1940. "In those years we were certainly not in such a position [to go to war], either morally or physically, for it might have meant fighting a two-ocean war with a one-ocean navy. I felt through those years that the term of 'appeasement' to characterize our policy was inadequate. It seemed to me to be a policy of plain common sense. Later, when Japan began to surround the Philippines and to threaten our own and Great Britain's life-lines in the east, and when we were at least getting ready in our country for what might come, I took the position that embargoes should then be applied, as our own national security was being menaced." Grew letter to Richard Gurley, October 5, 1943, Grew papers, Houghton Library.

49. Telegram translated August 4; PHA Exhibits, XII, 9.

50. Grew, Turbulent Era , II, 1284.

51. Hull, Memoirs , I, 270.

52. See FR, 1941 V, passim, for information on Japanese troop movements threatening Thailand; Exhibit 33, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1346-1384.

53. Stimson diary, August 8 and 12, 1941; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service , 387-388.

54. Memorandum by Cecil Gray, assistant to the secretary of state, August 2, 1941, in FR, 1941 , IV, 358-359.

55. On the various "routes" used by the China lobbyists, see FR, 1941 , V, "The Undeclared War," passim. For more on the lobbying effort, see J. M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 145. For a typical cable from Lattimore, see FR, 1941 , IV, 361-362.

56. Hornbeck memorandum to Welles, July 31, 1941, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

57. FR, 1941 , IV, 358-359. See also Blum, Morgenthau Diaries , 380.

58. FR, 1941 , V, 260.

59. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , 549-50; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1016.

60. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1016.

61. FR, 1941 , I, 347-348. The U.S. military was in full agreement with the civilians on this course. General Miles argued on September 23 that "forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact." See Hornbeck memorandum, September 30, 1941, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

62. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , 552-553.

63. Ibid., 553.

62. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , 552-553.

63. Ibid., 553.

64. Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, II, 423; Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 439.

65. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 556-559.

66. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1022.

67. Hornbeck memorandum, August 21, 1941, box 188, Hornbeck papers.

68. Stimson diary, August 9, 1941. He reported this directly to Hull.

69. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1022. On Grew's reaction to the proposal, see Waldo Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), 339-350.

70. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1022.

71. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1024; Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, II, 425. Hornbeck argued along somewhat similar lines in a memorandum written on September 5, "The chief danger attendant upon the holding of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister is that if such a meeting is held there must emanate from it an agreement. The only kind of an agreement that could possibly be arrived at would be an agreement in most general terms. Such an agreement would not (in the light of what we know of this country's attitude and policy and of what we are now given regarding Japan's attitude and policy) represent any real meeting of the minds of the people of the two countries thus committed by it" ( FR, 1941 , IV, 425-428).

72. Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, II, 425; Stimson diary, October 6, 1941.

73. FR, 1941 , IV, 426; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1024. A number of memoranda by Hornbeck specifically emphasized this point.

74. Hornbeck memorandum, September 5, 1941, "Reasons which make disadvantageous any personal meeting between the President and Prince Konoye," in box 145, Hornbeck papers.

75. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1024. Or, as the secretary put it during the Pearl Harbor investigation, such a meeting "would have a critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese" PHA Hearings, II, 425.

76. Hornbeck memorandum, September 5, 1941, "Reasons why it is contrary to the interests of the United States to enter at this time into any agreement of a general political nature with Japan," in box 145, Hornbeck papers; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 718.

77. PHA Hearings, V, 2092. The estimate was prepared by Hayes Kroner, and entitled "Japanese-American Relations." See PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1357-1359. Cf. Stimson diary, October 6, 1941.

78. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1026-1027.

79. Ike, Japan's Decision , 129-133. This decision was reaffirmed at the September 6 conference (ibid., 133-163). The policy of southward advance was reaffirmed at this meeting.

78. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1026-1027.

79. Ike, Japan's Decision , 129-133. This decision was reaffirmed at the September 6 conference (ibid., 133-163). The policy of southward advance was reaffirmed at this meeting.

80. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 608-609; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1028-1029.

81. Ike, Japan's Decision , 135-I36 ("The Minimum Demands of Our Empire to Be Attained Through Diplomatic Negotiations with the United States [and Great Britain], and the Maximum Concessions to Be Made by Our Empire").

82. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1028.

83. Ibid., 1029.

82. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1028.

83. Ibid., 1029.

84. FR, 1941 , IV, 497-499.

85. Examples may be found in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

86. FR, 1941 , IV, 436-441.

87. Quoted in Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 710.

88. FR, 1941 , IV, 459-461.

89. See for example Hornbeck's memorandum of October 22, citing portions of this Gauss dispatch, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

90. FR, 1941 , IV, 478-480.

91. These points are confirmed by Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 721. See also the following memoranda and communications: Grew to Hull, August 14, 740.0011 PW/448; Reed to Hull, September 11, 740.0011 PW/518; Reed to Hull, October 3, 740.0011 PW/551; Grew to Hull, October 10, 1941, 740.0011 PW /560, RG 59; Leahy to Hull, September 29, FR, 1941 , V, 298-299; Leahy to Hull, October 2, ibid., 302-303; Reed (Consul at Hanoi) to Hull, October 3, ibid., 305-306; Grew to Hull, October 8, ibid., 315; Leahy to Hull, October 8, ibid., 313-314; Leahy to Hull, October 11, ibid., 317; Reed to Hull, October 14, ibid., 319; Peck to Hull, October 15, ibid., 320-322; Reed to Hull, October 17, ibid., 329-330; Browne (Consul at Saigon) to Hull, October 29, ibid. Browne pointed out that in the preceding two weeks Japan had put into Indochina more than 30,000 new troops (mostly into the south), as well as all kinds of new military equipment. The building of airfields, barracks, and other structures was moving ahead rapidly, as if in preparation for an invasion to the south. Also see Browne to Hull, November 3, ibid., 332. Hornbeck contrasted Japan's continuing encroachments on Indochina with the administration's position that it should withdraw as a precondition for better relations with the United States. "While Japanese 'moderates' . . . are still carrying on conversations with the United States envisaging the possibility of some significant settlement between Japan and the United States, while these representatives declare that the Japanese Government is in accord with the principles to which the United States is

90. FR, 1941 , IV, 478-480.

91. These points are confirmed by Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War , 721. See also the following memoranda and communications: Grew to Hull, August 14, 740.0011 PW/448; Reed to Hull, September 11, 740.0011 PW/518; Reed to Hull, October 3, 740.0011 PW/551; Grew to Hull, October 10, 1941, 740.0011 PW /560, RG 59; Leahy to Hull, September 29, FR, 1941 , V, 298-299; Leahy to Hull, October 2, ibid., 302-303; Reed (Consul at Hanoi) to Hull, October 3, ibid., 305-306; Grew to Hull, October 8, ibid., 315; Leahy to Hull, October 8, ibid., 313-314; Leahy to Hull, October 11, ibid., 317; Reed to Hull, October 14, ibid., 319; Peck to Hull, October 15, ibid., 320-322; Reed to Hull, October 17, ibid., 329-330; Browne (Consul at Saigon) to Hull, October 29, ibid. Browne pointed out that in the preceding two weeks Japan had put into Indochina more than 30,000 new troops (mostly into the south), as well as all kinds of new military equipment. The building of airfields, barracks, and other structures was moving ahead rapidly, as if in preparation for an invasion to the south. Also see Browne to Hull, November 3, ibid., 332. Hornbeck contrasted Japan's continuing encroachments on Indochina with the administration's position that it should withdraw as a precondition for better relations with the United States. "While Japanese 'moderates' . . . are still carrying on conversations with the United States envisaging the possibility of some significant settlement between Japan and the United States, while these representatives declare that the Japanese Government is in accord with the principles to which the United States is

committed," he wrote, "a new Japanese move of aggression is now ordered by the Japanese Government" ( FR, 1941 , IV, 493-494). Horn-beck went so far as to argue that Japan's hedging of its obligations toward its Axis partners proved that Japan could never be trusted to live up to its commitments. See Hornbeck memorandum, September 27, 1941, box 463, Hornbeck papers. Hull felt the same way. "This Government finds it especially difficult at this time to reconcile the reported Japanese actions in Indochina with recent declarations of high Japanese officials that Japan's fundamental policy is based upon the maintenance of peace and pursuit of courses of peace," he wired Grew on October 2. Hull to Grew, October 2, FR, 1941 , V, 304-305.

92. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 660.

93. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 3, 1941. PHA Exhibits, XII, 51. The ambassador did believe, however, that it should not "be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation."

94. See text of the 57th Liaison Conference, October 4, 1941, in Ike, Japan's Decision , 179-181. Bishop Walsh described the Japanese reaction when news of Hull's October 2 reply came in: "With some difficulty, the protagonists of peace in the Japanese government . . . had held Cabinet, army, navy and all the other elements in line, or at least in quiescence, pending the conclusion of the negotiations. . .. Many, both in the civil government and the army, now think that the deception goes back to the beginning, that is to say, that the American government wanted only to draw them out in order to gain time, and to get a statement of their policy in order to condemn it. . .. After the receipt of the message it was very difficult to make any one in the Japanese government believe in the sincerity of the American government" ( FR, 1941 , IV, 527-539).

95. Hornbeck as usual took a vanguard position, declaring even that an apparent diplomatic victory with regard to China would really produce a defeat in Southeast Asia: "If the Japanese troops were withdrawn from China now in consequence of a diplomatic arrangements distinguished from a physical and material failure to make good their effort of conquest, the withdrawal would be made only for the purpose of preparing for a bigger and better assault a) upon some other region now and b) upon China at a later date." See Hornbeck memorandum, October 14, box 145, Hornbeck papers.

96. United Press news flash from Tokyo, October 17, 1941, quoted in Hornbeck memorandum, October 18, in box 463, Hornbeck papers.

97. Memorandum of R. E. Schuirmann, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 419.

98. Stimson diary, October 16, 1941.

99. Tokyo to Washington, #698, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 81.

100. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 22, 1941, ibid.

101. Tokyo to Washington (unnumbered), ibid., 82.

99. Tokyo to Washington, #698, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 81.

100. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 22, 1941, ibid.

101. Tokyo to Washington (unnumbered), ibid., 82.

99. Tokyo to Washington, #698, in PHA Exhibits, XII, 81.

100. Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 22, 1941, ibid.

101. Tokyo to Washington (unnumbered), ibid., 82.

102. Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori complained to Sir Robert Craigie in late October that the United States was deliberately foot-dragging to draw out the negotiations, which Japan could not continue for long. E. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War , 178-179.

103. PHA Exhibits, XII, 90.

104. Ibid., 92-93.

103. PHA Exhibits, XII, 90.

104. Ibid., 92-93.

105. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 704.

106. Ike, Japan's Decision , 208-239.

107. PHA Exhibits, XII, 100; Tokyo to Washington, November 11 (#762) and November 15 (#775), ibid., 116, 130; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1057.

106. Ike, Japan's Decision , 208-239.

107. PHA Exhibits, XII, 100; Tokyo to Washington, November 11 (#762) and November 15 (#775), ibid., 116, 130; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1057.

108. Tokyo to Washington, November 4, 1941 (#726), PHA Exhibits, XII, 94-96.

109. ''Instances Since the Outbreak of the Present Hostilities in China in which Japanese Statements of Policy Have Proved Unreliable," October 11, 1940. Prepared with Alger Hiss. Leo Pasvolsky of-rice files, box 1, National Archives.

110. The Japanese plan did not explicitly bar U.S. aid to China; it provided only for no U.S. interference in the peace negotiations between Japan and China. But Hull knew that Japan really meant "no aid" in place of "no interference." In one telegram to Nomura, for instance, the Japanese government explained: "[I]t goes without saying . . . that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China (This promise includes cessation of activies for aiding CHIANG)" (Tokyo to Washington, November 10 (#755), pt. 1, PHA Exhibits, 107-108). In part 2 of the message cited above, Japan's leaders reaffirmed that if the United States was of the intention "of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal" (Ibid., 108).

111. The correspondence on the "imminent" Japanese attack on Kunming began on October 28 and is reprinted in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1078ff. The letter quoted here is in ibid., 1476-1478. Cf. Stimson diary, November 4, 1941.

109. ''Instances Since the Outbreak of the Present Hostilities in China in which Japanese Statements of Policy Have Proved Unreliable," October 11, 1940. Prepared with Alger Hiss. Leo Pasvolsky of-rice files, box 1, National Archives.

110. The Japanese plan did not explicitly bar U.S. aid to China; it provided only for no U.S. interference in the peace negotiations between Japan and China. But Hull knew that Japan really meant "no aid" in place of "no interference." In one telegram to Nomura, for instance, the Japanese government explained: "[I]t goes without saying . . . that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China (This promise includes cessation of activies for aiding CHIANG)" (Tokyo to Washington, November 10 (#755), pt. 1, PHA Exhibits, 107-108). In part 2 of the message cited above, Japan's leaders reaffirmed that if the United States was of the intention "of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal" (Ibid., 108).

111. The correspondence on the "imminent" Japanese attack on Kunming began on October 28 and is reprinted in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1078ff. The letter quoted here is in ibid., 1476-1478. Cf. Stimson diary, November 4, 1941.

109. ''Instances Since the Outbreak of the Present Hostilities in China in which Japanese Statements of Policy Have Proved Unreliable," October 11, 1940. Prepared with Alger Hiss. Leo Pasvolsky of-rice files, box 1, National Archives.

110. The Japanese plan did not explicitly bar U.S. aid to China; it provided only for no U.S. interference in the peace negotiations between Japan and China. But Hull knew that Japan really meant "no aid" in place of "no interference." In one telegram to Nomura, for instance, the Japanese government explained: "[I]t goes without saying . . . that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China (This promise includes cessation of activies for aiding CHIANG)" (Tokyo to Washington, November 10 (#755), pt. 1, PHA Exhibits, 107-108). In part 2 of the message cited above, Japan's leaders reaffirmed that if the United States was of the intention "of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal" (Ibid., 108).

111. The correspondence on the "imminent" Japanese attack on Kunming began on October 28 and is reprinted in PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1078ff. The letter quoted here is in ibid., 1476-1478. Cf. Stimson diary, November 4, 1941.

112. On November 5, after a conference with Hull, Marshall, and Stark, Stanley Hornbeck drafted a memorandum with these considerations in mind: "Suppose that . . . by virtue of a break-down in Chinese morale . . . Chinese resistance to Japan were to cease. Japan would then be relieved of the entanglement of her 'China Incident' and would be in a position to turn her fleet and whatever else she still possesses of capacity for military adventuring into new moves either southward or northward or eastward. Should it not be a constant object of British

and American political, economic and military strategy to keep China's moral and material capacity to resist Japan at a high enough point to ensure against a termination of Chinese resistance?" (PHA Hearings, III, 1395). The Japanese minister of embassy, Wakasugi Kaname, summed up the U.S. position on China in a cable to Tokyo on October 29, 1941: "The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned 'peace on the Pacific' issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United States. It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States. Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure." See Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, October 29, 1941 (#1008), in PHA Exhibits, XII, 86-87.

113. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 708-710. Perhaps to gain more time, Hull also suggested bringing an influential representative of the Chinese government into the talks, to help promote friendly relations with Japan and speed a peace settlement. The effect would also have been to reduce Chinese suspicion of U.S. motives.

114. Ibid., 717-718.

113. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 708-710. Perhaps to gain more time, Hull also suggested bringing an influential representative of the Chinese government into the talks, to help promote friendly relations with Japan and speed a peace settlement. The effect would also have been to reduce Chinese suspicion of U.S. motives.

114. Ibid., 717-718.

115. Quote from Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor , 304.

116. Tokyo to Washington, November 16, 1941, PHA Exhibits, XII, 138.

117. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1062-1063; Israel, War Diary of Breckinridge Long , 233.

118. FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 755-756.

119. Washington to Tokyo, November 20, 1941, #1147, pts. 1&2, PHA Exhibits, XII, 161-62.

120. Tokyo to Washington, November 24, 1941, #821, ibid., 172. An official Japanese analysis of this final plan reaffirms the contention that Japan required a cessation of U.S. aid to China: "Regarding the above proposal, the Secretary of State contended that it was impossible for the American Government to accept the item 4 of our proposal and cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek regime unless Japan clarified her relations with the Tripartite Pact and gave assurances regarding

119. Washington to Tokyo, November 20, 1941, #1147, pts. 1&2, PHA Exhibits, XII, 161-62.

120. Tokyo to Washington, November 24, 1941, #821, ibid., 172. An official Japanese analysis of this final plan reaffirms the contention that Japan required a cessation of U.S. aid to China: "Regarding the above proposal, the Secretary of State contended that it was impossible for the American Government to accept the item 4 of our proposal and cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek regime unless Japan clarified her relations with the Tripartite Pact and gave assurances regarding

her adoption of a peaceful policy, and that the President's offer to act as 'introducer' of Sino-Japanese peace was predicated upon Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. Thereupon, the Japanese Government instructed the two Ambassadors to request reconsideration by the American Government, pointing out to the Secretary of State that, in case direct negotiations were opened between Japan and Chungking through 'introduction' by the President, the continuation of aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime by the United States, the peace introducer, would constitute an interference with the realization of peace, and that the American contention was therefore inconsistent"("Summary of the Japanese-American Negotiations, December 7, 1941," in [Japan] Board of Information, Official Announcements , 95).

121. On November 18, 1941, Nomura actually cabled his government suggesting that it agree to return to the pre-July status quo; the reply came back the next day: "[T]he internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored." A MAGIC translation of this cable was available on November 20 (Tokyo to Washington, November 19, #798, PHA Exhibits, XII, 155-156).

122. Hull testimony, PHA Hearings, XI, 5370-5371; see also Hull, Memoirs , II, 1070. Herbert Feis's insight into the collapse of Japanese-American negotiations should also be kept in mind: "Even if Japan was genuinely ready for reform, the repentence had come too late. The situation had grown too entangled by then for minor measures, its momentum too great. Germany-Italy-Japan had forced the creation of a defensive coalition more vast than the empire of the Pacific for which Japan plotted. This was not now to be quieted or endangered by a temporary halt along the fringe of the Japanese advance" (Herbert Feis, "War Came at Pearl Harbor: Suspicions Considered," Yale Review 45 (Spring 1956).

123. Department of State, Peace and War , 802-807; FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 757ff. The British government approved of Hull's negotiating position: "The Foreign Office agreed with Mr. Hull's firmness in insisting that nothing should be conceded to Japan except in return for definite Japanese action. They doubted whether the Japanese would withdraw from Indo-China on the terms put forward by Mr. Kurusu, but the offer would be worth considering if it were not accompanied by unacceptable conditions. We should have to take care to avoid any suggestion of abandoning China; it therefore seemed better not to make even limited economic concessions until an understanding had been reached about an ultimate settlement in China." E. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), 179.

124. For further evidence, see memo of conversation, December 5, 1941, FR, Japan, 1931-1941 , II, 774.

125. Stimson diary, September 12, October 6, 7, 28, 1941; also Stark to Kimmes, PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1064-1065.

126. The timing on this draft is still unclear. The State Department claims Roosevelt prepared it after November 20; however, Langer and Gleason ( Undeclared War , 872) suggest that it was ready by November 17.

127. FR, 1941 , IV, 626; PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1109. Earlier that month Roosevelt had toyed with a different formulation. Stimson shot it down: "He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to that: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feet that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington Conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into such an arrangement." See Stimson diary, November 6, 1941.

128. Secretary Morgenthau began work on a draft on November 17 (see FR, 1941 , IV, 606-613). His proposals were long and unwieldy. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs took up the idea on November 19th (ibid., 621-625; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1072).

127. FR, 1941 , IV, 626; PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1109. Earlier that month Roosevelt had toyed with a different formulation. Stimson shot it down: "He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to that: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feet that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington Conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into such an arrangement." See Stimson diary, November 6, 1941.

128. Secretary Morgenthau began work on a draft on November 17 (see FR, 1941 , IV, 606-613). His proposals were long and unwieldy. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs took up the idea on November 19th (ibid., 621-625; Hull, Memoirs , II, 1072).

129. For the various drafts of the modus vivendi , see FR, 1941 , IV, 627-630, 635-637, 637-640, 642-644, 645-646; final draft, 661-665.

130. Ibid., 645-646.

129. For the various drafts of the modus vivendi , see FR, 1941 , IV, 627-630, 635-637, 637-640, 642-644, 645-646; final draft, 661-665.

130. Ibid., 645-646.

131. Admiral Stark and an assistant to General Marshall saw the draft on November 21 (PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1106).

132. FR, 1941 , IV, 640.

133. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1170.

134. FR, 1941 , IV, 652-653.

135. Senate Judiciary Committee, Morgenthau Diary (China) , I, 530; FR, 1941 , IV, 660-661. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau received a copy of this communication, passing it along to Hull and Roosevelt on November 26. Stimson also passed it along. On that morning, Stimson recorded in his diary, "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposi-

tion at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above—that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose"(Stimson diary, November 26, 1941). A similar message reached the White House via the Lattimore-Curre route; see PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1160.

136. PHA Exhibits, XIV, 1300; Winant to Hull, FR, 1941 , IV, 665.

137. Hornbeck autobiography, box 497, Hornbeck papers. Actually the State Department knew of Churchill's views before the final telegram came in at 12:55 A.M. on November 26. The actual decision to dump the modus vivendi was made by Hull and Hornbeck on November 25.

138. Hull, Memoirs , II, 1081.

139. FR, 1941, IV , 665-666.

140. Stimson diary, November 26, 1941.

141. Hull offered the ten-point plan merely as a final summary of the U.S. position, as a record for posterity and not in the hopes of peace. Roosevelt told Stimson that although the State Department had closed up the negotiations, "they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull." Stimson "found out afterward that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position." (Stimson diary, November 27, 1941).

142. Ibid. Actually, Hull may have hoped to further delay Japan by some relaxation of economic pressure, but hardliners such as Hornbeck won out. Hull to Hornbeck, November 28, 1941, box 49, Hull papers.

141. Hull offered the ten-point plan merely as a final summary of the U.S. position, as a record for posterity and not in the hopes of peace. Roosevelt told Stimson that although the State Department had closed up the negotiations, "they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull." Stimson "found out afterward that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position." (Stimson diary, November 27, 1941).

142. Ibid. Actually, Hull may have hoped to further delay Japan by some relaxation of economic pressure, but hardliners such as Hornbeck won out. Hull to Hornbeck, November 28, 1941, box 49, Hull papers.